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Abstract 
This thesis aims to investigate the impact of implementation of The Code of Corporate 
Governance 
. 
for Listed Companies in China (or the Code) in 2002 upon the 
accrual-based earnings management (hereafter EM) practices in China's listed 
companies. Based on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Agency Theory (AT), it is 
hypothesised that, due to the improvement of the corporate governance Code, Chinese 
listed companies engage less in EM. In particular, it is hypothesised the relationships 
between the main corporate governance (or CG) mechanisms arranged from the 
executive compensation to the characteristics of controlling shareholders (shareholdings 
and ownership type) and EM prior to and after the Code. 
Drawing upon a panel data of 447 non-financial Chinese listed companies over 
the period of 2000-2006, the results provide robust evidence suggesting that while the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals (or DAs-proxy of EM) measured by the Modified 
Jones Model (Dechow el al., 1995) and the Larcker and Richardson (2004) (or L&R) 
Model respectively decreases over time, the reduction is more pronounced after the 
Code compared with it prior to the Code. In addition, the findings show that companies 
engage in larger earning-decreasing DAs are followed by smaller positive reversals. The 
findings also document that: (1) the performance-based compensation is neither 
statistically nor economically related to the magnitude of DAs; (2) the independent 
non-executives on the board significantly constrain the magnitude of DAs, and such 
effect is increased significantly in the post-Code period; (3) while both the audit 
committee and the institutional investors significantly reduce earnings-increasing DAs, 
especially in the post-Code period, they do not significantly mitigate the 
earnings-decreasing choices; (4) the use of the international reputable auditor (Big 4) is 
not significantly correlated to the magnitude of DAs; and (5) the controlling 
shareholders especially who are ultimately controlled by the State significantly engage 
in DAs before and after the Code. 
This thesis has made important theoretical and managerial implications. 
Theoretically, it implies that as TCE and AT are complementary theories, a theoretical 
framework by incorporating TCE with AT should be robust in investigating the 
relationships between CG and EM in China's stock markets. Managerially, it implies 
that investors should be aware of the EM behaviours and need to check firms' financial 
statements with great caution. For stock market regulators, they may need to: (1) 
enforce more transparent compliance with the CG Code, and extend the requirements 
and duties of non-executives so that greater oversight is provided; (2) strengthen the 
independence and expertise of the audit committee; and (3) be cautious of promoting 
the participation of international audit firms as these firms do not necessarily help China 
with improving its monitoring system. For policy makers, they may need to consider 
improving the legal environment so as to make expropriation of minority shareholders 
more difficult. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. The Starting Point of the Current Thesis 
The very nature of accounting accruals provides a great deal of discretion in 
determining the earnings a firm reported in any given period because of information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Insiders can manipulate earnings to dress-up 
their companies' apparent performance in order to maximise their own interests or to 
signal their private information, thus influencing the informativness of earnings (Chung 
et al., 2002; Gul et al., 2003; Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995). Earnings 
management (hereafter EM) can be defined as the alternation of firms' reported 
economic performance by insiders to either mislead some stakeholders or to influence 
contractual outcomes (Healey and Wahlen, 1999; Leuz et al., 2003; Shen and Chih, 
2007). Furthermore, investors who are concerned with the stock returns and regulators 
who set the regulations related to companies' performance (e. g. the thresholds of stocks 
issuing) frequently focus on the reported earnings. Since it heightens the pressure for 
firms to obtain funds in the capital markets, they are said to be motivated to manipulate 
the reported earnings in order to meet the investors' expectations and regulatory 
thresholds (Chou ei al.. 2006; Lee and Msaulis, 2009; Wright and Guan, 2004). In 
addition, regular scrutiny of firms' financial performance by financial analysts in the 
past decades puts further pressure on firms to maintain earnings momentum to fulfil the 
expectations of the market (e. g., Barth et al., 1999; Myers et al., 2006). And finally, in 
regard to the use of performance-related executive compensation, it is argued that 
executives increase the earnings-based awards, especially the equity-based components, 
through artificially manipulating firms' reported earnings (Bergstresser and Philippon, 
2006; Cohen el al., 2008; Gao and Shrieves, 2002). 
On the other hand, it is proposed that any improvements of corporate governance 
(CG) can be seen as the efforts to minimise agency costs and transaction costs among 
different groups according to the different risk bearing; and asset-specialised transactions 
respectively (l'ama and Jensen, 1983a, b; Williamson, 1984a; 2005b). CG constrains 
managers from behaving opportunistically by aligning their interests with those of 
shareholders and by providing constant monitoring on their actions (Garcia-Meca and 
Sanchez-Ballesta, 2009; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Thus, the reliability and 
integrity of' the financial reporting process will be enhanced if the opportunistic 
behaviours can be controlled by an efficient CG system (Dechow et al., 1996; Wild. 
1996). 
Fuelled by a series of high-profile financial scandals, such as Enron, Xerox, and 
WorldCom, there has been an international trend towards developing and implementing 
an effective CG system to fight against EM practices that have undermined investors' 
credibility in financial information. Numerous initiatives have been proposed and 
launched by countries to enhance their CG practices, for example, new listing and 
disclosure rules, mandatory training for the board directors, enforced codes/guidelines 
of CG, and so forth (Bai el al., 2004; Clarke, 2007; Mallin, 2007). Advocating higher 
governance standards has become a regular campaign with the participation of an 
increasing number of parties, such as, academics, regulatory authorities, corporations, 
and so forth. International organisations are also very keen on governance issues. The 
International Monetary Fund has demanded that governance improvements be included 
in its debt relief program. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance was 
originally issued by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in 1999 and further revised in 2004. More generally, the Principles are to assist 
Member and non-Member governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the 
legal, institutional and regulatory framework for CG in their countries, and to provide 
guidelines and suggestions for stock exchanges, investors, corporations, and other 
parties that have a role in the process of developing good CG (preamble of OECD, 
2004). 
Theoretically, although Agency Theory (AT) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) has 
been the dominant financial economics theory for CG research, other theoretical schools 
have emerged to complimenting AT in recent years. One prominent school is 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) originally advanced by Williamson in the 1990s. 
This thesis will review and apply both TCE and AT to the theoretical framework. In 
brief, while TCI considers how to "align transactions, which differ in their attributes, 
with governance structures, which differ in their costs and competences, in a 
discriminating (mainly, transaction cost economizing) way" (Williamson, 1985, p. 79), 
AT mainly deals with how to "design the contractual relation between the principal and 
the agent to provide appropriate incentives ex ante to minimise the agency costs so that 
the agent could maximise the principal's welfare" (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 7). 
1.2. The Focusing Point of the Current Thesis 
--China's Listed Companies 
In the past 25 years, China has experienced rapid economic growth although political 
change has been relatively slow (Hussain and Chen, 1999; Farah, 2006; Zhang, 2004). 
With average growth at around 9% and GDP quadrupled, China has become the largest 
and fastest-growing emerging economy in the world. Central to the strong growth in the 
economy has been the reform of the market and State-owned Enterprises (SoEs). In 
particular, many SoEs have been transformed into corporations with share capital and 
with profit and efficiency objectives. Some of the corporatized SoEs have been allowed 
to issue shares to individual investors. Here, the State does not own 100% of these 
enterprises' shares and in some cases its ownership has dropped to very low level. 
In the early 1990s, the Shanghai (SHSE) and Shenzhen (SZSE) Stock Exchanges 
were launched, with the aim of raising finance from the domestic and foreign investors 
to provide listed companies with new funds. A company may issue five different types 
of shares: State shares, legal person shares, employee shares, A-shares and B-shares. 
Only A- and B-shares are publically tradable. They may also issue shares in I-long Kong 
(H-shares) and on other overseas exchanges (e. g. N- and S-shares). By the end of 2009, 
with a stock-market capitalization of US$3.21 trillion generated by over 1,500 listed 
companies on SIISE and SZSI?, China's stock market had overtaken Japan as the 
world's second-largest stock market by value (after the US) for the first time since its 
birth (Bloomberg, 2009). 
Nevertheless, EM is found to he prevalent in Chinese listed companies. Chinese 
investors and regulators are un-sophisticated: they are usually fixated on reported 
earnings, thus may not be able to see through EM practices (e. g., Chen and Yuan, 2006; 
Chen el al., 2001; Ding el al., 2007; Liu and Lu, 2007; Yu el al., 2006). These empirical 
studies provide evidence suggesting that Chinese listed companies manipulate their 
earnings dramatically in order to: (1) gain authorization to issue IPOs or SEOs, and (2) 
avoid being delisted from the stock markets. The implicit assumption is that meeting the 
regulatory and market thresholds are companies' incentives to manage their earnings. In 
order to curb such practices, researchers argue that CG plays an important role in it. For 
instance, Liu and Lu (2007) propose that the pervasiveness of EM in China is largely 
determined by the level of CG. Good CG practices help resolve agency problems, which 
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in turn reduce firms' incentive to manage earnings. And, Firth et al., (2007) argue that 
good CG framework can promote the transparent and efficient stock markets in China. 
It should consist with the rule of law and clearly articulates the division of 
responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities. 
Based on the OECD principles of corporate governance (2004), the Code of 
Corporate Governance för Listed Companies in China (hereafter the Code) that intends 
to enhance the integrity of financial statements through improving CG system and bring 
forward the healthy development of the stock markets in China was published by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in January 2002. The Code which is 
the first official document regarding CG in the mainland China serves as the yardstick 
by which a company is able to measure its CG, and if there are deficiencies in CG, the 
regulatory authorities will instruct the company to correct its CG to comply with the 
Code. There are seven chapters that included in the Code dealing with: shareholders and 
shareholders' meetings; the listed company and its controlling shareholders; directors 
and the board of directors; the supervisors and the supervisory hoard; performance 
assessments and incentive and disciplinary systems; stakeholders; and information 
disclosure and transparency. 
1.3. Motivations of the Current Thesis 
Although the China's 2002 CG Code proposes sweeping changes (e. g., independence, 
and structure of the board, duty of controlling shareholders), the consequences of these 
changes have yet to be systematically studied. With regard to IN activities which have 
been proved to be rampant in China's listed companies (e. g., Chen and Yuan, 2006; 
Chen e/ ul., 2001; Ding el al., 2007; Liu and Lu, 2007; Yu el al., 2006), mitigating such 
opportunistically discretionary behaviours through improving the quality of financial 
reporting is laid at the heart of the Code. However, there is very little research to 
investigate the impact of the Code on EM which is of important policy implication. In 
particular, it is unclear whether EM activities are reduced after the passage of the Code. 
Chen and Cheng (2007), and Chen and hhang (2010a) consider the discretion in 
applying different accounting standards between the Chinese GAAP and IFRS as a 
means that used by firms to opportunistically manipulate reported earnings. In particular, 
they study the trend in earnings gap which is the differences between reported earnings 
under the Chinese GAAP and those under the IFRS and the impacts of' several CG 
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mechanisms enforced by the Code on it of 103 B-share companies over the period of 
1999 to 2006. More generally, they find a decreasing trend in earnings gap over time 
and establishment of audit committee among others contributes to such trend 
significantly. While their findings indicate the possibility of linking earnings gap to EM 
practices, however, the accrual-based items at operating level across the Code period in 
China still remain unclear since earnings gap and EM may not be necessarily the same, 
and EM is a more important topic to investigate. Thus, the current thesis is motivated by 
the gap of lacking an investigation in the extent of EM activities prior to and after the 
Code. 
Several mechanisms of CG are specifically enforced by the Code, including 
executive compensation, board independence, audit committee, external (statutory) 
audit, institutional investors, and controlling shareholders. Among them, the role played 
by executive compensation deserves particular attention. As mentioned by researchers 
(Chen el al., 2010; Maillin, 2007), in the past 10-plus years, there is an increasing 
tendency as well as a demand particularly from the upper-level employees of 
establishing a rewarding system that links the compensation for management personnel 
to company's performance and to individual's work pertormance. I lowever, to my best 
knowledge, there is no published study to empirically investigate the impact of 
executive compensation on EM practices in China's listed companies. It still remains 
unclear how EM practices in China are affected by tying executive compensation to 
firms' performance over time, and especially after the passage of the Code. For the 
monitoring mechanisms arranged from the independent non-executives to the 
institutional investors, their impacts on EM practices in China still remain unclear as the 
empirical studies have found mixed results. Whereas Chen et al., (2006) provide 
evidence suggesting that increasing the proportion of outsiders on the board is one way 
to reduce financial frauds, however, Chen and Chong (2007), Chen and Zhang (2010a), 
Clarke (2006) argue that independent directors remain inactive in mitigating firm's 
opportunistic behaviours. And, Chen and Zhang (2010a) argue that institutional 
shareholder activism is very similar to the market activism and both suffer from the lack 
of effective market discipline. In addition, although the empirical studies have provided 
evidence suggesting that other than managers controlling shareholders may also engage 
in EM practices due to the highly concentrated ownership structure in China's listed 
companies (e. g., Chen and Yuan, 2006; Ding el ul., 2007; Liu and L, u, 2007), it is still 
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unclear how such activities are affected by the passage of the Code as there is still 
paucity of study to investigate such an important issue. By putting all together, this 
thesis is motivated by the gap of lacking a comprehensive study of examining the 
impacts of the main mechanisms of CG (especially executive compensation) on EM 
activities between the pre- and post- Code periods. 
In the theoretical literature, AT is widely applied to the empirical problems of EM 
and CG in the Western countries (e. g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Lambert, 2001) as well as in 
the China's stock markets (e. g., Chen et al., 2007; Ding e/ al., 2007; Liu and Lu, 2007). 
Another prominent theory that has emerged recently is TCE. However, the application 
of it to investigate the relationships between CG and EM practices is much more 
underdeveloped (Marcher and Richman, 2006), especially in the case of China. The 
current thesis is motivated by the gap of lacking an alternative theoretical framework to 
AT for EM and CG research. 
Furthermore, prior literature shows that China's listed companies may engage in 
the discretionary accruals (DAs) to manipulate their reported earnings. As argued by 
Baker and Barbu (2007) that the harmonization of accounting policies has brought the 
Chinese accounting language closer to the international standards, while also offering 
Chinese firms the opportunity to manage their earnings via more conventional DAs. In 
order to measure DAs, most empirical studies apply the Modified Jones Model that 
advanced by Dechow el al-'s work in 1995 (e. g., Ding el ul., 2007; Liu and Lu, 2007; 
Lo et al., 2010). However, the misclassification issues in this model, in particular the 
extreme growth and performance of the firms (Bernard and Skinner, 1996; Dechow el 
al., 2003), seem not to he properly addressed. This thesis is motivated by the gap of 
lacking an alternative model to the Modified Jones Model to properly measure DAs in 
China's listed companies. 
1.4. Research Question and Objectives 
Motivated by the gaps that existed in the literature, the research question coupled with 
the relevant research objectives are formulated for the current thesis. Each of them aims 
to examine one specific area in relation to EM and CG in Chinese listed companies. 
Specifically, 
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Research Question: 
How does the passage of the Code with regard to the mechanisms of CG 
(especially executive compensation) affect EM activities in China's listed 
companies? 
Research Objectives (A-G): 
A: It is to investigate the prevalence of EM and compare the magnitude of EM 
between two contrasting governance regimes (pre and post- Code periods) in 
China's listed companies. 
As enforced by the China's 2002 Code, it aims to investigate the impact of the: 
B: performance-related executive compensation on constraining EM by aligning 
the interests of managers with those of shareholders between the pre and post- 
Code periods; 
C: independent non-executives on the board on constraining EM activities by 
providing effective monitoring between the pre and post- Code periods; 
D: establishment of audit committee on the board on limiting the level of EM 
through effective monitoring between the pre and post- Code periods; 
E: international reputable auditor (or the Big 4 auditor) on mitigating F ,M 
practices by providing effective monitoring between the pre and post- Code 
periods; 
F: institutional investors on constraining EM activities by providing effective 
monitoring between the pre and post- Code periods; 
G: investor protection on constraining the controlling shareholders From engaging 
in EM practices between the pre and post- Code periods. 
Fhrough addressing these research question and objectives, the current thesis 
contributes to the literature from the following aspects. Theoretically, it contributes to 
the literature by applying both AT and TCE to the theoretical framework of CG and EM 
research in the Chinese setting. Empirically, this thesis contributes to the literature by 
analysing the trend in EM activities over time and by providing a comprehensive 
investigation through directly linking EM practices with the major mechanisms of CG 
(especially executive compensation) enforced by the Code in China's listed companies. 
Methodologically, it contributes to the literature by comparing the consistency and by 
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investigating the applicability offered by two major models used to capture EM 
practices in China's listed companies, namely the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et (Il., 
1995) and Larcker and Richardson (or L&R) (2004) Model. 
1.5. Organisation of the Current Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows, the next two Chaplers (2 and 3) provide 
the theoretical review on TCE and AT respectively. 
Chap/er 4 starts with defining CG and analysing different board structures (one- 
tire board model vs. two-tire board model), which is followed by the demonstration of 
the China's 2002 Code and the in-depth evaluation of CG system in China. 
Chap/er 5 firstly defines EM by reviewing the empirical literature and by 
applying the elementary insights of AT and TCE to EM. And next, it analyses the 
incentives of EM coupled with the empirical studies which are mostly based on the 
Western experiences, such as capital market incentives (e. g., management buyouts, 
leveraged buyouts, IPOs, SEOs, expectations of the financial analysts), contracting 
incentives (e. g., lending covenants, executive compensation), and regulatory incentives 
(e. g., import relief, tariff, quota). It then focuses on the specific motivations of 
conducting EM practices in China's stock markets, namely the ROE requirement 
(capital market incentive) and delisting policy (regulatory incentive). The rest of 
Chapter 5 provides a brief analysis of the methods that are used in the accounting 
literature to measure accrual-based EM practices. 
('hapier 6 gives a survey of the recent empirical studies that investigate the 
correlations between the main CG mechanisms arranged from the executive 
compensation to the controlling shareholders and LM practices based on the global 
evidence and the China's evidence respectively. 
Built upon both the theoretical review and the empirical analysis, Chappter 7 
formulates the research question, the research objectives, and the hypotheses in relation 
to the trend in FM activities and the impacts of the main CG mechanisms on EM 
practices before and after the Code. 
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Chapter 8 provides the research design by reviewing the fundamentals of 
quantitative research, defining the key variables, demonstrating the study period, 
describing the sample and data collection, and establishing the statistical approaches to 
test the hypotheses. 
Chapter 9 demonstrates the descriptive statistics of the explanatory and the 
control variables, and the empirical results coupled with robustness tests of testing the 
hypotheses formulated. 
And finally, Chapter 10 concludes the thesis by reviewing the main findings, 
demonstrating the contributions and implications of the findings, and discussing the 
limitations and suggestions for the future research. 
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Chanter 2: Theoretical Review: 
Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) 
2.1. Introduction 
In his presidential address to the Royal Economic Society in 1986, R. C. O. Matthews 
stated that the economics of institutions has become one of the liveliest areas in our 
discipline" (Matthews 1986, p. 903). The New Institutional Economics (hereinafter 
referred to as NIE) (I) "holds that institutions matter and the determinants of institutions 
are susceptible to analysis by the tool of economic theory" (Matthews 1986, p. 903), (2) 
is different from but not hostile to orthodoxy, and (3) is an interdisciplinary combination 
of law, economics, and organisation in which economics is the first among equals 
(Macher and Richman, 2006). The NIE comes in two parts. Part one deals with the 
institutional environment, the so-called rules of the game. The second, in more 
microanalytic way, focuses on the structures of governance. Transaction cost economics 
(hereinafter referred to as TCE) is principally concerned with the latter-structures of 
governance (market, hybrid, and hierarchy) (Macher and Richman, 2006). TCE argues 
that "taking the institutional environment as given, economic agents purportedly align 
transactions with governance structures to affect economizing outcomes" (Williamson, 
1996, p. 5). 
The conceptual move to ICE is to describe firms not in technical terms as a 
production function but in organisational terms as an alternative mode of governance 
(Williamson, 2005c). The essential insight or working hypothesis of '1'CE is to "align 
transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance structures, which differ in 
their costs and competencies, in a discriminating, mainly transaction cost economizing 
way" (Williamson, 1991, p. 79). Simply put, 'I'CF tries to explain how trading partners 
choose, from a set of feasible governance structures ex pos'I, the arrangement that 
provides effective monitoring and control for mitigating opportunistic behaviours 
occurred during the business transactions at the lowest total cost (Shelanski and Klein, 
1995). All in all, as Williamson noted "TE C... by which I mean the comparative 
contractual approach to economic organisation in which economizing on transaction 
costs is treated as the main ease... " (Williamson, 2005b, p. 20). 
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For the applications of 'I'CE, Williamson (1996, p. 17) argues that "... any issue 
that can be formulated as a contracting problem can be investigated in transaction cost 
economizing terms. Every exchange relation qualifies. " TCE is an expansive concept; 
applications include non-standard contracting practices (customer and territorial 
restrictions, exchange agreements), regulation (deregulation), multinational economic 
organisation, corporate strategy, corporate governance, and so forth (Williamson, 
2005a). Rather than analysing each of these applications and ramifications, firstly, this 
chapter will provide a review of some fundamental concepts of TCE and governance 
structures. And then, emphases will be drawn on the financial-contract framework of 
firms and TCE's application to corporate governance respectively. 
2.1. Introduction 
2.2. Some Rudiments of TCE 
2.3. Governance Structures of TCE 
2.4. Comparative Statics of TCE 
2.5. TCE's Basic Approach to Corporate 
Governance 
2.6. Summary 
Section 2.1. provides a introduction; 
section 2.2. reviews some rudiments of 
TCF. Having these rudiments been set, 
section 2.3. demonstrates the different 
governance structures (market, hybrid, and 
hierarchy) through a simple contractual 
schema. Correspondingly, different 
contract law, adaptability, and instruments of each governance structure are discussed. 
Section 2.4. describes the comparative statics of"TCE. The main purpose is to evaluate 
the effects of'some environmental changes (e. g., property rights, contract law, reputation 
effects, and uncertainty) on the parameter shills of each governance mode. The analysis 
in section 2.5. emphasises on the financial-contract of firms and "I'CF's elementary 
application to corporate governance. Section 2.6. summarises the whole chapter. 
2.2. Some Rudiments of TCE 
2.2.1. Transaction and Transaction Costs 
According to Commons (1932, p. 4), the unit of activity... must contain in itself the 
three principles of conflict, mutuality, and order. This unit is a transaction". Not only 
does TCE agree that the transaction is the basic unit of analysis, but it views governance 
as an economizing response to Commons triple. In general, governance is a means by 
which to infuse order in a relation where potential conflict threatens to undo or upset 
opportunisms to realize mutual gains (Williamson, 1985). A transaction occurs when a 
good or service is transferred across a technological separable interface. One stage of 
activity terminates and another begins. With a well-working interface, as with a 
well-working machine, these transfers occur smoothly (Williamson, 1981 a; b; 1999). 
Transaction costs, on the other hand, which are often referred to as the economic 
counterparts of friction raise the questions, such as do parties to the exchange operate 
harmoniously? Are there frequent misunderstandings and conflicts that lead to delays, 
breakdowns, and other malfunctions? Arrow (1969, p. 48) defines transaction costs as 
the "costs of running the economic system". Viewing the economic system from the 
standpoint of contract, transaction costs can be considered as the costs of setting and 
maintaining the terms and conditions in the contract. In particular, the ex ante 
transaction costs cover the costs of '`drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an 
agreement or a contract", and the ex post costs of maladaptation and adjustment that 
arise when contract execution is misaligned as a result of gaps, errors, omissions, and 
unanticipated disturbances" (Williamson, 1996, p. 379). Among the costs occurring in 
different contracting stages, TCl emphasises on economizing the transaction costs ex 
post where maladaptation costs are the key features. The study of economizing 
transaction cost is a comparative institutional undertaking which recognises that there 
are a variety of different transactions on one side and alternative governance structures 
on the other. The objective is to match governance structures to the attributes of 
transactions in a discriminating way (Williamson, 1981 b). 
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2.2.2. Behavioural Assumptions of Human Actors 
If "nothing is more fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our 
research methods than our view of the nature of the human beings whose behaviour we 
are studying" (Simon, 1985, p. 303), then social scientists should be prepared to name 
the key features of human actors to which their research project relates. "ICE: names 
three: (1) the recognition that human actors are subject to bounded rationality; (2) the 
assumption that parties to a long-term contract possess feasible foresight; and (3) the 
belief that at least some parties are given to opportunism (Williamson, 2002a; b). In the 
following analysis, each of these assumptions is reviewed briefly. 
Simon (1961) takes the early notion that human actors are described as boundedly 
rational, by which he means that they are "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so" 
(p. xxiv). Human actors are thus neither non-rational nor irrational, but are attempting 
effectively to cope. TCE fully concurs with this concept. In the perspective of 
contracting, Williamson (2005, ab) argues that the main lesson of bounded rationality is 
that all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete. Moreover, "ICE also draws 
attention to another attribute of human actors-the feasible foresight. Specifically, it is 
argued that the parties to a long-term contract possess feasible insight as they may gain 
ability to look ahead, uncover possible hazards, and work out the ramifications, 
thereupon to incorporate hazard-mitigating mechanisms (Williamson, 2005b). For the 
third behaviour assumption, opportunism takes provision for self-interest seeking with 
guile and includes calculated efforts to mislead, deceive, obfuscate, and otherwise 
confuse. In the perspective of contracting, opportunism refers to that economic agents 
who make false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved threats or promises, cut corners for 
undisclosed personal advantage, cover up tracks, and the like (Williamson, 1983). It is 
not necessary to consider that all agents are equally opportunistic, however, it is 
sufficient to assume that less opportunistic agents are difficult and costly to ascertain ex 
amte and that "even among the less opportunistic, most have their price" (Williamson 
1979, p. 234). 
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Economic agents that are simultaneously subject to bounded rationality and (at 
least some) are given to opportunism does not by itself, vitiate autonomous trading. On 
the contrary, when effective ex ante and ex post competition can both be presumed, 
autonomous contracting will be efficacious. Of these two, effective ex ante competition 
is a much easier condition to satisfy: it merely requires that there will be large number 
of qualified bidders at the outset. However, the subsequent transformation of an 
exchange relation involving large numbers to one involving small numbers during 
contract execution or renewal stage (Fundamental Transformation) is what causes 
problems. Whether ex post competition is equally efficacious or breaks down as a result 
of contract execution depends on the characteristics of the transactions in question, 
which leads to the matter of dimensionalizing transaction (Williamson, 1981 b). 
2.2.3. Dimensionalizing Transaction 
Having the transaction been set as the basic unit of analysis, ]'CF argues that a 
fundamental move to the operationalisation of the theory is to name the principal 
dimensions with respect to which significant transaction cost consequences accrue. The 
important dimensions for describing transactions are: (1) the uncertainty or disturbances 
to which transactions are subject; (2) the frequency with which transactions recur; and 
(3) the degree to which durable, transaction-specific investments are required to realise 
least cost supply. Although all are important, TCl; attaches special significance to this 
last (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Williamson, 1979; 1993). 
Asset specificity has reference to the degree to which an asset can he redeployed 
to alternative uses and/or by alternative users without sacrifice of the productive value. 
This has a relation to the notion of suck costs. The reason why asset specificity is 
crucial is that, as expressed by Williamson (1981 a, b; 2005a), once the specific 
investments have been made, both parties are effectively operating in a bilateral (or at 
least quasi-bilateral) exchange relation for a considerable period thereafter (for the 
reason of Fundamental Transformation). Since the value of specific capital in other uses 
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is much smaller than the specialised use for which it has been intended, the supplier is 
effectively locked into transaction to a significant degree. This is symmetrical in that the 
buyer cannot turn to alternative sources of supply and obtain the item on favourable 
terms, since the cost of supply from unspecialised capital is presumably great. 
Accordingly, "where asset specificity is great, buyer and seller will make special efforts 
to design an exchange that has good continuity properties" (Williamson, 1981a, p. 555). 
Without purporting to be exhaustive, asset specificity distinctions of six kinds have been 
made: (1) site specificity, as where successive stations are located in a cheek-by-jowl 
relation to each other so as to economize on inventory and transportation expenses; (2) 
physical asset specificity, such as specialised dies that are required to produce a 
component; (3) human asset specificity that arises in a learning-by-doing fashion; (4) 
dedicated assets, which are discrete investments in general purpose plant that are made 
at the behest of a particular customer; to which (5) brand name capital and (6) temporal 
specificity have been added (Williamson, 1998b). 
The frequency with which transactions recur refers to as the number of times a 
transaction takes place between the parties to a contract per unit of time. As expressed 
by Williamson (2005a), frequency is mainly relevant in two respects: reputation effects 
among the involved groups and set-up costs of carrying a specific transaction, the net 
effects of which will vary with the parties. The prospect of recovering the set-up costs 
associated with specialised governance structures varies with the frequency with which 
transactions recur. Specialised governance structures are much easier to justify for 
recurrent transactions than Irr identical transactions that occur only occasionally. The 
transactions that TCE usually emphasizes on are of the recurring kind'. 
Uncertainty in terms of TCF, is described as the source of' disturbances to which 
adaptation is required. Disturbances are misalignments with the original spirit of the 
contract that may arise due to State-contingent situations (e. g., property expropriation 
by the State), lack of communication (e. g., one decision maker cannot find out the 
decisions and plans made by the others), and the behavioural uncertainty attributable to 
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opportunism (e. g., intentional nondisclosure, disguise or distortion of information) 
(Williamson, 1998b; 2002b). With regard to the third class of uncertainty, Williamson 
(1993, p. 461) argues that hazards due to the behavioural uncertainties "arise when 
incomplete contracting and asset specificity are joined". Thus, of special importance to 
ICE is the mitigation of hazards orientated from uncertainty accompanied by 
opportunistic behaviour of parties involved in transactions through allocation of 
governance structures that can offer the lowest transaction costs. 
2.2.4. Fundamental Transformation 
The bilateral dependence normally has its origins in the Fundamental Transformation. It 
is an intertemporal phenomenon and alters the nature of contractual relation during the 
contract implementation interval. Before analysing the different modes of governance 
structures, the concept of bilateral dependence originated from the Fundamental 
Transformation is still required to be clarified. 
Fundamental 'Transformation applies to that subset of transactions for which large 
number of qualified suppliers at the outset are transformed into what are, in effect, small 
number of actual suppliers during contract execution and at the contract renewal 
interval (Williamson, 1979; 1996,2002b). The key factor here is whether the 
transaction in question is supported by investment in different types of 
transaction-specific assets (Williamson, 1996). Where no such specialised investments 
are incurred, the initial winning bidders realise no advantage over nonwinners. Although 
it may continue to supply for a long period of time, this is only because, in effect, it is 
continuously meeting competitive bids From qualified rivals. Rivals cannot be presumed 
to operate on a parity, however, once substantial investments in transaction specific 
assets are put in place. Winners in these circumstances enjoy advantages over 
nonwinners, "which is to say that parity at renewal interval is upset" (Williamson, 1996, 
p. 61). Consequently, both parties are locked into the specific assets in the transactions. 
By stating differently, they are bilaterally dependent on each other during contract 
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execution and at the contract renewal interval as the transaction costs from redeploying 
the specialised assets involved to alternative uses and/or by alternative users are 
considerably great. Accordingly, the incentives of parties to work things out by 
providing appropriate safeguards rather than prematurely terminating the transaction are 
apparent. 
By following the concept of Fundamental Transformation, value-preserving 
governance structures are sought. Simple market exchange gives way to credible 
contracting, which includes penalties for premature termination, mechanisms for 
information disclosure and verification, specialised dispute settlement procedures and 
the like. Unified ownership (vertical integration) is predicted as bilateral dependence 
hazards build up and serves as the last resort (Williamson, 2005c). 
2.3. Governance Structures of TCE 
Having the rudiments of "ICE which are composed of the basic unit of 
analysis-transaction, transaction costs, behaviour assumptions of human actors 
(hounded rationality, feasible foresight, and opportunism), dimensions of describing a 
transaction (asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty), and Fundamental 
Transformation been demonstrated, different governance modes will be analysed in 
below. The structure of this section is composed of two parts: while part one 
demonstrates different modes of governance structures by concentrating on a simple 
contractual schema, the other part provides a comparative analysis in contact law, 
adaptability, and incentive and control instruments of each governance mode. 
2.3.1. The Simple Contractual Schema 
Assume that a good or service can be supplied by either of two technologies. One is a 
general purpose technology and the other is a special-purpose technology. Furthermore, 
the special-purpose technology requires greater investment in transaction-specific 
durable assets and is more efficient for servicing steady-state demands (Williamson, 
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1998a). 
Using k as a measure of transaction-specific assets, the transactions that use the 
general-purpose technology are ones for which k0. Node A which is located in Figure 
2.1. corresponds to this ideal transaction in law and economics: with an absence of 
dependence, prices are set competitively in the market (by supply and demand), and in 
the event of contractual breakdown, the courts award damages. Whereas classical 
market contracting-``sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by clear perfornmance" 
(Macneil, 1974, p. 738)-suffices this kind. 
If instead transactions use the special-purpose technology, and k>O condition 
exists. Since assets here are specialised and bilateral dependence between parties in 
transactions is created, productive value would be sacrificed if transactions are to be 
prematurely terminated. Parties have incentives to promote continuity and safeguard 
investments. By putting it in another way, cooperative adaptation comes to the fore 
(Williamson, 1996; 2005a). Now, let s denote the magnitude of any safeguards. An s=0 
condition is one in which no safeguards are provided; and a decision to provide 
safeguards is reflected by an s>O result (Williamson, 1991). TCF further classifies two 
forms of safeguards. One takes the form to provide added supports (applies to both 
inter- and intra- firm contracting): penalties to deter breach are introduced, added 
information disclosure is provided, and specialised dispute settlement machinery (e. g., 
arbitration) is devised. This form of safeguards is the credible commitment option 
(Williamson, 2005a; c). A second form is to take transactions out of markets and 
organise them under unified ownership where hierarchy is used to affect coordination 
(Williamson, 1981a). 
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Figure 2.1.: The simple contractual schema 
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Node B of Figure 2.1. poses unrelieved contractual hazards in that specialised 
investments are exposed (k>O) for which no safeguards (. 5=0) have been provided. 
According to the behaviour assumption about feasible foresight, parties to a long-term 
contract may gain ability to look ahead, uncover possible hazards, and work out the 
ramifications, hence such hazards can be recognised by foresighted players who will 
price out the implied risks. Node C and D are those for which additional safeguards 
have been provided (s>O), either in form of contractual safeguards-form one safeguard 
(node C) or unified ownership-form two safeguard (node 1)). Due to lack of additional 
contractual supports (safeguards), the price of' node I3 is greater than the price of either 
node C or I) (PI3>P(, rl)) (Williamson, 1985; 
1996; 2005a; c). In the event that costly 
breakdowns continue in the face of efforts to craft safeguards at node C, the transaction 
may be taken out of the markets and organised under unified ownership (vertical 
integration) instead. Inasmuch, however, as added bureaucratic costs accrue upon taking 
a transaction out of' the markets and organising it internally, internal organisation is 
usefully thought of as the "organisation form of last resort: try market, try hybrids, and 
have recourse to the firm only when all else fails" (Williamson, 1983, p. 357). All in all, 
the hierarchy form comes in only as higher degrees of asset specificity and added 
uncertainty require greater needs for cooperative adaptation. 
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Sources: Williamson, 2005c, p. 380. 
Having the different governance structures (market, hybrid, and hierarchy) been 
demonstrated through a simple contract schema, some queries still remain to be 
answered. What are the different contract laws according to the different modes of 
governance? What are the factors that are responsible for the different costs and 
competencies of each mode? 1-low do alternative modes of governance differ in contract 
implementation and enforcement respects? Can large firms always do as well as a 
collection of small firms and sometimes do better? (Williamson, 1991; 2005c). The 
answers to such questions can be obtained by conducting a comparative analysis of the 
different modes. 
2.3.2. A Comparative Analysis of Different Modes 
A comparative analysis approach in TCF_, applies to that any single governance structure 
is not stand-alone but has to examine in relation to alternative modes. TCF argues that 
the real import of the proposition that moving from one generic form of organisation to 
another is attended by discontinuities is that alternative modes of governance have 
different characteristics by reason of these discontinuities (Williamson, 2005b). Thus, as 
being developed below, each form of governance (market, hybrid, and hierarchy) is 
defined by a syndrome of attributes-distinctive strengths and weaknesses-that can 
not be replicated. The main idea is that there is no, in all purpose, superior form of 
governance structure. Ilowever, using a simple mode of governance to manage a 
complex transaction would be to risk contractual breakdown, whereas using a complex 
mode of governance to manage a simple transaction would be to incur costs without 
gain (Macher and Richman, 2006). The differences of the governance modes are 
examined in three major aspects: contract-law, adaptability, and incentives and control 
instruments. 
2.3.2.1. Contract Law 
In terms of contract law, two major points have been proposed by TCI:. First, each 
generic form of governance needs to be supported by a different form of contract law. 
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Second, the form of contract law that supports hierarchy is that of so-called forbearance 
or private ordering (Williamson, 1991). 
Macneil (1974; 1978) states that classical contract law is congruent with and 
supports the autonomous market form of organisation-the market mode. The market 
mode applies to the ideal transaction in law and economics-'`sharp in by clear 
agreement; sharp out by clear performance" (Macneil, 1974, p. 738)-in which the 
identity of the parties is irrelevant. The identity of parties plainly matters if premature 
termination or persistent maladaptation happened on one or both parties. According to 
the simple contractual schema, because no transaction-specific investments are involved, 
market modes are thus the ones in which parties bear no dependent relationship to each 
other. Indeed, each party can go its own way at negligible cost to another (Williamson, 
2002a; b). It' contracts are renewed period by period, that is only because current 
suppliers are continuously meeting bids in the spot market. Such transactions require the 
contract law to be interpreted in a very legalistic way. In particular, more formal terms 
supersede less formal should disputes arise between formal and less formal features (e. g. 
written agreements versus oral amendments), and hard bargaining to which the rules of 
contract law are strictly applied (Williamson, 1991). 
The neo-classical contract law, which relieves parties from strict enlbrcement, 
applies to contracts in which parties to the transactions maintain autonomy but are 
bilaterally dependent to a nontrivial degree (Williamson, 2002a). The hybrid mode of 
governance which has transaction-specific investments but safeguards on the contrary is 
supported by the neo-classical contract law. While the parties to such contracts maintain 
autonomy, the contract is mediated by an elastic contracting mechanism (Williamson, 
2000). 't'his regime better facilitates continuity and promotes efficient adaptation 
compared with the classical contract law (Williamson, 1998a). The forum to which this 
neo-classical contract refers disputes is that of arbitration rather than the courts. While 
the benefits and costs of arbitration are not within the scope of this thesis, the main 
reason that puts arbitration at such a primary level is that "there are open to the 
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arbitrator... quick methods of recognising and educating the disputes not open to the 
courts" (Williamson, 1991, p. 272). 
The implicit contract law of internal organisation or hierarchy mode of 
governance is that of forbearance. As stated by Williamson (1998b, p. 41), "transaction 
cost economics makes that move by studying contract laws (plural) rather than contract 
law (singular). This entails going beyond legal rules and legal centralism to include 
private ordering. " By definition, private ordering is "... efforts to craft governance 
structure supports for contractual relations during the contract implementation 
interval... " (Williamson, 2002a, p. 174). Moreover, TCE argues that ultimate appeal is 
important, in that it delimits threat position, but the main contractual action nevertheless 
takes place in the context of private ordering. Most disputes, including many that under 
current rules could he brought to a court are resolved by avoidance, self-help, and the 
like. Thus whereas courts routinely grand standing to firms should there be disputes 
over prices, the damages to be ascribed to delays, failures of duality, and the like, courts 
will refuse to hear disputes between one internal division and another over identical 
technical issues. The firm becomes its own court of ultimate appeal in this way, which 
explains why hierarchies differ significantly in dispute settlement (fiat) respects 
(Williamson, 1981a; b; 2002a; b). Williamson (2005c) points out that the underlying 
rationale for forbearance law is twofold: (1) parties to an internal dispute have deep 
knowledge--both about the circumstances surrounding a dispute as well as the 
efficiency properties of alternative solutions-that can he communicated to the court 
only at great cost, and (2) permitting internal disputes to be appealed to the court would 
reduce the efficacy and integrity of hierarchy. Thus, the application of Ihrbearance 
doctrine to internal exchange can work out their differences themselves or appeal 
unsolved disputes to the hierarchy for a decision. 
By putting all together, it is argued that different types of contract law, in 
particular, the classical, neoclassical, and forbearance contract law, play important roles 
in explaining the differences in governance modes. But there is more to governance than 
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contract law. Crucial differences in adaptability and in the use of incentive and control 
instruments are also germane (Williamson, 1991). 
2.3.2.2. Adaptation as the Central Economic Problem 
While both Hayek (1945) and Barnard (1962) agree that adaptation is the central 
problem of economic organisation, the type of adaptation to which they have reference 
differs. On one hand, Hayek (1945) mentions the adaptation of autonomous economic 
actors who adjust spontaneously to changes in the market mainly as signalled by 
changes in relative prices. In contrast, Barnard (1962) appeals to intentionality. He 
features cooperative adaptation made by economic actors with assistance of hierarchy 
within a firm. TCE submits that adaptability is the central problem of economic 
organisation and both Hayek and Barnard are correct, because they are referring to 
adaptations of different kinds, both of which are needed in a high-performance 
organisation system. Correspondingly, TCE argues that while the market adapts to 
changes in autonomous ways, the hierarchy adapts in coordinated ways, and the hybrid 
displays semi-strong adaptation of both kinds (Williamson, 1991). 
In particular, TCE refers to Hayek's kind of' adaptation as adaptation (A), where 
(A) denotes autonomy. This is the situation in which parties respond independently to 
parametric price changes so as to maximise their utility and profits respectively 
(Williamson, 1993). Adaptation (A) would entirely suffice if all disturbances are of this 
kind. Some disturbances, however, require coordinated responses, lest individual parties 
operate at cross-purposes or otherwise suboptimize. More generally, parties that bear a 
long-term bilaterally dependent relationship to each other must recognise that 
incomplete contracts (by the reason of bounded rationality) require gap-filling and 
sometimes to take transactions out of the alignment. Although it is always in the 
collective interest of autonomous parties to fill gaps, correct errors, and establish 
efficient alignments, it is also the case that the distribution of' the resulting gains is 
indeterminate. Self-interested bargaining (for the reason of opportunism) predictably 
obtains. Such bargaining is itself costly (Williamson, 1991). 
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Since the needs for coordinated investments and uncontested or less contested 
coordinated realignments increase, the recourse to a different adaptation mechanism is 
thus required. This calls for Barnard's type of adaptation which will be referred to as 
adaptation (C), where C denotes cooperation. By definition, it means that "the conscious, 
deliberate, and purposeful efforts to craft adaptive internal coordinating mechanisms" 
(Williamson, 1991, p. 279). Independent adaptations here would at best realise imperfect 
realignments and could operate at cross-purposes. Lest the concerns with costs and 
delays associated with self-interest bargaining be incurred, the relation is reconfigured 
by supplanting autonomy with hierarchy. The authority relation (fiat) has adaptive 
advantages over autonomy for transactions of a bilaterally (or multilaterally) dependent 
kind (Williamson, 2002a; b). 
The hybrid mode displays the semi-strong form of adaptation. It encourages type 
(A) adaptation by preserving ownership autonomy; one party involved in the 
transactions can respond efficiently to the price changes without consulting the other 
one. On the other hand, because there is a circumstance of bilateral dependence due to 
the specific assets investments, long-term contracts are supported by added contractual 
safeguards and administrative apparatus, such as information disclosure, 
dispute-settlement mechanisms, and so forth. 'T'hese facilitate adaptation of type (C) 
(Williamson, 1991). 
2.3.2.3. Incentive and Control Instruments 
In the market mode with adaptation type (A), prices can serve sufficiently to a 
disturbance and parties involved in non-specific assets transactions can reposition 
autonomously. Appropriating, as they do, individual streams of net receipts, each party 
has a strong incentive to reduce costs and adapt efficiently. Thus, as stated by 
Williamson (2005a; b), high-powered incentives result in such a situation. Moreover, 
other autonomous traders have neither legitimate claim against the gains nor can they be 
held accountable for the losses (Williamson, 1991). In terms of administrative controls, 
as the asset-specific investments do not exist in the transactions, market mode does not 
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offer any administrative control mechanisms, such as monitoring, career rewards, 
penalties, and so forth. 
Matters get more complicated when bilateral dependence intrudes. As illustrated 
by Williamson (1991) that hierarchy mode introduces an opportunity to realise gains 
when bilateral dependence and uncertainty accompanied with opportunism become 
intense. Comparing with the market, "the use of formal organisation to orchestrate 
coordinated adaptation to unanticipated disturbances enjoys adaptive advantages as the 
condition of bilateral dependence progressively builds up" (Williamson, 1991, p. 279). 
However, these gains through adaptation (C) come at cost. Not only can related 
divisions within the firm make plausible claims that they are causally responsible for the 
gains, but division that report losses can make plausible claims that others are culpable. 
In the field of accounting, the headquarters may use accounting system to affect 
strategic redistributions through transfer pricing changes, overhead assignments, 
inventory and tax conventions, and so forth, whatever the preferences oithe parties. The 
upshot is that internal organisation structure degrades incentive intensity, and added 
bureaucratic costs result (Williamson, 1986). Thus, in contrast to the market mode, 
hierarchy is buttressed by the differential efficacy of administrative controls within 
firms (Williamson, 2000). 
The hybrid mode shows the intermediate value in these two instruments. In 
particular, because of the preservation of ownership autonomy, the hybrid form elicits 
strong incentives. On the other hand, because of the bilateral dependence, added 
administrative control mechanisms or safeguards are provided to protect parties 
involved in transactions. Williamson (1998a; 2002a) emphasises the distinctive feature 
of the hybrid mode regarding the incentive and control instruments that if added 
incentive intensity gets in the way or bilateral adaptability, then weaker incentive 
intensity supported by the added administrative controls can be optimal. Table 2.1. 
provides a summary of each governance structure with regard to contract law, 
adaptation, and incentive and control instruments. 
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Table 2.1.: Specific aspects in governance structures 
Governance Structures 
Aspects Market Mode Hybrid Mode Hierarchy Mode 
Neo-classical Contract Law: 
Classical Contract Law: it relieves parties from Forbearance: this 
sharp in by clear strict enforcement and entails going beyond 
Contract agreement; sharp out by applies to contracts in legal rules and legal 
Law clear performance. And, which the parties to the centralism to include 
the identity of the parties transactions maintain private ordering. 
is irrelevant. autonomy but are 
bilaterally dependent to a 
nontrivial degree. 
Semi-strong form of 
adaptation: it preserves 
Adaptation A: the ownership autonomy Adaptation C: it 
adaptations of which encourages means the conscious, 
autonomous economic adaptations of type A. On deliberate, and 
Adaptation actors who adjust the other hand, because purposeful efforts to 
spontaneously to changes there is a bilateral craft adaptive internal 
in the market mainly as dependence, long-term coordinating 
signalled by changes in contracts are supported by mechanisms. 
relative prices. added contractual 
safeguards and 
administrative apparatus, 
these facilitate adaptations 
of type C. 
Low-Level Incentives 
Intermediate Value in plus High-Level 
High-Powered Incentives Incentive and Control Administrative 
but No Administrative Instruments: because of Controls: because of 
Control Mechanisms: the preservation of the managerial 
Incentive individual streams of net autonomy, the hybrid discretion or 
and Control receipts, each party has a mode elicits strong self-fulfilment, the 
Instruments strong incentive to incentives. On the other internal organisation 
reduce costs and adapt hand, because of bilateral structure degrades 
efficiently. And, markets dependence, added incentive intensity 
do not have any of the administrative control and added 
administrative control mechanisms (safeguards) bureaucratic costs 
mechanisms. are provided to protect result. And, it is 
both parties. buttressed by the 
administrative 
controls. 
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2.4. Comparative Statics of TCE 
In the last section, different modes of governance-market, hybrid, and hierarchy-are 
briefly described through a simple contractual schema. In addition, by conducting a 
comparative analysis of contract law, adaptability, incentive and control instruments, the 
distinctive features in strength and weakness of each mode are demonstrated. The main 
statement is that there is no, in all purpose, superior form of governance structure. 
Transactions vary in their attributes, governance structures vary in costs and 
competencies, efficient alignment in a cost economizing way is where the predictive 
action resides. The unchanging lesson of TCE for all feasible forms of organisation is 
this: `-a place needs to be made for each generic form, but each form needs to be kept in 
its place" (Williamson, 1998b, p. 46). 
This section focuses on some predictions of TCE concerning with how the choice 
of a cost effective contractual framework can be affected by the shifts in certain factors 
of the external environment. In other words, rather than concentrating on the specific 
characteristics of each mode, the followings aim to evaluate the effects of external 
changes on each governance mode. Four different kinds of changes are examined: 
property rights, excuse and forbearance doctrine, reputation effects, and uncertainty. 
2.4.1. Property Rights 
There are two major concerns of property rights in examining the parameter shifts of 
governance structure, specifically, the governmental expropriation and information 
leakage. For the former, the effect-a shift in institutional environment from strong to 
weak property rights-on the choice of cost effective contractual framework depends on 
whether the durability and immobility of the assets implicated are correlated with their 
asset specificity. If duality and immobility are uncorrelated with asset specificity, then 
the transaction costs of all forms of private-sector governance increase together as 
expropriation hazards increase (Williamson, 1991). In other words, no real change in the 
comparative choice of cost effective contractual frameworks is expected to take place. 
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In such a situation, TCE argues that the government sector will have to bear a large 
durable investment burden, while the private sector durable investments will favour 
assets that can be smuggled or are otherwise mobile-such as general-purpose human 
assets (skilled machinists, physicians) that can be used productively if immigration law 
can be more flexible to other countries (Williamson, 1991). An example is taken from 
the latest laws on government expropriation of institutional and private houses in China. 
In August 2007, the lawmakers of China voted to add one clause to the Law on the 
Management of Urban Real Estate, allowing the government to expropriate institutional 
and private houses on the State-owned land for public interests. Although the economic 
consequences of such legislation have yet to be studied, an anonymous Chinese 
entrepreneur remarks, "I don't want to get too deep into the real estate businesses. If the 
situation changes, I'll get stuck with them. "2 In this situation, as stated by Williamson 
(1996, p. 113), "... the objectivity of law is placed in jeopardy if the law and its 
enforcement are under control of a one-party State. " 
Not only may property rights be devalued by the government, but the value of 
specialised knowledge and information may be appropriated and/or dissipated by 
suppliers, buyers, and rivals (Williamson, 2005a). If' investments in knowledge cannot 
lawfully be protected or if nominal protection (e. g., patent) is ineffective, then the ex 
an/e incentives to make such investments are impaired and the ex pm, d1 incentives to 
embed such investments in protective governance structures are increased. Vertical or 
lateral integration into related states ofproduction in which the hazards of inFormation 
leakage are greatest is sometimes undertaken for the precisely protective purposes. 
Trade secret protection is an example3. Interpreted in terms of comparative governance 
costs apparatus, not only the adaptation (A) of autonomy suffers due to the increased 
risk of information leakage, but also the costs of hybrid contracting compared with 
hierarchy increase. Consequently, the distribution of transactions favours greater 
reliance on trade secret protection as a form of hierarchy (Williamson, 2005c). 
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2.4.2. Excuse and Forbearance Doctrine (Contract Law) 
Improvements or not in a contract law regime can be used to judge how relevant 
governance structures shift. In particularly, TCE concentrates on the possible variations 
in the excuse doctrine-a contract law doctrine which relieves parties to a contract from 
strict enforcement. For instance, an improvement in excuse doctrine could shift the 
costs of hybrid governance mode down. The idea here, as proposed by Williamson 
(1991, p. 290), is that "excuse doctrine can be either too lax or too strict. " If it is too 
strict, then parties will be reluctant to make specialised investments in support of each 
other because of the added risk of truly punitive outcomes should unanticipated events 
materialise and the opposite party insist that the letter of the contract be observed. If it is 
too lax, then incentives to think through contracts, choose technologies judiciously, 
share risks efficiently, and avert adversity will be impaired (Williamson, 1991). Whether 
a change in excuse doctrine is an improvement or not depends on the initial conditions 
and on how these trade-offs play out. However, assuming that an improvement is 
introduced in both cases, TCE predicts that the effect will be to lower the costs of hybrid 
contracting-especially at higher value of asset specificity. The effect of' such 
improvements would be to increase the use of hybrid contracting, especially as 
compared with hierarchy (Williamson, 2005a). 
In addition, a change in forbearance doctrine would be reflected in governance 
costs of hierarchy. For example, mistaken forbearance doctrine-a willingness by the 
courts to litigate intrafirm technical disputes-would have the effect of shifting the costs 
of hierarchical governance up (Williamson, 1991). This would disadvantage hierarchy 
in relation to hybrid mode of contracting. 
2.4.3. Reputation Effects 
Reputation effects are important in transactions as parties involved can consult not only 
from their own experiences but also benefit from the experiences of others. As 
expressed by Williamson (1993), one way of interpreting a network is as a 
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non-hierarchical contracting relation in which reputation effects are quickly and 
accurately communicated. In a community of traders in which reputation effects take 
place, any improvements in such effects can attenuate incentives to behave 
opportunistically in transactions since the immediate gains from opportunism in the 
regime must be traded off against future costs. The ethic communities will predictably 
displace non-ethic communities. Non-ethic communities, to be viable, will resort to 
market or hierarchy (Williamson, 1991). It is argued that improvements in reputation 
effects reduce the hazards due to opportunistic behaviour, thus the costs of hybrid 
governance mode. Hybrid contracting outperforms the other two governance modes in 
the regime where reputation effects are more highly perfected, ceteris paribus. 
In addition, as argued by Williamson (1995), reputation effects are pertinent 
within firms as well. If internal reputation effects improve, then managerial 
opportunism will be reduced and the costs of hierarchical governance will fail. 
2.4.4. Uncertainty 
Alchian and Woodward (1988) in their works argue that in Williamson's TCE 
framework, he implicitly but not analytically distinguishes between two kinds of 
hazards, namely, the holdup and moral hazards" (p. 121). Although the elementary ideas 
of these two different types of hazards have been described with regard to opportunism 
in most of Williamson's works, Alchian and Woodward (1988) still provide a definition 
Ior each of them. Holdup hazards refer to as an attempt to expropriate by refusal to pay 
or serve when specific assets are employed in transactions. And, moral hazards "arise in 
agreement in which at least one party relies on the behaviour of the other and 
information about that behaviour is costly" (Alchian and Woodward, 1988, p. 122). This 
section mainly focuses on how different governance modes are affected by uncertainty 
or the increased degree of uncertainty. 
In transactions without specific assets involvement (or the market mode), 
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continuity of such transactions has little value since new trading relations can easily be 
arranged among large number of qualified suppliers. Market exchange continues and the 
discrete-contracting paradigm (classical contract law) holds across standardised 
transactions of all kinds, whatever the degree of uncertainty (Williamson, 1979). 
However, degree of uncertainty matters in transactions with specialised asset 
investments. Whenever investments are idiosyncratic (for the reason of asset specificity) 
in nontrivial degree, uncertainty makes it to be imperative for trading parties to devise a 
mechanism to work things out since the contractual gaps will be larger and the 
occasions for sequential adaptations will increase in number and importance 
(Williamson, 1981a). 
In the situation of increased uncertainty, trading parties in transactions with 
low-level specific assets involvement may choose to sacrifice valued design features in 
favour of a more standardised good or service. Market governance would then be 
applied as the increased degree of uncertainty does not alter this governance mode. As 
specific assets involvement deepens, increased uncertainty raises the costs of hybrid 
mode since parties have to design an elaborated governance structure which facilitates 
more effective, adaptive, and sequential decision making in order to preserve the valued 
design features in transactions. As uncertainty increases to high level, hybrid apparatus 
often gives way to the unified ownership governance structure or hierarchy mode. 
Correspondingly, the hybrid mode is to be devised for the semi-strong uncertainty 
(Williamson, 1979). 
2.4.5. Simultaneous Parameter Shifts 
The comparative statics analysis set out above treats each form of governance structure 
as a syndrome of attributes and introduces parameter shift one at a time. Suppose, 
instead, that a series of shifts are to occur together. Could theses be processed as a 
sequence of independent changes? If, however, a related set of changes is made 
simultaneously, it would not do to treat these independently. If strong interaction effects 
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exist, these must be treated as a cluster (Williamson, 1991). 
The phenomenon of the simultaneous parameter shifts can be explained by the 
following examples. One of them is the success story of Japanese corporations in the 
1980s-1990s. The key factors here are employment, subcontracting, and banking. As 
argued by Williamson (1996), because these three factors bear a complementary relation 
to each other and the changes are linked, the American corporations cannot expect to 
replicate the Japanese corporations by making changes in only one of these practices 
and not in the others. Thus, exact replication of individual practices will be suboptimal, 
however, if linkages are important. Similar consideration applies to the economic 
reforms in China. If, for example, the efficacy of privatization turns crucially on the 
manner in which banking is organised and on the security of property rights, then the 
piecemeal proposals that merely focus on these features by ignoring the relevant 
supporting institution and infrastructures are fraught with hazards (Sun el al., 2002). 
Williamson (1991, p. 294) argues that "applications to economic reform need to make 
express provision for contextual differences between alternative forms of capitalism. " In 
conclusion, the study of viable cluster of organisation is a combined law, economics, 
and organisations undertaking. 
It is worth mentioning that the study of corporate governance and earnings 
management in China which is the main focus of the current thesis calls the similar 
inspirations as proposed by Williamson in above. In particular, certain features of 
corporate governance and earnings management which have been proved to be 
applicable and representative in American and European markets may not be 
appropriate in China due to differences in culture, law, economics, and so forth. By 
building upon the existing literature, this study adopts a comparative analysis approach 
to investigate the specific institutional features of China's security markets in the 
following chapters. 
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2.4.6. A Three-Level Schema 
Before moving to the applications of TCE, this 
histillutiunal miri; nment section summarises the fundamental concepts 
R, pý, l_, nIt L, t,. 1111,11'alMII i through a three-level schema which is proposed by 
Williamson (1996). The three-level schema is 
shown in Figure 2.2. 
co, eroance 
Based on the previous discussions, the main clue is 
that governance does not operate in isolation. The 
i 
Indkidual i comparative efficacy of alternative governance Ihuun JrJ niinnaht}. "Irniblr 
.--. ihir. i elii': and ol"pn uni, nu 
modes varies with the institutional environment on 
one hand and the attributes of economic actors on the other. The institutional 
environment is treated as the locus of shift parameters, changes in which shift the 
comparative costs of governance, and the individual is where the behaviour assumptions 
originate (Williamson, 1996). As indicated, the institutional environment defines the 
rules of the game. If changes in property rights, contract laws, norms, customs, and the 
like induce changes in the comparative costs of governance, then a reconfiguration of 
organisation is usually implied. This is shown by the solid arrow named "shift 
parameter" in Figure 2.2. The solid arrow from the individual to governance carries the 
behavioural assumptions within which 'I'CI; operates, and the circular arrow within the 
governance sector reflects the proposition that structure has a life of its own due to 
differences in contract laws, adaptability, and incentive and control instruments 
(Williamson, 1996). 
The feedback effects are drawn as dashed arrows in Figure 2.2. In particular, the 
feedback effects from governance to the institutional environment can either be 
instrumental or strategic. An example of the former is the improvement in contract law, 
brought about at the request of parties who find that extant law is poorly suited to 
support the integrity of contract. Strategic changes could take the form of protectionist 
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trade barriers against domestic and/or foreign competition. Feedbacks from governance 
to the level of the individual can be interpreted as endogenous preference due to 
advertising or other forms of "education". The individual is also influenced by the 
environment, in that endogenous preferences are the product of social conditioning 
(Williamson, 1996). 
2.5. TCE's Basic Approach to Corporate 
Governance 
As argued by Williamson (1985, p. 17), "... any issue that formulated as a contracting 
problem can be investigated in transaction cost economizing terms. Every exchange 
relation qualifies. " There are numerous applications and ramifications that TCE applied 
to, such as non-standard contracting practices, regulation, labour-market organisation, 
and so forth. Instead of focusing on all of them, this section will draw particular 
attention to the applications of TCE to corporate governance. The discussions below are 
primarily based on two academic studies of Williamson-Coi7)orale Governance (1984) 
and ('orpor"ale Finance and Corporate Governance (1988). Briefly, this section starts 
with discussing the financial contract-framework of the firm, and then it provides an 
analysis of TCE's essential approach to corporate governance. 
2.5.1. The Contract-Framework of the Firm 
The definition of firm can be visualised as an organisation construct, where a legal 
person (a fictitious person) called the firm contracts with each of its constituencies in 
order to secure the resource (e. g. labour and capital) necessary for production and 
related business activities. TCE predicts that the type of contractual framework that is 
established between the firm and its constituents will vary as a function of the attributes 
to each individual transaction. As expressed by Williamson (2002b, p. 182), "TCE 
maintains that the contractual relation between the firm and its `stakeholders'-customers, 
suppliers and workers along with financial investors-can be interpreted as variations of 
the basic contractual theme. " 
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Moreover, TCE makes two further observations which are important to 
understand the economics of the firm as an organisational construct. The first matter 
concerns the interdependencies between the constituent parties of the firm. As 
Williamson (1988, p. 1201) pointed out, the study of "corporate financing is complicated 
by interdependencies within and between contracts, [and therefore] changes in one set 
of terms commonly require realignments in others. " For instance, if the CEO of a firm 
perceives that the risks to his human specific assets have increased as a consequence of 
mechanisms (e. g., corporate takeovers, proxy contests, managerial competition) in 
corporate control market, one of his responses is to seek for further safeguards in order 
to secure his post and protect himself from losses. I Iowever, these increased safeguards 
proposed by the CEO may come at expense of reductions in the effectiveness of 
shareholders' safeguards. The CEO may attempt to reduce the efficacy of the board by 
offering high paid consulting jobs to its members or try to increase the number of 
directors that are friendly to him. In general, these measures are intended for reducing 
board interdependence, and in such situation, investors' benefits may be jeopardised by 
managerial discretion (Williamson, 1984). Thus, the notion of interdependence as 
proposed by TCE facilitates the analysis on the financial contract-framework of the firm 
as it aims to investigate some issues (e. g. the contractual relationship between the firm 
and its independent directors) without losing sight of other important subjects (e. g. the 
relationship between the firm and its audit committee or external auditors). 
The second observation focuses on the management and ownership matters of the 
firm. Instead of holding the belief that firms are "owned, controlled and administered by 
capital rather than labour" (Alchian and Woodward, 1988, p. 72), TCE predicts that the 
manager is the member with comparative advantage in deciding what the firm and its 
members should do, and this manager need not be an owner. Accordingly, Williamson 
takes the so-called managerial discretion hypothesis. This hypothesis "ascribes dc facto 
control to those who are knowledgeable, strategically situated, and disposed to be 
actives" (Williamson, 1984, p. 1221). Thus, upon examination of the groups that 
potentially qualify under the above characteristics, the management in the large and 
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diffusely owned corporation enjoys nontrivial degree of discretion. However, recent 
corporate governance theory has proved the argument that outside United States, 
particular at countries with poor shareholder protection, even the largest firms tend to 
have controlling shareholders. For instance, La Porta et al. (1998); (1999) study the 
shareholding structure among 49 and 27 wealth nations respectively. By using various 
variables, such as antidirecior index, Widely Held (I if there is no controlling 
shareholder), Family (1 if a family person is the controlling shareholder), State (1 if the 
domestic or foreign State is the controlling shareholder), and so forth, their results are 
consistent with the argument that ownership concentration is extremely high around the 
world. In an average country, close to half equity in a publicly traded company is owned 
by the three largest shareholders. In addition, Claessens el al. (2000) (2002), Leuz el al. 
(2003), Shen and Chih (2007) study the ownership construction among Asian countries. 
They all reach a similar argument that the voting rights frequently exceed cash-flow 
rights via pyramid and cross-holdings. More than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a 
single shareholder. Chen and Yuan (2006), Ding el al. (2007), Liu and Lu (2007) argue 
that the central problem in China's firms is the expropriation of minority shareholders 
by controlling shareholders. Accordingly, instead of merely focusing on managerial 
discretion, an investigation of' controlling-shareholders' expropriation may be more 
interesting and appropriate in the case of China. 
2.5.2. Corporate Governance in Perspective of TCE 
According to the simple contractual schema, when a transaction is characterised by the 
specific-asset investments, both parties incur losses if the relationship is prematurely 
terminated (for the reason of bilateral dependence), and hence both parties have the 
incentives to work things out by providing extra safeguards. In terms of corporate 
governance, "ICI? predicts the inverse relationship between good corporate governance 
(higher safeguard intensity) and financing costs: the higher (lower) the safeguard 
intensity/corporate governance the lower (higher) the external equity financing costs, 
other things equal. Thus, if the corporation is to perform well financially for its owners, 
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an appropriate level of safeguard intensity (good corporate governance) will be essential. 
Based on such arguments, Williamson (1984a; 2005b) focuses on the important role 
played by the board of directors as safeguard to protect stockholders' value. 
Additionally, he also mentions several other measures, such as audit committee, external 
auditors, debt-holders (banks), and institutional investors. 
As argued by Williamson (1984a), in general, the board is created and awarded to 
equity that is elected by the pro-rata votes of those who hold tradable shares; has the 
power to replace the management; decides on management compensation; has access to 
internal performance measures on a timely basis; can authorise audits in depth for 
special follow-up purposes; is apprised of important investment and operating proposals 
before they are implemented, and in other respects bears a decision-review and 
monitoring relation to the firm's management. The board of directors thus evolves as a 
way by which to reduce the cost of capital for projects that involve limited 
redeployability. The "board of directors should be considered as a governance structure 
whose principal purpose is to safeguard those who face a diffuse but significant risk of 
expropriation because the assets in question are numerous and ill-defined, and cannot be 
protected in a well-focused, transaction-specific way" (Williamson, 1984a, p. 1197). 
Moreover, Williamson (1984a) compares the inside board of directors with the 
independent non-executive directors. On one hand, he argues that while management 
participation on the board can often facilitate shareholder monitoring of the 
management and can also help to safeguard the employment relation between firm and 
management. On the other hand, he points out that since managers enjoy more 
informational advantages because of their full-time status and inside knowledge, the 
participating board easily becomes an instrument of the management4. 'T'his calls for the 
participation of the independent non-executive directors on the board. The independent 
non-executive board members are invited to join with the board to enhance the quality 
of strategic decision monitoring and control. By putting all together, Williamson (1988) 
argues that the efficient board (safeguard) should consist of both inside and outside 
directors. 
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In addition to the board safeguarding, some alternative control mechanisms are 
also qualified to protect investors' value. For instance, as argued by Williamson (1984a), 
corporate charter restrictions and informational disclosure requirements are the 
examples. Some managements, however, play "end games" (undisclosed strategic 
decisions to cut and run before corrective measures can be taken) and individual 
managers commonly disclose information selectively or distort data. In order to 
minimise the transaction costs derived from such concealment and distortion, additional 
checks are thus required to be created. Williamson (1984a) mentions the important roles 
played by two monitoring governance mechanisms to limit management's tendency of 
channelling benefits to themselves through disclosing misleading information, namely 
the audit committee and the statutory auditor. He points out that "... an audit committee 
composed of outside directors and the certification of financial reports by an accredited 
auditing firm can mitigate management's opportunistically discretionary behaviours in 
information disclosure" (Williamson, 1984a, p. 1211). Another control instrument is the 
required disclosure of financial reports to a public agency with the power of 
investigation (Williamson, 1984a). These administrative agencies are akin to The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (U. S. ), Financial Services Authority (U. K. ), 
China Securities Regulatory Commission, and so forth. 
Furthermore, Williamson (1984a) argues that as the exposure to risk increases, 
debt holders become more concerned with the details of firms' operating decisions and 
strategic plans; with high debt-equity ratios the creditors become more like 
shareholders and greater consultation between the management and its major creditors 
results" (p. 1197). While TCE originally considers the monitoring role played by the 
banks, institutional shareholders such as pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, and 
so forth have recently been emphasised. Williamson (2007) states that corporate 
monitoring by institutional investors can constrain managers' self-serving behaviours. 
Large institutional investors have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, 
discipline, and influence managers. Thus, corporate monitoring by institutional 
investors can force managers to focus more on corporate performance and less on 
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opportunistic or self-serving behaviours. And, he also points out that in order to secure 
the value of ultimate beneficiaries (stakeholders) through consistent monitoring of 
firms' performance, the institutional investors are required to be active. This is backed 
up by direct involvement in firms where appropriate. If companies persistently fail to 
respond to the queries proposed by the stakeholders (e. g. the reliability of firm's 
accounting policies made by the management), institutional investors will vote against 
the board at general meetings. 
2.6. Summary 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) proposed by Williamson in the 1980s focuses on 
how trading parties choose, from a set of feasible governance structures ex pose, the 
arrangement that provides effective monitoring and control for mitigating opportunistic 
behaviours occurred during the business transactions at the lowest total costs. The asset 
specificity involved in the transactions and safeguards provided by different governance 
modes are the deciding factors of selection of governance structure. 
In brief, when specific assets are at stake, bilateral coordination of investment 
decisions may be desirable, and market modes may give way to hierarchy modes or the 
fully integrated firms. In comparison with the market modes, although hierarchies offer 
greater protection for specific investments, they provide managers weaker incentives to 
maximise profits and normally incur additional bureaucratic costs. Between the two 
poles of market and hierarchy are a variety of hybrid modes, such as complex contracts 
and partial ownership agreement. 
TCE predicts that the type of contractual framework between the firm and its 
stakeholders/constituents varies as a function of the attributes to each individual 
transaction. Given the notion that ownership and control in the large and diffusely 
owned corporation are not fully coincide, managers enjoy nontrivial degree of 
discretion. Due to the concentrated ownership structure in the Chinese setting, instead 
of merely focusing on managerial discretion based on 'ICE, an investigation of 
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controlling shareholders' expropriation may also be interesting and relevant. 
In regard to the application of TCE to corporate governance, it predicts the inverse 
relationship between good corporate governance (higher safeguard intensity) and 
financing costs: the higher (lower) the safeguard intensity/corporate governance the 
lower (higher) the external equity financing costs, other things equal. Among the 
mechanisms of corporate governance, while TCE particularly emphasises the 
importance of the board, it also mentions several other mechanisms, such as audit 
committee, external auditor, debt-holders (banks), and institutional investors. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Review:: 
Agencv Theory 
ýTý 
3.1. Introduction 
The classical agency problem was firstly proposed by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means 
in 1932. They observed that ownership and control in large corporation were often 
separated and inquired whether this had organisational and public-policy ramifications. 
Although the agency problem was subject to repeated public-policy scrutiny during the 
ensuing 35 years, there was very little conceptual headway. More microanalytic and 
operational approaches to it awaited developments in the 1970s. The remarkable 
academic work on this issue was conducted by Jensen and Meckling in 1976. Their 
study on Agency Theory (hereafter referred to as AT) expressly considers with the 
separation of ownership from control and problems resulting from the conflicts of 
interest that may emerge in contractual relationships when parties are differently 
informed or uncertain. More generally, it mainly deals with "how to structure the 
contractual relation [ex ante] between the principal and the agent to provide appropriate 
incentives for the agent to make choices which will maximize the principal's welfare" 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 7). State diflerently, the main objective of Al is to 
explain how contracting parties design contracts ex ante to minimize the costs 
associated with the opportunistic behaviours. 
As expressed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1983; 2000), agency 
costs/problems arise in any situation involving cooperative effort by two or more people 
even though there is no clear-cut principal-agent relationship. This chapter mainly 
focuses on the application to corporate governance. In particular, it starts with analysing 
the factors which can differentiate the magnitude of different agency problems/costs 
across countries regarding the differences in property right and contract law. And then, 
it demonstrates the important roles played by the mechanisms of corporate governance 
in mitigating the agency problems/costs. 
In comparison with "ICE, AT shares the argument that managers operate under 
bounded rationality and are profit maximisers, the concern that all complex contracts 
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are unavoidably incomplete, the problem that managers enjoy nontrivial degree of 
discretion, and the assumption that managers are given to opportunism and moral 
hazard that may expropriate the benefits of shareholders. However, AT examines 
contract predominately from an ex ante incentive-alignment point of view while TCE is 
more concerned with crafting ex post governance structures within which the integrity 
of contract is decided. Differences between two theories with respect to their choice unit 
of analysis, focal cost concern, risk factor, and contractual focus are largely responsible 
for the above incentive/governance difference. The main argument is that although these 
two theories concentrate on different perspectives of contracting (ex-ante vs. exp(st), 
they are mainly complementary rather than contradictory or on form can supersede the 
other. As proposed by Stiles and Taylor (2001), Williamson (1996) that both helped and 
will continue to inform the understanding of economic organization. 
3.1. Introduction 
3.2. Some Fundamentals of AT 
3.3. The Role of Law and Corporate 
Governance 
3.4. A Comparison between AT and TCE 
3.5. Summary 
The structure of this Chapter is 
organised as: section 3.1. gives the 
introduction. Section 3.2. reviews some 
fundamentals of AT. Section 3.3. 
illustrates the role of law and corporate 
governance from the perspective of AF. 
Section 3.4. makes a comparison between AT and "I'CE. Section 3.5. summaries the 
whole chapter. 
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3.2. Some Fundamentals of AT 
3.2.1. Agency Relationship 
At the most fundamental level, AT starts with the definition of an organisation. 
Specifically, an organisation is referred to as "a legal entity that serves as a nexus of 
contract for a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts among disparate 
individuals" (Jensen, 2000, p. 137). These contracts or internal "rules of the game" 
specify the rights of each agent in the organisation, performance criteria on which 
agents are evaluated, and the payoff functions they face. The contractual structure 
combines with available production technologies and external legal constraints to 
determine the cost function for delivering an output within a particular form of 
organisation (Jensen, 1986). Within such a contractual framework, AT mentions that the 
organisations, including large open corporations, large professional partnerships, 
financial mutuals, and nonprofits, have the problems that result from separation of 
decision management (initiation and implementation) and control (ratification and 
monitoring) of decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1993b). 
Having this initial observation been made, AT then emphasizes on the concept of 
agency relationship. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 5), an agency 
relationship can be defined as "a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some services on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authorities to the agent. " Given that 
individuals are Resourceful, Evaluative Maximizer recognised from the REMM model 
demonstrated by Jensen and Meckling (1994), there is reason to believe that the agent 
may not always act in the best interests of the principal(s). As expressed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p. 5) "if parties to the relationships are utility maximizers, there is a 
good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal(s). " That is, since the agent may at most own a fraction of the total residual 
claims (e. g. the shares of common stock), he doesn't bear the total wealth consequences 
stemming from his decisions regarding the operation of company. Instead, the agent 
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may enjoy the full amount of any perquisites or appropriations from extraction the 
principals. As a result, the agent has incentives to act on his own benefits and in 
detriment to the principals' interests. It is this misalignment between the interests of 
principal(s) and agent gives the origin to what are designed in AT as agency costs. 
Based on the arguments proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their work of 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Cosis and Owner ship Struciur e, the 
following section emphasizes on the agency costs. 
3.2.2. Agency Costs 
In order to provide a clear picture of the agency costs, the followings present an analysis 
from the perspectives of both the principal and the agent. On one side, the principal can 
limit divergence from his interests by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent 
and by incurring monitoring mechanisms designed to limit the aberrant activities of the 
agents. On the other hand, in some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources 
(bonding costs) in making sure that he will not take certain actions which would harm 
the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such 
actions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This view is very similar to the argument of 
bilateral dependence proposed by TCE. In terms of TCE, the principal engages in 
monetary specific-assets as they have to pay the agent for the services provided and set 
up the monitoring mechanisms. The agent, on the other hand, engages in the human 
specific-assets as they may need the specific knowledge or skills to provide services 
required by the principal. In such a circumstance, both parties are locked into the 
specific assets, and the incentives for them to work things out by providing appropriate 
safeguards rather than prematurely terminating the transactions are apparent. 
Moreover, AT further argues that it is generally impossible for the principal or the 
agent at zero cost to ensure that agent will make optimal decisions from the principal's 
viewpoint. In most agency relationships, the principal and agent will incur positive 
monitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addition 
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there will be some divergence between the agent's decisions and those decisions which 
would maximize the welfare of the principal (Jensen, 2004). The dollar equivalent of 
the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal as a result of this divergence is 
another cost of agency relationship, and it is referred to as the residual loss. 
By putting all together, agency costs are defined as the sum of (1) the 
expenditures for providing monitoring mechanisms by the principal; (2) the bonding 
costs by the agent; and (3) the residual loss. The last is the key feature, since the other 
two are incurred only in the degree to which they yield cost-effective reductions in the 
residual loss (Jensen, 2000). In particular, residual loss is the reduction in value of firm 
that obtains when the principal (or investor) dilutes his ownership. The shift out of 
profits and into managerial discretion induced by the dilution of ownership is 
responsible for this loss (Jensen, 2005). 
It is worth mentioning the generality of agency costs/problems. As argued by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 6), "the problem of inducing an agent to behave as if he 
were maximizing the principal's welfare is quite general. " Agency costs/problems arise 
in any situation involving cooperative effort by two or more people even though there is 
no clear-cut principal-agent relationship. It exists at every level of management in firms, 
in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in governmental authorities and bureaus, in 
unions, and so forth. As stated earlier, this study confines its attention to only a small 
part of this general problem-the analysis of agency costs generated by the contractual 
arrangements between the owners and management of corporation (or between the 
controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders) with special attention to 
corporate governance. 
3.2.3. Behaviour Assumptions of Human Actors 
The view of AT in behaviour assumptions falls extremely on the concept of incentives 
or creation of incentives of human actors. Indeed, the issue of incentives goes to the 
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heart of what it means to maximize or optimize, to the very core of what it means to 
choose. Rational individuals always choose the option that makes them better oft' as 
they set it. This is, by definition, the purposeful action-the attempt to accomplish some 
end. For instance, an individual takes action A over action B because he expects A to 
result in better outcomes. In a study named The nature of man, Jensen and Meckling 
(1994) use the Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximizing Model (REMM) to explain the 
behaviour of human actors and further validate their argument in incentives. Some 
fundamentals of the REMM model are provided below6: 
Postulate 1. Every individual cares; he is an evaluator. This is to argue that (a) 
individual cares about almost everything: knowledge, independence, the plight of others, 
the environment, honour, interpersonal relationship, status, wealth, culture, and so forth; 
(b) individual is always willing to make trade-offs and substitutions. Each individual is 
always willing to give up some sufficiently small amount of any particular good for 
some sufficiently large quantity of other goods. Furthermore, valuation is relative in the 
sense that the value of a unit of any particular good decreases as the individual enjoys 
more of it relative to other goods; and (c) individual preferences are transitive-that is, 
il 'A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C. This is similar to 
the notion of transitivity in microeconomics. 
Pustulule H. Each individual s" tii'ant. ti are unlimited. This is to say that (a) each 
individual prefers more goods to less. Goods can be anything from art objects to ethical 
norms; and (b) the individual can not be satisfied. Ile always wants more of some things 
either material goods or non-material goods. 
Postulate III Each individual is a maximizer: This means that individual attempts 
to obtain the highest level of value possible. However, individuals are always 
constrained in satisfying their wants. Wealth, time, and physical laws of nature are 
examples of important constraints. Individuals are also constrained by the limits of their 
knowledge about various goods and opportunities. Thus, as illustrated by Jensen and 
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Meckling (1994, p. 4), the notion of an opportunity set provides the limit on the level of 
value attainable by any individual. " 
Postulate IV The individual is res"ourcef il. By this, Jensen and Meckling (1994) 
mean that individuals are creative. They are able to conceive of changes in their 
environment, foresee the consequences thereof, and respond by creating new 
opportunities. Human beings are not only capable of learning about new opportunities, 
they also engage in resourceful, creative activities that expand their opportunities in 
various ways. Obviously, this is very similar with the argument of feasible foresight 
proposed by TCE. Both of them argue that individuals have the capacity to look ahead, 
to work things out, to learn about new opportunities, and so forth. 
With regard to the other two behaviour assumptions of ICE, AT proposes the 
similar arguments. In respect to bounded rationality proposed by TCE, Jensen (1994, 
p. 1) discusses the universal tendency of people to behave in non-rational. He argues that 
"... though they are Resourceful, Evaluative Maximizer human, they are imperfect in the 
sense that have inherited a brain that is biologically structured so as to blind them from 
perceiving and correcting certain types of errors... " Accordingly, Jensen and Meckling 
(1994) argue that it is costly, if not impossible, to write contracts representing claims on 
a firm which clearly delineate the rights of holders for all possible contingencies. Thus, 
due to bounded rationality, complex contracts are also treated as incomplete in AT. For 
the assumption of opportunism in TCE, it is argued that AT refers to moral hazard and 
adverse selection rather than opportunism. But the concerns are the same, whence these 
are merely terminological differences (Williamson, 1996). The upshot is that both Al' 
and TCE work out of substantially identical behaviour assumptions. The followings 
provide a brief analysis of moral hazard and adverse selection proposed by Al' 
respectively. 
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3.2.4. Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 
According to the argument stated by Padilla (2004, p. 5), "both the principal and the 
agent are confronted with uncertainty. " And, this uncertainty may appear in various 
ways. First of all, the principal is uncertain about actions undertaken by the agent and/or 
information held by the agent. In the mainstream-economic theories, such principal's 
uncertainty is usually referred to as the information asymmetry. There is a state of 
asymmetric information because the agent holds information that the principal does not 
(Jensen, 2003). Secondly, uncertainty bears on the outcomes of agent's actions. An 
agent is uncertain about the outcomes of his actions. For the principal, this latter 
phenomenon manifests itself more precisely in the fact that the principal is uncertain 
about the causality between agent's actions and the outcomes (Jensen, 1986). 
Thus, the issues of uncertainty which exist between the principal and the agent 
impose certain constraints that complicate the forming of complete contract. In 
particular, two kinds of problems contribute to such constraints, namely, the problem of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. 
3.2.4.1. Moral Hazard 
A moral hazard problem arises when the principal cannot observe the agent's actions 
because (]) there is a positive cost of monitoring; agent's actions, and (2) he is not even 
able to perfectly infer agent's actions by observing the outcomes because the agent's 
actions may not completely determine the outcomes (DeMarzo and Fishman, 2007). 
Traditionally, the literature argues that this latter phenomenon may result from the 
intervention of an unexpected-random-exogenous occurrence that has influenced the 
outcomes, that is to say, it would be the consequence of' some kind of windfall or 
misfortune and not of the agent's actions (Padilla, 2002; 2004). 
Due to the problem of moral hazard, the principal faces two major difficulties in 
designing the contracts completely. First, he can not design the contracts based on 
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observing of the agent's actions because the costs of monitoring such actions are 
generally and relatively prohibitive. Second, the principal can not entirely predicate the 
contracts on the outcomes of the agent's actions. That is because he is uncertain about 
the causality between the agent's actions and the outcome. DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) 
argue that even if the principal would predicate the contracts on the observation of 
agent's actions anyway, the agent would not sign the contracts because he is risk-averse 7 
All in all, this is to say that such difficulties prevent the principal from designing the 
complete contracts contingent on either the agent's actions or outcomes of these actions. 
It is difficult for the principal to contractually assign the full consequences to actions 
taken by the agent (Jensen, 2004). Consequently, the agent may be able to engage in 
opportunistically discretionary behaviour, that is to say, undertake actions that may 
undermine the utility of the principal (Padilla, 2002). Kotowitz (1987, p. 549) defines 
moral hazard as "actions of economic agents in maximizing their own utility in the 
detriment of others, in situations where they do not bear the full consequences or, 
equivalently, do not enjoy the full benefits of their actions due to uncertainty and 
incomplete or restricted contracts which prevent the assignment of full damages 
(benefits) to the agent responsible. " 
Moral hazard problems have been identified in various kinds of contractual 
relationships. While it may be interesting to consider several different examples in 
different areas, the following provides an example in field of corporate finances. In case 
of stock issuing by company A through either Initial Public Offerings or Seasoned 
Equity Offerings, individuals or institutional investors may wish to invest in this 
company in return for a promise of bonuses and profits. As long as there is a possibility 
of default which normally results from the actions of company A, as argued by both 
Padilla (2004) and Demarzo and Fishman (2007), there is a moral hazard problem since 
the diverse and/or minority shareholders cannot afford the costs of providing a system 
to efficiently monitor company A's actions and perfectly observe the outcomes of 
actions taken by Company A as these actions may not completely determine the 
outcomes. 
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3.2.4.2. Adverse Selection 
An adverse selection problem appears when the agent possesses information that may 
be useful to his decision-making, but the principal does not acknowledge that. 
Consequently, the principal cannot know if the agent has made the most appropriate 
decision in light of the information possessed by the agent precisely because the 
principal does not have this information. In more standard terminology, the principal 
faces up to an asymmetric-information situation (Jensen, 2003). In an adverse selection 
problem, the costs of monitoring the agent's actions are not at stake insofar as the 
principal is not in possession of the information held by the agent. Again, he is not able 
to know if the agent's actions are appropriate (Shapiro, 2005). 
The origin of adverse selection problem can be traced back in articles of Akerlof 
(1970) and Wilson (1980). The elementary argument is that "... sellers (agents) can 
better observe the quality of the products that they sell while buyers (the principals) can 
only observe the average quality. The consequence is that sellers have an informational 
advantage over the buyers. The sellers then can sell the low-quality products at the same 
price as high quality products since buyers cannot tell the difference between a good 
and a bad product" (Akerlof, 1970, p. 489-490). Furthermore, Wilson (1980) argues that 
when buyers have heterogeneous preferences, there may be multiple equilibria and, in 
particular, that the nature of equilibrium varies with the nature of the institution or 
convention which sets the price. Following the arguments of Akerlof (1970) and Wilson 
(1980), the literature has produced further developments and analysis on the nature of 
the market and equilibria in presence of adverse selection. These developments tackle 
adverse selection with different approaches and/or introducing further refinements. 
The following example proceeds from Demarzo and Fishman's work (2007) in the 
context of investment dynamics. They illustrate that because of the agency problem, the 
agent may know more about firm's current cash flow than investors-for example, the 
agent may privately observe the current cash flow or privately observe his current effort 
choice. It is argued that except för the agency problem, there is no issue of asymmetric 
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information. That is, in each period, the agent and investors have symmetric information 
regarding all investment opportunities, agent and investor payoffs, and so forth. This 
rules out setting in which the agent knows more than investors about the future cash 
flows of the firm, for example, because the agent has private information about future 
investment opportunities or cash flows or because the agent uses hidden savings to alter 
future cash flows. Another example is earnings management. Earnings management is 
defined by Healy and Wahlen (1999) as a means that used by the management to either 
"mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes" (p. 368). Obviously, the problem of 
adverse selection due to asymmetric information is created between the management 
and stakeholders in such a circumstance. 
3.3. The Role of Law and Corporate Governance 
More generally, this section starts with analysing the factors which can differentiate the 
magnitude of different agency problems/costs across countries according to the 
differences in property right and contract law. With regard to corporate governance, AT 
proposes the similar argument with TCE by considering it as a set of mechanisms that 
can offer investors protections in order to mitigate opportunistic behaviour. And, both 
theories state that any improvements of corporate governance system can be seen as the 
efforts to minimise opportunistically discretionary behaviour thus lower agency costs 
and transaction costs among different groups according to the different risk bearing and 
asset-specialised transactions respectively (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; b; Williamson, 
1984a; 2005b). The corporate governance mechanisms proposed by AT can either be 
external or internal. While the former includes the determinants of the stock market and 
market of takeovers, the internal mechanisms consider with both incentive and 
monitoring activities inside the organisation. 
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3.3.1. The Role of Law: Property Right and Contract Law 
3.3.1.1. Property Right 
La Porta et al., (1998) examine how legal systems pertaining to investor protection 
differ across countries and the consequences of such differences. They gather data 
concerning the legal systems of 49 countries that have listed companies. For each 
country, they take note on the package of property right that the law assigns to 
shareholders and use this information to create an "antidirector-rights index". The core 
idea is that the higher property right shareholders have the easier it is for them to 
exercise their power against opportunistic discretion in the firms. Similarly, for 
debt-holders a "creditor rights index" is created based on the same principle that rights 
are only appropriate if they are backed by the law. Moreover, a proxy for the quality of 
law enforcement of property right for the sample countries is also built. In particular, 
they classify the countries into two main legal families: the civil-law or French tradition 
and the common-law or English tradition. While the civil law-tradition "uses statutes 
and comprehensive codes as a primary means of ordering legal material, and relies 
heavily on legal scholars to ascertain and formulate its rules", the common law is 
formed by judges who have to resolve specific disputes and precedents from judicial 
decisions, as opposed by contributions by scholars, shape common law" (La Yorta el al., 
1998, p. 11l9). Based on the results, they argue that (a) property laws differ markedly 
around the world, (b) countries whose legal rules originate in the common law tradition 
tend to protect the property right of investors considerably more than countries whose 
laws originate in the civil law, and (c) ownership concentration is extremely high around 
the world; in an average country, close to half the equity in a publicly traded company is 
owned by the three largest shareholders. Furthermore, they also indicate that 
concentration is indeed a response to poor level of protection on investor's property 
right, as good accounting standards and shareholder protection measures are associated 
with a lower concentration of ownership. 
By following the similar methods in their 1998's work, La Porta ei al., (1999) 
focus on ownership concentration and investor protection of 27 wealth nations around 
52 
the world. More generally, they find evidence suggesting the pervasiveness of another 
form of conflicts of interests that is between the controlling shareholders and the 
minority shareholders. Outside U. S., particularly at countries with poor shareholder 
protection, even the largest firms tend to have controlling shareholders. These 
controlling shareholders have the power to expropriate the minority shareholders as well 
as the interests in doing so. And, in consistent with the argument proposed in their 
1998's work, they argue that ownership concentration is a consequence of poor legal 
protection of minority shareholders' property right. 
Continuing with their study in this area, La Porta el al., (2000a; b; 2002) propose 
an argument that managers as well as the controlling shareholders are constrained in 
their expropriations of wealth and perquisites through effectively protecting the property 
right. To investigate this argument, they utilise portion of 1998 database and 
complement with accounting and marketing data from the listed companies across 
countries. They find that poor shareholder protection is penalised with lower stock 
market valuation, and that higher cash-flow ownership by controlling shareholder 
improves such valuation, especially in countries with poor investor protection. And 
finally, they suggest that shareholder protections on property expropriates are important 
for stock market developments because where laws are protective for outside inventors 
and well enforced; investors are willing to finance firms, and financial markets are both 
broader and more valuable. 
3.3.1.2. Contract Law 
Another important aspect emphasised by the law and finance literature refers to the 
characteristics of contract law and the way in which it is applied in dispute resolution. 
By following La Porta el a!., 's argument of controlling shareholders, Johnson el al., 
(2000) also focus on the action being taken by the controlling shareholders for their own 
benefit, at the expense of minority shareholders. And, they call this action as 
"tunneling". In regard to contract law, they propose that "countries with legal system 
based on civil-law emphasise the predictability of the law" (Johnson e/ al., 2000, p. 23), 
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it means that legal rules are quite strict in the sense that controlling shareholders can get 
away with expropriation of minority shareholders' wealth as long as their actions 
rigorously conform to the letter of law. The following admittedly extreme case taken 
from Brealey ei al., (2007) is pertinent. Specifically, a controlling shareholder realises 
that a reverse stock split can be used to loot the company's assets. Ile therefore proposes 
that the existing shareholders receive I new share in place of every 136,000 shares they 
currently held. Why does the controlling shareholder pick the number 136,000? Because 
the two minority shareholders own less than 136,000 shares, therefore they do not have 
the right to any new share(s). Instead they are simply paid off with the par value of their 
shares and the controlling shareholder is left owning the entire company. As pointed out 
by Brealey el al., (2007), since a reverse stock split requires only the approval of a 
simple controlling shareholder in this case, the proposal is voted through. Moreover, 
Johnson ei cal., (2000) state that these elements of legal system have weakened the 
developments of stock markets in civil law countries both rich and poor. 
For the common law system, Johnson ei al.. (2000) suggest that it can offer better 
protection to the minority shareholders because it emphasises the notion of fairness. In 
common law countries, as the law is developed by the judges through decisions of 
courts and similar tribunals rather than through legislative statues, the duties of loyalty 
and care are thus important. It can cover the unforeseen situations that do not need to be 
clearly stated in the original letter of contract law. In such a circumstance, insiders of 
the companies are more likely to be found liable if they engage in self-dealing or other 
actions destined to expropriate other shareholders' benefits. In contrast to the legal 
system of civil law countries, these characteristics in the common law countries can be 
used to promote the growth and stability of financial markets. 
3.3.2. Corporate Governance in Perspective of AT 
Corporate governance has been categorised as a set of mechanisms protecting investors 
from opportunistic behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). These mechanisms can either 
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be internal or external. As proposed by Fama and Jensen (1983a; b), it is the fact that the 
unrestricted nature of common stock residual claims allows special market (external 
mechanisms) and organisational mechanisms (internal mechanisms) for controlling the 
agency problems of specialised risk bearing. By following their argument, this section is 
divided into two subsections-one section focuses on the external mechanisms of 
corporate governance while the other considers the internal mechanisms. 
3.3.2.1. The External Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
--Stock Market and Market for Takeovers 
According to Jensen (2004), the unrestricted alienability of the residual claims of open 
corporations gives rise to an external monitoring device unique to these 
organisations--a stock market that specialises in pricing common stocks and 
transferring them at low cost. Stock prices are visible signals that summarise the 
implications of internal decisions for current and future net cash flows. This external 
monitoring exerts pressure to orient a corporation's decisions process towards the 
interests of residual claimants. 
For the takeover market, Jensen (2004) argues that external monitoring from a 
takeover market is also unique to the open corporation and is attributable to the 
unrestricted nature of its residual claims. Because the residual claims are freely 
alienable and separable from the roles in the decision process, "attacking managers can 
[thus] circumvent existing managers and the current board to gain control of the 
decision process" (Jensen, 2004, p. 556). This is accomplished by a director offer to 
purchase stock (a tender offer) or by an appeal for stockholder votes Ior directors (a 
proxy fight). 
In China, due to the unique cultural and institutional background, Chinese listed 
companies are regulated by a uniform legal system, and most of them are dominated by 
one controlling shareholder which is the State (Bai el al., 2004). It is argued that the 
external controlling mechanisms, such as an effective stock market and market for 
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merger and acquisitions (M&A) may play very limited role in constraining 
opportunistically discretionary behaviour comparing with the Western countries. For 
instance, On Kit Tam (1999, p. 3) argues that "... because of the special institutional 
structure of Chinese listed companies [State domination in most cases], the external 
stock market for corporate control is effectively limited if not eliminated. " The market 
for M&A has been relatively quiet in China as well. Statistically, by the end of 2006, 
the total M&A transaction volume has increased to 2-3% of the China's GDP from only 
1% in 1997. Liu and Lu (2007, p890) state that "... an active takeover market does not 
exist in China... [and] it still lags behind developed market and most Asian peers. " By 
putting all together, while the external governance mechanisms may pronounce to be 
efficient in mitigating the opportunistic behaviour in the Western countries, it is not the 
case in China. How can agency costs be limited or controlled if these external forces arc 
less pronounced? This calls for the internal controlling forces, specifically, the incentive 
and monitoring activities. 
3.3.2.2. The Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
a. The Incentive Activities 
According to Jensen (2003; 2004; 2005), the internal controlling forces include both 
incentive and monitoring activities. The former mainly deals with the compensation 
strategies for the executives. The components of executive compensation can be 
grouped into three categories: (1) compensation that does not depend on firm 
performance (salary, pensions, and insurance); (2) compensation that depends on market 
measures of firm performance (restricted and phantom stock, stock options, and stock 
appreciation rights); and (3) compensation that depends on accounting measures of 
performance (bonus, performance units, and performance shares) (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990; 2004). Based on the arguments stated by Jensen (2003), the section below 
analyses and evaluates each of these three categories in relation to their power in 
mitigating agency problems/costs. 
Firstly, compensation in form of salary payments fixed at the beginning of the 
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period controls the major sources of conflict, primarily through future adjustments in 
salary. This will be most effective in controlling younger managers where the present 
value of future salary subject to renegotiation is large. However, for managers closer to 
retirement, the control afforded by adjustment in future salary is less; in the extreme 
case, for managers less than a year from planned retirement, future salary changes 
provide no control of the effort problem (Jensen, 2003). 
For the market-based compensation provisions, Jensen (2003) argues that they are 
well suited to control the effort and horizon problems, since the market value of stock 
reflects present value of the entire future stream of expected cash flows. For instance, 
because the expected payoff to stock options increases with stock variance, options 
provide manager with incentives to invest in projects that increase the riskiness of firm's 
cash flows. Options thus help to control manager's incentives to take too little risk. 
Stock options also help control the underleverage problem. Higher leverage becomes 
more attractive to manager since it increases the variance of equity and thus the value of' 
options. However, as expressed by Jensen (2003, p. 146), 'unless options are adjusted 
for dividend paid, they reinforce the overretention incentive associated with fixed 
claims. " In the situation of overretention, it is argued that managers compensated with 
fixed claims on the corporation have incentives to retain funds within the firm to 
increase the coverage on their fixed claims. Thus, if stock options and dividend paid 
policy is uncorrelated, investors may never get dividends paid. 
And finally, Jensen (2003) argues that the accounting-based performance 
measures will be relatively more important in compensating middle managers than 
market-based measures of performance, since these measures allow disaggregation of 
the firm's total performance among divisions. In particular, bonus plans explicitly tic 
managers' compensation to an accounting measure (e. g., net profit, RUF, IPS) of the 
change in value of the firm. This form of tie to performance reduces the costs resulting 
from conflicts over the effort and horizon problems between the managers and the 
shareholders. In addition, since bonus plans are tied to the pervious year's performance, 
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they can also motivate near-retirement managers to care about performance in their last 
years. 
h. The Monitoring Activities 
For the monitoring activities, Jensen (2004; 2005) mainly emphasizes on the role played 
by the board. In particular, it is argued that monitoring control force in open corporation 
is delegated by residual claimants to the board. Residual claimants generally retain 
approval rights (by vote) on such matters as board membership, auditor choice, mergers 
and new stock issues. Other management and control functions are delegated by the 
residual claimants to the boards. The board then delegates most decision management 
functions and many decision control functions to the relevant sub-committees, but it 
retains ultimate control over them, including the rights to ratify and monitor major 
policy initiatives and to hire, fire, and set the compensation of top level decisions 
managers. 
Moreover, Jensen (2004) argues that in order to he efficient, the board is to be 
composed of both internal managers and outside/non-executive directors. On one hand, 
it is natural to believe that the internal managers are the most influential members since 
they have valuable specific intormation, for example the information about the daily 
operations, the capital structure of a specific investment, the corporate law, the relevant 
technology and so forth. Such information can act as an important support to top 
managers in dealing with special decision problems. However, as expressed by Jensen 
(2004, p. 886), "the hoard is not an effective device for decision control unless it limits 
the decision discretion of' individual top managers-this signals the absence of' 
separation of decision management and decision control, and, in our theory, the 
organisation suffers in the competition for survival. " In order to handle this, corporate 
hoards should also include outside/non-executive members, that is, members who are 
not internal managers, and they should hold a majority of scats. The non-executive 
hoard members act as arbiters in disagreements among internal managers and carry out 
tasks that involve serious agency problems between internal managers and residual 
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claimants, for instance, setting executive compensation or searching for replacements 
for top managers (e. g., Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen, 2004,2005; Shapiro, 2005). 
Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983b) states that non-executive directors have incentives 
to develop reputations as experts in decision control. They use their directorships to 
signal to internal and external markets for decision agents that (1) they are decision 
experts, (2) they understand the importance of diffuse and separation decision control, 
and (3) they can work with such decision control systems. 
Besides, other mechanisms of corporate governance are also mentioned by Jensen 
(2004; 2005). He argues that monitoring activities become specialised to those 
institutions and individuals who possess comparative advantages in these activities. For 
institutional investors and financial institutions, he mentions the importance of being 
active to minimise agency costs, " ... 
I mean an [active] investor who actually monitors 
management, sits on boards, is sometimes involved in dismissing management, is often 
intimately involved in the strategic direction of the company, and on occasion even 
manages... and as a response to problems caused by the lack of' effective monitoring of 
corporate managers, [continuing] developments in financial institutions is crucial" 
(Jensen, 2000, p. 64-67). He also points out the importance of auditing with special 
efforts on audit committee and external auditors. In particular, an audit committee 
should be an outstanding function in monitoring activities. And, in order to be efficient, 
it has to be entirely composed of non-executive directors. And, in principle, external 
auditors could act as a checking point to make sure the financial information provided 
to the public is comprehensive, punctual, and accurate. 
3.4. A Comparison between AT and TCE 
Having the fundamentals and applications of' T in the field of' law and corporate 
governance been briefly reviewed in previous sections, this section aims to provide a 
comparison between AI' and i'CF. AT shares many similarities with For instance, 
both share the argument that managers operate under hounded rationality and are profit 
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maximisers, the concern that all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete, the 
problem that managers enjoy nontrivial degree of discretion, and the assumption that 
managers are given to opportunism and moral hazard that may expropriate the benefits 
of shareholders. Stiles and Taylor (2001, p. 33) point out that "bosh theories [AT and 
TCE] work on nearly symmetric assumptions... [and] both regard the board of directors 
as an instrument of control. " However, there are still differences between these two 
theories. The most significant one is that AT examines contract predominately from an 
ex ante incentive-alignment point of view while TCE is more concerned with crafting ex 
post governance structures within which the integrity of contract is decided (Williamson, 
1996). Differences between AT and TCE with respect to their choice unit of analysis, 
focal cost concern, risk factor, and contractual focus are largely responsible for the 
above incentive/governance differences. These categories of differences are illustrated 
in Table 3.1. and relevant explanations are provided in the following analysis. 
Table 3.1.: Comparison between AF and ICE; 
Agency Theory (AT) Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
Unit of Analysis Principal/agent relationship Transaction 
Focal cost concern Residual loss Maladaptation 
Delegation: Exchange: 
Risk Factor - Separation ownership and -Asset-specificity 
control 
Ex ante alignment to minimize Ex post governance to minimize 
Contractual focus agency costs transaction costs 
(i. e. incentives and monitoring) (i. e., market, hybrid, and hierarchy) 
Sources: Beccerra and Gupta (1999), p. 179 and Williamson (1996), p. 179. 
Recall from the previous discussion, AT is based on the dyadic contractual 
relationship between one party, the principal, who delegates certain tasks to another 
party, the agent. As proposed by Beccerra and Gupta (1999), Al' applies to one dyadic 
vertical relationship from the perspective of one of the parties: the principal. In contrast, 
the basic unit of analysis is generally referred to as the transaction in "1'CE. For instance, 
Williamson (1985) argues that not only does "ICI; agree that the transaction is the basic 
unit of analysis, but it views governance as an economizing response to Commons triple 
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(Commons, 1932). 
Rather than focusing on the ex ante costs where residual loss originated from the 
divergence of interests between the principal and the agent is the key feature in Al', TCE 
emphasizes ex post costs where maladaptation costs due to misalignments as a result of 
gaps, errors, omissions, and unanticipated disturbances during contract execution period 
are the key features. Such costs occur only in an inter-temporal, incomplete-contracting 
context. Reducing these costs through judicious choice of governance structure (market, 
hybrid, and hierarchy), rather than merely realigning incentives and pricing them out, is 
the distinctive TCE orientation. 
For the risk factor, AT argues that the principal bears the risk of his delegation to 
the agent of certain tasks due to the separation of ownership and control. In particular, 
the principal will carry the benefits and costs of the delegated tasks which entail risks 
inherent to the task resulting from environmental uncertainty. And, the principal also 
suffers the risk of the agent not behaving in the best interests of the principal (Jensen, 
2003). Both of these types of risk arise from the attitudinal and informational context in 
which the agency relationship takes place (Beccerra and Cupta, 1999). With regard to 
asset specificity, TCE; defines it as to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to 
alternative uses/or by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value. 
Furthermore, it argues that where asset specificity is great, both buyer and seller will 
encompass higher risk and the corresponding losses if the contract prematurely 
terminated (for the reason of bilateral dependency through Fundamental 
Transformation). Accordingly, both ofthem are willing to make special efforts to design 
exchange that has good continuity properties. 
For the contractual focus, AT aims to design a contract ex ante which can 
efficiently align the different interests between the principal and the agent in order to 
minimize agency costs to the principal of the agency relationship. T CE, on the other 
hand, focuses on how to align transactions, which differ in their attributes, with 
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governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies ex pos!, in a 
discriminating, mainly transaction cost economizing way. 
In summary, it is argued that although these two theories concentrate on different 
perspectives of contracting (ex ante vs. ex post), they are mainly complementary rather 
than contradictory or one form can supersede the other. As proposed by Stiles and 
Taylor (2001), Williamson (1996) that both helped and will continue to inform the 
understanding of economic organisation. 
3.5. Summary 
In general, the Agency Theory (or AT) developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
mainly focuses on how to structure the contractual relation between the principal and 
the agent to provide appropriate incentives and monitoring mechanisms ex un/c to 
minimise the agency costs so that the agent could maximize the principal's welfare. 
With regard to the fundamentals of AT, the agency relationship takes place when 
the principal engages the agent to perform some services on his/her behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authorities to the agent. The corresponding 
agency costs may include the monitoring expenditures, bonding costs, and residual loss. 
Based on the analysis of behaviour assumptions of' human actors through the 
Resourceftil, Evaluative, Maximizing Model (or RI? MM), there are two specific 
problems in respect to agency costs, namely the moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Differences in both the property right and contract law may contribute to the 
magnitude of different agency problems/costs across countries. Having the legal 
background been set, the mechanisms of corporate governance that protect investors 
from opportunistic behaviours include two major categories: the external and internal 
mechanisms. While the external mechanisms include the stock market and the market of 
takeovers, the internal system mainly deals with the executive compensation, board, 
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institutional investors, audit committee, and external audit. 
And finally, this chapter makes a comparison between Al- and TCE. The objective 
is to find out the similarities as well as the differences between these two major theories 
reviewed. By analysing four major factors (unit of analysis, focal cost concern, risk 
factor, and contractual focus), it is argued that while AT and TCE share many 
similarities, the most significant difference is that AT examines contract predominately 
from an ex ante incentive-alignment or monitoring point of view while TCE is more 
concerned with crafting ex post governance structures within which the integrity of 
contract is decided. By putting all together, these two theories should be viewed as 
complementary rather than contradictory or one form can supersede the other. 
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Chapter 4: Corporate Governance 
(Codes, Guidelines and Rules 
4.1. Introduction 
During the last decade, each year has seen introduction, or revision, of a corporate 
governance code in a number of countries. These countries have encompassed a variety 
of legal backgrounds (for example, common law in the U. K., civil law in France), 
cultural and political contexts (such as democracy in Australia, socialism in China), 
business forms (for instance, public corporations in the U. S., family-owned firms in 
Singapore), and share ownership (such as institutional investor-dominated in the U. K. 
and U. S., State ownership in China). In each of these countries, the introduction of 
corporate governance codes has generally been motivated by a desire for more 
transparency and accountability, and a desire to increase investor confidence of both 
potential and existing investors in the stock markets. In addition, the developments of 
the codes have often been driven by financial scandals, corporate collapses, or similar 
crises (Mallin, 2007). For example, the Cadbury Report (U. K. ) was published in 1992 
following various financial scandals or collapses, such as Coloroll, Polly Peck, and 
Maxwell. Similarly, after the accounting scandals at Enron, Xerox, and WorldCom, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was taken into force in 2002. 
The corporate governance codes/guidelines have been issued by a variety of 
bodies arrange from committees, appointed by government departments and usually 
include prominent respected figures from business and industry, representatives from 
the investment community, professional bodies, and academics, through to stock 
exchange bodies, various investor representative groups, such as those representing 
directors or company secretaries. With regard to the compliance with the 
codes/guidelines, it is generally based on a voluntary disclosure basis, whilst some 
codes, such as the U. K. 's Combined Code (2006), are on a 'comply or explain basis', 
that is, either a company has to comply fully with the code and state it has done so, or it 
explains why it has not (Mallin, 2007; Monks and Minow, 2008 ) 
Based on the OECD principles of corporate governance (2004), the ('adle of 
Corporate Gove>"nanee, fi)r Listed ('ompanies in China (hereafter referred to as the Code) 
that intends to build the integrity of financial statements through improving corporate 
governance system and bring forward the healthy development oC the stock markets in 
China was published by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 
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January 2002. The Code which is the first official document regarding corporate 
governance in the mainland China serves as the yardstick by which a company is able to 
measure its corporate governance. There are seven chapters included in the Code. In this 
chapter, other than briefly reviewing each chapter contained in the Code, an in-depth 
evaluation of the current corporate governance system in China will also be provided. 
Before moving to explore the China's 2002 Code and its corporate governance 
system, this chapter starts with defining what it means by the term, corporate 
governance. Next, it analyses the different structures of the boards, in particular the one- 
tier board model and the two-tier board model. For the former model, both executive 
and non-executive directors operate together in one organisational layer. The two-tier 
board model distinguishes from it by including an additional organisational layer--the 
supervisory board which is designed to separate executive function of the board from its 
monitoring function. 
4.1. Introduction 
4.2. Defining Corporate Governance 
4.3. Two Distinctive Board Structures- 
one-tier or two tier board model 
4.4. Corporate Governance in China 
4.5. An Evaluation of China's Corporate 
Governance System 
4.6. Summary 
Section 4.1. provides an introduction of 
the chapter; based on the recent 
literature, section 4.2. defines corporate 
governance; section 4.3. distinguishes 
different models of hoard structures; 
section 4.4. analyses corporate 
governance in China with emphasis on 
tile l nlna s LUUL ( octet section 4.5. 
provides an in-depth evaluation of the current corporate governance system in China; 
and linally, section 4.6. summaries the whole chapter. 
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4.2. Defining Corporate Governance 
While the fundamentals of corporate governance have been reviewed and analysed in 
relation to TCE and AT in the last two chapters respectively, a clear and condense 
definition of corporate governance is still required to be identified. The followings 
review the concept of corporate governance from different perspectives based on the 
literature. 
Gillan and Starks (1998, p. 5) define corporate governance as "the system of laws, 
rules, and factors that control operations at a company. " A firm's governance, they say, 
comprises the set of structures that provide boundaries for the firm's operations. This set 
of structures includes participants in corporate activities, such as managers, workers, 
and suppliers of capital; the returns to those participants; and the constraints under 
which they operate. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance in terms of 
the economic interests of participants. In particular, they refer to corporate governance 
as dealing "... with ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves 
of getting a return on their investment" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 13). Similarly, 
Zingales (1998, p. 4) defines corporate governance as "... the complex set of constraints 
that shape the ex-post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by the firm. " More 
recently, Denis and McConnell (2003, p. 1-2) define corporate governance as "... the set 
of mechanisms-both institutional and market-based-that induce the seif-interested 
controllers of a company (those that make decisions regarding how the company will be 
operated) to make decisions that maximize the value of the company to its owners (the 
suppliers of capital). " By putting all together, in a much condensed terminology, 
corporate governance can be described as the set of mechanisms which are composed of 
laws, rules and factors that control the operations of' a company for the purpose of' 
maximising its value to the suppliers of capital. 
There have been specific reasons for the increase in general interests in corporate 
governance. Charkham (2005, p. 6-7) identifies three: (1) the liberalisation of' capital 
flows and increased opportunities for cross-boarder investment. IIe argues that 
"... governance was recognised as an important medium- and longer-term issue by 
investors everywhere]'; "it is economically advantageous, politically stabilizing, and 
ethically desirable to secure improvements in governance and the rule of law... I and I the 
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increased possibilities for cross-boarder investment accentuate the importance of 
transparency and the trustworthiness of accounts " (Charkham, 2005, p. 6); (2) the 
second development is the shift to market economy which introduces the whole concept 
of corporate governance; and (3) the third factor is globalisation, a term can mean many 
things, from the increased propensity of major companies to trade right around the 
world. At one time major companies transferred manufacturing plants aboard to capture 
the benefits of well-trained and low-cost workforces, but now services can he offshore 
too-U. K. call centres based in India for example. Furthermore, as proposed by Zattoni 
and Cuomo (2008, p. 1), "... the forces of globalisation create competition among 
governance systems, and increase the anxiety of the political elite concerning the 
effectiveness of the national governance model. " 
Furthermore, Gillan and Starks (2003, p. 5) argues that as the corporate 
environment has changes, so too have corporate governance practices. Governance 
changes, although differing by country, have been particularly common in economies 
where the banking, capital markets, and legal systems have undergone dramatic 
changes. " Indeed, it can be recognised that changes in corporate governance are likely 
to arise as endogenous responses to environmental factors, and where the Code of 
corporate governance is definitely the one. Before analysing the first Code regarding 
corporate governance in China's companies implemented in 2002, two distinctive 
models of the hoard structures need to be clearly demonstrated. 
4.3. Two Distinctive Board Structures 
--One-tier or Two-tier Board Model 
As illustrated by Maassen (2002), regional and international developments have resulted 
in two leading approaches to the organisation oi' corporate hoards: the Anglo-Saxon 
one-tier board model and the continental F. uropcan two-tier board model. In the 
following section, these two models will be demonstrated correspondingly. There is a 
continuing debate about the effectiveness of' these two models. While some scholars 
may favour the one-tier board model, others may be against it and consent the 
effectiveness of the two-tier board model. But, a detailed assessment of the 
effectiveness of the two models is beyond the scope ofthis thesis`'. 
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In general, Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US, UK, and Canada have adopted 
variants of one-tier board model. In this model, executive and non-executive directors 
operate together in one organisation layer, the so-called the one-tier board. Some one- 
tier boards are dominated by a majority of executive directors while others are 
composed of a majority of non-executive directors. In addition, while some one-tier 
boards can have a leadership structure that separates the CEO from the Chair position, 
others operate under a structure that combines the role of the CEO with that of the 
Chairman. In literature, the latter is referred to as CEO-duality. One-tier boards also 
make often use of board committees such as audit, remuneration, nomination committee, 
and so forth (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). 
On the other hand, the continental European countries such as Germany, Finland 
and the Netherlands have adopted variants of two-tier board model. In this model, an 
additional organisational layer has been designed to separate executive function of the 
board from its monitoring function. The supervisory board (the upper layer) is entirely 
composed of non-executive supervisory directors who may represent labour, the 
government, institutional investors, and so forth. The management board or the lower 
layer is usually composed of executive managing directors (Massen, 2002). 
Mallin (2007) indicates the key distinctions between the supervisory board and 
management hoard which are demonstrated in Table 4.1. The supervisory hoard (with 
the head called the Chair) is elected by shareholders and employees and it in turn 
appoints the management board (leading by the CFO). The supervisory board has a 
control function whereas the management board manages the business. It is generally 
not accepted by corporation laws that corporate statutes foresee in the possibility that 
directors combine the CE 0 (the head of management hoard) with the Chairman roles 
(the head of the supervisory board) in two-tier hoards. Because the CIX) has no seat in 
the supervisory board, its hoard leadership structure is formally independent from the 
executive function of the board. This is particularly the case in two-tier hoards in the 
Netherlands and Germany. In variants of two-tier board models in these countries, 
executive managing directors are not entitled to have a position in the supervisory hoard 
of the corporation (Monks and Minow, 2008). 
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Table 4.1.: Summary of key differences between supervisory and management board 
Supervisory Board: the Chair Management Board: the CEO 
Members (shareholder representatives) are Members are appointed by the 
elected by the shareholders in general supervisory board 
meeting; members (employee representatives) 
are nominated by the employees 
Controls the direction of the business Manages the business 
Oversees the provision of information and that Provides various information and 
appropriate systems have been put in place by reports; and installation of 
the management board appropriate systems, e. g. a risk 
management system 
Resources: Mallin (2007), p. 162. 
In the Chinese setting, the board structure seems to be the two-tier board structure 
which is similar to that used in the Central-European countries (e. g., Germany, the 
Netherlands) (Dahya el al., 2003; Firth et al., 2010). A China's listed company is 
required to have both the supervisory board and the management hoard. While the 
former is in charge with overseeing the firm, the latter focuses on the daily operations of 
the firm. In addition, the management board needs to include the independent non- 
executives other than the executives with the monitoring aim. In order to facilitate the 
functionality of the management board, the sub-committees are recommended to he 
established. 
4.4. Corporate Governance in China 
1 laving the different structures of the board models been analysed, this section will draw 
attention to the Code of ('orporale (lovernunce for Listed ('ompa nies in ('hiriu 
formulated by the CSRC in January 2002 with the aim to build the integrity of financial 
statements through improving corporate governance system and bring forward the 
healthy development of the stock markets. It is the first ollicial document regarding 
corporate governance practices implemented in mainland China. Prior to 2002, there 
was no rule regulating corporate governance matters, except for the Company Law, 
which was promulgated in 1993 originally and further revised in 2005. Betöre moving 
to explore the China's 2002 Code, the following section provides a synopsis of C'hina's 
economy and stock markets. 
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4.4.1. An Overview of China's Economy and Stock Market 
China is rapidly developing into the largest industrial economy in the world. The 
country has sustained the strongest and most consistent economic performance of the 
region since the 1980s with an annual average economic growth rate in excess of 8% 
(Clarke, 2007). Statistically, China's exports reached US$1.22 trillion worth of goods in 
2007; it was 25.7% more than that in the previous year (Arniti and Freund, 2007). Amiti 
and Freund (2007) argue that the sophisticated exports, diversified products, and the 
growth in varieties are the key factors for China to achieve this high export growth. 
China's export dynamism is revealed in a sharp move into the advanced technology 
products (e. g. electronics, machinery). For instance, in 2007, China's export volume of 
advanced technology products (ATP) accumulated to $347.8 billion, more than seven 
times that of 2001. The percentage of AEP exports of all products increased from 17.5% 
in 2001 to 28.6% in 2007, and ATPs made by foreign-invested enterprises accounted for 
nearly 90% of all ATP exports (Amiti and Freund, 2007). For the Foreign Director 
Investment (FDI), since the 1990s, China has received great amounts of FDIs. 
Statistically, in 2007, China received a record of $74.8 billion, rose 13.6% from the 
previous year (Clarke, 2007). 
For the stock market, it is organised by the government as a vehicle for its State- 
owned Enterprises (SoEs) to obtain capital and improve operating performance. Since 
the primary objective of' developing equity market is to help Sols relaxing external 
financing constraints, regulations introduced have been asymmetrically in favour of 
SoEs or the companies with close ties to the government Ming el al., 2007; 1 iu and l, u. 
2007). In the early 1990s, the Shanghai (SIiSE) and Shenzhen (S/, Sl; ) Stock Fxchange 
were launched, with the aim of raising finance from domestic and foreign investors to 
provide listed companies with new funds. By the end of 2009, with a stock-market 
capitalization of US$3.21 trillion generated by over 1,500 listed companies on both 
stock exchanges, China's stock market had overtaken Japan as the world's second- 
largest stock market by value (after the U. S. ) for the first time since its birth (Bloomberg, 
2009). Chinese companies, especially the SoEs, have benefited greatly from rapid 
equity issuance growth and public enthusiasm for the equity market due to a lack of' 
other attractive investment vehicles (Chen ei al., 2005). Tradable shares are mainly held 
by individuals (retail investors), while the shares held by institutional investors (e. g., 
mutual funds, pension funds) are relatively small". For individuals, buying equity 
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stocks is the only feasible investment opportunity outside of low yielding bank deposits. 
There is very limited bond market and low-convertibility of the Chinese currency, the 
renminhi (RMB), makes investing in foreign securities impossible for most people 
(Chen el al., 2005). 
Chinese listed company shares are classified as A-, B-, II-, N-, and S-shares. A- 
shares are issued by domestic companies and available to domestic investors only and 
traded in the RMB currency on the SINE and SZSE. B-shares are issued by domestic 
companies registered in the mainland, but traded in hard currency by foreign investors, 
including overseas Chinese institutions in Ilong Kong and Taiwan on the SIISE and 
SZSE. Individual domestic inventors have been allowed to trade B-shares since 2001. 
If-, N-, and S- shares are issued by domestic companies and traded on the Hong Kong, 
New York, and Singapore Stock Exchange correspondingly (Clarke, 2007). Shares of' 
listed companies are classified further into (in terms of ownership) State shares, legal 
person shares, and individual shares, with each type accounting for around one-third of' 
all shares. State shares are held by central and local governments, represented by State 
asset management or investment companies. State shares can also be held by the parent 
of' the listed companies, typically a Sol:. "These State shares are not tradable, yet they 
normally form the largest shareholding in the firm. 
At beginning of 2005, a program to convert non-tradable shares into A-shares 
carried out-`split share reform'. On 24 August 2005, the Guide/hies on /hei Refiwnl on 
Non-tradable Shares of'Stale-controlled Comp anies" was released, which specifics the 
guidelines on the proportion of State-owned shares in State-controlled companies in line 
with the national economic restructuring and layout, as well as the need to facilitate a 
sound development of the capital markets (CSRC, 2005). According to the guidelines, 
1,400 listed companies can gradually convert their non-tradable shares (Cooper, 2008). 
1lowever, the chief administrator of the CSRC, Fulin Shang said that the reform on non- 
tradable shares introduced aims at eliminating trading right difference between non- 
tradable and tradable shares, not floating all non-tradable shares at the stock market. 
"Making all shares tradable doesn't mean selling out all shares"'(', said Shang Fulin. In 
addition, he clarifies that after the non-tradable shares become tradable, whether they 
come into circulation or not depends not only on the shareholders' strategic choice, but 
also on relevant restrictions. According to the 2005 Guidelines, the restrictions are: (1) it 
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depends on the entire strategic layout of State-owned sectors. After the reform is 
completed, State-owned shares can be cashed in only upon the approval of the State- 
owned assets authorities; (2) it depends on the intention of controlling shareholders. 
Even though there are no restrictions in the laws, the controlling shareholders will hold 
a substantial amount of shares in the long run in order to control the company (CSRC, 
2005). As argued by Clarke, (2007), Cooper, (2008), the State remains the controlling 
shareholder in most listed enterprises, revealing the limitations of China's efforts to 
diversify ownership. As the result, this program may only have minor impacts on the 
current ownership structure of China's listed companies, thus the results carried out by 
the current thesis. The following Table 4.2. provides a summary of the current share 
classes in China. 
Table 4.2.: Share classes in China 
Type Description 
A-shares Domestically listed shares, denominated in local currency. Foreign investors 
may not own these shares. 
B-shares Domestically listed shares of China-incorporated companies, denominated 
in US$ in Shanghai and HK$ in Shenzhen. Served for foreign investors 
(initially) and domestic institutions and individuals (since 2001), these 
shares now make up the majority of trading. 
H-, N-, and S- Shares of mainland registered companies listed on the Hong Kong, New 
shares York, and Singapore Stock Exchange correspondingly. 
Legal Person Roughly a quarter of every listed firm's equity is transferred to domestic 
shares institutions (joint stock companies, NBFIs (Non Banking Financial 
Institutions), and SoEs with at least one non-State owner) and cannot be 
traded. 
State shares More than one-third of equity is transferred to the State (central and local 
governments, as well as SoEs, which are wholly owned by the State), the 
ultimate owners being the State Council. Legal person and State shares are 
not tradable, though they can be transferred with permission from the 
CSRC. The non-tradable feature of legal person and State shares allows the 
government to claim that share issuance is not akin to privatisation. 
Employee Shares are offered to workers and managers of a listed company (usually at 
shares a substantial discount). On average, these account for less than 5% of the 
total shares. In addition, not every company issues employee shares. 
source: Mm et al., world trank Country Study Paper, 2003, p. 39. 
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4.4.2. The Code of Corporate Governance in China (2002) 
This subsection starts with providing a summary of key characteristics influencing the 
development of Chinese corporate governance. In particular, this is composed of the 
categories of business form, ownership structure, legal system, board structure, and the 
important aspect. Each of them is illustrated in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3.: Summary of key characteristics influencing Chinese corporate governance 
Feature Key characteristic 
Main Business Form State-owned Enterprises, joint 
stock companies 
Predominant ownership structure State 
Legal system Civil law 
Board Structure Two-tier board model 
Important Aspect Influence of Communist Party 
Source: Mallira 2007, p. 232. 
Furthermore, corporate governance developments also involve a number of' 
regulatory bodies in China, including the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the State Economic and Trade Commission 
(SETC), and People's Bank of China (PBOC) which is essentially the central bank of 
China. 
In 2001, a series of corporate scandals came to light fr violating provisions 
related to financial reporting and management in China. The followings briefly present 
several highest-profile cases: 
i Guangxia (Yitichuan) Industry Co. Ltd. 
Guangxia, a listed pharmaceutical company, falsified profits for several years to present 
itself as a fast-growing entity with sophisticated, state-o1-the-art technologies. 't'he 
company fabricated sales contracts and export figures and exaggerated its financial 
statements, reportedly inflating net profit by RM13745 million (US$90 million). The 
CSRC initiated an extensive probe of the company in August 2001, and the MOF 
eventually stripped the accounting license of its longstanding auditor ('l'ianQin audit 
company) (Mallin, 2007). 
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Lantian Co. Ltd. 
Lantian was listed on the Shanghai stock exchange in 1996 and hailed as the first 
publicly listed Chinese ecological and agricultural company. Immediately after its IPOs, 
however, investors grew suspicious of the company's soaring share price and incredibly 
strong profit growth because its business lines, lake fisheries and lotus processing, were 
unlikely to generate profits at that level. In specific, the company reported RMB1.84 
billion (US$222 million) in sales income but only RMB8.5 million (US$1 million) in 
account receivable-an impossible gap for a legitimate company (Mallin, 2007). 
Despite the company declared that it had settled most of' its transactions with cash, 
financial analysts estimated that it fabricated 2000 net profits up to RMB500 million 
(US$60 million) (Braendle el al., 2005). In October 2001, the CSRC launched an 
investigation of the company's connected transactions, suspicious accounts receivables, 
and inflated earrings. In November 2001, banks stopped extending new loans to I, antian 
and the company's major creditors, Citic Industrial Bank and China Minsheng Banking 
Corp., filed lawsuits against the company. In October 2004, the CEO of Lantian 
(Zhaoyu Huo) was sentenced to prison for two years. In July 2006, Lantian and its 
external auditor (Hual, un audit company) were put in charge o1' RMB6.2 million ($0.7 
million) (Mallin, 2007). 
Sanju Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. 
The CSRC uncovered Sanjiu's troubles in the mid-2001. The listed company, which was 
reportedly China's largest pharmaceutical group, had misappropriated RMB2.5 billion 
(US$302 million) on behalf of a few major shareholders and related business partners 
without consent of other shareholders or the public. "These diversions amounted to 96% 
of' the company's net assets. posing considerable threat to company's operations. The 
CSRC reprimanded the senior principals, headed by lbrmcr military serviceman 
Xinxian Zhao and fined the company RM11150 million (US$18.1 million). Major 
shareholders and related business partners had repaid RMR349 million (US$42.2 
million) to Snajiu by March 2002 (Shi and Weisert, 2002). 
These corporate scandals have helped fuel the drive for corporate governance 
reforms in China. Specifically, in January 2002, CRSC issued the ('ode of ('orporwlc' 
Governance 
, 
far Listed Companies in China (hereinafter the ('. ode) which is broadly 
based on the OECD principles of corporate governance (2004). The main objectives of 
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the Code are to address "the protection of investors' interests and rights, the essential 
behaviour rules and moral standards for directors, supervisors, and managers, and other 
senior management members of listed companies. and the accuracy of financial 
information provided to the investors " (Code, p. 1 . ). 
The Code is seen as the yardstick 
by which a company is able to measure its corporate governance, and if there are 
deficiencies in the corporate governance of a company, then the securities supervision 
and regulatory authorities may instruct the company to correct its corporate governance 
to comply with the Code (Preamble of Code, 2002). The Code contains seven main 
chapters dealing with: shareholders and shareholders' meetings; listed company and its 
controlling shareholders; directors and the board of directors supervisors and the 
supervisory board; performance assessments and incentive and disciplinary systems; 
stakeholders; and information disclosure and transparency. 
i. Shareholders and Shareholders 'Meetings 
The Code states the corporate governance structure of a company shall ensure fair 
treatment toward all shareholders, especially minority shareholders. All shareholders are 
to enjoy equal rights and to bear the corresponding duties based on the shares they hold" 
(Section 1.2., p. 1). Shareholders should have equal rights and, it' their rights are 
infringed, then they should redress through legal action. For instance, Section 1.3., (p. 2) 
of the Code expresses that "... in the event the resolutions of shareholders' meetings or 
the resolutions of the board of directors are in breach of laws and administrative 
regulations or infringe on shareholders' legal interests and rights, the shareholders shall 
have the right to initiate litigation to stop such breach or inlringement... shareholders 
shall have the right to request the company to sue for such compensation in accordance 
with law. " 
Companies should establish communications channels with shareholders and 
shareholders should be informed o1'significant matters that affect the company (Section 
2.5. ). Shareholders should be notified in good time of a shareholders' meeting and 
agenda items should be given an appropriate amount of time in the meeting. F. lectronic 
communications may be used to help increase the number of' shareholders participating. 
Shareholders may vote in person or may appoint a proxy to vote on their behalf (Section 
2.7., 2.8., and 2.10. ). The role of institutional investors is specifically mentioned in the 
appointment of directors, remuneration, and other major decisions (Section 2.11. ). In 
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related party transactions, these transactions should, in principle, he at market value 
(Section 2.12,2.13, and 2.14). 
ii. Listed Company und Its Controlling Shareholders 
This section of the Code deals with a protocol for how the controlling shareholders 
should behave when an enterprise is being restructured or reorganised prior to listing. 
Certain aspects of the enterprise, such as its non-operational institutions and welfare 
institutions, will not be transferred to the listed company, but may continue to provide 
services to the listed company in the capacity of a separate company based on 
commercial principles. Reform of labour, personnel, and distribution system may occur 
(Section 2.15., 2.16., 2.17., and 2.18. ). However, the controlling shareholders should not 
act in a way detrimental to the listed company's or shareholders' legal rights and 
interests by adversely restructuring assets or otherwise marking advantage of' their 
position (Section 2.20., and Section 2.21. ). 
The controlling shareholders initially nominate the candidates for directors and 
supervisors on the basis of their professional skills, knowledge, and experience. The 
shareholders' meeting or the board of directors will approve appointments as 
appropriate (Section 2.20. ). The listed company should he able to act independently of' 
the controlling shareholders, including its personnel, and also the financial and 
accounting management systems of listed company should be independent From the 
controlling shareholders (Section 2.23.. 2.24., and 2.25. ). The board of directors and 
supervisory board should operate in an independent manner and indeed the Code states 
that ``a listed company's business shall be completely independent from that of its 
controlling shareholder" (Section 2.26., and 2.27. p. 4). 
iii. Directors and Board of'Dir°ector"s 
In order to enable shareholders to make an informed choice as to which candidate to 
vote for in director elections, there should he detailed disclosure of information about 
the candidate. The emphasis is on appointments being made through a transparent 
process (Section 3.28,3.29., 3.30., 3.31., and 3.32. ). 
Directors should attend appropriate training sessions to familiarise themselves 
with their directorial duties and responsibilities. They should be suitably qualified with 
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appropriate skills and knowledge (Section 3.36., and 3.37. ). They should faithfully, 
honestly, and diligently perform their duties for the best interests of the company and all 
shareholders, and they should also devote adequate time and energy to their role as 
director and to attending board meetings (Section 3.33., 3.34., and 3.35. ). The board of 
directors is accountable to shareholders and shall treat all shareholders equally and shall 
be concerned with the interests of stakeholders (Section 3.43. ). 
The board of directors should meet periodically and have a pre-set agenda, with 
timely and clear information about the agenda items being sent to all the directors. If 
two or more independent directors feel that the information is unclear or inadequate, 
then they may apply to postpone the meeting or the discussion of the relevant agenda 
item. And, minutes of the board meetings should be carefully maintained (Section 3.46., 
and 3.47. ). 
According to Section 3.49., a listed company shall introduce independent 
directors to its board of directors in accordance with relevant regulations. Independent 
directors shall be independent from the listed company that employs them and the 
company's major shareholders. An independent director may not hold any other position 
apart from independent director in the listed company. The independent directors shall 
bear the duties of good faith and due diligence and care towards the listed company and 
all the shareholders. They shall protect the overall interests of the company, and shall be 
especially concerned with protecting the interests of minority shareholders from being 
infringed (Section 3.50. ). In addition, the CSRC issued the Guicleline. s. Jör Introducing 
Independent Directors to the Board of Directors" oI Listed Companies in the summer of 
2001. The guidelines mandate all domestically listed companies to amend their articles 
as necessary to comply with the guidelines and to appoint, by June 30 2002, at least two 
members of the board of directors shall be independent directors, and by June 30`x' 2003, 
at least one third of board shall be independent directors. 
The Code also recommends that various committees of the board be established, 
such as a corporate strategy committee, a remuneration and appraisal committee, an 
audit committee, and a nomination committee (Section 3.52. ). Independent directors 
should be in majority on these committees and the audit committee, nomination 
committee, and remuneration/appraisal committee, at least one independent director 
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should be an accounting professional (Section 3.52., and 3.53. ). 
iv. Supervisor and Supervisory Board 
The supervisory board should comprise individuals with professional knowledge or 
working experience in such areas as law and accounting. The supervisory board's 
members need to be able to supervise effectively the directors and managers and to 
examine knowledgeably the company's financial matters (Section 4.64. ). The 
supervisory board is accountable to shareholders and its duties include supervising 
corporate finance, the directors' and managers' performance, and protecting the 
company's and shareholders' legal rights and interests. The supervisory board's 
members should be provided with appropriate information to enable them to do their job 
effectively. And, the supervisory board's meetings should be minuted (Section 4.59., 
4.60., 4.61., and 4.66. ). 
v Performance Assessments and Incentive and Disciplinary Systems 
Directors, supervisors, and management's performance should be assessed through a 
fair and transparent procedure, with directors and management being evaluated by the 
board of directors or by the remuneration/appraisal committee (Section 5.69., and 5.70. ). 
When any individual's performance is being reviewed, then the director being discussed 
should leave the meeting. Independent directors and supervisors should be evaluated by 
a combination of self-assessment and peer review. The performance and compensation 
of the directors and supervisors should be reported to the shareholders' meeting (Section 
5.70., and 5.71. ). 
The Code has an interesting provision in the context of the selection and 
appointment of management personnel, as it states "no institution or individual shall 
interfere with a listed company's normal recruiting procedure for management 
personnel" (Section 5.73., p. 9). As expressed by Mallin (2007), one problem with 
appointments in Chinese companies is that the State still wields a lot of influence and a 
mechanism is needed to isolate, as far as possible, the appointments process from the 
influence of political appointments. The Code seeks to make this an explicit point in the 
selection process. 
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Similarly, there is much demand from employees in Chinese companies, 
particularly at the higher levels where an awareness of the Western practices is more 
apparent, to link compensation with performance. The Code illustrates that the 
compensation for management personal should be linked to both the company's 
performance and the individual's work performance (Section 5.77., and 5.78. ). 
W. Stakeholders 
The section of the Code that deals with stakeholders states that "while maintaining the 
listed company's development and maximizing the benefits of shareholders, the 
company shall be concerned with the welfare, environmental protection and public 
interests of the community in which it resides, and shall pay attention to the company's 
social responsibilities" (Section 6.86., p. 10). In addition, the Code also mentions that 
the company should respect the legal rights of the various stakeholder groups and 
provide them with information as appropriate (Section 6.81., and 6.84. ). In particular, 
employees are encouraged to provide feedback on various issues that might affect them 
by direct communication with the board of directors, the supervisory board, and 
management personnel (Section 6.85. ). 
vii. Information and Disclosure and Transparency 
The quality of financial reporting lay at the heart of the Code 2002. It recommends that 
a listed company shall establish sound financial and accounting management systems in 
accordance with laws and regulations and shall conduct independent business 
accounting. Controlling shareholders shall respect the financial independence of the 
company and shall not interfere the financial and accounting activities of the company 
(Section 7.88. ). In regard to information disclosure, the 2002 Code mentions that it is a 
continuing responsibility of listed companies. A listed company shall truthfully, 
accurately, completely and timely disclose information as required by laws, regulations, 
and the company's articles of association. Furthermore, the Code also suggests that in 
addition to disclosing mandatory information, a company shall also voluntarily and 
timely disclose all other information that may have a material effect on the decisions of 
shareholders and stakeholders, and shall ensure equal access to information for all 
shareholders (section 7.89. ). 
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In addition. there should be specific disclosure to the company's corporate 
governance. plus the company should make disclosure about its state of corporate 
governance and the reasons why it may differ from the Code (it is based on the "comply 
or explain" mechanism). It should also mention any plans to improve its corporate 
governance (Section 7.91. ). The company should disclose information relating to the 
shareholding distribution in the company: for example, detail of shareholders who own 
a comparatively large percentage of shares (what level this might be is not specified in 
the Code), shareholders who can control the company by acting in concert (that is, 
acting together), and the shareholders who actually control the company (Section 7.92. ). 
Table 4.4. provides a summary of corporate governance structure in China by 
incorporating the influencing characteristics with the fundamentals of China's 2002 
China's Code. 
Table 4.4.: A Summary of the corporate governance structure in China 
Corporate Governance Structure in China 
Key Characteristics influencing China's Corporate Governance 
Main business form State-Owned Enterprises (SoEs), joint stock 
companies 
Stock Exchanges SHSE and SZSE 
Ownership structure State 
Legal system Civil law 
Board structure Two-tier board model 
Important aspect Influence of Communist Party 
Codes, Guidelines, and Rules of Corporate Governance in China 
Name (Time) of the Codes Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
in China (2002) 
Issued By China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
Context 7 Chapters 
Reasons of Issuing (General) 
" financial scandals (i. e. Guangxia Industry Co. Ltd.; 
Lantian Co. Ltd.; Sanju Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. ); 
" better and improved corporate governance. 
Implementation 'comply or explain' mechanism 
The Main Concerns 
(Condensed) 
" it is based on the OECD principles of Corporate 
Governance; 
" it addresses the protection of investors' interests 
and rights and the essential behavior rules for 
directors, supervisors, managers, and so forth. 
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Table 4.4.: A Summary of the corporate governance structure in China (continued) 
Codes, Guidelines, and Rules of Corporate Governance in China 
" it is the elementary standard in measuring 
company's corporate governance; 
The Main Concerns " it highlights the accuracy and independence 
(Condensed) in financial information disclosure; 
" the securities supervision and regulatory 
authorities can instruct the company to 
correct or even change its corporate 
governance to comply with the Code. 
Board Independence 1/3 independent directors on the board 
Executive Pay Disclosure Not covered 
Audit Committee Composition Majority of independent directors on the audit 
committee 
The Role Institutional Yes 
Shareholders 
Minority Shareholders Protection Yes 
4.5. An Evaluation of China's Corporate 
Governance System 
4.5.1. The Implementation and Enforcement of the China's 
2002 Code 
As argued by Berglof and Claessens (2004), Wymeersch (2006), Zattoni and Cuomo 
(2008), almost all existing corporate governance codes are of a non-statutory nature, 
their binding force cannot be based on the usual legal techniques, such as liabilities, 
injunctions, tines, imprisonment. Hence, enforcement is the key to ensure these Codes 
are implemented effectively. Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are 
intimately linked as they affect firms' ability to commit to their stakeholders, in 
particular to external investors (Berglof and Claessens, 2004). E, nlorcement is generally 
left to the effectiveness of internal corporate (e. g. the board of' directors) and of external 
market forces (e. g. listing rules published by stock exchanges). Only in a few countries 
(e. g., Germany and Netherlands), the law attaches explicit legal consequences to the 
code or even to its provisions. For instance, the German Company Law contains an 
express reference to the governance code, whereby companies are legally obliged to 
adhere to the code, and can only derogate by stating their reasons (Wymeersch, 2005). 
Additionally, the code sometimes is referred in law and supervised by a government 
body, more specifically the security market supervisor in some countries. Depending on 
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the way the supervision is exercised, it may cone close to traditional statutory law. The 
full statutory approach is the one followed in the US with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
(Wymeersch, 2006). 
The recommendations contained in the Chinese Code (2002) do not have the force 
of law. Compliance with the Code is voluntary and as a result firms remain free to 
choose their own corporate governance structure. However, the CSRC adopts as part of 
its listing rules the requirement for all Chinese listed companies to include a statement 
of compliance with the Code in their annual reports. In the event that a firm does not 
fully comply, details of, and reasons for, the non-compliance must be disclosed, thereby 
making non-compliance a potentially costly action. On 28 March, 2007, the CSRC 
introduced the Notice on the Specific Activities of Strengthening Corporate Governance 
(hereafter referred to the Notice (2007)). The main objectives of the Notice (2007) are: 
(1) to improve the independence of the listed companies from their controlling 
shareholders; (2) to enhance the regulatory system of the listed companies in daily 
operations; (3) to solve the problem in the seeming application of the 2002 Code by 
some companies. Specifically, the Notice (2007) includes a self-check list for the 
companies to see if they comply with the 2002 Code, including the essential situation of 
the company and shareholders, the shareholders meetings, the board, the supervisory 
board, and the management team; the independency of the company; the transparency 
of the company; and the general evaluation of the company's corporate governance 
framework. In addition, on 30 January, 2007, the CSRC introduced the Regulation.; oil 
Information Disclosure of Listed Companies to make sure that all listed companies 
comply with the 2002 Code. For instance, provision 3(21) states that annual report shall 
contain the information on corporate governance (e. g., shareholders meetings, hoard 
structure, supervisory board meetings) and the application status of the Company Law, 
Securities Luws, Code of' Corporate Governance 
. 
fier Listed Companies in China. 
Guidelines fur Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of' Listed 
Companies. 
However, academic researchers often challenge the watchdog view of both the 
court and the CSRC in China. In brief, it is argued that the court as well as the CSRC in 
China are neither independent, nor are they sophisticated in dealing with complicated 
financial matters, and sometimes they are corrupt (Cai, 2007; Cohen, 1997; Lubman, 
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2000; Peerenboom, 2002). In particular, Young et al., (2007) state that, in a company, 
governance is actually in the hands of a few people who enjoy close relationship with 
the central administrative authorities in China. And if disputes arise in the company, 
these people are more likely to settle the disputes through informal mediation based on 
harmony, rather than enforcing the legal rights through litigation. In addition, Cai (2007) 
illustrates the inefficiency of the CSRC by arguing that it can not properly detect the 
alleged activities and/or fraudulent activities conduced by the listed companies and thus 
initiate the enforcement actions against such activities. He reports that the number of 
total enforcement actions initiated by the CSRC is only one-fifth of the 1,278 
companies that were listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen by the end of 2005. Stated 
differently, at most one in twenty-five companies was subject to any kind of 
enforcement action. Furthermore, according to Pister and Xu (2005), the sanctions 
administered are often benign, with only 22% of all enforcement actions resulting in 
fines as opposed to warnings or informal reprimands. 
For the law enforcement system, Cai (2007, p. 86) argues that "... the reality in 
China is that effective law enforcement will not he attained in the near future", 
"... China's efforts to develop a vigorous stock market are doomed to fail as long as 
China does not fundamentally change its law enforcement mechanisms. " Monks and 
Minow (2008, p. 380) states that "enforcement is weak and there are not enough 
qualified directors to serve on hoards in order to facilitate the enforcement process. " 
Spencer Stuart's 2007 Corporate Governance Lexicon cites an economic study by Qiao 
Liu and concludes, "shareholder protection is poor, insider trading rife, and listed 
companies tend not to take the maximization of shareholder value as their prime 
directive. " (Monks and Minow, 2008, p. 379). 
In summary, as the compliance with the 2002 China's Code is generally on a 
voluntary disclosure basis, the watchdogs of the security markets published several 
rules and/or policies in order to enforce the implementation of the Code in China's 
listed companies. However, in practice, the impacts of the court as well as the CSRC in 
China are arguably ineffective. They are neither independent, nor are they sophisticated 
in dealing with complicated financial matters, and sometimes they are corrupt. As the 
result, the legal enforcement system is relatively weak in China. It is thus argued that 
the implementation of the Code may be prevented regardless of the efforts that have 
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been made. In other words, it may not usually be the case as the Code formulated. 
4.5.2. Several Concerns of China's Corporate Governance 
System 
Other than the ineffective legal enforcement system mentioned in the previous section, 
there are several concerns of the corporate governance system in China's listed 
companies arranged from the influence of the controlling shareholders to the 
independence of the supervisory board. Each of the concerns will be discussed in the 
followings. 
Concern 1. The Influence of the Controlling shareholders 
The most pronounced influence of the controlling shareholders is on shareholders' 
meetings in China's listed companies. A recent survey (CNINFO, 2005) reveals that, 
public investors including both individual and institutional investors are very reluctant 
to participate in the shareholders' meetings for those that are fully manipulated by the 
controlling shareholders. Comparing with more than 40% of company's shares usually 
is held by controlling shareholders, the survey estimates that, on average, public 
investors who take part in a shareholders' meeting, represent only 4-5% ownership of 
the listed firms. Smaller shareholders with 3% ownership or less are even not allowed to 
raise any issue to discuss in shareholders' meetings (CSRC, 2000). Furthermore, all the 
issues on which shareholders are asked to vote in a shareholders' meeting are prepared 
by corporate executives and/or controlling shareholders themselves. By putting all 
together, it is argued that the minority shareholders who only hold a fraction of 
company's equity in China may be unwillingly to get involved in shareholders' 
meetings, as they find it is very difficult (if not impossible) to vote against the 
controlling shareholders' sell'-dealing interests which are obtained at the expenses of' 
others or their reckless decisions which are less effective on improving the performance 
of' companies. 
Secondly, due to the dominating position held by controlling shareholders, in most 
listed companies, the members of the board are dominated by controlling shareholders 
to certain extent. The majority of directors have direct or indirect relationship with the 
controlling shareholders as they are either the current or the former employees of the 
controlling shareholders. As showed in a survey (CNINFO, 2006), while 42.34% hoard 
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members of a listed company is holding a senior position in the controlling 
shareholders' entities, another 40.12% of directors held a senior position in the 
controlling shareholders' entities previously. 
Concern 2: Independent Board of'Directors 
Another concern is about the independence and functionality of the non-executive 
directors in the listed companies. For the board independence, although the Code 
requires introduction and minimum number of non-executive directors on the board, a 
survey conducted by CNINFO (2006) reveals that 15% of listed firms fail to comply 
with and report a percentage of independent directors lower than 33.33% (or one third 
of board). This illustrates the enforcement for the Code is relatively weak. In addition, 
some real-life cases are quoted. For instance, a notorious example of Yili Group (stock 
code: 600887) demonstrates that an independent director of the company got tired, 
when challenging the shareholders of the company and investigating the company's 
undisclosed transactions and suspicious conducts (China Securities News'2,4"' August 
2004). Kalong (stock code: 000921) shows that even when independent directors have 
recognised financial statements are potentially fraudulent, they don't oppose in hoard 
meetings (China Securities News'3,13 April 2005). 
Another concern with the board is related to its normal functionality. Taking the 
nomination process as an example, although the Code recommends a nomination 
committee on the board to be established, in reality, more than halt' of the companies do 
not comply with it (CNINFO, 2006). A candidate director has to be nominated by 
shareholders only. Due to the dominating position of the controlling shareholders in the 
listed companies, eventually, most candidates for non-executive directors are nominated 
directly by the controlling shareholders. Since the controlling shareholders have high 
incentives in nominating the non-executives who are more likely to represent their 
interests instead of those of minority shareholders, the nature of independence of non- 
executive directors may be jeopardised. Furthermore, the Code also mentions the role 
played by the institutional investors in nominating firms' directors and setting their 
compensation strategies. However, due to the low ownership in the firms, they are not 
either interested or allowed to be involved. 
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Concern 3: Audit C'ommillee 
According to Cohen Commission (1978), Ribbon Report (1999), and the requirements 
of NYSE (2003), audit committee members ought to be independent if they are to 
provide an effective corporate governance control mechanism. For instance, all publicly 
listed companies on the NYSE must have an audit committee consisting of a minimum 
of three members and all must be independent directors. Both the Cadbury Report (1992) 
and Combine Code (1998,2003,2006) state that the board should establish an audit 
committee of at least three non-executive directors. Thus, the third concern is related to 
the functionality of audit committee in China's listed companies. Although the China's 
Code (2002) encourages establishment of an audit committee on the board, it only 
requires an audit committee to be composed of a majority of independent directors 
instead of all independent non-executives compared with the requirements in the 
developed markets. The Chinese Code's requirement for only a majority of committee 
members to be independent non-executives seems inadequate to U. K. and U. S. eyes. 
Despite the requirement differences in the composition of audit committee, 
Chambers (2007) argues that the differences between U. S. or U. K. and Chinese audit 
committee guidelines are mainly to do with the greater detail with which the 
committee's duties are defined and regulated. For instance, other than enhancing the 
integrity and accountability of the financial statements, the audit committee served on 
the board of a U. K. 's or a U. S. 's company is also required to be involved in the risk 
management and non-accounting control as well as the scrutiny of the non-financial 
information provided by the firm. Since these issues are not specifically addressed in 
the China's 2002 Code, the audit committee in a Chinese listed company may be less 
active. In a study of 103 B-share companies, Chen and Zhang (2010a) reveal that only 
30% of the companies with audit committees on their boards by 2006. They argue that 
the relatively weak requirement coupled with inefficient enforcement mechanisms on 
audit committee provides a leeway for companies to bend the independence of audit 
committee members; it eventually limits the monitoring role played by the audit 
committee in China. 
Concern 4: The Independence ofthe Supervisory Board 
In contrast to the board structures in Germany (the supervisory hoard which is 
composed of entirely independent directors elect the management board), the 
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independence of the supervisory board of China is often challenged. This is due to (1) 
there is no clear hierarchical relation between the management board and the 
supervisory board; both executive and supervisory board are appointed by, and may be 
dismissed by, shareholder actions; (2) controlling shareholders have strong control over 
the activities of the supervisory board, primarily because they retain a large percentage 
of ownership and the supervisors mainly represent controlling shareholders' interests 
rather than those of the minority shareholders. 
Dahya e/ al., (2003) interview directors, supervisory board members and senior 
executives of 16 listed companies in China on the effectiveness of the supervisory board. 
Based on their results, they argue that the controlling shareholders have strong control 
over the activities of the supervisory hoard in China. The Communist Party and the 
government have a strong direct influence, mainly through personnel control. In such an 
environment, it is difficult for supervisory hoards to expose serious problems that are 
discovered. 
One participant in their interviews revealed that, "last year's supervisory board 
report was quite frank but it was killed when the cadres of the factory met. This year's 
report was accepted straight with no amendment at all. This report is Weixindi [against 
my will] ... In 
fact, last year's report was revised following; the "suggestions" of the 
cadres. But even so, not all of the revised version was included in the annual 
report... "I'he managers of the factory wanted me to state in the report that `there are no 
illegal acts in the company'. I dared not to write it that way. So I reported 'no illegal 
acts were discovered' instead. " The problem is even serious in a company that is headed 
by a highly ranked central government official. A manager reveals that the supervisory 
board report is revised from "no discovery of violation" to "'no violation" at the request 
of the board of directors (Dahya el al., 2003, p. 315). In addition, a Senior Fconomist of 
a company said, "to enhance the usefulness of the supervisory hoard, first, it is 
important to improve the independence of it. It should not be subordinate to the Party 
Committee and the Board of Director. Second, the supervisory hoard should be given 
more power. It should not have the voting right, but should have the power to vote" 
(Dehaya et al., 2003, p. 317). 
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4.6. Summary 
Based on the literature reviewed (e. g., Denis and McConnell, 2003; Gillan and Stark, 
1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Zingales, 1998), in the condensed terminology, 
corporate governance is described as the set of mechanisms that induce the self- 
interested controllers of a company to make decisions that maximise the value of the 
company to its owners. By stating differently, corporate governance deals with the ways 
in which suppliers of finance assure themselves of getting a return on their investments. 
Different models of board structure may contribute to the differences in corporate 
governance systems across country. In the Anglo-Saxon one-tier model, executive and 
non-executive directors operate together in one organisational layer. While some one- 
tier board structures can separate the CEO from the Chair, others may operate under a 
leadership structure that combined these two roles together. With regard to the 
Continental European two-tier model, an addition layer-the supervisory hoard is 
introduced in order to separate the executive function from its monitoring function. The 
supervisory board is elected by shareholders and employees and it in turn appoints the 
management board. In China, a listed company seems to apply the two-tier hoard 
structure model. 
The Code oICorporate Governance. for Listed Comp anies" in ('hinu was published 
by the CSRC with quality of financial reporting laid at its heart aims to enhance the 
shareholder protection against the controlling shareholders' expropriation through 
building a comprehensive corporate governance system. The China's 2002 Code 
contains seven chapters. Through an in-depth evaluation of the corporate governance in 
China, it is argue that the relatively weak legal enforcement system resulted from the 
ineffectiveness of both the court and the CSRC may prevent the implementation oC the 
Code. In addition, there are several concerns of'C'hina's corporate governance arranged 
from the influence of the controlling shareholders to the independence of the supervisor 
board. 
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Chapter 5: Earnings Management 
(EM) 
5.1. Introduction 
The recent wave of corporate governance failures has raised the concerns about the 
integrity of accounting information provided to investors and resulted in a drop in 
investor confidence. Top executives have been found to manage their earnings 
aggressively, through accounting sleight-of-hand and corporate policies designed to 
improve their companies' apparent performance (e. g., Jain et al., 2003; Jain and Rezaee, 
2003; Rezaee, 2004). This chapter starts with defining earnings management (or EM) 
based on the literature. And, by applying the theory of AT and TCE to EM respectively, 
it is argued that EM could be seen as a specific tool or means utilised by insiders of the 
companies to achieve their private benefits at the expense of other shareholders. 
According to I Iealy and Wahlen (1999), three general incentives which are largely 
based on the Western experiences of engaging in EM are classified: (1) capital market 
motivations (e. g., management buyouts, leveraged buyouts, IPOs, SEOs, financial 
analysts' expectations), (2) contracting motivations (e. g., lending covenants, executive 
compensation), and (3) regulatory motivations (e. g., import relief, tariff, quota). Each of' 
these will be described in the following sections, and a table summary of the empirical 
studies on examining these incentives will be provided at the end of this chapter. 
In China's stock markets, FM practices have also been rampant (e. g., Aharony et 
al., 2000; Chen el al., 2001; Chen and Yuan, 2006; Yu el u1., 2006). It is argued that 
Chinese investors and regulators are un-sophisticated: they are usually fixated on 
reported earnings, thus may not be able to see through EM practices. The specific 
incentives of engaging in EM practices have been documented in the literature are: (1) 
ROE requirements for issuing additional shares (capital market motivation), and (2) 
regulatory policies for de-listing firms (regulator motivation) (Ming el al., 2007; Liu and 
I, u, 2007). For the contracting motivations, the lending covenants are rarely used in the 
Chinese listed companies as the companies usually use properties or assets-based 
mortgages to the banks for borrowing and in most of the cases the properties of their 
parent companies instead of themselves are mortgaged to the banks (e. g., Cai cri a!., 
2008; Firth ei al., 2008; Zou and Xiao, 2006). And, to my best knowledge, there is no 
empirical evidence demonstrates whether executive compensation in China is regarded 
as an incentive of managers to engage in EM as proposed by TCF, or should he 
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considered as an alignment strategy (AT) that encourages managers to make operating 
and investing decisions that maximise shareholder wealth, thus limiting their incentives 
of EM behaviours. 
For the rest of the chapter, the measurements of EM are briefly reviewed. Based 
on McNichols (2000; 2002), there are three essential proxies: (1) aggregate accruals 
models, (2) specific accrual models, and (3) frequency distribution approach. Each of 
the measurements awards a subsection for discussion. A table summary of approaches 
with the relevant authors introducing them is also provided. 
The basic structure of this chapter is given in the followings: 
5.1. Introduction 
5.2. Earnings Management 
5.3. Incentives of EM 
5.4. Measurements of EM 
5.5. Summary 
Section 5.1. provides the introduction of 
the chapter; section 5.2. states the 
definition(s) of EM, and the application of 
AT and TCF. to EM respectively; section 
5.3. demonstrates the incentives of E, M in 
general and China correspondingly; 
section 5.4. descrihes flit, throo f'c«'ti-, l 
measurements of EM in the literature; and section 5.5. summarises the whole chapter. 
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5.2. Earnings Management 
The terminology related to the modification of financial statements is not so clear. For 
example, there are terms such as manipulation, modification, adjustment, smoothing, 
and so forth, which are usually used quite synonymously in the literature. Stolowy and 
Breton (2000) use extensive term accounts manipulations for all modifications and 
discretionary entries made to the financial statements. In the literature, the most 
commonly used term for firms' accounts adjustment is earnings management (hereafter 
refer to as FM). The primary focus on EM literature has been detecting whether and 
when EM takes place (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). More specifically, it is to understand 
why managers manipulate earnings, how they do so and the consequence of this 
behaviour (McNichols, 2000; 2002). 
First of all, this section provides `'various" definitions of I; M based on the recent 
literature. Next, an analysis of the application of both AT and "E'C E to FM is 
demonstrated. It is argued that EM can be used as a specific tool or means by the 
insiders of the company to achieve their private benefits at the expense of other 
shareholders. 
5.2.1. Definition of EM 
There is no consensus on the definition of [; M and there are several in some degree of 
different definitions in the literature. For instance, Dye (1988) and Scott (2005) state 
that FM is the choice by firm of accounting policies so as to achieve some specific 
managerial objectives. Teoh el al., (1998a) argue that EM is the process of taking 
deliberate steps within the constraints of GAAP to bring about desired level of' reported 
earnings. The sources of EM within GAAP include the choice of accounting methods, 
the application of accounting methods, and the timing of asset acquisitions and 
dispositions. Flealy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) propose that "earnings management 
occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes 
that depend on reported accounting numbers. " 13encish (2001) proposes that there are 
two perspectives on EM 14: the opportunistic perspective holds that managers seek to 
mislead investors, and the information perspective (firstly enunciated by Ilolthausen 
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and Leftwich, 1983) argues that managerial discretion is a means for managers to reveal 
(or signal) to investors their private expectations about the firm's future cash flows. And, 
Zhou and Chen (2004) define EM as a purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gains. 
By putting all together, three shared either implicitly or explicitly aspects merit 
discussion: 
First, there are many ways that managers can exercise judgement in financial 
reporting. For example, judgement is required to (1) estimate numerous future economic 
events such as expected lives and salvage value of long-term assets, obligations for 
pension benefits and other post-employment benefits, deferred taxes, and losses from 
bad debts and asset impairments; (2) choose among accepted accounting methods for 
reporting the same economic transactions, such as the straight-line or accelerated 
depreciation methods or the LIFO, FIFO, weighted-average inventory valuation 
methods; (3) make decision on working capital management (such as inventory levels, 
the timing of inventory shipments or purchases, and receivable policies), which affects 
cost allocations and net revenues; (4) decide how to structure corporate transactions. For 
example, business combinations can be structured to qualify ihr pooling or purchase 
accounting, lease contracts can be structured so that lease obligations are on- or off- 
balance sheet, and equity investments can be structured to avoid or require 
consolidation; and (5) choose to make or defer expenditures, such as research and 
development, advertising or maintenance (Ilealy and Wahlen, 1999). 
A second to note is that the objective of EM as being to "mislead" shareholders 
(or some class of shareholders) about the underlying economic performance of the firm 
to achieve some self-dealing benefits (Beneish, 2001). This can arise it' managers 
believe that (at least some) shareholders do not undo FM. It can also occur ii' managers 
have access to information that is not available to outside shareholders so that EM is 
unlikely to be transparent to outsiders (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). It is argued that F ,M is 
related to the information asymmetry between managers and firm's other interest groups. 
Prior literature documents a relationship between information asymmetry and FIM by 
arguing that the existence of information asymmetry between management and 
shareholder is a necessary condition for EM (Chaney and Lewis, 1995; Dye, 1988; Lara 
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et a/. 2005; Richardson, 2000; Thomas, 2001; Trueman and Titman, 1988). Beneish 
(2001) demonstrates EM as managers taking advantages of an asymmetry of 
information with shareholders. Dutta and Frank (2002) state that there is information 
asymmetry between managers and other interest groups and that asymmetry can not be 
totally eliminated by changing the contractual agreement. As illustrated by Mealy and 
Wahlen (1999), due to the ineffectiveness of the auditing, management's use of 
judgement creates opportunities for EM, in which managers choose reporting methods 
and estimates that do not adequately reflect firms' underlying economics. While the 
study of the correlation between EM and information asymmetry is an interesting 
research topic, but, it is out of the scope of the current thesis. 
And thirdly, some of the judgments can make financial reports more informative 
for users. This can arise if certain accounting choices or estimates are perceived to be 
credible signals of a firm's financial performance. For example, as expressed by Healy 
and Wahlen (1999), if auditing is effective, managers' estimates of net receivable will 
be viewed as a credible forecast of cash collections. Managers can use reporting 
judgement to make financial reports more informative by overcoming limitations to 
current accounting standards. And, until recently some successful R&D firms created 
R&D limited partnerships, which permitted them to effectively capitalise R&D outlays 
that otherwise would have been expensed (Beneish, 2001). Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
argue that management's use of judgement in financial reporting has both costs and 
benefits. The costs are the potential misallocation of resources that arises from F. M. 
Benefits include potential improvement in management's credible communication of' 
private information to external shareholders, improving in resource allocation decisions. 
1-lowever, they also specify that "decisions to use accounting judgement to make 
financial reports more informative for users do not fall within our definition of earnings 
management" (I leafy and Wahlen, 1999, p. 369). 
5.2.2. Applying AT and TCE to EM 
In a review of AT and its application to accounting, Lambert (2001, p. 3-4) states that 
"agency theory has been one of the most important theoretical paradigms in accounting 
during the last 20 years... while [it] has generated insights into financial accounting and 
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audit issues, by far its largest contributions have been to managerial accounting". This 
makes AT's application to EM to be very important for this thesis. 
To start with, as argued by Fama and Jensen (1983b) agency problems arise 
because contracts are not costlessly written and enforced. And, this problem in decision 
process is more pronounced when decision managers who initiate and implement 
important decisions'5 are not the major residual claimants and they do not bear a major 
share of the wealth effects of their decisions. Without effective control procedures, such 
decision managers are more likely to take actions that are deviated from the interests of 
residual claimants. This is the hypothesis of separation of ownership and control- 
separation of residual risk bearing from decision management leads to decision system 
that separate decision management from decision control (Fama and Jensen, 1993b, 
p. 304). By applying the hypothesis of separation of ownership and control to IN, it can 
be said that EM occurs when managers (the agent) initiate and implement decisions in 
firm's financial reporting policies which are within the constraints of GAAP, and they 
are not the major residual claimants thus do not bear a major share of the wealth effects 
of the decisions, the principals (e. g., shareholders, debt holders, and other stakeholders) 
do bear the wealth effects. According to the Jensen Meckling's RFMM model on 
human behaviours, rational individuals always choose the option that makes them better 
off as they set it. For instance, an individual takes action A over action 13 because lie 
expects A to result in better outcomes. In other words, they are profit maximisers 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1994). And, in some situations it will pay the agent to expand 
resources (bonding costs') to guarantee that he will not take certain actions which 
would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if lie does 
take such actions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For the monitoring costs, Jensen (2004) 
argues that because both the external and internal monitoring costs are imposed on the 
manager, it is in his interest to ensure that the monitoring is performed in the lowest cost 
way (Jensen, 2004). Thus, without effective control procedures, the decisions managers 
are likely to engage in accounting manipulations to maximise their own benefits by 
influencing contractual outcomes that depend on accounting numbers and to minimise 
the bonding and monitoring costs imposed on them by misleading shareholders about 
the underlying performance of the company. In a similar vein, Lambert (2001) uses the 
revelation principle which applies agents receive private information (this is mainly due 
to the notion of separation of ownership and control-initiation and implementation of 
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decisions are all allocated to the managers), have the ability to transmit the information, 
and the principal is able to credibly commit to how the information is used to explain 
EM. He states that "... when the revelation principle applies, any equilibrium that 
involves nontruthful reporting (e. g. one where earnings management is taking place) 
can always he dominated by one [the managers] where truth telling is induced" 
(Lambert, 2001, p. 71). 
On the other hand, Marcher and Richman (2006, p. 23) in a survey argue that 
... there are 
fewer direct applications of TCE reasoning to empirical problems in 
accounting [and corporate governance]. This relative dearth of TCE research is 
somewhat surprising given the apparent relevance of accounting phenomena to 
questions of economic organization and performance". Thus, the current thesis 
contributes to the literature by directly applying TCE to EM. 
To begin with, the Fundamental Transformation of TCE applies to that subset of 
transactions for which large number of qualified suppliers at the outset are transformed 
into what are, in effect, small number of actual suppliers during contract execution and 
at the contract renewal interval (Williamson, 1979; 1996; 2002b). The key factor here is 
whether the transaction in question is supported by investment in different types of 
transaction-specific assets (Williamson, 1996). This implies that as the assets invested 
by parties become more and more specialised, both parties are "locked into" the specific 
assets; they are bilaterally dependent and bear the relevant costs if transactions are 
prematurely terminated. TCE also predicts that the manager is the member with the 
comparative advantage in deciding what the firm and its members should do, and this 
manager need not be an owner. Accordingly, TCE takes the so-called managerial 
discretion hypothesis. This hypothesis "ascribes de facto control to those who are 
knowledgeable, strategically situated, and disposed to be actives" (Williamson, 1984, 
p. 1221). By applying TCE to EM, it can be said that EM occurs when managers (one 
party) initiate and implement decisions in firm's financial reporting policies which are 
within the constraints of GAAP, and given that that all complex contracts are 
unavoidably incomplete by reason of bounded rationality, they will bear the relevant 
costs if the shareholders (the other party) prematurely terminate the transaction as 
managers and shareholders have high level of human asset specificity and monetary- 
based asset specificity involvements respectively. For instance, the shareholders will not 
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invest in the firm anymore, if it can not reach the expected level of performance 
measured by accounting numbers. The managers have to bear the relevant costs from 
the lack of investment (e. g., credibility lose, liquidity problems, lower compensation, 
pressure from the regulators), and in the extreme case, they may be forced to retire from 
the firm. In order to minimise such costs resulted from premature transaction 
termination, managers may manage earnings in order to mislead shareholders by 
artificially dressing up their firms' apparent performance. In addition, TCE argues that 
the economic agents who make false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved threats or 
promises, cut corners for undisclosed personal advantage, cover up tracks, and the like 
(Williamson, 1983). It is not necessary to consider that all agents are equally 
opportunistic, however, it is sufficient to assume that less opportunistic agents are 
difficult and costly to ascertain ex ante and that '`even among the less opportunistic, 
most have their price" (Williamson, 1979, p. 234). And, according to the theory of 
feasible foresight, parties have the capacity to look ahead, uncover hazards which may 
against their private benefits, thereupon incorporate hazard-mitigating mechanisms 
(Williamson, 2005b). Thus, other than minimising the premature transaction 
termination risk called by shareholders, managers also engage in FM to negotiate the 
terms of transaction for their own benefits, for instance, they may manipulate earnings 
to influence the contractual outcomes (e. g. compensation package) that depend on 
reported accounting numbers. A structure summary of applying both AT and TCF to 
hM is provided in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1.: Summary of applying AT and TCI to EM 
Applying AT and TCE to EM 
AT EM TCE EM 
all decisions are management all decisions are management 
initiated and . judgments in initiated and .. judgments in 
implemented by accounting policies implemented by accounting policies 
managers managers 
no wealth effects; manage earnings to transaction costs manage earnings to 
agency costs (bonding mislead the (bilateral dependence); mislead the 
& monitoring costs); shareholders and to opportunism; feasible shareholders and to 
profit maximisation gain private benefits foresight gain private benefits 
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5.3. Incentives of EM 
5.3.1. An Overview 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), there are three major incentives of conducting 
EM: (1) capital market motivations, (2) contracting motivations, and (3) regulatory 
motivations. Each of them will be briefly reviewed in the following sub-sections. At the 
end of this chapter, Table 5.3. provides a summary of the empirical studies of EM's 
incentives. 
5.3.1.1. Capital Market Motivations 
The widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial analysts to 
help value stocks can create an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings. These 
include the studies of EM in periods surrounding capital market transactions and when 
there is gap between firn performance and analysts' or investors' expectations (ßeneish, 
2001; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Lambert, 2001). The major theoretical framework of 
the capital market motivations which is applied by most published studies is AT (e. g., 
Chen et al., 2008; Chou et al., 2006; Lee and Masulis, 2009; Perry and Williams. 1994; 
Wright and Guan, 2004; Wu, 1997). As stated by Chen el al., (2008), AT provides a 
conceptual framework for investigating the influence of capital market incentives on 
EM according to the accounting decisions. More generally, it is argued that because of 
the separation of decision management from decision control, management has the 
ability (management is involved in making and implementing the decisions) as well as 
the incentive (the managers do not bear the wealth effects of their decisions and they are 
profit maximisers) to maximise their own benefits or minimise agency costs. At here, 
the management benefits are to issue more shares at higher price (or to meet certain 
requirements) and to avoid missing the analysts' and investors' expectations (the 
bonding costs may increase, if they miss the expectations) by managing reported 
earnings. In the perspective of TCE, the capital market incentives can also be explained. 
Based on the previous discussion, in a specific-asset transaction between managers and 
shareholders (high level of human asset specificity and monetary-based asset 
specificity), managers will bear the relevant costs if shareholders prematurely terminate 
such a transaction. Thus, they are likely to engage in EM to minimise the risk of' 
premature termination of the transaction when they cannot meet the analysts' or 
investors' expectations. Based on the arguments of opportunism and feasible foresight, 
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managers may also engage in EM to raise capital at more favourable terms (e. g. higher 
issuing price). 
Several studies examine I'M prior to management buyouts (MBOs). It is argued 
that going-private restructurings provide unique opportunities to manipulate earnings 
since managers face conflict of interests when they are engaged in buying the firm's 
stock in order to take it private. As the representatives of stockholders, managers have a 
fiduciary duty to them. This duty conflicts with a strong incentive to buy the firm's 
stock at the lowest possible price. Their personal stake in an MBO may motivate 
management to depress pre-buyout accounting earnings to portray a less favourable 
picture of the firm, either through decisions on the timing of discretionary cash flow or 
the selection of accounting methods or estimates. Perry and Williams (1994) investigate 
EM preceding MBOs using a sample of 175 MBOs during the period over 1981 and 
1988 in the US. By using the discretionary accruals calculated from Jones (1991) Model 
as the dependent variable and earning changes as the independent variable, they find 
significantly negative discretionary accruals which are used to lower reported earnings 
in the year immediately preceding the public announcement of management's intention 
to bid for control of the company. Wu (1997) examines EM behaviours of 87 US MBO 
cases during the period of 1980 to 1987. By following the similar research method used 
by Perry and Williams (1994), the overall evidence she provided favours the hypothesis 
that managers manipulate earnings downwards prior to the MRO proposal. And, an 
examination of pre-MBO stock prices indicates a downward movement. This downward 
movement is systematically associated with pre-MBO earnings changes. Moreover, pre- 
announcement declines in earnings are specific to MBOs. 
More recently, Wright el al., (2006) examine the incidence of l; M in countries 
where the level of investor protection provided by the legal environment is high. In 
particular, they compare the discretionary accruals calculated from the Modified Jones 
Model of 92 UK MBO firms with those of 63 MBO firms for the period of] 997-2002. 
Overall, their results indicate that, managers of MBO firms in both the UK and US 
significantly manage earnings downwards through income-decreasing; discretionary 
accruals in the year immediately prior to the buyout. And, managers ofthe US MB() 
firms manage earnings downward to a greater extent than their counterparts in the UK 
The authors argue that while the UK and US are similar in numerous respects, various 
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cultural and organisational differences exit, such as the UK firms differ from US firms 
in use of equity compensation; the audit function between the UK and the US is also 
different. These country specific factors influence managers' willingness to engage in 
EM practices. 
Implicitly, instead of focusing on accrual-based EM, Wright and Guan (2004) 
investigate the accounting method choices of 74 US firms over a period of three years 
leading up to a MBO in 1998. By using a match approach and multivariate logit 
analysis, they provide evidence suggesting that management' self-serving behaviour 
begins far in advance of the actual MBOs. Specifically, management of the M130 firms 
tends to use income increasing accounting policies over some period of time prior to the 
MBOs. The conclude their study by stating that "[sleli-serving managers who act to 
take a firm private make accounting choices that result in maximisation of their own 
benefits while reducing future cash flows of the firm" (Wright and Guan, 2004, p. 58). 
By using a sample of 247 reversed leveraged buyouts (LBOs) that are offered 
between 1981 and 1999 in the US, Chou el al.. (2006) find positive and significant 
correlation between discretionary current accruals calculated using the Modified Jones 
Model and offerings of reverse LBOs indicating that managers of equity-issuing firms 
opportunistically manipulate earnings upwards, regardless of the form of equity offering. 
Furthermore, they find that the abnormal accruals are negatively related to post-offering 
stock returns within the first year following the offering even alter controlling for firm 
size, book-to-market ratio, offering size, and participation of buyout specialists or 
involvement of management. 'T'hese results suggest that investors discover the IN 
practices for reverse LBO firms shortly after the offerings, and/or an earnings reversal 
leads them to change their perception of the true earnings prospects of the reverse LBO 
firms. 
In addition, recent studies have also examined and indicated that managers 
manipulate earnings in periods of equity offers. These include firms that report positive 
(income-increasing) unexpected accruals prior to seasoned equity offerings (SLOB) (Lee 
and Msaulis, 2009; Rangan, 1998; Teoh ei al., 1998b; Yoon and Miller, 2002), initial 
public offerings (IPOs) (Li el al., 2006; Nagata and Hachiya, 2006; Teoh et a/.. 1998a), 
and stock-financed acquisitions (Botsari and Meeks, 2008). 
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Specifically, Teoh et al.. (1998b) hypothesize that issuers have unusually high 
income-increasing accounting adjustments pre-issue (in order to reach the thresholds of 
stock issuing) and unusually poor earnings and stock return performance post-issue. By 
using a sample of 1,265 SEOs during 1976-1989 in the US and discretionary accruals 
(calculated using the Modified Jones Model) as the proxy for EM, they provide robust 
evidence to support their hypothesis that discretionary accruals grow before the offering, 
peak in the offering year, and decline thereafter. This accruals pattern causes net income 
to grow before, peak in, and decline after the offering year. The post-issue net income 
declines are especially pronounced for issuers that aggressively manage discretionary 
accruals before the issue. 
In the similar vein, Rangan (1998) investigates whether investors' inability to 
unravel EM around the time of the offerings can explain the subsequent poor stock price 
performance. Based on the discretionary accruals (proxy for EM, obtained from the 
Modified Jones Model), earnings changes, and market adjusted stock returns of 230 US 
SEOs for the years of 1987-1990, the author finds that SEOs firms significantly manage 
their earnings upwards before the offerings suggesting managers manipulate reported 
earnings to meet the thresholds of stock offerings. And, he also documents that 
discretionary accruals are negatively correlated with both earnings changes and market- 
adjusted stock returns in the year following the offerings. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in discretionary accruals is associated with an earnings decline of about two to 
three cents per dollar of assets. And, it is also associated with a decline in market- 
adjusted stock returns of about 10%. In conclusion, he states that "... the stock market 
does not correctly value the implications of discretionary accruals for subsequent 
earnings. Rather, the market appears to extrapolate earnings growth associated with 
discretionary accruals and hence overvalues issuing firms"; "... I conclude that issuing 
firms can manipulate their stock price by managing earnings" (Rangan, 1998, p. 121). 
Yoon and Miller (2002) investigate 249 Korean SI; Os firms during the period of 
1995-1997 to investigate if firms manage earnings in the year hebre a planned issue of' 
SEOs. Using three research methods (accrual difference tests, correlation tests between 
net income and CFO, and sign-change ratio tests), they find that the Korean firms 
contemplating SEOs do manage earnings upwards through income-increasing; 
discretionary accruals particularly when their relative performance has been poor. 
100 
Analysis of operating performance around SEOs shows that SEOs firms tend to increase 
reported earnings in the year immediately preceding and the year of SEOs. 
Lee and Masulis (2009) investigate the accounting information quality (measured 
by discretionary accruals calculated using the Modified Jones Model) of 963 US SEOs 
during the period of 1990-2002. They provide evidence suggesting that firms 
aggressively manipulate earnings through income-increasing discretionary accruals 
upwards in the year prior to the SEOs. The poor accounting information quality is 
associated with higher flotation costs in terms of (1) larger underwriting fees; (2) larger 
negative SEO announcement effects; and (3) a higher probability of SEO withdrawals. 
As stated by Teoh el al., (1998a), the high degree of information asymmetry 
between issuers of IPOs and investors at the time of offerings provides firms 
opportunity to mislead investors through EM practices in order to meet the thresholds of 
offerings or to raise funds at favourable terms, such as higher offering price. Thus, it is 
argued that IPOs process is particularly susceptible to EM. Empirically, Teoh et al., 
(1998a) examine the relation between the long-run post-IPOs return underperiormance 
and 1130s firms' EM. Specifically, they examine the correlation between current and 
long-term discretionary accruals (using the Modified Jones Model) and annual income 
performance of 1,649 US IPOs firms during 1980-1992. Their results suggest that 
discretionary accruals are high around the 1POs comparing with those of' non-issuers. 
And, issuers with higher discretionary accruals have poor stock return performance in 
the subsequent three years. They conclude by stating that "... investors are not able to 
fully understand managerial earning choices made the IPOs firms. Because investors 
behave as if they arc fixated on these high Imanipulatedl earnings, lands they are 
disappointed later" (Teoh ei al., 1998a, p. 1966). 
More recently, Nagata and Ilachiya (2006) question whether managers of' IPOs 
firms manipulate earnings upwards to meet the issuing requirements and the reasons of' 
doing so. Based on a sample of 830 Japanese IPOs for the year of' 1989-2000, they use 
performance-matched abnormal accruals (using the Modified Jones Model) as the proxy 
of EM and find managers significantly manipulate earnings upwards prior to the 
offerings. 't'hey also report that IPO issuers have the incentives to manage earnings to 
reduce the amount of wealth transfer and control of the firm. 
Li et al., (2006) investigate 3,989 US IPOs firms over the period of 1980-1999 to 
determine if the managers engage in EM and aggressive EM is related to the delisting 
risk. By using current discretionary accruals (DCAs) calculated using the Modified 
Jones Model, they find that DCAs in IPOs year are significantly and positively related 
to the probability of involuntary delisting after IPOs. Furthermore, they find that IPOs 
firms associated with conservative EM are more likely to be merged or acquired and 
they earn positive abnormal returns. 
EM by acquirers ahead of share bids in a stock-financed acquisition may affect 
whether a bid succeeds, and hence which management team controls the target's assets, 
as well as the distribution of gains between target and acquirer shareholders. In the 
share corporate takeovers, the consideration received by target shareholders is the 
acquiring firm's stock. The total number of shares issued by the acquirer to gain control 
is computed based on the acquiring firm's stock price on or near the takeover agreement 
date. Because this exchange ratio is inversely related to the acquiring firm's stock price, 
the acquiring firm may have an incentive to increase accounting earnings prior to the 
takeover in the hope of raising the market price of its stock, and therefore reducing the 
cost of buying the target (Hartzell et al., 2004; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). In order to test this argument, ßotsari and Meeks (2008) 
investigate a sample of 42 UK companies involved 48 cases of share-financed 
acquisitions over 1997-2001, and use distribution approach of discretionary accruals 
calculated using the Modified Jones Model, their results suggest that acquiring 
companies engage in income-increasing EM in the year immediately preceding the otter 
announcement, and this manipulation is mostly concentrated on the working capital 
component of accruals. 
Other studies of EM have shown that earnings are managed to meet the 
expectations of financial analysts or investors. One obvious reason is that if' the 
companies can not meet the expectations of financial analysts or investors, the public 
will lose confidence in the company's performance and the stock price will thus he 
plunged. As proposed by Burgstahler and Eames (2006), firms engage in manipulating 
earnings to avoid negative earnings surprises. Empirically, Albarbanell and l, chavy 
(2003) use 22,173 financial analysts' stock recommendations (e. g., Buy, Hold, or Sell) 
for the period over 1985-1998 in the US and quarterly unexpected accruals to analyse 
102 
how a firm's stock price sensitivity to earnings news, as measured by outstanding stock 
recommendations, affects the direction and magnitude of discretionary accruals 
measured by the Modified Jones Model. In particular, they find a tendency for firms 
rated by the financial analysts a Sell to encourage more frequently in extreme, income- 
decreasing EM practices, indicating that they have relatively stronger incentives both to 
take earnings bath and increase accounting reserves than other firms. In contrast, firms 
rated by the financial analysts a Buy are more likely to engage in EM practices that 
makes reported earnings equal to or slightly higher than analysts' forecast. 
Burgstahler and Eames (2006) study the correlation between the discretionary 
accruals (for EM measurement, calculated from the Modified Jones Model) and 25,951 
analysts' forecasts over 1996 to 2000 in the US stock markets. More generally, they 
provide evidence suggesting an unusually low frequency of' small negative annual 
earnings surprises and an unusually high frequency of zero and small positive earnings 
surprises at several forecast horizons. 
Chen el al., (2008) study accrual-based and real-based FM behaviours measured 
through the Modified Jones Model and cash flow from operations respectively of 6,685 
US firms during 1987-2006. The objective of their study is to empirically assess how 
the market values the act of meeting or beating analysts' forecasts in the presence of 
FIM. Their findings suggest that firms engage in both accrual-based and real-based FM 
to meet or heat analysts' expectations in order to get their equity to he valued as 
premium by the market. However, comparing with the control firms that do not engage 
in IM, market discounts the magnitude of this premium by approximately one-third at 
earnings announcement day when EM practices are acknowledged. 
5.3.1.2. Contracting Motivations 
Accounting data are used to help monitor and regulate the contracts between the tirm 
and its stakeholders. For instance, while management compensation contracts are used 
to align the incentives of management with those of the external stakeholders, lending 
contracts are written to limit manages' actions that benefit the firm's stockholders at the 
expenses of its creditors (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) suggest that these contracts create incentives for IN 
because it is likely to be costly for compensation committees and creditors to "undo" 
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EM. A large literature has emerged to test whether the incentives created by lending and 
compensation contracts can explain EM. The following section reviews the empirical 
evidence on the association between contracting incentives and voluntary changes in 
accounting methods, estimates, or accruals. 
a. Lending Covenants 
Debt-holders normally use lending covenants to protect themselves from 
opportunistically discretionary behaviours. By definition, a lending covenant requires 
borrowers to maintain their physical assets to certain standards, meet minimum 
disclosure requirements, engage only in permissible businesses, or maintain a certain 
level of insurance (Brealey et al., 2007). In terms of AT, which is applied by most 
studies in this field (e. g., Demiel ei al., 2007; DeAbgelo el cal., 1994; Kasanen el al., 
1996; Moeira and Pope, 2007; Prevost el al., 2008; Sweeny, 1994), the agency 
relationship is between the management (the agent) and the creditors (the principal). 
And, by taking the hypothesis of separation of ownership and control, the assumption 
that individuals are profit maximisers, and the notion of avoiding agency costs, it is 
argued that the lending contracts may not effectively constrain management from 
engaging in opportunistic discretion at the expense of the creditors. In particular, when 
firms are in the period with negative returns, the decisions managers are likely to 
engage in EM to hide from their creditors a signal (loss) that could negatively affect the 
costs of debt. In terms of TCE, managers and creditors are bilaterally dependent; both of 
them are bounded to the relationship as the high level of specific assets involved in the 
transaction. Thus, one party will bear the relevant costs, ii' the other one prematurely 
terminates the transaction. Given the notion that all contacts are unavoidably incomplete 
by the reason of bounded rationality, in order to avoid the transaction costs resulted 
from premature termination, managers thus are likely to engage in EM to artificially 
dress-up the apparent performance of firms, especially when they can not fulfil the 
requirements of the covenants. In addition, managers may also manipulate earnings in 
order to get a better deal from the creditors (e. g. lower interest rate). 
Empirically, Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeny (1994) examine the firms 
that actually violate a lending covenant. However, the empirical evidence from these 
two studies is mixed. On one hand, Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that the 139 
sample firms (US) accelerate earnings by using discretionary accruals measured by the 
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Modified Jones Model one year prior to the covenant violation for the study period of 
1988-1992. They interpret this as evidence of EM by firms that are close to their 
lending covenants. On the other hand, based on the discretionary accruals of 150 US 
firms during 1980-1990, Sweeny (1994) also finds covenant violators utilise income- 
increasing accounting changes, but these typically take place after the violation. This 
finding indicates that the 150 sample firms (US) do not make accounting changes 
specially to avoid violating the lending convent. 
In addition, Prevost et al., (2008) find evidence suggesting that the major 
incentive for the firms (14,855 US firm-year observations over 1993-2005) to engage in 
aggressive accounting (measured by discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones 
Model) is to avoid debt covenant violations. And, they point out two strategies that are 
used by firms to manage the reported earnings: (1) the "save for the future" strategy is 
to spread profits obtained in the current period over future periods; and (2) the "borrow 
from the future" strategy is to reflect in the current period that profits are expected to be 
gained in the future. 
Instead of analysing the accrual-based EM practices, Moeira and Pope (2007) 
examine the earnings changes over time. In particular, they investigate whether firms 
with negative returns face higher incentive to make earnings upwards and their ultimate 
intention is to hide from credit market a signal that could be translated into a negative 
impact on the costs of debt. By analysing the relation between changes in net income 
and debt of 1,138 UK firms for the period of 1976-1994, they find that firms with 
negative returns show higher EM pervasiveness than their counterparts, reporting a 
greater number of small profits and fewer small losses. They also provide evidence 
suggesting that the negative return firms with larger needs of debt show higher 
pervasiveness in undertaking EM to avoid violation of lending covenants. 
As stated by Kalay (1982), Bradley and Roberts (2004), the dividend 
constraints/restrictions are among the most common covenants in debt contracts. Since 
the level of reported earnings is an important determinant of dividends in such 
covenants (Daniel ei al., 2008), managers then have the incentive to manipulate 
earnings upwards to avoid dividend cuts when reported earnings would otherwise be 
below the expected dividend levels'? (Daniel el cal., 2008; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
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Empirically, DeAngelo ef at.. (1994) examine the total accruals (as a proxy for EM) of 
76 financially troubled US firms with a record of persistent losses and dividend 
reductions over 1990-1994. They find that managers' accounting choices primarily 
reflect their firms' financial difficulties, rather than attempts to inflate income. Firms 
with and without binding covenants exhibit minor accrual differences in the ten years 
before the dividend reduction. Healy and Palepu (1990) study the changes of total 
accruals of 126 US firms that experience tightness in their dividend constraints during 
1980-1990 and find no evidence that these firms make accrual changes to circumvent 
the dividend restriction. However, with such small sample size, the results of both 
studies may be limited to reflect the full picture (e. g. the pervasiveness and magnitude 
of accounting manipulations). 
More recently, Daniel et al., (2007) investigate 1,500 S&P firms during 1992- 
2005 in the US, and find that firms are more likely to manage earnings upwards through 
discretionary accruals measured by the Modified Jones Mode when their earnings 
would otherwise fall short of expected dividend levels. This EM behaviour appears to 
significantly impact the likelihood of a dividend cut. In particular, firms whose 
discretionary accruals cause reported earnings to exceed expected dividend levels are 
significantly less likely to cut dividends than are firms whose reported earnings fall 
short of expected dividend levels. 
By using 37 Finnish firms over 1970-1989, Kasanen et al., (1996) document that 
firms manage earnings upwards by using discretionary accruals calculated fron the 
Modified Jones Model in response to pressure from large institutional shareholders to 
pay dividends. In conclusion, the authors state that "... our empirical evidence gives 
support for the hypothesis that dividends are an important determinant of' earnings 
management in Finland during 1970-89. And, earnings management is driven by an 
implicit contract between the firm and its shareholders" (Ksanen el (1l., 1996, p. 305). 
Although the authors argue that the sample covers around 90% of' the market 
capitalisation of industrial firms in the Helsinki Stock Exchange (Finland), such a small 
sample size may still be a concern. 
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h. Directors 'Remuneration 
More generally, directors' remuneration is composed of six elements (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990; 2004; Mallin, 2007; Murphy, 1999; ): base salary, bonus, stock options. 
restricted share plans (stock grants), pension, and benefits'. The following section will 
provide an analysis on the effectiveness of compensation strategy which has been seen 
as a mechanism to align management's interests with those of shareholders. 
Theoretically, by structuring appropriate incentives, AT aims to minimize agency 
costs to the principal of the agency relationship; it is to design a contract ex anie which 
can efficiently align the different interests between the principal and the agent. As 
argued by Baker el al.. (2003), most academic studies (e. g., Baker el a/.. 2003; Efendi cal 
al., 2007; Guidry el al.. 1999; Holthausen el al., 1995) have typically focused on testing 
executive compensation strategy within an agency theory framework, primarily 
examining alignment aspects. Arguably, by tying executive compensation strategy to 
performance (measured by different criteria, e. g., profitability, stock price, growth), it 
encourages managers to make operating and investing decisions that maximise 
shareholder wealth. Stating differently, because of linking the executive compensation 
with changes in shareholder wealth, it increases shareholder wealth by reducing agency 
problems (David el al., 2006). In particular, AT argues that the well-designed 
compensation contract as one way of the ex ante alignments will help to ensure that the 
objectives of directors and shareholders are aligned, and so share options and other 
long-term incentives are the key mechanisms (Conyon 1997; 2006). 
However, the effectiveness of aligning the interests of managers with those of' 
investors by linking the compensation strategy to company's performance is often 
challenged. Starting from the theoretical view point, TCF focuses on the ex pox! 
governance to minimize transaction costs in a discriminating (mainly, transaction cost 
economizing) way by allocating different governance structures correspondingly to the 
different attributes of transactions. In transaction between managers and shareholders, 
as managers engage in high level of human asset specificity and shareholders engage in 
dedicated asset specificity, these two parties are said to be bilaterally dependent. Tying 
executive compensation strategy to firm's performance through long-term incentives 
(such as stock options) increases the level of bilateral dependence due to executives' 
involvement in both the specific human asset and the specific monetary asset, thus the 
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transactions costs involved (Williamson, 1991; 1996). Since shareholders usually use 
financial information to evaluate the executives' performance, executives will be 
motivated to engage in EM practice: (1) to mislead the shareholder of company 
performance (a negative performance may make shareholders to terminate the 
transaction with managers, and they may lose more than before due to increased 
transaction costs); (2) to negotiate a better compensation package with shareholders. By 
putting all together, TCE argues that remuneration strategy as an ex ante alignment may 
not be an effective mechanism to prevent opportunistic discretion given the written 
contracts are never complete and managers are given to opportunism. 
Similar argument is also proposed by Bebchuk and Fried (2004) that there are 
significant flaws in pay arrangements, which have hurt shareholders both by increasing 
pay levels and, even more important, by leading to practices that dilute and distort 
managers' incentives" (p. 155). Clarke (2007, p. 72) states "a far more insidious indicator 
of the extent to management entrenchment in the US corporations is the rapid escalation 
of CEO and executive remuneration, regardless of performance, that suggests in this 
respect management of is out of control of either hoards or shareholders. " And, Monks 
and Minow (2008) argue that if shareholders, as the consumers of executive 
compensation, cannot act when it is out of control, the system simply isn't working. It is 
just one symptom of corporate governance system that fails to ensure management 
accountability. Further, they argue that "... there is an inherent conflict of interests 
between shareholders and management with regard to compensation... it is important to 
note that the conflict is not over the amount of compensation, but over the variability of 
the compensation. Shareholders want compensation to vary with performance as much 
as possible, while managers understandably want as much certainty as possible... " 
(Monks and Minow, 2008, p. 309). 
F, mpirically, a number of studies have examined the executive compensation in 
relation to managers' incentives of engaging in IN activities (Mallin, 2007, Wearing, 
2005). In general, the evidence reported by these studies is consistent with the notion of 
managers using accounting judgement to increase performance-based compensation. In 
other words, without effective monitoring and control mechanisms, simply linking 
executive compensation to the company's performance cannot prevent opportunistic 
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discretion, in fact, it motivates managers to engage in accounting manipulations for 
better rewards. 
For instance, Guidry et al., (1999) test the bonus-maximisation hypothesis that 
managers make discretionary accrual decisions to maximise their short-term bonuses. 
By investigating the relationship between discretionary accruals calculated from the 
Modified Jones Model and bonus plan for executives of 117 US firms over the period of 
1994-1995, they find that divisional managers for a large multi-national firm are likely 
to defer income when the earnings target in their bonus plan will not be met and when 
they are entitled to the maximum bonuses permitted under the plan. In the similar vein, 
1-Iolthausen et al., (1995) examine the extent to which earnings are manipulated to 
maximise the value of payments under short-term bonus plans. By following the similar 
research method used by Guidry el al., (1999), they investigate 443 firm-year 
observations over 1982-1990 in the US and provide evidence suggesting that the CFOs 
manipulate earnings downwards when they are at the upper hound of their bonus 
contracts in order to increase the present value of payments from those bonus plans. 
However, they find no evidence that managers manipulate earnings downwards when 
they are below the lower bound of their contract. With relatively small sample size, both 
studies may suffer the power in generalising their findings. 
More recently, researchers draw their attention especially to the impacts of stock 
options with larger sample size. Using 7,301 US firm-year observations over 1992-1999, 
Gao and Shrieves (2002) show that FM intensity measured by the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (obtained from the Modified Jones Model) scaled by asset size is 
related to the managerial compensation contract design. In particular, the amounts of 
stock options and bonuses, and the incentive intensity of stock options, are all positively 
related to EM intensity. 
Baker el al., (2003) study whether the structure of executive compensation, 
specifically, stock options relative to other forms of' pay, is associated with 
opportunistical use of discretionary accruals in reported earnings. By using 168 US 
firms during 1992-1998, they investigate the relationships between discretionary 
accruals (calculated from the Modified Jones Model) and difIercnt forms of' 
compensation (e. g., salary, bonus, and stock options) and provide evidence suggesting 
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that relatively high option compensation is associated with more income-increasing 
discretionary accrual choices in periods leading up to option award dates in order to 
raise the stock price, thus the exercise price. Furthermore, they find that this association 
is stronger when managers are able to publicly announce earnings prior to the option 
award date. In conclusion, they state that "... [the] results are consistent with the general 
implication that option compensation creates opportunistic incentives for managers to 
manipulate reported earnings for their private benefits... " (Baker e/ al.. 2003, p. 557). 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) argue that tying the managers' incentives 
together with those of shareholders through linking compensation strategy with 
company's performance (e. g. companies' share prices) may have the perverse effect of 
encouraging managers to exploit their discretion in reporting earnings, with an eye to 
manipulating the stock prices of their companies. By using 4,671 firm-year observations 
in the US over 1993-1996, the authors find that the use of discretionary accruals 
(obtained through the Modified Jones Model) to manipulate reported earnings is more 
pronounced in firms where the CEO's potential total compensation is closely tied to the 
value of stock and option holdings. In addition, during the years of high accruals, the 
CEOs exercise unusually large numbers of options as the CEOs and other insiders sell 
large quantities of shares. By studying discretionary accruals caculated from the 
Modified Jones Model of 240 Japanese firms during 1991-2000, Shuto (2007) finds 
evidence suggesting that the use of discretionary accruals in Japanese firms increases 
with performance-related executive compensation, especially the stock options. 
Instead of investigating the direct link between FM practices and executive 
compensation, Denis el al., (2006) use a sample of 358 US firms for the period of 1993- 
2002, and show a significant positive association between the likelihood of securities 
fraud allegations and the intensity of executive stock options using Black and Scholes 
(1973) model". They conclude their study by arguing that stock options increase the 
incentive of engaging in fraudulent activity. In addition, they find that the positive 
relation between the likelihood of fraud allegations and option intensity is stronger in 
firms with higher outside blockholder and higher institutional ownership. 
And, using 190 US companies contained 95 financial reports restating firms with 
the matched control firms for the years of 1997-2002, Fiendi ei al., (2007) lind that the 
likelihood of a misstated Financial statement increases greatly when the CEO has very 
sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options. Additionally, misstatements are also 
more pronounced for firms that are constrained by an inter-coverage debt covenant, that 
raise new debt or equity capital, or that have a CEO who serves as the board chair. 
In summary, these studies suggest that compensation and lending contracts may 
have the perverse effect of encouraging managers to exploit their discretion in reporting 
earnings. 
5.3.1.3. Regulatory Motivations 
The literature of EM has explored the effects of several forms of accounting-related 
regulations, such as industry-specific, anti-trust, and anti-dumpling regulations. The 
theoretical background is related to the political cost hypothesis which states that 
political sector has the power to transfer wealth between various parties. From the 
perspective of EM practices, the more a firm is subject to potential wealth transfers in 
the political process, the more its management is likely to adopt accounting policies in 
order to reduce such transfers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 1979; 1986)2. From the 
perspective of AT, which is applied by most research (e. g., Garrod el u/., 2007; Jones, 
1991; Key, 1997; Magan el at., 1999), firm can be seen as the agent, and regulator/the 
whole society is the principal; there exists conflict of interests as these two parties have 
different objectives in the political process. Given that the contacts are incomplete 
(these will be the particular regulations, such as anti-trust or anti-dumpling policies) and 
managers are opportunistic, such agency problem may motivate the firm to manipulate 
reported earnings in order to avoid wealth transfers in the political process at the 
expense of the principal. In terms of TCE, the political process can he seen as a specific 
transaction between firm as one party and the regulator/the whole society 21 as the other 
one, and the political cost is the cost of undertaking such transaction. Given that all 
contracts are unavoidably incomplete (the particular regulations), the opportunistic 
managers who have the ability of feasible foresight may engage in 1; M to avoid the 
wealth transfers at the expense of the other party. 
A number of studies have investigated the specific regulations to recognise 
managers' EM incentives. The followings provide a brief summary of the empirical 
studies on the regulatory incentives. For instance, Jones (1991) tests whether firms can 
benefit from import relief (e. g., tariff increases, quota reductions) by decreasing 
reported earnings through EM during import relief investigations by the United States 
International Trade Commission (ITC). The import relief determination made by the 
ITC is based on several factors are specified in the federal trade acts, including the 
profitability of the industry. By analysing the discretionary accruals calculated from the 
Jones Model of 49 US firms during 1980-1985, she finds that firms in industries seeking 
import relief tend to defer income in the year of application. She concludes by stating 
that '`explicit use of accounting members in import relief regulation provides incentives 
for managers to manage earnings downwards in order to increase the likelihood of 
obtaining import relief and/or increase the amount of relief granted" (Jones, 1991, 
p. 193). 
Key (1997) examines the relationship between total accruals (calculated as the 
differences between depreciation expenses and amortization expenses plus the net 
differences between net assts and net liabilities) and several firm characteristics (e. g., 
gross property, plant, equipment, gross intangible assets) for 24 firms in the US cable 
television industry at the time of Congressional hearings (1984-1985) on whether to de- 
regulate the industry. Her evidence is consistent with firms in the industry deferring 
earnings during the period of Congressional scrutiny. With such a small sample size, the 
evidence from the study on the frequency of EM for regulatory purposes may be 
difficult to interpret. As stated by Key (1997, p. 334), -jai limitation of examining; one 
industry with a small number of firms is that omitted variables are more likely to have 
an unspecified influence compared to large sample studies with diverse firms. " 
Magan el al., (1999) study the EM measured by the Modified Jones Model during 
anti-dumping investigations in Canada. The purpose of their study is to assess if 
Canadian firms lodging antidumping complaints against foreign competitors 
opportunistically reduce their reported earnings to obtain favourable ruling from the 
Canadian External Trade Tribunal. In a sample of 223 Canadian firms during 1976- 
1992, their results indicate that Canadian firms reduce their reported earnings by a 
significant amount (6.3% of lagged assets) during the year in which they are under 
investigation by the tribunal. Moreover, the authors find that investors can correct the 
price-earnings relation to take into account the systematic underestimation of earnings 
reported by firms launching antidumping complaints. 
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Gill-de-Albornoz and Illueca (2005) analyse the effect of price regulation on 
accounting policy of 114 firm-year observations of 13 Spanish electricity companies 
over the period of 1991-2000. Their results are consistent with managers artificially 
reduce reported earnings using discretionary accruals measured by the Modified Jones 
Model when the government establishes tariff increase. In this way, companies attempt 
to diminish their political visibility and counteract social outcry arising from the 
government's decision. 
Furthermore, Garrod et al., (2007) examine the extent to which economic 
incentives subject to political cost impact on accounting choice. By using 25,740 firm- 
year observations of the Slovenian small private firms for year 2002 to test the 
relationships between discretionary accruals calculated using the Modified Jones Model 
and net income, earnings before tax, ordinary income before tax from ordinary activities, 
and adjusted operating profits respectively, they find that profit firms manage earnings 
downward to reduce, but not entirely eliminate, current period corporate tax. 
Elimination of tax is constrained by political cost resulting from the increased 
possibility of a tax audit. Interestingly, they argue that this same political cost also 
provides an incentive to firms that are genuinely in a position where they would pay no 
tax in the current period to adopt earnings-increasing accounting policies. 
In summary, the empirical studies are consistent with the theoretical argument that 
in the presence of a political process (the specific regulations) with a potential wealth 
transfer between firm (one party in terms ot"1 CE or the agent in perspective of Al') and 
regulators/the whole society (the other party in terms of -RT. ' or the principal in terms of' 
AT), the former may manipulate reported earnings with the objective of misleading the 
latter in order to reduce the possibility of wealth transfer. 
5.3.2. Incentives of EM in China 
1? M has also been rampant in China's listed companies. Chinese investors and 
regulators are unsophisticated: they are usually fixated on reported earnings, thus may 
not be able to see through IM (Chen and Yuan, 2006; Chen el al., 2001; Ding ei u/., 
2007; Liu and Lu, 2007; Yu el al., 2006). Based on the literature, two types of 
incentives of EM in China have been documented, including the capital market 
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incentive (ROE requirements for issuing additional shares) and the regulatory incentive 
(regulatory policy for de-listing firms). In particular, the CSRC requires listed 
companies to meet certain return on equity (ROE) criteria before they can apply for 
permission to issue additional shares to shareholders. And, the most important criterion 
for delisting a listed company is a reported net loss for three conservative years. Liu and 
Lu (2007, p. 882) state that "such practices [ROE requirements and delisting policy] 
unintentionally provide the listed firms with strong incentives to manage earnings. " 
For the contracting motivations, the lending covenants are rarely used in the 
Chinese listed companies as the companies normally use properties or assets-based 
mortgages to the banks for borrowing and in most of the cases the properties of their 
parent companies instead of themselves are mortgaged to the banks (e. g., Cai el al., 
2008; Firth e/ (il., 2008; Zou and Xiao, 2006). As proposed by Allen el al., (2005), 
Dobson and Kashyap (2006) that China still manages to maintain dominant State 
ownership in the banking sector in order to channel bank deposits to the ailing State- 
owned Enterprises (SoEs). These State-owned banks which account for more than 70% 
of bank lending have the obligations to lend to SoEs. While the efficiency of the 
China's banking system is not within the scope of the current thesis, however, it can be 
argued that lending to the listed companies especially those transferred from the SoF,, s 
seems to be treated as a political process in China instead of a market originated 
procedure in which lending covenants are important. To my best knowledge, there is no 
empirical evidence demonstrates whether executive compensation in China is an 
incentive of managers to engage in EM as proposed by TCE or should he considered as 
an alignment strategy (AT) that encourages managers to make operating and investing 
decisions that maximise shareholder wealth, thus limiting EM behaviours. The effect of 
executive compensation on EM practices is thus unclear. A detailed analysis of' 
executive compensation in perspective of China will be provided in the next chapter. 
This section is composed of two parts: (1) capital market incentive of' IN in 
China-ROE requirements, and (2) regulatory incentive of' F, M in China- delisting 
policy. A summary of the empirical studies of these incentives can be found in Table 
5.4. 
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5.3.2.1. Capital Market Incentive of EM in China 
--ROE Requirements 
Most studies apply AT to investigate capital market incentive of EM in China (e. g., 
Chen and Yuan, 2006; Haw el al., 2005; Huang et al., 2006; Liu and Lu, 2007; Yu el al., 
2006). In terms of agency relationship, firms are the agent as majority of listed 
companies in China regard issuing shares as the best channel for raising funds (Huang 
et al., 2006; Liu and Lu, 2007). One the other hand, the general investors on the market 
coupled with the relevant Chinese authorities who set financial thresholds (e. g., net 
profits, ROE requirements) on rights issuing are the principals. Due to the widespread 
use of accounting information by regulators and investors to help value stocks, firms 
manipulate reported earnings in order to mislead both authorities and general investors 
about their performance in attempt to issue shares and influence short-term stock price. 
From the perspective of TCC, it can also be applied to the capital market incentive of' 
EM in China. In transaction between firms and their shareholders, these two parties are 
bilaterally dependent as firms need to raise funds from the markets through issuing 
shares to maintain a proper liquidity level, and shareholders, on the other hand, require 
the specific human asset provided by the firms (or managers of the firms) to make sure 
that the companies run smoothly (in perspective of Chinese regulators) and to assure of' 
getting a return on their investments (in perspective of general investors). The 
widespread use of accounting information by regulators and investors to evaluate firms, 
this bilateral dependence, however, creates an incentive for firms to manipulate their 
reported earnings in order to minimise the risk of premature termination of transaction 
when they cannot meet the investors' expectations and regulatory thresholds lör issuing 
shares. Based on the arguments of opportunism and feasible foresight, firms may also 
engage in EM to raise capital at more favourable terms (e. g. higher issuing price). 
Recall from the previous discussion, China's stock exchanges (Si 1SF, and S/, l II; ) 
were opened in the early 1990s as an experiment in mixing a market economy with 
central planning. To raise additional capital, listed firms can issue shares through 
Seasoned Equity Offerings (SI Os) to investors. In the early 1990s, because of' the 
insatiable demand for stocks from public investors, SEOs were quickly and Fully 
subscribed by shareholders (Chen and Yuan, 2006). To curb this excessive activity, the 
CSRC issued a series of guidelines to restrict additional rights can he issued alter 
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November 1993. As summarized in Table 5.2., each guideline requires a minimum level 
of profit or ROE, and limits the number of shares that can be issued. 
Table 5.2.: The CSRC's five guidelines regulating rights issue activities: 1993-1999 
Date of Guideline Profitability Requirement Limitation on No. of New 
Shares 
Nov. 17,1993 Two years' profits 30% of existing shares 
Sept. 20,1994 Three years' profits and three-year No change 
average ROE>_10% 
Jan. 24,1996 ROE>10% in each of previous three 30% of existing shares, 
yearsa excluding shares issued as 
stock dividends 
Mar. 17,1999 Three-year average ROE>_10%, and No change 
ROE? 6% in each of previous three 
yearsb 
Mar. 15,2001 Three-year average ROE_6%, and 30% limit can be waive if the 
expected ROE? 6% for the year of actual control shareholders buy 
rights issues all the new shares 
aFor companies in the energy, raw materials, and infrastructure sectors, ROE is reduced to 9% 
in each of the previous three years. 
bFor companies in the energy, raw materials, infrastructure, agriculture, and high-tech sectors, 
the average ROE is reduced to 9%. 
Source: Chen and Yuan, 2006, p. 64h, and Yu et al., 2006, p. 345g. 
To start with, the 1993 guideline required listed firms to report two years' profits 
as the threshold to issue additional shares. The guideline was tightened to a three-year 
average ROE of 10 percent in 1994. However, the 1994 guideline was proved to he 
ineffective to limit the amount of SEOs, as reported by Chen and Yuan (2006, p. 648) 
that `'the amount of capital raised through SEOs exceeded that from IPOs in 1995; the 
rights issues were $0.8 billion compared with $0.3 billion of IPOs. " As a response, the 
guideline in 1996 required an ROE at least 10 percent in each of the previous three 
years. This guideline significantly reduced the number of firms that can apply to the 
CSRC for SEOs. For instance, the total amount of capital raised through SFIOs in China 
remains $0.8 billion compared with $2.7 billion from 11 0s in 1996 (Chen and Yuan, 
2006). In early 1999, in response to public criticisms of earnings-manipulation 
phenomenon (this is known as the "10% phenomenon", for an detailed analysis refer to 
Chen and Yuan, 2006; Chen and Wang, 2007; Yu el al., 2006), the C'SRC lowered the 
standard requiring that firms needed to have an average ROE above 10°/, in the past 
three years but not lower than 6% in any of these years. In March 2001, the CSRC 
further lowered the standard, stating that firms must have an average ROE above 6% in 
the past three years. However, this is not an easy task for most Chinese listed companies 
considering the fact that the average ROE of listed companies is about 6.5%, and the 
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average ROE for most industries in China is below 6% by the end of 2005 (Chen and 
Shih, 2004). Thus, given the fact that the CSRC relies on ROEs to review a listed 
company's application for issuing more shares, listed companies have strong incentive 
to manage earnings above the necessary threshold. As argued by Yu al cal., (2006, 
p. 3456), "China's listed firms are likely to have strong incentives to conduct EM, 
especially to meet regulatory requirements to raise equity capital in the stock market. " 
And, Chen and Wang (2007, p. 224) state that `'... the reduction of the ROE threshold 
[CSRC's requirements in 2001] did not seem to reduce the magnitude of earnings 
manipulation"; "... the earnings manipulation target shifted from 10% to 6% as the 
regulation on rights issues changed. " 
Empirically, a number of studies examine the relationship between EM and ROE 
requirements during the SEOs process in China's listed companies. For example, I law 
et al., (2005) examine whether Chinese listed firms manage earnings to meet regulatory 
benchmarks on ROE and whether regulators and investors consider the quality of 
earnings in respective to their regulatory and investment decisions. By analysing the 
aggregate income effect of below-the-line items (net of taxes) scaled by the book value 
of equity, discretionary accruals calculated from the Modified Jones Model, and 
reported ROE adjusted for the effect of below-the-line items (net of taxes) of 329 firm- 
year observations from the A-share market that report ROE between 10%-11 % over 
1996-1998, they show that firms whose ROEs are in the range of 10% to I1 `% 
("borderline firms") have higher discretionary items such as abnormal accruals and non- 
operating income than other firms. Their evidence suggests that managers execute 
transactions involving below-the-line items and use accounting accruals to achieve 
regulatory benchmarks to qualify for the rights offering. They further partition the 
sample into three subgroups: firms that successfully received approval for the rights 
offering from the regulators, those that were unsuccessful, and those did not apply. 
Their results show that while both successful and unsuccessful firms (including non- 
applicants) manage earnings upwards, the income-increasing magnitude for successful 
firms is significantly greater than that for unsuccessful firms. 
Chen and Yuan (2006) use a sample of 440 applicants for additional rights issues 
from 1996 to 1998 to examine the correlation between EM (measured by discretionary 
accruals using the Modified Jones Model) and capital resource allocation in China. 
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They find that many firms in China are still able to gain rights issue approval through 
accrual-based FM practices, and such opportunistically discretionary behaviour 
associates with miss-allocation of capital resources. They also show that these firms 
subsequently underperform other approval firms that do not use the same practices. 
Huang el al., (2006) study the existence and magnitude of both accrual-based 
(discretionary accruals calculated from the Modified Jones Model) and real EM (both 
below-the-line and above-the-line items). By using 2,046 firm-year observations 
selected from A-share market in manufacturing industry during 1996 to 1998, their 
main findings illustrate that real and accruals-based EM activities are significantly 
higher for firms in danger of missing the performance thresholds imposed by the 
authorities to issue rights. They call these firms the suspect firms. Among these suspect 
firms, they find that "... suspect firms which have been non-suspect in the previous year 
show a significant increase in accrual-based EM activities" (Huang et at., 2006, p. 25- 
26). 
Using 2,504 firm-year observations from 1999 to 2005, Liu and Lu (2007) 
examine the relation between EM and corporate governance in China by introducing a 
tunneling perspective. By using total accruals as the measurement for tunneling, they 
provide evidence suggesting that Chinese listed companies have strong incentives to 
manage earnings in order to meet ROE thresholds. And, they also identify the 
importance of' corporate governance in mitigating EM that "... Chinese listed 
companies' earnings management is significantly related to the main aspects of their 
corporate governance [e. g., independent board of director, audit committee, ownership 
structure]. Good corporate governance mitigates agency problems, especially agency 
conflicts between the largest shareholders and the minority shareholders, which often 
takes the form of tunneling in the Chinese context" (Liu and Lu, 2007, p. 894). However, 
the explanatory power of total accruals as a measure for accounting management is 
questionable, since it is biased not only by variations in investments in fixed asset but 
only by changes in working capital. Furthermore, the relationship between accruals and 
tunneling may not be fixed; it will depend on whether investors are seeking long-term 
or short-term benefit. 
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Yu et al., (2006) investigate whether Chinese firms manipulate earnings to meet 
regulator requirements in rights issuing. Indirectly, instead of focusing the accrual- 
based EM practices, they analyse the trend in EM measured by income from non- 
operating activities for a sample of 5,921 firm-year observations over 1994-2002, they 
document that EM at the thresholds of 6% and 10% ROE is very pervasive and the non- 
core income is the major means used in such EM. 
In addition, several studies document the existence of upwards EM prior to the 
initial public offerings (IPOs) of Chinese listed companies. For instance, Aharony el al.. 
(2000) examines EM in the process of financial packing preceding IPOs in which 
Chinese State-owned Enterprises issue shares to foreign investors. For 83 Chinese firms 
that issue B-Share or 11-Shares over 1992-1995, they analyze the trends in return on 
assets (ROA) and selected earnings components (e. g., total assets, net sales, net income) 
in two years preceding and three years following the IPO. More generally, they find that 
the median firm ROA peaks in the IPO indicating an upwards EM and declines after. 
I-Iowever, with such a small sample size, the pervasiveness of EM is difficult to 
interpret given that there are over 1,400 listed companies in China's market to date. As 
the authors admit that "... among this study's limitations, the most significant is small 
sample size" (Aharony el al., 2000, p. 125). In addition, the measurement of EM is 
another concern. Earnings patterns analyzed through ROA may be affected by 
macroeconomic factors, such as the fluctuation of inflation rates, exchange rates (for the 
firms that have oversea subsidiaries), and so forth. 
By using a large sample size of 884 companies in both A-share and B-share 
markets over 1995-1999, Chen and Shih (2004) study the patterns of several selected 
financial indicators (e. g., operating revenue growth rate, net profit growth rate, earnings 
per share, ROA) of companies in three years preceding the IPO. Their results 
demonstrate that companies tend to inflate the figures in financial statements which are 
required to provide to implement the IPOs procedures. And, Wang (2005) documents a 
sharp decline in operating performance of IPO firms over 5 years alter issuing. One of 
the reasons for this trend is, as argued by the author, the pre-issue manipulating of 
reported earnings. In order to conduct his research, Wang (2005) use several 
performance measures (e. g., ROA, operating income to assets, sales to assets, returns on 
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sales) to study the post-issue performance of 747 firms that applied for IPOs over 1994- 
1999. 
All in all, it can be said that Chinese companies manipulate reported earnings to 
mislead authorities and investors about true performance of the firms in order to issue 
shares (either ROEs or IPOs) at favourable terms. The means used to manipulate 
earnings are various ranging from the non-cash accrual items at operating level to the 
non-operating transactions with related parties. 
5.3.2.2. Regulatory Incentive of EM in China 
--Delisting Policy 
To protect minority shareholders and encourage better corporate governance, the CSRC 
introduced a special dc-listing mechanism in 1998 (The Company Law of the People's 
Republic of China, revised in 2005). Under the guidelines, China's two stock 
exchanges-the SHSE and the SZSE start to de-list Chinese listed firms. The stock 
exchanges will first label firms in financial trouble (consecutive losses for three years) 
as special treatment (ST) firms. It means that the stocks of such firms can only be traded 
with 5% price change limit each trading day compared to 10% for normal stocks. In 
addition, the midterm reports of such firms must be audited. If a ST firm continues to 
suffer loss for one more year, it will be designated to a particular transfer (PT) tirmn. PT 
stocks can only be traded on Friday, with a maximum 5% upside limit to last Friday's 
close, but no restriction on the downside. PT firms will be de-listed if they cannot 
become profitable within one year. On 22 February 2001, as per the Company Law, the 
CRSC issued the Policy of'Suspension and/or De-listing Loss-making ('o npanie. s'. fi"orn 
the Stock Market (CSRC, 2002). Comparing to the police issued in 1998, there are 
several changes: (1) firms will be labelled as ST and suspended for consecutive losses 
for three years on both exchanges; (2) up to the middle of the coming year, if the firms 
continue to suffer loss, they will strictly be de-listed from the stock exchanges; (3) P"1' 
system will be ceased. 
Taking this delisting policy as a political process between firms and the relevant 
regulatory authorities, according to AT, firms can be regarded as the agent, on the other 
hand, the relevant authorities are the principal. There is conflict of interests between 
these parties as they have different objectives in such a political process. In particular, 
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while the firms simply don't want to be delisted, the regulators would like to know the 
truth in firms' performance in order to deicide if they should be delisted. Due to the 
widespread use of accounting information as the only criterion to evaluate firms' 
performance by the market regulators, they are motivated to manipulate reported 
earnings to mislead the true performance in order to avoid wealth transfers (to be 
delisted) in such political process. Consequently, regulators have to bear the relevant 
costs of not being able to accurately and efficiently discover and de-list a poorly 
performed firm which is dressed-up through EM practices. By applying TCE. to this 
incentive of EM in China, it is argued that firms and regulators are bounded to each 
other as one party prematurely terminates the transaction, the other one will bear the 
relevant political costs. At here, the so-called political costs are the costs of delisting. 
Thus, in order to minimise the political costs, the opportunistic managers who have the 
ability of feasible foresight are likely to engage in EM practices to mislead the market 
regulators about their firms' true performance to avoid being de-listed. Chen el a!., 
(2001), Chen and Wang (2004), Defond et al.. (2000), and Lee and Cao, (2002) argue 
that the Chinese security regulations contain explicit profitability targets that govern the 
eligibility for determining delisting status, leading to strong incentives for EM. 
Empirically, several studies investigate the relationship between EM practices and 
the delisting policy. For instance, Chen et al., (2004) study 537 A-share firms over the 
period of 1999-2004 to examine whether firms manipulate earnings to avoid delisting. 
With regard to the revised delisting rules issued in 2001, they analyse the discretionary 
accruals measured by the Modified Jones Model as the proxy Ior FM during different 
time periods (pre- and post- delisting policy revised period; 1999-2000 period vs. 2002- 
2004 period in specific) and provide evidence suggesting an increasing trend in income- 
increasing discretionary accruals in the post-policy period. They further divide the 
sample into two sub-groups: one presents the firms with no-loss, and the other stands 
for the loss-making firms. They show that while both groups have income-increasing 
accruals, the loss-making firms have higher discretionary accruals (at 1% significant 
level) than those of the other group. 
Chen and Wang (2004) adopt four models in their study, including: (1) the 
random walk expectation model of accrual profit amount; (2) the accrual profit 
expectation model in consideration of growth factors; (3) the accrual profit expectation 
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model considering scale and industrial factors; and (4) the Modified Jones Model. Using 
a sample of 2,202 observations of A-share companies over 1997-2000, their results 
show that the loss-making companies intentionally conduct remarkable EM to increase 
profits in order to avoid being delisted. Based on all A-Share Chinese listed companies 
over the period of 1992-1999, Lee and Cao (2002) use seven different models to 
investigate the asymmetric relationship between earnings and returns (e. g., accounting 
recognition coefficient; earnings autocorrelation asymmetry; earnings-returns mapping 
asymmetry; R2 asymmetry) They provide evidence showing that (1) asymmetry in 
earnings-returns relation is ubiquitous, but the nature of asymmetry varies from case to 
case, (2) the asymmetric in earnings-returns relation seems associated with the 
regulations in China (e. g. managers may not release the true financial information to 
avoid be delisted). 
By putting all those together, the empirical evidence supports the theoretical view 
by pointing out that delisting policy leads managers to engage in EM in Chinese listed 
companies. 
5.4. Measurements of EM 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999) and McNichols (2000), a fundamental element 
of any test for EM is a measure of management's discretion over earnings. More 
generally, three approaches with various modifications and characteristics have been 
used by most researchers to evaluate the existence of EM. These approaches include: 
the (1) aggregate accruals models, (2) specific accrual models, and (3) frequency 
distribution approach. The followings will briefly analyse each of these approaches. 
u Aggregale Accruals Models 
There is a large literature that attempts to indentify discretionary accruals based on the 
relation between total accruals and hypothesized explanatory factors. The aggregate 
accrual models use magnitude of accruals as a proxy for the extent to which insiders 
exercise discretion in reporting earnings. Panel A of Table 5.5. describes the most 
typical aggregate accruals estimation approaches and indicates the authors introducing 
these approaches. 
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This literature begins with Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986), who use total 
accruals and change in total accruals, respectively, as measures of management's 
discretion over earnings. More recently, Leuz et al., (2003) and Shen and Chih (2007) 
introduce four different models in measuring EM, (1) the firm-level standard deviation 
of operating earnings dividend by the firm-level standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations; (2) the correlation between changes in accounting accruals and operating 
cash flows; (3) the magnitude of accruals; and (4) the aggregate EM score, is computed 
by averaging the rankings for the previous three individual EM measures. 
Jones (1991) introduces a regression approach to control for nondiscretionary 
factors influencing accruals, specifying a linear relation between total accruals and 
change in sales and property, plant and equipment. Dechow el al., (1995), Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) provide a modified version of the original Jones (1991) Model. The 
modification is designed to eliminate the conjectured tendency of the Jones (1991) 
Model to measure discretionary accruals with error when discretion is exercised over 
revenues. The adjustment relative to the original Jones Model is that the change in 
revenues is adjusted for the change in receivables in the event period. The modified 
version implicitly assumes that all changes in credit sales in the event period result from 
EM. As expressed by Dechow et al., (1995), "... it is based on the reasoning that it is 
easier to manage earnings by exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on 
credit sales than it is to mange earnings by exercising discretion over the recognition of 
revenue on cash sales. " McNichols (2000; 2002) argues that over 1993-2000 the 
greatest number of studies used an aggregate accruals approach based on the Jones or 
Modified Jones Model. She concludes that the large number of studies published that 
use aggregate accruals suggest that it is widely accepted as a proper proxy for FIM. 
However, some academics question the validity and reliability of' this 
discretionary accruals proxy (e. g., Bernard and Skinner, 1996; Dechow el al., 1995; 
McNichols and Wilson, 1988; McNichols, 2000; 2002; Peasnell ei al., 2000a; Thomas 
and Zhang, 2000; Wilson, 1996; Xie, 2001). For instance, Dechow et al., (1995) 
evaluate alternative accrual-based models for detecting EM. They use four distinct 
samples of firm-year observations (e. g., (1) a randomly selected sample of' 1000 firm- 
year observations over 1950-1991; (2) samples of 1000 firm-year observations that are 
randomly selected from pools of firm-year experiencing extreme financial performance 
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over 1950-1991; (3) samples of 1000 randomly selected firm-year observations in 
which a fixed and known amount of accrual manipulation has been artificially 
introduced over 1950-1991; and a sample of 32 firms that are subject SEC enforcement 
actions (the SEC has published details of its major enforcement actions since April 1982) 
for allegedly overstating annual earnings over 1982-1991) to test the Healy Model, 
DeAngelo Model, Jones Model, and Modified Jones Model. More generally, they find 
that all of the models appear well specified when applied to a random sample of firm- 
year; and the modified version of the model developed by Jones (1991) exhibits the 
most power in detecting EM. However, when the models are applied to samples of firm- 
year experiencing extreme financial performance, all models lead to misspecified results. 
In addition, McNichols (2000) estimate the Jones (1991) and Modified Jones models of 
accruals from 1988 to 1998 to test for a relation between discretionary accrual estimates 
and growth. Using cross-sectional estimation at the two-digit industry level (US), she 
provides evidence showing that EM measures based on these two models are not 
sufficiently powerful or reliable to assess EM behaviour in many contexts likely to be of 
interest to accounting researchers, standard letters and analysts. Specifically, "l 
conjecture that firms with greater expected earnings growth are likely to have greater 
accruals than firms with less expected earnings growth. Furthermore, this effect is not 
controlled by the current year change in sales and therefore estimated discretionary 
accruals using the Jones and Modified Jones Models are significantly associated with 
analysts' projections of long-term earnings growth. This finding holds after controlling 
for return on assets" (McNichols, 2000, p. 335-336). Building upon the cross-sectional 
Modified Jones Model, Larcker and Richardson (2004) develop another accrual model 
to control misclassification issues (e. g. extreme performance and growth). In particular, 
two additional independent variables that are shown to be correlated with measures of' 
unexpected accruals are added to the Modified Jones Model. First, it is the book-to- 
market ratio (BM). It is included as a proxy to control the extreme growth in the firms' 
operations. Large accruals for growing firms are expected (see also McNichols, 2000, 
2002). Second, the current operating cash flows (CFO) as a measure of current 
operating performance is included to control the extreme level of performance for some 
firms. 
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b. Specific Accrual Models 
A second approach in the literature is to model a specific accrual, as in Beaver and 
McNichols (1998), McNichols and Wilson (1998), Moyer (1990), Nelson (2000), 
Penalva (1998), Petroni (1992), Petroni ei al., (2000). These studies often focus on 
industry settings in which a single accrual is sizeable and requires substantial judgement 
(McNichols, 2000; 2002). Based on these characteristics, as well as anecdotal evidence, 
the researchers state that opportunistic discretion is likely to be reflected in a specific 
accrual or set of accruals (McNichols, 2002). As with aggregate accruals studies, a key 
aspect of the research design task is modelling the behaviour of each specific accrual to 
identify its discretionary and nondiscretionary components. Panel B of Table 5.5. 
provides several examples of measures of the specific discretionary accruals and 
indicates the authors introducing these approaches. In contrast to the above studies, 
Beneish (1997) develops a model based on several specific accruals, focusing on firms 
from a number of industries. This model is based on a number of financial statement 
ratios to identify EM, several of which relate to specific accruals such as receivables, 
inventory and account payable. As mentioned by McNichols (2000, p. 335), "[this 
approach] utilises a richer information set to identify variation in the levels of these 
specific accruals... there seems to be great potential to apply this approach further, with 
more extensive modelling of the behaviour specific accruals. " 
McNichols (2000; 2002) identifies three advantages and disadvantages to this 
specific accruals approach relative to the aggregate accruals approach respectively. 
Briefly, the major advantages are: (1) the researcher can develop intuition for the key 
factors that influence the behaviour of the accrual, exploiting his or her knowledge of 
generally accepted accounting principles, (2) a specific accrual approach can he applied 
in industries whose business practices cause the accrual in question to he a material and 
a likely object of judgement and discretion, and (3) one can estimate the relation 
between the single accrual and explanatory factors directly. On the other hand, there are 
three potential disadvantages: (1) it is crucial that the specific accrual reliably reflect the 
exercise of discretion. If it is not clear which accrual management might use to 
manipulate earnings, then the power of a specific accrual test for IN is reduced, (2) 
specific accruals approaches generally require more institutional knowledge and data 
than aggregate accruals approaches. This raises the cost of applying such approaches, 
and (3) the number of firms for which a specific accrual is managed may he small 
125 
relative to the number of firms with aggregate accruals. This may limit the 
generalizability and the sensitivity of the findings of specific accruals studies. 
c. Frequency Disiribution Approach 
A third approach is to examine the statistical properties of earnings to identify 
behaviour that influences earnings, as developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and 
Degeorge et al.. (1999). These studies focus on the behaviour of earnings around a 
specified benchmark, such as zero or a prior quarter's earnings, to test whether the 
incidence of amounts above and below the benchmark are distributed smoothly, or 
reflect discontinuities due to the exercise of discretion. They both suggest that if firms 
have greater incentives to achieve earnings above a benchmark, then the distribution of 
earnings alter management will have fewer observations than expected for earnings 
amount just below the threshold, and more observations than expected for earnings just 
above the threshold. Panel C of Table 5.5. describes this approach in testing F, M and 
indicates the authors introducing these approaches. 
A noteworthy feature of the distribution approach is that the power of the 
approach comes from the specificity of the predictions regarding which group of firms 
will manage earnings, rather than from a measure of discretion over earnings. 
Specifically, this approach measures discretion over earnings as the behaviour of 
earnings after management, which no doubt includes discretionary and nondiscretionary 
components. However, as argued by McNichols (2000), it seems implausible that the 
behaviour of the nondiscretionary component of earnings could always explain the 
differences (these could be large in some cases) in the narrow intervals around the 
hypothesized earnings targets. Stated differently, measurement error in their proxy for 
discretionary behaviour seems unlikely to be correlated with the partitioning variable in 
this approach. Moreover, this approach is silent on the incentives for management to 
achieve specific benchmarks. As stated by McNichols (2000), "how these incentives 
vary across firms, and what targets might be appropriate in difterent contexts are 
important question for future research. A better understanding of why managers 
manipulate earnings will allow researchers to assess the power of' FM tests, and 
ultimately strengthen our understanding of the implications of EM for investors and 
other contracting parties. " 
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5.5. Summary 
This chapter starts with defining earnings management (EM) as the alternation of firms' 
reported economic performance by insiders to either mislead some stakeholders or to 
influence the contractual outcomes. It is used to reduce outsider interference and protect 
insiders' private control benefits. Both AT and TCE are applied to explain the 
phenomenon of EM. In brief, both theories propose that managers make judgements in 
accounting policies. In order to minimise the agency costs (the monitoring and bonding 
costs) and the transaction costs (the costs resulted from premature termination of the 
bilaterally dependent transaction) correspondingly, managers are likely to manipulate 
reported earnings in order to mislead investors about firms' true performance. Based on 
AT, managers do not bear the wealth effects of their decisions and are profit maximisers. 
In terms of TCE, managers are given to opportunism and have the feasible foresight. 
Thus, they are likely to dress-up the firms' apparent performance in order to gain 
private benefits. While AT is mostly applied to study EM in the literature, the 
application of TCE is relatively underdeveloped. This thesis contributes to the literature 
by directly applying TCE to accounting manipulations. 
Based on the Western experiences, three incentives of conducting EM have been 
indentified in the literature, such as capital market motivations (e. g., management 
buyouts, 1POs, SEOs), contracting incentives (e. g., lending covenants, executive 
compensation), and regulatory incentives (e. g., import relief, tariff). While EM has also 
been rampant in China, Chinese listed companies manipulate their earnings dramatically 
in order to meet the ROE requirements for additional shares issuing and/or to avoid 
being delisted. For the performance-related executive compensation, to my best 
knowledge, there is no published study to empirically examine the relationship between 
it and EM in China. A detailed analysis of this phenomenon will be provided in the next 
chapter. 
And finally, based on McNichols (2000; 2002), three measurements of accrual- 
based EM have been reviewed briefly, including: (1) aggregate accruals models, (2) 
specific accrual models, and (3) frequency distribution approach. 
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Table 5.5. Discretionary accrual proxies 
Panel A: Aggregate accruals models 
Authors Discretionary Accrual proxy 
Healy (1985) Total accruals 
DeAngelo (1986) Change in total accruals 
(1) the firm-level standard deviation of operating earnings dividend by the 
Leuz et al., (2003); firm-level standard deviation of cash flow from operations; (2) the correlation 
Shen & Chih (2007) between changes in accounting accruals and operating cash flows; (3) the 
magnitude of accruals; and (4) the aggregate EM score. 
Jones (1991) Residual from regression of total accruals on change in sales and property, 
plant and equipment. 
Modified Jones Model Residual from regression of total accruals on change in sales and on property, 
from Dechow et al., plant and equipment, where revenue is adjusted for change in receivables in 
(1995) the event period. 
Kang & Residual from regression of noncash current assets less liabilities on lagged 
Sivaramakrishnan levels of these balances, adjusted for increases in revenues, expenses and 
(1995) plant and equipment. 
Dechow et al., (2003); Residual from regression of total accruals on change in sales and on property, 
Larcker & Richardson plant and equipment. And, two additional independent variables (BM and 
(2004) CFO) are introduced. 
Panel B: Specific accruals models 
Authors Discretionary Accrual proxy 
McNichols & Wilson Residual provision for bad debt, estimated as the residual from a regression of 
(1988) the provision for bad debts on the allowance beginning balance, and current 
and future write-offs. 
Petroni (1992) Claim loss reserve estimation error, measured as the firm year development of 
loss reserves of property casualty insurers. 
Beaver & Engel (1996) Residual allowance for loan losses, estimated as the residual from a regression 
of the allowance for loan losses on net charge-offs, loan outstanding, 
nonperforming assets and one year ahead change in nonperforming assets. 
Beneish (1997) Days in receivables index, gross margin index, asset quality index, depreciation 
index, selling general and administrative expense index, total accruals to total 
assets index. 
Beaver & McNichols Serial correlation of one year development of loss reserves of property 
(1998) casualty insurers. 
Panel C: Frequency distribution approach 
Authors Test for EM 
Burgstahler & Dichev Test whether the frequency of annual earnings realisations in the region above 
(1997) (below) zero earnings and last year's earnings is greater (less) than expected. 
Degeorge et al., (1999) Test whether the frequency of quarterly earnings realisations in the region 
above (below) zero earnings, last quarter's earnings and analysts' forecasts is 
greater (less) than expected. 
Myers et al. , 
(2006) Test whether the number of consecutive earnings increases is greater than 
expected absent EM. 
Sources: McNichols (2000), p. 3 17, and McNichols (2002), pp. 61-69. 
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Chapter 6: Earnings Management 
and 
Corporate Governance 
6.1. Introduction 
Based on the theoretical review of both TCE and AT, the analysis of corporate 
governance with special attention to the system in China, and the illustration of the 
definition, incentives, and measurements of EM, the purpose of this chapter is to 
critically review the main empirical studies that investigate the impacts of corporate 
governance mechanisms on EM practices with regard to the Western experiences and 
China's setting correspondingly. Given that the primary objective of this thesis is to 
examine the impacts of the China's Code (2002), key governance mechanisms enforced 
by the Code are reviewed. These include the executive compensation, board 
independence, audit committee, statutory auditor, institutional shareholders, and 
controlling shareholders. 
In addition to reviewing the empirical studies of corporate governance, a series of 
summary tables which can be found at the end of this chapter have been created. The 
purpose of these tables is to complement the discussion in the chapter and also to sum 
up the main characteristics and conclusions of these studies. 
The structure of this chapter is tabulated as followings: 
6.1. Introduction 
6.2. Executive Compensation 
6.3. Board Independence 
6.4. Internal and External Audit 
6.5. Institutional Shareholders 
6.6. Controlling Shareholders 
6.7. Summary 
Section 6.1. introduces the chapter; section 
6.2. reviews executive compensation; 6.3. 
studies hoard independence and I; M from 
global and Chinese evidence respectively; 
section 6.4. studies the empirical research 
on both the internal and external audit; 
section 6.5. analyses the studies on 
institutional shareholders; section 6.6. 
focuses on the controlling shareholders; and finally section 6.7. provides the summary. 
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6.2. Executive Compensation 
6.2.1. Global Evidence of Executive Compensation 
Recall from the previous chapter, the theoretical view on the effectives of executive 
compensation proposed by AT is contradictory to the argument originated from TCI_;. In 
brief, by tying executive compensation to performance (measured by different criteria, 
e. g., profitability, stock price, growth), it encourages managers to make operating and 
investing decisions that can maximise shareholders' wealth. State differently, by linking 
compensation of executives with changes in shareholders' wealth, it can reduce the 
conflict of interests or agency problem (David et al., 2006). And, the classical Al' 
argues that a well-designed compensation contract as an ex-ante alignment is to ensure 
the objectives of executives and shareholders are aligned, and so share options and other 
long-term incentives are the key mechanisms (Conyon, 1997; 2006). In contrast, TCF 
proposes that in transaction between executives and shareholders, as executives engage 
in high level of human asset specificity and shareholders engage in dedicated asset 
specificity, these two parties are said to be bilaterally dependent. Tying executive 
compensation strategy to firm's performance through long-term incentives (such as 
stock options) increases the level of bilateral dependence due to executives' 
involvement in both the specific human asset and the specific monetary asset, thus the 
transactions costs involved (Williamson, 1991; 1996). As shareholders usually use 
financial information to evaluate the executives' performance, executives may largely 
be motivated to engage in EM practices: (1) to mislead the shareholder of company 
performance (a negative performance may make shareholders to prematurely terminate 
the transaction with managers, and they may lose more than before due to increased 
transaction costs); (2) to negotiate a better compensation package with shareholders. By 
putting all together, TCE argues that remuneration strategy as an ex ante alignment may 
not he an effective mechanism to prevent opportunistic discretion given the written 
contracts are never complete and managers are given to be opportunism. 
Empirical studies provide consistent results with the argument proposed by 
that executive compensation, especially the equity-based components motivates 
executives to engage in EM practices. While a detailed analysis of the empirical studies 
has been provided in the previous chapter, the followings give a brief review of'them. 
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Based on the data of 117 and 64 US firms, Guidry et al., (1999) and Holthause et 
al., (1995) study the impact of bonus plan on executives' EM practices. In general, 
Guidry et al., (1999) provide evidence suggesting that managers for a large multi- 
national firm are likely to defer income when the earnings target in their bonus plan will 
not be met and when they are entitled to the maximum bonuses permitted under the plan. 
While Holthause et al., (1995) find no evidence that managers manipulate earnings 
downwards when they are below the lower bound of their contract, but they report that 
executives manipulate earnings downwards when they are at the upper bound of their 
bonus contracts in order to increase the present value of payments from those bonus 
plans. However, with relatively small sample size, both studies may suffer the power in 
generalising their findings. 
More recently, researchers draw their attention especially to the impacts of stock 
options with larger sample size. Based on 7,301 US firm-year observations over 1992- 
1999, Gao and Shrieves (2002) find that both the amounts and intensity of stock options 
are significantly related to EM intensity. For 168 US firms, Baker el a/., (2003) study 
whether stock options relative to other forms of pay is associated with opportunistically 
use of discretionary accruals in reported earnings. The findings release that high option 
compensation is associated with more income-increasing discretionary accrual choices 
in periods leading up to option award dates in order to raise the stock price, thus the 
exercise price. By investigating the correlation between discretionary accruals and stock 
options of 4,671 firm-year observations in the US over 1993-1996, Bergstresscr and 
Philippon (2006) provide evidence suggesting that the use of discretionary accruals to 
manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced in firms where the executives' 
potential total compensation is closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings. In 
addition, during years of high accruals, executives exercise unusually large numbers of' 
options and other insiders sell large quantities of'shares. And, Shuto (2007) studies 240 
Japanese firms and documents that the use of discretionary accruals in Japanese firms 
increases with performance-related executive compensation, especially the stock 
options. 
Instead of investigating the direct link between EM practices and executive 
compensation, Denis el al., (2006) study the likelihood of securities fraud allegations 
based on 358 US firms over 1993-2002. Their results are consistent with those that 
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directly study EM practices since they report a significant positive correlation between 
the likelihood of securities fraud allegations and the intensity of stock options. In 
addition, by focusing on 190 US companies contained 95 financial reports restating 
firms for the years of 1997-2002, Efendi el al., (2007) find that the likelihood of a 
misstated financial statement increases greatly when the CEO has very sizable holdings 
of in-the-money stock options. 
6.2.2. China's Evidence of Executive Compensation 
To my best knowledge, there is no published study to empirically investigate the impact 
of executive compensation on EM practices in China's listed companies. It thus still 
remains unclear whether performance-related executive compensation in China is used 
as an incentive of managers to engage in EM practices as proposed by TCE or should be 
considered as an alignment mechanism (AT) that encourages managers to make 
operating and investing decisions that maximise shareholder wealth, thus limiting the 
level of EM. 
In line with the AT, this study follows its major arguments on performance- 
related executive compensation in China. In particular, it is conjectured that by tying 
executive compensation to firms' performance in China, opportunistically discretionary 
behaviours of the managers in China's firms may be limited as their interests are 
aligned with those of the shareholders, thus limiting the level of F ,M behaviours. There 
are two possible reasons, including the China's executive compensation reforms started 
in the 1980s but awaited more systematic and operational developments until the 2000s, 
and the unique compensation structure in China. 
Firstly, the reforms of executive compensation in China have been largely 
influenced by the market-oriented reforms since 1978. In China's centrally planned 
economy prior to the reforms, all the enterprises were State owned and their prof its 
were all repatriated to the State. There were neither incentive schemes, nor profit 
sharing schemes for managers. Sun and Tong (2003) argue that managers seemed to he 
isolated or semi-isolated as there was no connection at all between them and the 
enterprises they served prior to the reforms; under such a circumstance, no matter how 
much you did, how well you did, and how quickly you did for your jobs, you would he 
paid same. In the 1980s, the Chinese economy reforrns took place with one of the major 
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objectives to introduce profit retention or profit sharing schemes. In other words, 
managers started to be rewarded by their performance in the firms (Groves el al., 1994; 
1995). However, the process of establishing a fully-functional executive compensation 
system is slow in China (Clarke, 2007; Cooper, 2008), and more systematic and 
operational developments waited until the 2000s. Argued by Mallin (2007), in the past 
10-plus year, there appears a increasing tendency as well as a demand from employees 
in Chinese companies, particularly at the higher levels where an awareness of the 
Western practices is more apparent, to link compensation with performance. Chen el al., 
(2010) provide evidence suggesting that the developments of the Chinese executive 
compensation system have been largely influenced by the recent global governance 
convergence and the introduction of foreign investments. And, the China's Code (2002) 
states that "to attract qualified personnel and to maintain the stability of management, a 
listed company shall establish rewarding systems that link the compensation for 
management personnel to the company's performance and to the individual's work 
performance" (Chapter 5, Section 3, p. 77). 
By checking the firms' annual reports, it confirms with the argument that, until 
recently, more Chinese companies have directly linked the management compensation 
to their firms' performance which is usually measured by the annual net profit. For 
instance, Wanke Enterprise Ltd. (Code: 000002) states in its 2003 annual report that the 
compensation of the management team is based on the increased rate of' annual net 
profits. In its 2004 annual report, Nanbo Ltd. (Code: 000012) announces that the 
compensation plan of the top executives should be proposed by the compensation 
committee and reviewed and evaluated by the board of directors. The measurement 
standard is based on the yearly net profits. Only few haven"t but are trying to establish a 
performance-based compensation for their management team. l)ingli 'technical 
Development Ltd. (Code: 600614) in its 2004 annual report states that they haven't 
established the assessment system that links the performance with compensation for 
their top management team, but they are trying to build one in the near future with 
efforts. 
By putting all together, it is conjectured that due to the move from an executive 
compensation system that was entirely separated from the performance in the 1990s to a 
more systematic and operational performance-based system developed until the 2000s, 
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the interests of executives may be aligned with those of the firms/shareholders. The 
executives may be more likely to focus on improving the performance of the firms as 
they will be paid more for any efficient works. Theoretically, it encourages executives 
to make operating and investing decisions that can maximise the value of shareholders, 
thus limiting their incentives of behaving opportunistically at expense of shareholders. 
Secondly, in perspective of the Western counties, the equity-based executive 
compensation is widely used and it could account for more than 50% or even a higher 
proportion of the total compensation awarded to the executives (Jensen and Murphy, 
2004). However, the effectiveness of such a compensation strategy is often challenged 
and largely blamed as the root cause of EM practices. As reviewed previously, the 
empirical studies in the recent corporate governance literature provide consistent results 
suggesting that EM practices (mostly measured by discretionary accruals) and/or other 
opportunistic behaviours (e. g., accounting fraud, restating financial statements, 
providing misleading financial information) are concurrent with the use of equity-based 
compensation. It is argued that stock-option components provide incentives that 
motivate executives to exploit their discretion in reported earnings and other 
opportunistic behaviours (e. g., Baker et al., 2003; Cohen et al., 2008; Gao and Shrieves, 
2002; Shuto, 2007). The assumption underneath is that by artificially improve 
companies' apparent performance through EM practices, especially prior to the options 
exercise date, it ensures executives getting better rewards. 
In contrast to the Western countries, managerial and director shareholding are 
very small and executive stock option schemes are rare due to the dominant hierarchy 
structure of the authority in China's companies (Chen ei cil., 2006; Chen el al., 2010, 
Firth et al., 2006). Statistically, executives' shareholding was only about 0.00421%, in 
2000, but further decreased to 0.0032% by the end of 2006 (compile from firms' annual 
reports). In addition, by the end of 2006, over 60% the stocks of Chinese listed 
companies are still non-tradable, which means they could not be traded in the secondary 
market, accordingly, it is hard to price them. Stock price is not a sufficient indicator of 
firm value (Chen ei al., 2010). Therefore, stock options or stock ownership could hardly 
be considered as an incentive of engaging in EM practices for executives in Chinese 
listed firms as they are not commonly used. 
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In summary, given that the lack of stock options utilised in China which have 
been largely blamed as the root cause of EM practices based on the Western experiences, 
tying executive compensation to performance may become a mechanism to align the 
interests of managers with those of the shareholders, thus encourage them to act on 
behalf of shareholders and limit their opportunistically discretionary behaviour-EM. 
6.3. Board Independence 
6.3.1. Global Evidence of Board Independence 
Based on the literature, both TCE and AT have mentioned the role of the hoard to 
monitor or safeguard opportunistic behaviours. In terms of TCE, a hoard is created and 
awarded to equity that is elected by the pro-rata votes of those who hold tradable shares; 
has the power to replace management; decides on management compensation; has 
access to internal performance measures on a timely basis; can authorise audits in depth 
for special follow-up purposes; is apprised of important investment and operating 
proposals before they are implemented, and in other respects bears a decision-review 
and monitoring relation to the firm's management. The board thus evolves as a way by 
which to reduce the costs of capital for projects that involve limited redeployability. The 
"hoard of directors should be considered as a governance structure whose principle 
purpose is to safeguard those who face a diffuse but significant risk of expropriation 
because the assets in question are numerous and ill-defined, and cannot he protected in a 
well-focused, transaction-specific way" (Williamson, I984a, p. 1197). 
In perspective of AT, the monitoring control force in open corporation is 
delegated by residual claimants to the board. Residual claimants generally retain 
approval rights (by vote) on such matters as board membership, auditor choice, mergers 
and new stock issues. Other management and control functions are delegated by the 
residual claimants to the board (Jensen, 2004; 2005). The hoard then delegates most 
decision management functions and many decision control functions to its sub- 
committees, but it retains ultimate control over internal agents, including the rights to 
ratify and monitor major policy initiatives and to hire, fire, and set the compensation of 
top level decisions managers (Jensen, 2004). 
For the board composition, both theories argue that the board should be composed 
of both insider and outsiders. On one hand, it is natural to believe that internal managers 
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are the most influential members since they have valuable specific information, for 
example the information about the daily operations, the capital structure of a specific 
investment, the corporate law, and so forth. Such information can act as an important 
support to the top managers in dealing with special decision problems (Jensen, 2004; 
2005; Williamson, 1984a). On the other hand, since managers enjoy more informational 
advantages because of their full-time status and inside knowledge, the participating 
board may easily become an instrument of the management (Williamson, 1984a). 
Similarly, as expressed by Jensen (2004, p. 886), "the board is not an effective device 
for decision control unless it limits the decision discretion of individual top 
managers... this signals the absence of separation of decision management and decision 
control, and, in our theory, the organisation suffers in the competition for survival. " In 
other to handle this problem, both theories argue that corporate boards should include 
independent non-executives directors, that is, members who are not internal managers, 
and they should hold a majority of seats. The outside board members act as a 
monitoring mechanism and as arbiters in disagreements among internal managers and 
carry out tasks that involve serious agency problems between internal managers and 
residual claimants, for instance, setting executive compensation or searching; 1or 
replacements for top managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen, 2004; 2005; 
Williamson, 1984a). 
More recently, Monks and Minow (2008) argue that it is recognised that the board 
as the most important control mechanism available because it forms the apex oFa firm's 
governance structure. In a similar vein, Clarke (2007, p. 33) states that the board of' 
directors is the fulcrum of corporate governance: the critical nexus in which the fortunes 
of the company are decided". And, Stiles and Taylor (2002, p. 4) propose that "the hoard 
is the link between shareholders of firm and managers entrusted with undertaking the 
loperations] of the organisation. " For the independent non-executive directors, Wearing 
(2005) suggest that because the independent non-executive directors usually have no 
personal financial interest, no potential conflict of interests arising from day-to-day 
involvement in running the business, they thus can exercise an impartial judgement over 
the fairness of executives' self-dealings. It can be said that the board dominated by 
independent non-executives permit an adequate oversight function of top management 
(Dedman, 2002; Hopt and Leyens, 2004; Johnson et al., 1996; Karpoff el al., 1996; 
Klein, 2002). 
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The majority of empirical literature, which is mainly based on the Western 
security markets, has confirmed a positive correlation between the independence and 
monitoring effectiveness of the board. While there are studies that directly examine the 
correlation between board independence and EM practices largely measured by 
discretionary accruals, other studies provide implicit evidence on the correlation 
between board independence and other opportunistically discretionary behaviours, such 
as accounting fraud, violations of accounting policies, and providing the misleading 
financial information. The followings start with analysing the direct evidence, and then 
review the implicit results. 
Using 630 UK firms, Peasnell el al., (2000) examine whether the associate 
between board composition and EM activity differs between the pre- and post-Cadbury 
periods. EM is measured by the use of income-increasing abnormal accruals calculated 
using the Modified Jones Model when unmanaged earnings undershoot target earnings. 
Results provide evidence of accrual-based EM to meat earnings targets in both periods. 
However, "... [our] results for the post-Cadbury period indicate less income-increasing 
accrual management to avoid earnings loss or earnings declines when the proportion of 
non-executive directors is high" (Peasnell et al., 2000, p. 415). In conclusion, they argue 
that the appropriately structured boards are discharging their financial reporting duties 
more effectively post-Cadbury. 
Furthermore, Peasnell et al., (2005) investigate whether the incidence of I'M by 
UK firms (the sample size is 1,271 firms) depends on board monitoring over the period 
of 1993-1996. Consistent with their previous study on the impact of'the Cadbury report, 
they show that the likelihood of managers making income-increasing abnormal accruals 
to avoid reporting losses and earnings reductions is negatively related to the proportion 
of outsiders on the board. They also find that the change of' abnormal accruals being 
large enough to turn a loss into a profit or to ensure profit does not decline is 
significantly lower for firms with a high proportion oi' outside hoard members. "I'hus, 
they conclude by stating that boards contribute towards integrity o1' linancial statements. 
Based on a sample of 692 S&P firms for period of' 1992-1993, Klein (2002) 
examines whether board characteristics are related to EM by firm. To operationalise this 
study, abnormal accruals calculated from the Modified Jones Model are used as the 
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proxy of EM, and the matched-portfolio method to adjust the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals is also introduced. The results show a significantly negative 
correlation between the board independence and abnormal accruals. Reductions in 
board or audit committee independence are accompanied by large increases in abnormal 
accruals. Hence, the author concludes that boards structured to be more independent 
from the CEO are more effective in monitoring the corporate financial accounting 
process. 
Xie et al., (2003) investigate the relation between EM and structure, background, 
and composition of a firms' board of directors. They are particularly interested in the 
role played by outside directors and their background in corporations, finance, or law. 
By using discretionary accruals calculated from the Modified Jones Model and 282 US 
firm-year observations during the period of 1992-1996, they report that EM is less 
likely to occur or occurs less often in companies whose boards include both more 
independent outside directors and directors with corporate experiences. They also find 
an associate between lower level of EM and meeting frequency of the boards. "Thus, 
they conclude that board activity influences members' ability to serve as effective 
monitors, and "... the recommendations of this panel appear, in our sample, to make 
hoards more effective monitors of corporate financial reporting" (Xie ei al., 2003, 
p. 314). 
Kao and Chen (2004) examine the correlation between board characteristics and 
IN. They argue that management of a firm may engage in I? M liar their own henelits. 
However, under proper governance system, the hoard of directors might he able to 
monitor the firm and prevent management from engaging in IN. By analysing the 
relation between the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated from the 
Modified Jones Model and several characteristics of the hoard (e. g., size, independence) 
of 1,097 Taiwanese firms in 2002, they provide evidence suggesting that when the 
board size is large, extent of EM is high. Further, they divide their sample into 
electronic and non-electronic lirms22 and find that while there is no significant 
correlation in the electronic firms, discretionary accruals are significantly and 
negatively related to the number of independent directors on the hoard in the non- 
electronic firms. Thus, they confirm that the more outside directors on the hoard, the 
more efficient monitoring can be provided and thus the less extent of EM. 
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Furthermore, Ebrahim (2007) examines the relation between EM behaviour and 
activity of both the board and audit committee. By using the Modified Jones Model to 
calculate discretionary accruals, and a sample of 2,360 US firm-year observations in the 
period of 1999 and 2000, the results indicate that the absolute value of abnormal 
accruals is negatively related to the proportion of independent directors on the board 
and the audit committee. It is thus argued that introducing independent non-executive 
directors on the board and its sub-committees can effectively mitigate EM practices 
through constrain opportunistic behaviours. In addition, results also show consistent and 
significantly negative correlation between EM and both institutional ownership in the 
firm and quality of its outside audit. 
The followings highlight the studies that investigate the effectiveness of board 
independence on mitigating other opportunistically discretionary behaviours, such as 
accounting fraud, violations of accounting policies, and providing the misleading 
financial information. For instance, Beasley (1996) examines the relation between the 
board composition and occurrence of financial statement fraud. The main objective is to 
test the prediction of number of outsiders on the board is lower for firms experiencing 
financial statement fraud than no-fraud firms. In order to carry out this study, a paired 
sample methodology is utilised by which "firms in the same industry of comparable size 
and capital structure and with a significantly different proportion ofoutside directors on 
the board are paired" (Beasley, 1996, p. 450-452). Based on the results from logic 
regression analysis of 75 fraud and 75 no-fraud US firms over 1979-1990, the results 
indicate that no-fraud firms have the board with significantly higher proportion of 
outside members than fraud firms. Additionally, as outside director ownership in the 
firm and outside director tenure on the board increase, and as the number of outside 
directorships in other firms held by outsiders decreases, the likelihood of financial 
statement fraud decreases. Thus, he concludes that "hoard composition is more 
important for reducing the likelihood of financial statement fraud ... the supplement 
analysis shows that not only does board composition significantly affect the likelihood 
of financial statement fraud, but board size and certain outside director characteristics 
also affect [this likelihood]... " (Beasley, 1996, p. 463). 
In the similar vein, Dechow et al., (1996) investigate firms subject to accounting 
enforcement actions by the SEC for alleged violations of the US-GAAP. The aim of the 
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study is to investigate whether the likelihood of earnings manipulation is systematically 
related to the weaknesses in oversight of management. Based on a sample of 92 firms 
subject to enforcement actions by the SEC between 1982 and 1992 (and 92 control 
firms), they find that an important motivation for earnings manipulation is the desire to 
attract external financing at low cost. For corporate governance, they report evidence 
suggesting that firms manipulate earnings are: (i) more likely to have the board 
dominated by the management, (ii) more likely to have a CFO who simultaneously 
serves as the Chairman of the board, (iii) more likely to have a CEO who is also the 
firm's founder, (iv) less likely to have an audit committee, and (v) less likely to have an 
outside blockholder. In conclusion, they state that "poor oversight of management 
through weak governance structure is an important catalyst for earnings 
manipulations... [and] the desire to raise external financing at low cost represents an 
economically significant motivation for earnings manipulation that has received 
relatively little attention in previous academic research" (Dechow el al., 1996, p. 30-31). 
However, with such small sample size, the pervasiveness and magnitude of the 
effectiveness of independent non-executive directors may not be well established in 
both studies. 
By focusing on 989 observations from the US banking industry of 2000-2001, 
Thou and Chen (2004) investigate the correlation between hoard characteristics and EM 
through loan loss provisions by commercial banks. They introduce and use both loan 
loss provision and discretionary loan loss provision models to operationalisc their study. 
Their results provide evidence suggesting that banks with more active hoards are 
associated with less EM. When they further classify firms into high and low N, M groups. 
they find that the number of board meetings is negatively related to NM lör low NM 
banks. For the high EM group, independence and size of the board play an important 
role in constraining EM practices. 
On the other hand, there are those who point out outside directors may become 
effective monitors only if they have proper incentives (Park and Shin, 2004). Monks 
and Minow (2008) argue that directors become effective, not just because they have no 
economic ties to the company beyond their jobs as directors, but because they are 
significant shareholders. They note that disinterested outsiders can mean uninterested 
ones. In other words, outside directors are likely to be uninterested directors in 
152 
jurisdictions, where they have only token ownership interest, if any, in the firms they 
serve. It is argued that simply increasing board representation of outside directors does 
not, ipso facto, lead to an increasing reduction in EM. 
Empirically, Park and Shin (2004) study the effect of board composition on 
practices of EM in Canada. For the research method, they use abnormal accruals 
calculated from the Modified Jones Model as the proxy of EM. They use two earnings 
targets: zero earnings and last fiscal year's earnings. Firms are hypothesized to practice 
EM to meet these two targets. Using a sample of 202 Canadian firms over 1991-1997, 
they find that earnings are managed upwards to avoid reporting losses and earnings 
declines. While outside directors, as a whole, do not reduce abnormal accruals, directors 
from financial intermediaries reduce EM, and board representation of active 
institutional shareholders reduces it further. By investigating the impacts of the issuance 
of the Toronto Stock Exchange's Corporate Governance Guidelines (1994), they do not 
find monitoring of abnormal accruals by outside directors, as whole, or by directors 
from financial institutions is more effective after the 1994 guidelines. They conclude 
their study by stating that adding outside directors to the board may not achieve 
improvement in governance practices by itself, especially in jurisdictions where 
ownership is highly concentrated and outside directors' labour market is not well 
developed. 
Implicitly, Ahmed el al., (2006) examine whether the information-usefulness of 
annual earnings varies with the faction of outside directors serving on the board and 
hoard size. Their model is an assessment of whether the association between earnings 
per share (EPS) and share returns (RET) varies as a function of the proportion of outside 
directors and board size, in which the association between F, PS and R1', 'l' is the proxy 
for the information usefulness of annual earnings. Using a panel data of 604 New 
Zealand (NZ) firms over 1991-1997, their results show that a smaller (larger) board size 
is positively (negatively) associated with earnings informativeness. This suggests that a 
smaller board size is more effective than a larger hoard in monitoring the quality of 
earnings. However, the fraction of outside directors does not appear to be significantly 
related to earnings informativeness. Furthermore, the authors examine the e1'fcct ofthe 
NZ Companies and Financial Reporting Acts 1993, overall, their results suggest that 
"... [the Acts] did not strengthen the relation between board size and outside hoard 
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representation and usefulness of earnings but at the same time did not seem to have 
weakened the relation significantly either" (Ahmed et al., 2006, p. 428). 
In summary, while both TCE and AT emphasize the monitoring role of the board 
in mitigating opportunistic discretion, but the empirical results are mixed. While some 
scholars (e. g., Beasley, 1996; Dechow ei al., 1996; Peasnell el al., 2000; 2005) report 
significantly negative relation between outside directors (measured either by the 
absolute number or proportion) and EM practices coupled with other discretionary 
behaviours, others don't find any significant correlation (e. g., Ahmed ei al., 2006; Park 
and Shin, 2004). 
6.3.2. China's Evidence of Board Independence 
Recall from the previous chapters, Chinese listed companies did not introduce the 
independent non-executive directors into their boards until the CSRC required them to 
do so in 2001. And, as mentioned earlier, the proportion, nomination, and independence 
of non-executive directors are all questionable due to the dominating position held by 
controlling shareholders in Chinese listed companies. As argued by Chen and Cheng 
(2007), Clarke (2006), the effectiveness of independent directors on monitoring in 
Chinese listed companies may be jeopardised. According to Clarke (2006, p. 216-217), 
"it is difficult to imagine that the independent director opinion will have a great effect 
on the way listed companies are run [in China]... there is a potential downside to 
implementation of the independent director opinion if it turns out to have any real 
effect... [it is because] the usual substitutes for shareholder monitoring as a means of 
disciplining managers-shareholder litigation, the managerial labour market, the input 
and produce market, and the market for corporate control-do not, with the exception of 
the input and produce market, function at all well in China. " 
Empirically, the number of studies that examine the correlation between I'M and 
independent board of directors in China is limited. This may be due to the difficulties in 
getting a proper measurement of EM and reliable database. Instead ol'directly linking 
hoard independence with EM practices, Chen and Cheng (2007) investigate the 
opportunistic behaviour in applying different accounting standards between the Chinese 
(iAAP and IFRS. By using a sample of 104 B-share firms and a model of net profit 
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differences to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance in accounting 
harmonisation over 1999-2003, they do not find any significant relation among 
independent directors, audit committee, and institutional shareholdings with the 
harmonisation of accounting practices in China. Chen and Zhang (2010a) modify the 
original model used by Chen and Cheng (2007) by using the net profit differences of 1- 
7 items which arrange from allowance for doubtful debts to revenue recognition as the 
dependent variable and proxy of EM. Based on a sample of 103 B-share companies over 
1999-2006, while they find a significantly negative correlation between audit committee 
and earnings gap (or EM), they do not report any significant correlation between the 
proportion of independent directors on the board and earnings gap. In conclusion, they 
argue that the independent directors on the board remain inactive in mitigating firm's 
opportunistic behaviour in China. In addition, by conducting a survey over 150 
empirical studies, Clarke (2006, p. 204) find that "researchers have not found consistent 
empirical support in China for the effectiveness of independent directors in enhancing 
corporate performance", for example, Gao and Ma (2002), Ile and Wang (2002), Luo el 
al., (2004)23, Tian and Lau (2001), Xiao (2004). In conclusion, he argues that 
proponents of the institution of independent directors misconceive the nature of 
corporate governance problem in China and have not taken into account specific 
features of Chinese institutional environment-particular the legal environment-that 
affect the viability of any proposed solution. 
In contrast, Chen el al., (2006) examine whether boardroom characteristics have 
an effect on corporate financial fraud in China. Based on a sample of 338 firms (with 
169 fraud firms and 169 paired and non-fraud firms) over 1999-2003, they test the 
relation between fraud and governance structures (e. g., proportion of outside directors 
on the board, board size, number of board meetings). The results from multivariate 
analysis show that board characteristics are important in explaining fraud; the 
proportion of outside directors, the number of board meetings, and the tenure of the 
Chairman are associated with the incidence of fraud. In particular, they find (1) a 
significantly negative correlation between the proportion of' outside directors on the 
hoard and incidence of fraud suggesting outsiders monitor management and help deter 
fraud; (2) a significantly positive relation between the number of board meetings and 
incidence of fraud suggesting directors realise some acts or decisions are borderline 
legal and so there is more debate about them resulting in more meetings; (3) a 
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significantly negative relation between the Chairman tenure and incidence of fraud 
suggesting that the Chairmen with shorter tenure appear less able to deter fraud. 
However, the study has a caveat concerning the sample selection. Specifically, although 
the study tests all published CSRC enforcement actions from 1999 to 2003, the cases of 
minor infractions (for the minor infractions, the CSRC will give an internal warning or 
reprimand to offending party and this will not be disclosed to the public) are excluded. 
This leads to an impression that only the most "extreme" cases have been considered, 
but the pervasiveness and magnitude of the effectiveness of independent directors may 
be difficult to obtain. In addition, fraud firms are much easier to identify and measure 
than those that engage in EM practices. 
6.4. Internal and External Audit 
Theoretically, both TCE and AT highlight the important roles of internal and external 
audit in monitoring and mitigating opportunistic discretion in the firms. TCE argues that 
some managements play "end games" (undisclosed strategic decisions to cut and run 
before corrective measures can be taken) and individual managers commonly disclose 
information selectively or distort data. In order to minimise the transaction costs derived 
from such concealment and distortion, additional checks are thus required to be created. 
In particular, Williamson (1994a) points out that "... an audit committee composed of 
outside directors and the certification of financial reports by an accredited auditing firm 
can limit management's tendency of channelling benefits to themselves through 
disclosing misleading information" (Williamson, 1984a, p. 1211). 
In a similar vein, AT argues that an audit committee should he an outstanding 
function in monitoring activities. In order to be efficient, it has to be entirely composed 
of outside directors. And, in principle, external auditors could act as a checking point to 
make sure the financial information provided to the public is comprehensive, punctual, 
and accurate (Jensen, 2000). The following subsections focus on the effectiveness of 
internal and external audit on mitigating EM practices. 
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6.4.1. Audit Committee 
6.4.1.1. Global Evidence of Audit Committee 
The board appoints the sub-committees which should report regularly to the board. 
Although the board may delegate various activities to these sub-committees, it is the 
board as a whole that remains responsible for the areas covered by the sub-committees 
(Mallin, 2007; Monks and Minor, 2008). The possible sub-committees include the audit, 
remuneration, nomination, strategy, and risk committee, among these, the audit 
committee is arguably the most important one in providing diligent oversight to ensure 
that management is not compromising shareholder interests and maintaining 
accountability of the firms' reported earnings (e. g., Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001; 
Defond and Jiambalvo, 1991; Kunitake, 1983). In particular, it is the role of the audit 
committee to review the scope and outcome of the audit, and to ensure the objectivity of 
auditors is maintained. This would usually involve a review of the audit fee and fees 
paid for any non-audit works, and independence of auditors. The audit committee 
provides a useful bridge between both internal and external auditors and the board, 
helping to ensure that the board is fully aware of all relevant issues related to audit. 
Clarke (2007) lists six responsibilities of the audit committee, including: (1) to monitor 
the integrity of the financial statements of the company, (2) to review the company's 
internal financial controls, (3) to monitor and review the effectiveness of the company's 
internal audit function, (4) to make recommendations to the board in relation to the 
appointment of external auditor and to approve remuneration and terms of engagement 
of external auditor, (5) to review and monitor external auditor's independence and 
objectivity and effectiveness of the audit process, (6) to develop and implement policy 
on the engagement of external auditor to supply non-audit services. 
Furthermore, the Cohen Commission (AICPA, 1978) and Blue Ribbon Report 
(BRC, 1999) stress that audit committee members ought to be independent if they are to 
provide effective corporate governance control mechanisms. And, NYSE (2003) 
requires that publicly listed companies on the NYSE must have an audit committee 
consisting of a minimum of three members and all must be independent directors. 
Empirically, the role played by the audit committee in monitoring firms has been 
examined by directly linking it with EM practices in the literature. Davidson el ul., 
(2005) investigate the role of firm's internal governance structure in constraining FIM 
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practices in Australia. It is hypothesised that EM behaviour is systematically related to 
the strength of internal corporate governance mechanisms-the audit committee and 
internal audit function. Based on a cross-sectional data of 434 listed Australian firms, 
for the financial year ending in 2000, their results suggest that while the establishment 
of an audit committee is not significantly, the number of non-executive directors on the 
committee is found to be negatively and significantly associated with EM measured by 
the absolute level of discretionary accruals calculated from the Modified Jones Model. 
Crutchley ei al., (2007) study the governance characteristics, earnings quality, 
growth rates, dividend policy, and compensation structure of 97 US firms over 1991- 
2002 under investigation by the SEC for accounting fraud. In order to measure FIM, 
they use two different models, including: (1) absolute value of discretionary current 
accruals calculated from the Modified Jones Model, and (2) Q-score of Penman and 
Zhang (2002), which examines the year-to-year change in estimated reserves and their 
current level relative to the industry median. A Q-score of 0 indicates good quality, 
whereas both high and low Q-score indicate that current earnings are of poor quality. By 
comparing with another 97 industry-matched and non-scandal US firms, their results 
show that the corporate environment which is most likely to lead an accounting scandal 
manifests significant growth and accounting practices that are already pushing the 
envelope of earnings smoothing. Firms operating in such an environment tip over the 
edge into fraud if there are fewer outsiders on the audit committee and outside directors 
appear overcommitted. 
Bedard et al., (2004) investigate the relation between the audit committee's 
expertise (financial, governance, and firm-specific expertise), independence and 
activities and aggressive EM on a sample of 3,947 firm-year observations (I JS) over the 
period of 1996-2002. It is argued that audit committee leading by an independent 
director with financial and governance expertise can effectively monitor opportunistic 
discretion. Using a cross-sectional version of the Jones Model to measure the abnormal 
accruals (proxy of EM), they find that aggressive EM is negatively associated with the 
financial and governance expertise, independence, and presence of a clear mandate 
defining the responsibilities of the audit committee. The association is similar Ihr both 
income-increasing and income-decreasing EM suggesting audit committee members are 
concerned with both types of EM. 
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Agrawal and Chadha (2005) examine whether certain corporate governance 
mechanisms are related to the probability of a company manipulating its earnings. They 
compare the level of discretionary accruals calculated from the Modified Jones Model 
of 159 US public companies with an industry-size matched sample of control firms (the 
total sample size is 318) for the years of 2001 and 2002. Overall, their results provide 
evidence suggesting that the probability of engaging in EM practices is lower in 
companies whose audit committees have an independent director with financial 
expertise. The relation is statistically significant, large in magnitude, and robust to 
alternative specifications. Thus, they state that independent directors with financial 
expertise served on the audit committee are valuable in providing oversight of a firm's 
financial reporting practices. 
Indirectly, the effectiveness of audit committee on mitigating other opportunistic 
discretion in accounting field arranged from overstatement errors to lowering the quality 
of financial statements has also been studied. 
Defond and Jiambalvo (1991) argue that audit committee is an important element 
of a firm's control environment and it can reduce the likelihood of overstatement errors. 
Empirically, they examine the incidence of accounting errors revealed by prior period 
adjustments for 41 US firms in comparison with a control group of another 41 US firms 
from 1976 to 1987. This comparison is used to highlight circumstances that are likely to 
motivate managers to use errors as an earnings manipulation tool. They find that while 
earnings overstatements are more likely when firms have diffuse ownership, lower 
growth in earnings, and fewer income-increasing GAAP alternatives available, they are 
less likely among firms that have audit committee which are entirely composed of 
independent non-executive directors. 
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) conduct a survey on 51 US companies with 
one or both of two types of financial reporting problems: (1) SEC entbrcement actions 
and (2) material restatements of quarterly earnings. As of 1 February 1989, the national 
market system of the NASDAQ required audit committee for all registered companies. 
To enhance the power of their analysis, they thus concentrate on four year-period betöre 
1989. By comparing with the paired no-financial problems firms, the authors find that 
firms which have (1) an audit committee composed entirely of non-executive directors, 
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(2) Certified Public Accounts (CPAs) on their audit committee, and (3) frequent audit 
committee meetings, are less likely to be subject to the SEC enforcement actions or 
restating their quarterly reports. In other words, it would be likely to find less financial 
fraud in those firms. 
Abbot et al., (2004) address the impact of certain audit committee characteristics 
identified by the Blue Ribbon Report (1999) on the likelihood of financial restatements. 
They examine 88 US restatements of annual results (without allegations of fraud) in the 
period of 1991-1999, together with a matched pairs control group of firms of similar 
size, exchange listing, industry and auditor type. They document that the independence 
and activity level (proxy for audit committee diligence) of the audit committee exhibit a 
significant and negative association with the occurrence of the restatements. They also 
find a significant negative association between an audit committee that has at least one 
member with financial expertise and restatements. As they argued (Abbot el al., 2004, 
p. 69), "... our results underscore the importance of BRC's [Blue Ribbon Report, 19991 
recommendations as a means of strengthening the monitoring and oversight role that the 
audit committee plays in the financial reporting process. " 
Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007) analyse the relation between the likelihood 
that a company receives a qualified audit report (as a measure of the quality of financial 
information) and existence and characteristics of the audit committee. By comparing 
148 Spanish firms that voluntarily created and 232 Spanish firms did not create an audit 
committee in the period following the publication the 1998 Spanish Code of Corporate 
Governance (Olivencia Code), their results indicate that the mere presence of' an audit 
committee does not reduce the occurrence of error and non-compliance qualifications, 
as audit committees are not effective per se. However, the proportion of' independent 
non-executives on the audit committee has significant influence on the receipt of' 
qualifications of this kind. In other words, an independent audit committee reduces the 
likelihood of receiving an error or non-compliance qualification. 
All in all, the empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical statement that 
an audit committee which is composed of independent non-executive directors should 
be able to mitigate the opportunistic behaviours, thus EM practices. 
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6.4.1.2. China's Evidence of Audit Committee 
As already been mentioned in the previous chapters, the 2002 Chinese Code (CSRC, 
2002) encourages the establishment of an audit committee on the board to facilitate the 
convergence of Chinese accounting practices and improve the quality of financial 
reporting. However, both compliance and enforcement of this requirement as indicated 
earlier are relatively weak in China. Further, the independence of the committee is also 
doubtful, given that the committee is only required to be composed of a majority instead 
of all independent directors. Therefore, as argued by Chen and Zhang (2010a) the 
effectiveness of the audit committee in China on mitigating reported earnings 
manipulations is not clear. 
Within a limited number of empirical studies on this issue, Ho and Wang (2001) 
test the relation between a set of corporate governance factors (e. g., proportion of 
independent directors, existence of an audit committee) and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure provided by listed firms in I-long Kong in the late 1997 and early 1998. 
Based on the argument of AT that audit committee can effectively mitigate the activities 
of EM, they hypothesise that improved monitoring on the hoard, especially audit 
committee leads to more voluntary disclosures. Using a weighted disclosure index for 
measuring voluntary disclosure, their results indicate that the existence of an audit 
committee is significantly and positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
The authors use a questionnaire survey of 610 CFOs and 535 financial analysts for all 
listed firms in Hong Kong, however, with the response rate of 17% and 18`Yo 
respectively, only I Chinese H-share firm has responded. Thus, their results may 
represent the population of listed firms in Hong Kong to certain degree, but not for the 
companies listed in the mainland China. 
Chen and Zhang (2010a) report a significantly negative correlation between the 
existence of audit committee and earnings gap which is used as the proxy for EM for 
103 B-share companies over 1999 to 2006. With such a small sample size, their results 
on the pervasiveness and magnitude of the effectiveness of audit committee may not 
well represent the total population of listed companies in China. And, the earnings gap 
introduced may not be necessarily the same with EM. 
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6.4.2. Statutory Audit 
6.4.2.1. Global Evidence of Statutory Audit 
The quality of external auditing can have a significant influence on the quality of 
recorded earnings, and therefore, constitutes a constraint on EM practices. The 
international reputable auditors, such as the Big 4 auditor24, are usually used as the 
proxy for quality auditing. As expressed by Krishnan (2003), not only do the large audit 
firms have more resources and experts to detect EM, but they also have greater 
incentive to protect their reputation because of their large client base. Street and Gary 
(2002) provide supporting evidence of this argument that being audited by a large firm 
is positively and significantly associated with IFRS compliance, both in the case of 
disclosure requirements (standards compliance) and in the case of measurement and 
presentation requirements (practices compliance). 
By directly investigating the correlation between the Big 4 auditor and FM, a 
large number of studies provide evidence showing the effectiveness of employing the 
Big 4 auditor on mitigating companies' EM behaviour. For instance, Becker e/ al., 
(1998) investigate the relation between audit quality and EM. Consistent with the prior 
research, they treat audit quality as a dichotomous variable and assume that the Big 4 
auditor is of higher quality than non-Big 4 auditor. EM is captured by discretionary 
accruals that are estimated using a cross-sectional version of Jones Model. They 
hypothesise that clients of non-Big 4 report more discretionary accruals to increase 
income than those annual reports audited by the Big 4. By using a US sample of 10,379 
Big 4 and 2,179 non-Big 4 firm year observations for the period of 1989-1992, they find 
that clients of non-Big 4 report discretionary accruals that are, on average, 1.5%-2.11! /o 
higher than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of the Big 4 auditor. 
Francis et al., (1999) examine if the likelihood of' hiring a Big 4 auditor is 
increasing in the firm's endogenous propensity to generate accruals. They hypothesise 
that high-accrual firms have greater scope of aggressive and/or opportunistic IM and 
therefore have an incentive to hire a brand name Big 4 auditor to provide assurance that 
reported earnings are credible. In a sample of 74,390 firm-year observations (based on 
all NASDAQ firms) over the period of 1975-1994, their results indicate that even 
though the Big 4 audited firms have higher level of total accruals, they still have lower 
amounts of estimated discretionary accruals. Thus, the authors conclude by stating that 
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"... these findings are consistent with the Big 4 auditor constraining aggressive and 
potentially opportunistic reporting by firms with high level of accruals" (Francis el al., 
1999, p. 17). 
Gore et al., (2001) examine the provision of non-audit services provided by 
auditors to their audit clients can impair independence more severely for smaller 
auditors than for larger auditors. Using a sample of 4,779 UK firms over 1992-1998, 
they find that clients' EM activities to avoid losses and earnings declines is positively 
associated with the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees for non-Big 4 auditors but not for 
the Big 4 auditor. Further, the difference in the effectiveness of the Big 4 and non-Big 4 
auditors in constraining EM widen as the non-audit fee ratio increases. These results 
suggest that, "when the provision of non-audit services is relatively high, smaller 
auditors are less able to resist aggressive accounting by their clients" (Gore el al., 2001, 
p. 28). 
Using a sample of 4,422 (or 24,114 firm-year observations) clients of the Big 4 
auditor over 1989-1998 in the US, Krishnan (2003) examines the association between 
auditor industry expertise, measured in terms of both audit market share in an industry 
and an industry's share in the auditor's portfolio of client industries, and a client's level 
of absolute discretionary accruals calculated using the Modified Jones Model. The 
results indicate that clients of nonspecialist auditors report absolute discretionary 
accruals that are, on average, 1.2% higher than the discretionary accruals reported by 
clients of specialist auditors. His findings are consistent with the notion that 
".... specialist auditors mitigate accruals-based EM more than nonspecialist auditors and, 
therefore, influence the quality of earnings" (Krishnan, 2003, p. 1). 
Zhou and Elder (2004) investigate the relation between audit quality as measured 
by audit firm size and industry specialisation, and EM measured by discretionary 
current accruals, for companies making seasoned equity offerings (SF, Os). By using 
2,453 observations of SEOs in the US between 1991 and 1999, they find evidence 
suggesting that the companies employing the Big 4 auditor are associated with few I'M 
practices in the years before, during, and subsequent to the SEOs. In other words, they 
argue that higher audit quality as evidenced by auditor size (the Big 4) is associated 
with less EM. 
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Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) address whether German companies that 
have adopted IFRS engage significantly less in EM compared to German companies 
reporting under German GAAP, while controlling for other differences in EM 
incentives. By using a sample of 636 firm-year observations during the period of 1999- 
2001, and the absolute value of the discretionary accruals, they show that the IFRS- 
adapters do not present different EM behaviour compared to companies reporting under 
German GAAP. Moreover, it appears that companies that have adopted IFRS engage 
more in earnings smoothing. However, they report that "... [this] increase in earnings 
smoothing with a adoption of IFRS is significantly reduce when the company has a Big 
4 auditor" (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005, p. 176). Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2008) investigate the relation between external auditing quality and EM in 
private firms across different European countries. Using data on private firms of six 
European countries25, their study provides evidence that, after controlling for self- 
selection, audit quality differentiation between the Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms also 
exists in the private client segment market. In addition, their results suggest that audit 
quality and investor protection are substitute in constraining EM in private firms, in the 
sense that the Big 4 audit quality effect attenuates when investor protection is stronger. 
6.4.2.2. China's Evidence of Statuary Audit 
The use of an external auditor is mandatory for all listed companies in China. For the 
companies listed on the B-share market, it is usually audited by two Certified Public 
Accountant (CPA) firms. Specifically, their domestic GAAP statements are usually 
audited by a local Chinese CPA firm while their IFRS statements are audited by an 
international CPA firm. A reconciliation of the company's net income and shareholders' 
equity from Chinese GAAP and [FRS should he included in the company's annual 
report. Recent years have seen a significant increase of auditor concentration in China, 
with strong support from the CSRC. Many local Chinese CPA firms have merged with 
the Big 4, hoping to improve the quality of their auditing. The total number of Chinese 
local CPA firms declined from 106 in 1999 to 71 in 2002 and less than 50 in 2006 
(CSRC, 2007). Furthermore, the Big 4 concentration ratio increased from 19% in 1999 
to 37% in 2002 and 5l% in 2006 (CSRC, 2007). 
While the above trend may be an indication of the quality auditing pcrtormed by 
the Big 4, however, as indicated by Wearing (2005) that the quality control of audit is 
164 
very much dependent on the local branch and is heavily influenced by the local 
circumstance as many Big 4 local branches mainly engage local employees with few 
expatriates being the top senior management from regional headquarter. Several studies 
(e. g., Ball et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2000b; Leuz et al., 2003), in the similar vein, also 
suggest that the quality of financial disclosure is in large part determined by the 
underlying economic and institutional background influencing managers' and auditors' 
incentives. Thus, taking these local influencing factors into consideration, the quality of 
auditing provided by the Big 4 auditor may not be the same in China comparing with 
that provided in the Western countries. The literature provides supporting evidence for 
the above argument. First of all, as argued by Chen (2005) and Chen and Cheng (2007), 
that the underlying economic and institutional factors (e. g., monitoring system, ethic 
education or training, legal infrastructure and enforcement) have not been well 
developed to ensure the reliability of financial reporting in China that investors would 
expect. Secondly, the lack of qualified auditing professionals in China is another reason 
that contributes significantly to the inefficient performance of external auditor on 
monitoring opportunistic discretion (Chen el cal., 2002; Chen and Zhang, 2010a). 
Therefore, due to the lack of both supporting institutional environment and qualified 
auditing professionals in China, it is argued that the quality of audit performed by the 
same auditor, even if the Big 4, may be different from it appears in a well-developed 
institutional system. Put it in another way, the Big 4 may not provide the same high 
quality of auditing in China comparing with the Western countries. 
6.5. Institutional Shareholders 
6.5.1. Global Evidence of Institutional Shareholders 
Theoretically, AT argues that monitoring activities to become specialised to those 
institutions and individuals who possess comparative advantages in these activities. For 
institutional investors, the importance of being active to minimise agency costs is the 
core in AT's argument. Jensen (2000, p. 64-67) states that ". .. 
I mean an (actives investor 
who actually monitors management, sits on boards, is sometimes involved in dismissing 
management, is often intimately involved in the strategic direction of the company, and 
on occasion even manages-and as a response to problems caused by the lack of' 
effective monitoring of corporate managers, [continuing] developments in financial 
institutions is crucial. " In perspective of TCE, Williamson (1984a) argues that as the 
exposure to risk increases, these debt holders become more concerned with the details 
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of the firm's operating decisions and strategic plans; "with high debt-equity ratios the 
creditors become more like shareholders and greater consultation between the 
management and its major creditors results" (Williamson, 1984a, p. 1197). For 
institutional shareholders, Williamson (2007) states that corporate monitoring by 
institutional investors can constrain opportunistic behaviours. Large institutional 
investors have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, discipline, and 
influence managers. Thus, corporate monitoring by institutional investors can force 
managers to focus more on corporate performance and less on opportunistic or self= 
serving behaviour. And, it is also pointed out that in order to secure the value of 
ultimate beneficiaries (or stakeholders) through consistent monitoring of the company 
performance, the institutional investors are required to be active. This is to be hacked up 
by direct engagement in the firms where appropriate. If companies persistently fail to 
respond to concerns raised by stakeholders (e. g. the reliability of firm's accounting 
policies made by the management), institutional investors will vote against the board at 
general meetings. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the pattern of ownership has changed and, in 
the US and UK in particular, individual share ownership has declined and institutional 
share ownership has increased. As stated by Gillan and Starks (2003), over seventy 
years later, institutional investors own large proportions of equity in many companies 
across the world, and the key role played by institutional investors in corporate 
governance can not be underestimated. In the similar vein, Mallin (2007) proposes that 
with the internationalisation of cross-border portfolios, and financial crises that have 
occurred in many parts of the world, it is perhaps not surprising that institutional 
investors increasingly look more carefully at the corporate governance of companies. 
Empirical research, on one hand, shows that monitoring and controlling activities 
provided by institutional investors effectively constrain firms from manipulating 
reported earnings opportunistically (Black, 1990; Bushes, 1998; Monks and Minow, 
2007; Roe, 1994; Romano, 2001). For instance, Chung el al., (2002) examine whether 
large institutional shareholding in a firm deter EM practices in the firms when they have 
incentives to increase or decrease reported profits. Using discretionary accounting 
accruals as the measure of EM and a sample of 12,478 US firm-year observations over 
the period of 1988-1996, they find that the presence of large institutional shareholding 
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inhibits firms from increasing or decreasing reported profits towards the desired level or 
range of profits. Their evidence is consistent with the notion of' institutional investors 
monitoring and constraining self-serving behaviours. 
Moreover, Chung et at., (2005) hypothesise that low-growth companies with high 
free cash flow (SFCF) will use income-increasing discretionary accruals (DAC) to 
offset the low or negative earnings that inevitably accompany investments with negative 
net present values (NPVs). Their results, using 22,576 firm-year observations over the 
period of 1984-96 and income-increasing discretionary accruals calculated from the 
Modified Jones Model, confirm their hypothesis. In addition, they also show that 
institutional investors with substantial shareholding moderate the SFCF-DAC relation, 
which suggests that external monitoring by institutional investors is effective in 
deterring EM practices. 
Sheng (2003) investigates the association between institutional ownership and 
Australian firms' aggressive EM strategies. He predicts that the association between 
institutional ownership and firms' income increasing discretionary accruals is expected 
to vary as the level of institutional ownership increases. Based on a sample of' 836 non- 
financial Australian listed firms for the years between 1993 and 1997 and discretionary 
accruals calculated from the Modified Jones Model, Sheng (2003) finds a non-linear 
association between institutional ownership and income increasing discretionary 
accruals. In particular, a positive association is found at lower institutional ownership 
levels, consistent with the view that transient (short-term oriented) institutional 
investors create incentives for firms to mange earnings upwards. On the other hand, a 
negative association is found at the higher institutional ownership levels, consistent with 
view that long-term oriented institutional investors' monitoring opportunistic accruals 
discretion. In conclusion, it is argued that (Sheng, 2003, p. 105) "... institutional 
investors can act as a complementary corporate governance mechanism in mitigating 
myopic aggressive earnings management by corporations when they have a sufficiently 
high ownership level. " 
Using a sample of 1,541 US firms for the period over 1989-95, Rajpopal el (I/., 
(2003) show that absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated from the Modified 
Jones Model declines with institutional ownership. This result reflects that institutional 
167 
investors are better informed than individual investors, which reduces the perceived 
benefits of managing accruals. In addition, their findings also demonstrate as 
institutional ownership increases, stock prices tend to reflect a greater proportion of the 
information in future earnings related to current earnings. This result is consistent with 
the notion of institutional investors looking beyond current earnings compared to 
individual investors. Collectively, they conclude that firms do not manipulate earnings 
due to pressure from institutional investors. 
And, the study of Velury and Jenkins (2006) is designed to provide insights into 
the monitoring role of institutional investors by examining whether institutional 
ownership affects the quality of reported earnings. In order to address this issue, they 
develop a multidimensional method of measuring earnings quality using the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) conceptual framework as a basis. Based on a 
sample of 4,238 US firm-year observations over the period of 1992-1999, they report a 
positive association between institutional ownership and earnings quality. By taking 
ownership concentration into account, however, they find a negative association 
between concentrated ownership and earnings quality. In conclusion, they state that 
(Velury and Jenkins, 2006, p. 1051) "... there is a general positive association between 
institutional ownership and earnings quality that is negatively affected by increased 
ownership concentration. " 
Based on a sample of 662 US firm-year observations over 1993-2000, Cornett cal 
al., (2006) find that both institutional ownership of shares and institutional investor 
representation on the board reduce the use of discretionary accruals as a means of IN 
practices. And, these factors largely offset the impact of options compensation, which 
they find strongly encourages EM. Hence, they conclude by stating that "... the results 
reinforce previous research pointing to the beneficial impact of outside monitoring 
[from institutional shareholders], but cast doubt on the role of pay- for-perl'ormance 
compensation as a means of eliciting superior performance. The quality of reported 
earnings improves significantly with monitoring, but degrades dramatically with option 
compensation" (Cornett et al., 2006, p. 20). 
On the other hand, as expressed by Bainbridge (2005, p. 12-17), institutional 
investors activism is rare and limited primarily to union and State or local public 
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employee pensions. Because institutional investors generally are profit maximisers, they 
will not engage in an activity whose costs exceed its benefits. And, they are likely to 
step in only where there are serious long-term problems. In the similar vein, 
McCormack (1998) addresses this issue from both the benefits and costs of being 
activism. On the benefit side of the equation, he argues that activism is unattractive 
because in many cases it is unlikely to be availing. In some cases, intervention will 
come too late. In others, the problem may prove intractable, as where technological 
changes undercut the firm's competitive position. Turing to the cost side of the equation, 
because it is impossible to predict ex ante which corporations are likely to experience 
problems, activist institutions will be obliged to monitor all of their portfolio firms. 
Because corporate disclosure rarely give one a full picture of the corporation's prospects, 
moreover, additional and more costly monitoring mechanisms must be established. 
Empirically, Sunil Wahal (1996, p. 20) states that "collectively, [my] results cast doubt 
on the effectiveness of pension fund activism as a substituted for an active market for 
corporate control. " Karpoff et al., (1996, p. 393) agree: "there is no persuasive evidence 
that [shareholder] proposals increase firm values, improve operating performance, or 
influence firm policies. " Karpoff (2001, p. 1) argues that "... I survey the recent 
empirical research on shareholder activism, and conclude that the disagreement among 
researchers is more apparent than real. More evidence indicates that shareholder 
activism can prompt small changes in target firms' governance structures, but has 
negligible impacts on share values and earnings. " And, Black (1997), Gillan and Starks 
(2000), Johnson and Shackell (1997), Wagster and Prevost (1996) all report that 
institutional shareholder activism tends to have little impact on the target companies in 
either improving performance or constraining management discretions. 
In summary, the empirical results of the correlation between monitoring provided 
by institutional investors and EM practices are mixed. On one hand, scholars such as 
Chung el al., (2002), Rajpopal et al., (2003), Sheng (2003), Velury and Jenkins (2006) 
provide evidence suggesting a significantly negative correlation between shares held by 
institutional investors and EM. More generally, their results suggest that institutional 
investors monitor and constrain the self-serving behaviours. On the other hand, scholars 
such as Karpoff et al., (1996), Karpoff (2001), Wahal (1996) challenge the activism of 
institutional shareholders and provide evidence arguing that institutional investors 
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activism is rare which can't be classified as an effective mechanism to mitigate 
opportunistic discretion. 
6.5.2. China's Evidence of Institutional shareholders 
One promising feature emerged recently from the A- and B-share markets is the 
increasing trend in institutional ownership in the listed companies that is both a 
reflection and a consequence of the government's efforts to promote institutional 
investors to enter into the China's stock markets since 1997. According to Chen and 
Zhang (2010a), over the period of 1999-2006, there is a significant increase in 
shareholding held by institutional investors in China. On average, the percentage of 
institutional shareholding increases to 6% by the end of 2006 from 2% in 1999. By 
comparing with the institutional shareholding in developed capital market, however, it 
is still quit low. For instance, in the US, around 55% of US equities are owned and 80% 
of share trades are made by the institutional investors. In the UK, institutional 
ownership is around 65%-80%. And, the overseas level of ownership in UK reached 
approximately to 21% by the end of 2005 (Mallin, 2007). 
Other than the smaller shareholding in the listed companies, Zhang (2007, p. 741) 
argues that shareholder activism is very similar to market activism and they both suffer 
from the same problem, "... not only are they not effective in disciplining serious 
managerial misbehaviour that offers managers more gain than loss, even their limited 
value to discourage such misbehaviour as managerial shirking is conditioned on that the 
opportunities for illegitimate enrichment by managers are f'ew". In the similar vein, 
Chen and Zhang (2010a) state that shareholders, market and shareholder activism are 
one combined mechanism. On one hand, market discipline needs the helps of 
shareholder voting to oust incompetent management. On the other hand, active 
participation in corporate governance by shareholders is informed by information from 
the market. However, if the fraudulent self enrichment can not he detected, the 
importance of market will adversely affects the monitoring function of the institutional 
shareholders, and the ability of shareholder activism to discipline managerial shrinking 
will also be lost. By putting all together, due to smaller shareholding and lack of 
effective market discipline, institutional investors may not effectively mitigate 
opportunistic behaviour (or EM) in China. 
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6.6. Controlling Shareholders 
6.6.1. Global Evidence of Controlling Shareholders 
Both AT and TCE propose that most large corporations in the developed capital markets 
are to a significant extent controlled by their managers who enjoy nontrivial degree of 
discretion, thus how to minimise the agency costs/transaction costs that originated from 
managers' opportunistically discretionary activities is the main concern of these two 
theories. In other words, both attempt to address the conflict of interests between 
management and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1984). 
Recent developments in corporate governance literature have highlighted another 
form of conflict of interests-action being taken by the controlling shareholders for 
their own benefit, at the expense of minority shareholders. As proposed by La Porta el 
al., (1997); (1999); (2000a; b); Velury and Jenkins, (2006), in some less developed 
capital markets, even the largest firms tend to have a highly-concentrated ownership 
structure and top manager represent the interests of controlling shareholders. In 
comparison with the conflict of interests between management and shareholders, the 
essential effect of both scenarios is the same: insiders, through their control of' the firm, 
pursue their private benefits at the cost of outsiders (Ding et al., 2007). In transaction, 
the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders are the two parties involved, 
while the firm is dominated by controlling shareholders. In such a circumstance, both 
parties are bilaterally dependent as the high level of dedicated asset specificity 
involvement; one party will bear the relevant costs, if the transaction is prematurely 
terminated by the other party. However, based on the TCE's arguments of opportunism 
and feasible foresight, controlling shareholders have the incentives as well as the means 
to take actions for their own benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. As argued 
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 758), "large investors may represent their own interests, 
which need not coincide with the interests of other investors in the firm. " 
In order to fight against the expropriation from controlling shareholders, empirical 
evidence mentions the important role played by the investor protection offered in the 
stock markets. For instance, La Porta et al., (1998) examine 49 countries around the 
world at the end of 1993. By classifying the sample countries into four specific groups 
based on their legal origins as, the common-law, French-civil-law, German-civil-law, 
and Scandinavian countries, they compare the shareholder protection, quality of' 
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enforcement of law, and ownership concentration among different groups and report 
evidence suggesting that: (1) laws differ markedly around the world. Countries whose 
legal rules originate in the common-law tradition tend to protect investors considerably 
more than the countries whose law originate in civil law, and especially the French- 
civil-law tradition. The German-civil-law and the Scandinavian countries take an 
intermediate stance toward investor protections; (2) law enforcement differs a great deal 
around the world. German-civil-law and Scandinavian countries have the best quality of 
law enforcement; (3) ownership concentration is extremely high around the world. In an 
average country, close to half equity in a publicly traded company is owned by the three 
largest shareholders. Furthermore, good accounting standards and shareholder 
protection measures are associated with a lower concentration of ownership, indicating 
that concentration is indeed a response to poor investor protection. 
La Porta at al., (1999) use data on ownership structures of 691 different sizes of 
corporations in 27 wealth economies at the end of 1995 to identify the ultimate 
controlling shareholders of these firms. By comparing the 26 different variables, such as 
antidirector index26, Widely Held, Family, Stale, and so forth, they find that outside the 
US, particularly at countries with poor shareholder protection, even the largest firms 
tend to have controlling shareholders. Sometimes that shareholder is the State, but more 
often it is a family, usually the founder of the firm or his descendants. They also report 
that the controlling shareholders typically have control over firms considerably in 
excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation 
in management. Consequently, they argue that "... [large] firms are not run by 
professional managers without equity ownership who are unaccountable to shareholders, 
but by controlling shareholders... [the controlling shareholders] are ideally placed to 
monitor the management, and in fact the top management is usually part of the 
controlling family, but at the same time they have the power to expropriate the minority 
shareholders as well as the interest is so doing" (p. 511-512). 
Claessens et al., (2000) examine the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 
corporations in nine East Asian countries27 at the end of fiscal year 1996. By following 
the similar comparison methods used by La porta e1 al., (1998), (1999), they document 
evidence suggesting that in all countries, the voting rights frequently exceed cash-flow 
rights via pyramid and cross-holdings. The separation of ownership and control is most 
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pronounced among family-controlled firms and small firms. More than two-thirds of 
firms are controlled by a single shareholder. And, Claessens et al.. (2002) disentangle 
the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership28. In their regression model, 
the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets at the end of 1996 is 
set as the dependent variable. And, the main independent variables are the share of cash- 
flow rights held by the largest shareholder (ownership) and the share of voting rights 
held by the largest shareholder (control). To operationalise their model, they use a 
dataset of 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies at the end 
of fiscal year 1996 (same as their previous study, except Japan). On balance, given that 
concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, their findings 
document an inverted "U-shape" correlation between firm's value measured by sales 
growth and cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder. Particularly, firm value 
increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a 
positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest 
shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. 
Implicitly, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) study the role of firms' political 
connections in Indonesian firms' financing strategies and their long-rum performance. 
They view political connections as an example for domestic arrangements which can 
reduce the benefits of global financing. By using 132 Indonesian firms at the end of 
1996, they find that firms with strong political connections are less likely to have 
publicly traded foreign securities. 
With regard to EM practices, Leuz et al., (2003) document systematic differences 
in the level of EM of 70,955 firm-year observations, across 31 countries and 8,616 non- 
financial firms for the fiscal years 1990-1999. They perform a descriptive cluster 
analysis to identify groupings of countries with similar institutional characteristics and 
then show that EM measured by four different models varies systematically across these 
institutional clusters. In particular, EM is measured as: (1) a country's firm-level 
standard deviation of operating earnings divided by the firm-level standard deviation of 
cash flow from operations; (2) the correlation between changes in accounting accruals 
and operating cash flows; (3) the magnitude of accruals; (4) the ratio of "small profits 
[0.00,0.01]" to "small losses [-0.01,0.00]". And, aggregate IM score. The analysis 
suggests that outsider economies with relatively dispersed ownership, strong investor 
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protection, and large stock markets exhibit lower levels of EM than insider countries 
with relatively concentrated ownership, weak investor protection, and less developed 
stock markets. 
Following the similar measurements of EM used by Leuz el al., (2003), Shen and 
Chih (2007) study the impact of corporate governance on EM for nine Asian countries 
with 204 firms29 at the end of year 2000, consistent with the findings of Leuz el al.. 
(2003), they find that a firm in a country with good anti-director rights engages in less 
earnings smoothing and earnings aggressiveness. And, stronger enforcement of laws 
can result in less earnings smoothing, but this effect is stronger in countries with 
sounding corporate governance system. They conclude their study by saying that "... on 
predicting EM across countries, in addition to country-level governance, the role of 
corporate governance should have to be taken into account. " 
6.6.2. China's Evidence of Controlling Shareholders 
One unique feature of Chinese listed companies is that ownership is highly concentrated 
(Aharony et al., 2000; Chen and Yuan, 2006; Ding et al., 2007; Jian and Wong, 2004; 
Liu and Lu, 2002). According to the data by the end of 2006, the live largest 
shareholders on average account for 58.5%30 of the total equity, compared with 25.4% 
in the US and 33.1% in Japan (Mallin, 2007). More strikingly, the largest shareholder 
holds more than 42% ' of total shares for an average Chinese listed company. Due to 
such an ownership structure, the possibility of one form of principal-agent conflicts 
exists in China's companies when they are publicly listed, since the separation of' 
ownership and control is a common feature (Ding e/ al., 2007). In addition, the other 
form of conflict of interests between the controlling shareholders and the minority 
shareholders may also exist in China's listed companies, since the former has the 
incentives as well as the means to expropriate the latter (Ding et al., 2007; Lo et cal., 
2010). In practice, controlling shareholders are rarely challenged by other shareholders 
on important issues. And, minority shareholders cannot take listed companies to court, 
due to the limitations in the civil law system, and a lack of punishment spectrum in the 
current securities law32 (e. g., Chen et al., 2006; Firth et al., 2007; Liu and Im, 2007). 
Thus, it is worth reviewing the empirical studies that investigate whether the controlling 
shareholders engage in EM practices in China. 
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To date, there are several studies that provide empirical evidence suggesting 
controlling shareholders utilise different means to engage in EM practices in China's 
listed companies. For instance, Ding et al., (2007) examine the relation in Chinese listed 
firms between EM practices and two different ownership characteristics, namely 
concentration (holdings of top I shareholder) and type of the ownership (privately- 
owned versus State-owned). By using 273 firms at end of year 2002 and discretionary 
accruals calculate from the Modified Jones Model as the proxy of EM, they find the 
relation between EM and ownership concentration exhibits a statistically significant 
non-linear, inverted "U-shape" pattern. On one hand, large shareholders tend to 
maximise accounting earnings in order to reap benefits in the future. On the other hand, 
when ownership concentration reaches high level, large shareholders become the true 
owners of the firm, and are thus more likely to seek to preserve its future growth 
potential by minimising account earnings. 
Firth et al., (2007) investigate the how ownership structure in China affect the 
informativeness of earnings in China's listed companies. They measure the 
informativeness of earnings by the earnings-returns ratio and discretionary accruals. 
Using a sample of 5,189 firm-year observations over the period of 1998-2003, their 
results document that ownership concentration is negatively and significantly correlated 
with the informativeness of earnings (e. g., low level of earnings-returns ratio, high level 
of discretionary accruals). It is argued that large shareholders may influence lirms to 
adopt accounting policies that reflect the wishes of the large owners rather than reflect 
the economic substance of the business transactions. 
Using a sample of 131 Chinese listed firms in the basic materials industries such 
as mining, lumber, chemicals and building materials for the years of 1997-2002, and the 
related party transactions as the proxy of EM, Jian and Wong (2004) provide evidence 
suggesting that Chinese listed companies use recurring related party transactions to 
manage operating earnings and achieve certain ROE targets, or strive to he eligible for 
rights issues. In addition, listed companies divert the money that obtained from 
operations to their related firms. And, these EM and tunneling activities arc more 
pronounced for State-controlled companies. In the similar vein, by using a panel data of 
633 Chinese listed companies for the 1999-2005 period, Liu and Lu (2007) provide 
consistent evidence suggesting that controlling shareholders largely engage in using 
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discretionary accruals measured by the Modified Jones Model to artificially dress-up the 
performance of the firms in order to avoid de-listing and raise capital through rights 
issue. 
Instead of directly examining EM practices, Jiang et cal., (2005) investigate the 
widespread use of corporate loans by controlling shareholders to extract funds from 
Chinese listed companies. By focusing on the "Other Receivables (OREC)-these loans 
represent a substantial portion of the reported assets of Chinese firms" of 1,133 listed 
companies in China for the period of 1996 to 2002, they show that companies with large 
OREC balances experience worse future operating performance and are much more 
likely to become candidates for delisting. High-OREC firms have generally lower 
market valuations, but still earn negative risk-adjusted returns in the future. And, this 
behavior is most severe when the blockshareholders' controlling right is significantly 
larger than their ownership right. 
Wang et al., (2004) use a panel data set of financial and ownership information on 
992 China's publicly listed firms (on both the SHSE and SZSE) between 1990 and 2000 
to explore the effectiveness of public listing as a means of reforming State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) in China. They find that public listing is associated with share 
deterioration in performance for up to six year after the year of listing, and it is true for 
firms with or without direct State ownership. These findings suggest that firms without 
formal State ownership do not behave so much differently from firms with State 
ownership in their quest for profits, and that ownership concentration by large 
shareholders is ineffective in improving performance when they are likely to he the 
State agencies or SOE-like institutions. Overall, they conclude that "... using public 
listings as a means to reform SoEs has not worked wonders... " (Wang el u/,. 2004, 
p. 17). 
P6 
6.7. Summary 
While the empirical studies based on the Western countries show that executives engage 
in EM practices to increase compensation, especially the equity-based components (e. g., 
Baker et al., 2003; Cohen et al., 2008; Gao and Shrieves, 2002; Shuto, 2007), there is 
no published study on such an important issue in China. In line with AT, it is 
conjectured that tying executive compensation to performance may become a 
mechanism to limit EM through aligning the interests of managers with those of the 
shareholders. 
The empirical studies have found mixed results regarding the impact of 
independent directors on EM (e. g., Ahmed el at., 2006; Park and Shin, 2004; Peasnell ei 
at., 2000; 2005). In China, the empirical results are also inclusive (e. g., Chen el al., 
2006; Chen and Cheng, 2007; Clark, 2006). It is argued that the effectiveness of 
independent directors on monitoring may be jeopardised due to the strong influence 
from the controlling shareholders. 
The empirical studies show a negative correlation between the establishment of an 
independent audit committee and EM practices (e. g., Abbot ei cal., 2004; Bedard el erl., 
2004; Crutchley et al., 2007). In China, Chen and Zhang (2010a) and Ilo and Wang 
(2001) document the similar results. However, as both the compliance and 
independence of audit committee may be damaged due to the relatively weak 
enforcement, its effectiveness on mitigating EM is not very clear. 
For external auditing (or the Big 4 auditor), it significantly and negatively 
correlates with EM activities as documented in the literature (e. g., Becher et al., 1998; 
Core et al., 2001; Fracis et al., 1999). In China, the Big 4 auditor may not provide the 
same high quality of auditing due to the lack of supporting institutional environment 
and qualified auditing professionals (e. g., Ball ei al., 2000; Chen, 2005; [cut e! (1/., 
2003). 
The empirical results with regard to the institutional investor activism are 
inclusive (e. g., Bainbridge, 2005; Black, 1997; Cornett et al., 2006). In China, the 
177 
relatively weak legal environment, smaller ownership and trade volume of institutional 
investors may limit their role in mitigating EM (Chen and Zhang, 201 Oa; Zhang, 2007). 
And finally, consistent with the global evidence on the impact of the controlling 
shareholders (e. g.. Claessens ei al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1998; 1999; Leuz et al., 2003), 
in China, empirical studies provide evidence of controlling shareholders utilising 
different means to engage in EM practices (e. g., Ding et al., 2007; Firth et al., 2007; Liu 
and Lu, 2007). 
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Chapter 7: Hypotheses Development 
7.1. Introduction 
As proposed by Black (1999) that research questions, objectives, and hypotheses are 
formulated to bridge the gap between the more abstractly stated research problem and 
purpose and the detailed design for data collection and analysis. While the research 
questions are concise and interrogative statements, the research objectives are clear, 
concise, and declarative statements in relation to the questions formulated. A hypothesis 
is the formal statement of the expected relationship or relationships between two or 
more variables in a specific population. More generally, Black (1999) states that the 
hypothesis translates the research problem and purpose into a clear explanation or 
prediction of the expected results or outcomes of the study. 
Based on both the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed in the previous 
chapters, this chapter begins with stating the research question coupled with research 
objectives. In brief, the research question is: how does the passage of the Code with 
regard to the mechanisms of corporate governance (especially executive compensation) 
affect EM activities in China's listed companies? With regard to this research question, 
it is to investigate the extent of EM activities by comparing two contrasting governance 
regimes (pre and post- Code periods) in China's listed companies, and to investigate the 
impacts of several mechanisms enforced by the Code. 
Then, two major categories of hypotheses are formulated regarding (1) the trend 
in EM activities over time, and (2) the impacts of the main mechanisms enforced by the 
Code (e. g., executive compensation, independence of the board, internal and external 
audit, institutional shareholdings, and the characteristics of controlling shareholders) on 
such activities in China's listed companies. 
The structure of this chapter is provided as the followings: 
7.1. Introduction 
7.2. Research Question and Objectives 
7.3. Hypotheses Development 
7.4. Summary 
Section 7.1. gives a brief introduction; 
section 7.2. provides the research 
question and objectives based on both 
the theoretical and empirical literature; 
section 7.3. formulates the hypotheses; 
section 7.4. summaries the whole chapter. 
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7.2. Research Question and Objectives 
As argued by Argyrous (2005, p. 3) that "[a] research question proposes a broad 
question in general... [a] research objective states the aim of a research project in terms 
of cases of interest and the variables upon which these cases are thought to differ". The 
precisely stated research questions and objectives can guide the research project to he 
conducted in the meaningful ways and avoid it to end up with a jumble of information 
which does not create any real knowledge. Thus, clear research questions and objectives 
have to be formulated before undertaking statistical analysis to avoid the situation 
where huge amounts of data are gathered unnecessarily and which do not lead to any 
meaningful results (Argyrous, 2005). 
Recall from the previous discussion, based on the OECD principles of corporate 
governance (2004), the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed ('ompcinies in ('hing 
(hereafter the Code) that intends to enhance the integrity of financial statements through 
improving corporate governance system and bring forward the healthy development of 
the stock markets in China was published by the CSRC in January 2002. Although the 
Code proposes sweeping changes (such as independence and structure of the board, 
duty of controlling shareholders), the consequences of these changes have yet to he 
systematically studied. With regard to EM activities which have been proved to he 
rampant in China's listed companies (e. g., Chen and Yuan, 2006; ('hen ei a!., 2001; 
Iring et al., 2007; Liu and Lu, 2007; Yu et al., 2006), mitigating such opportunistically 
discretionary behaviours through improving the quality of financial reporting is laid at 
the heart of the Code. However, there is still lack of study that directly investigates the 
trend in and the impact of the Code on EM practices. 
And, as reviewed in the previous chapters, several major mechanisms with regard 
to corporate governance arranged from the executive compensation to the controlling 
shareholders are enforced by the Code. Among them, there is no published study to 
empirically investigate the impact of' executive compensation on IN practices in 
China's listed companies. It still remains unclear whether performance-related executive 
compensation in China is an incentive of managers to engage in I'M practices as 
proposed by TCE or should be considered as an alignment mechanism (Al) that 
encourages managers to maximise shareholder wealth, thus limiting the level of' l: M. 
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And, it is still unclear how executive compensation is affected by promulgation of the 
Code. For the monitoring mechanisms arranged from the independent non-executives to 
the institutional investors, their impacts on EM practices in China are still unclear since 
the empirical results reviewed are mixed (e. g., Chen et al.. 2006; Chen and Cheng 2007; 
Chen and Zhang, 2010a, Clarke, 2006). Although empirical studies have provided 
evidence suggesting that controlling shareholders may engage in EM practices in 
China's listed companies due to the concentrated ownership structure (e. g., Chen and 
Yuan, 2006; Ding el al.. 2007; Liu and Lu, 2007), it is still worth investigating the 
impact of the Code regarding investor protection on controlling shareholders since there 
is paucity of study to investigate such an important issue. 
By putting all together, motivated by the gap of lacking a comprehensive study 
that investigates the impact of the Code on EM which is of important policy implication, 
the research question of this thesis is: how does the passage of the Code with regard to 
the mechanisms of corporate governance (especially executive compensation) aftcct 
EM activities in China's listed companies? In order to address this research question, 
the corresponding research objectives are formulated. In particular, it is to investigate 
the prevalence of EM activities across time, and to compare such activities between the 
pre- and post- Code periods; it is to investigate the impacts of the governance 
mechanisms enforced by the Code on mitigating EM practices by either tying the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders (executive compensation) or providing 
constant monitoring (independent directors, audit committee, statutory audit, and 
institutional investors); and it is to investigate the impact of investor protection enf`6rced 
by the Code on limiting controlling shareholders' EM practices. 
7.3. Hypotheses Development 
According to Argyous (2005), Field (2005), Pallant (2005) the development of 
hypotheses involves formulation of testable statements for two or more factors 
identified as relevant to the problem under study. By testing their relationship 
scientifically, it is possible to obtain sonne reliable information on what kind of 
relationships exist among the variables operating in the problem space. In order words, 
hypothesis is a statement about some characteristics of'the distribution of a population. 
And, hypothesis testing is the procedure for deciding whether some aspects of, a 
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population distribution have specified characteristics. In following sections, two major 
categories of hypotheses are formulated in relation to (1) the trend in EM activities over 
time, and (2) the impacts of the main governance mechanisms enforced by the Code on 
EM practices in China's listed companies. 
7.3.1. The Hypothesis of EM Trend in China's Listed 
Companies 
Recall from the theories reviewed, TCE predicts the inverse relationship between good 
corporate governance (higher safeguard intensity) and financing costs: the higher (lower) 
the safeguard intensity/corporate governance the lower (higher) the external equity 
financing costs, other things equal. Thus, if the corporation is to perform well 
financially for its owners, an appropriate level of safeguard intensity (e. g. good 
corporate governance) will be essential (Williamson, 1984a; 2005b). In terms of Al', it 
proposes the similar argument by arguing that corporate governance is regarded as a set 
of mechanisms that can offer investors protections in order to mitigate opportunistic 
behaviour. Furthermore, both theories propose that any improvements of corporate 
governance system can be seen as the efforts to minimise opportunistically discretionary 
behaviour thus lower agency costs and transaction costs among diiicrent groups 
according to the different risk bearing and asset-specialised transactions respectively 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b; Williamson, 1984a; 2005b). 
According to the China's 2002 Code, it is formulated to promote the 
establishment and improvement of modern enterprise system of listed companies, to 
standardise the operations of listed companies, to enhance the integrity of financial 
information provided to the public, and to bring forward the healthy development of the 
securities markets. All listed companies shall act in the spirit of the Code in their efforts 
to improve corporate governance. In line with the theories, since improved corporate 
governance system can constrain discretionary behaviours, it is hypothesised that the 
degree of earnings manipulations towards the desired level is declined alter the passage 
of the Code. In alternative form: 
HI: Ceteris paribus, the Chinese listed companies' le'Ve/ q/ 'l is lower in the 
post-Code period. 
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In order to test this hypothesis, the level of discretionary accruals of the listed 
companies is analysed prior to and after the passage of the Code. 
7.3.2. The Hypotheses of Corporate Governance and EM in 
China's Listed Companies 
7.3.2.1. Executive Compensation 
As discussed early, there is a continuing debate about effectiveness of tying executive 
compensation to firm's performance on mitigating opportunistic discretion. While AT 
argues that manages are more likely to make operating and investing decisions that can 
maximise shareholder wealth by tying their compensation to performance. 'I'CE states 
that remuneration strategy as an ex ante alignment may not be an effective mechanism 
to prevent opportunistic discretion given that the written contracts are never complete 
and managers are given to be opportunism. The empirical studies based on the Western 
countries provide consistent results suggesting that EM practices (mostly measured by 
discretionary accruals) and/or other opportunistic behaviours (e. g., accounting fraud, 
restating financial statements, providing misleading financial information) are 
concurrent with the use executive compensation, especially the equity-based 
components (e. g., Baker et al., 2003; Cohen et al.. 2008; Gao and Shrieves, 2002; Shute, 
2007). 
However, due to lack of empirical evidence, it still remains unclear about the 
impact of performance-related executive compensation on EM practices in China's 
listed companies. In line with AT, the hypotheses formulated in below f`6llow its major 
arguments on executive compensation. More generally, it is conjectured that due to the 
lack of stock options utilised in China which have been largely blamed as the root of' 
IN practices based on the Western experiences, tying executive compensation to 
performance advanced from the one that totally separated compensation Brom firms' 
performance in the 1980s may become a mechanism to align the interests ofmanagers 
with those of the shareholders, thus may encourage them to act on behalf of 
shareholders and limit their opportunistically discretionary behaviour I , M. 
Furthermore, the China's 2002 Code highlights and strengthens the role played by the 
performance-based executive compensation by mentioning that "to attract qualified 
personnel and to maintain the stability of management, a listed company shall establish 
rewarding systems that link the compensation for management personnel to the 
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company's performance and to the individual's work performance"', and "the 
performance assessment shall become a basis for determining the compensation and 
other rewarding arrangements" (Section 3, Chapter 5). Correspondingly, it is 
hypothesised that executive compensation can reduce EM practices in China, and such 
impact is hypothesised to be more pronounced after the Code. 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative correlation hetireen executive 
compensation and EM in the Chinese listed companies. 
H2e: Ceteris paribus, the negative correlation between execu/ive conipen. s'ution 
and EM in the Chinese listed companies is more pronounced in the post-('ode period. 
It is to test the relationship between discretionary accruals as the dependent 
variable (proxy of EM) and executive compensation (cash compensation of' top 3 
highest paid executives) as the independent variable. Given that the managerial and 
director shareholdings are very small and executive stock option scheme are rare, stock 
options or stock ownership could hardly be considered as an effective incentive for the 
executives in Chinese listed firms (Firth ef al., 2006; Chen and /, hang. 2010c, Chen ei 
al., 2010). For this reason, the total cash compensation received by top 3 executives is 
thus examined. Time measurement is introduced to differentiate the pre-Code period 
value from the post-Code period value of the independent variable. 
7.3.2.2. Independent Board of Directors 
Both TCE and AT have mentioned the role of' the board in monitoring opportunistic 
behaviour. TCE argues that the board evolves as a way by which to reduce the costs of 
capital for projects that involve limited redeployability (Williamson, 1984x; 1988). Al' '(Fama 
and Jensen, 1983a; b) states that the board could be regarded as a major control 
instrument in a corporation for safeguarding equity finance. For the hoard composition, 
both theories argue corporate boards should include outside members, that is, members 
who are not internal managers, and hold a majority of seats. The outside board members 
act as arbiters in disagreements among internal managers and carry out tasks that 
involve severe problems between internal managers and residual claimants, for instance, 
setting executive compensation or searching for replacements for top managers (lama 
and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen, 2004; 2005; Williamson, 1984a). 
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In regard to the empirical studies that are mainly conduced in the US and UK, the 
results of the effectiveness offered by the independent non-executives on mitigating IM 
are still inclusive. On one hand, Beasley (1996), Dechow et al., (1996), Klein (2002), 
Peasnell ei al., (2000), (2005), Xie ei al., (2003) document a significantly negative 
correlation between the proportion of independent non-executives on the board and IM 
which is mostly measured by discretionary accruals or earnings fraud. One the other 
hand, Ahmed et al., (2006), Monk and Minow (2008), Park and Shin (2004) state that 
adding outside directors to the board may not achieve improvement in governance 
practices by itself. 
Based on the Chinese experiences, while Chen et ul.. (2006) provide evidence 
suggesting that increasing the proportion of outsiders on the board is one way to reduce 
financial fraud, Chen and Cheng (2007), Chen and Zhang (2010a), Clarke (2006) argue 
that independent non-executive directors on the board remain inactive in mitigating 
firm's opportunistic behaviour in China. Due to the dominance of controlling 
shareholders in listed companies, the effectiveness of independent directors on 
monitoring managerial discretion may be jeopardised. 
Despite these mixed results, this thesis follows the arguments proposed by "I'CT: 
and AT and hypothesises that independent non-executives can mitigate IN in Chinese 
listed companies. Furthermore, the China's Code (2002) requires a listed company to 
introduce independent directors to its board. These directors shall he independent from 
the listed company that employs them and the company's major shareholders. And, by 
June 30`' 2002, at least two members of the board of directors shall he independent 
directors, and by June 30`x' 2003, at least one third of the hoard shall he independent 
directors. Accordingly, since the Code enforces the power of independent of' non- 
executive directors on the board, it is thus hypothesised that the effectiveness of' 
independent non-executives on constraining EM practices in China alter promulgation 
of the Code is more pronounced. In alternative form: 
H3a: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative correlation between ill(! proportion r, J 
independent non-executives on the hoard and EM in the Chinese listed companies. 
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H3e: Ceteris paribus, the negative correlation between the proportion of' 
independent non-executives on the board and EM in the Chinese listed company is more 
pronounced in the post-Code period. 
In order to investigate these hypotheses, the dependent variable-discretionary 
accruals as the proxy of EM, and the independent variable-the proportion of' 
independent non-executives on the board are used. In order to differentiate the pre-Code 
value of the board independence from its post-Code value, time measurement is 
included. 
7.3.2.3. The Internal and External (Statutory) Audit 
Both TCE and AT highlight the important roles played by internal and external 
(statutory) audit in mitigating the opportunistic behaviour of management. In particular. 
TCE argues that some managements play "end games" (undisclosed strategic decisions 
to cut and run before corrective measures can be taken) and individual managers 
commonly disclose information selectively or distort data. In order to minimise the 
transaction costs derived from such concealment and distortion, additional checks are 
thus required to be created. As pointed out by Williamson (1984a) "... an audit 
committee composed of outside directors and the certification of financial reports by an 
accredited auditing firm can mitigate management's opportunistically discretionary 
behaviours in information disclosure" (Williamson, 1984a, p. 121 1). In the similar vein, 
AT proposes that an audit committee should be an outstanding function in monitoring 
activities. In order to be efficient, it has to be entirely composed of outside directors. 
And, in principle, external (statutory) auditor could act as a checking point to make sure 
the financial information published is comprehensive, punctual, and accurate (Jensen, 
2000). 
The Internal Audit-Audit Committee 
The benefits of creating an audit committee have been documented in the literature 
(Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1991; Kunitake, 1993). As 
proposed by Archambeault and Dezoort (2001), audit committee could provide diligent 
oversight to ensure that management is not compromising shareholder interests. 
Empirical studies have provided evidence suggesting that the independent audit 
committee is significantly and negatively related to 1_; M practices and other 
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discretionary behaviours, such as overstatement errors, lowering the quality of financial 
statements (e. g., Abbot et al., 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Bedard ei al., 2004; 
Crutchley et al., 2007; Davidson et al., 2005; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1991; I lo and 
Wang, 2001). 
Based on the Chinese stock markets, few studies investigate the impact of the 
audit committee on constraining firms from self-dealing in accounting policies. For 
instance, Ho and Wang (2001) provide empirical evidence suggesting that the existence 
of an audit committee on firms' boards is significantly and positively related to the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. Chen and Zhang (2010a) report a significantly negative 
correlation between the existence of audit committee and earnings gap which is used as 
the proxy of EM for companies in China's B-share market. I lowever, given that the 
sample size of both studies is relatively smal134, the measurements used may be 
questionable. While the extent of voluntary disclosure used by Ho and Wang (2001) 
may be an implicit proxy of EM, earnings gap under the Chinese GAAP and the I FRS 
introduced by Chen and Zhang (2010a) may not be necessarily the same with EM. Thus, 
the pervasiveness and magnitude of the effectiveness of audit committee on mitigating 
EM practices in China's listed companies may not be well presented. 
In line with the arguments proposed by TCF and AT with regard to audit 
committee, this thesis hypothesises that audit committee can mitigate IN practices in 
China's listed companies. And, the 2002 Code recommends that various committees of' 
the board be established in China's listed companies. Among these board sub- 
committees, audit committee has the responsibility to review the scope and outcome of 
audit, and to ensure the objectivity of auditors is maintained. Further, the ('ode requires 
it to be composed of a majority of independent directors, and at least one independent 
director should be an accounting professional served on the committee. Since the ('ode 
strengthens the role played by the audit committee, it is hypothesised that the 
effectiveness of creating an audit committee on the board oil mitigating F, M practices is 
more pronounced in the post-Code period. In alternative form: 
H4a: Celeris paribus, there is a negative correlation between the creation ()/'III) 
audit committee on the board and EM in the Chinese listed companies. 
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H4h: Ceteris paribus, the negative correlation between the creation of an audit 
committee on the board and EM in the Chinese listed companies is more pronounced in 
the post-Code period. 
In order to test these hypotheses, the dependent variable is designed as 
discretionary accruals, and the independent variable is the establishment of audit 
committee. Time measurement is included to distinguish the value of the independent 
variable in the post-Code period from those in the pre-Code period. 
External ('Statutory) Audit -The Big4 Auditor 
It is argued that the quality of external auditing can have a significant influence on 
quality of reported earnings, and therefore, constitutes a constraint on FM. The large 
international reputable audit firms (or the Big 4) are reasonably and usually used as the 
proxy for quality auditing. As expressed by Krishnan (2003), not only do the large audit 
firms have more resources and experts to detect EM, but they also have greater 
incentive to protect their reputation because of their large client base. Empirically. 
Becker el al., (1998), Francis et al., (1999), Gore el al., (2001). Krishnan (2003), Van 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005,2008) provide results that are consistent with the 
notion of large international reputable auditors constraining aggressive and potentially 
opportunistic reporting by firms. 
In China, recent years have seen a significant increase ofauditor concentration in 
China, with strong support from the CSRC. Many local Chinese ('PA firms have 
merged with the Big 4, hoping to improve the quality of'their auditing. Statistically, the 
total number of Chinese local CPA firms declined from 106 in 1999 to 71 in 2002 and 
less than 50 in 2006 (CSRC, 2007). Furthermore, the Big 4 concentration ratio 
increased from 18% in 1999 to 37% in 2002 and 51% in 2006 (('SR(', 2007). While 
such a trend may be an indication of the quality auditing performed by the Big 4, 
however, some researchers state that the Big 4 may not provide the same high quality of 
auditing in China comparing with that provided in the Western countries. This is in 
large part determined by the Chinese underlying economic and institutional factors (e. g., 
monitoring system, ethic education or training, legal infrastructure and enforcement) 
which have not been well developed to ensure the reliability of financial reporting in 
China that investors would expect (e. g., Ball ei al., 2000; Chen, 2005, Chen and ihang, 
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2010a; La Porta et al., 2000b; Leuz el al., 2003). And, the lack of qualified auditing 
professionals in China is another reason that contributes significantly to the inefficient 
performance of external (statutory) auditor on monitoring managerial discretion (Chen 
et al., 2002; Chen and Zhang, 2010a). 
Despite these inconsistent results, in line with the theories, this thesis hypothesises 
that international reputable auditors (or the Big 4 auditor) can constrain the FIM 
practices in Chinese listed companies, and such impact is hypothesised to be more 
pronounced in the post-Code period. In alternative form: 
H5;,: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative correlation between the use of an 
international reputable auditor and EM in the Chinese listed companies. 
H5h: Ceteris paribus, the negative correlation between the use of an international 
reputable auditor und EM in the Chinese listed companies is more pronounced in the 
post-Code period. 
In order to test these hypotheses, the variables will he used are: the dependent 
variable-discretionary accruals (proxy of EM), the independent variable --the Big 4 
auditor. The time measurement is included to differentiate the value of the independent 
variable between the pre- and post-Code periods. 
7.3.2.4. The Institutional Shareholders 
Theoretically, AT argues that monitoring activities to become specialised to those 
institutions and individuals who are holding significant amount of firm's shares and 
possess comparative advantages in these activities. For institutional investors and 
financial institutions, the importance of being active in minimising agency costs is the 
core in AT's argument. In perspective of TCE, Williamson (2007) states that large 
institutional investors have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, discipline, 
and influence managers. Corporate monitoring conducted by these institutional 
investors can force managers to focus more on corporate performance and less on 
opportunistic or self-serving behaviour. TCF also state that in order to secure the value 
of' ultimate beneficiaries (or stakeholders) through constant monitoring companies' 
performance, the institutional investors are required to be active. This is to be hacked up 
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by direct engagement in the firms where appropriate (Gillan and Starks, 2003. Mallin, 
2007). 
However, empirical evidence based on the Western countries is mixed. On one 
hand, some researchers (e. g., Chung et al., 2002; Cornett el al., 2006; Rajpopal el al., 
2003; Sheng, 2003; Velury and Jenkins, 2006) provide evidence showing that large 
institutional shareholders inhibit managers from increasing or decreasing reported 
profits towards their desired level or range of profits. On the other hand, others (e. g., 
Bainbridge, 2005; Black, 1997; McCormack, 1998; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Johnson el 
al., 2000; Karpoff et al., 1996; Karpoff, 2001) argue that institutional shareholder 
activism can prompt only small changes in target firms' governance structures on 
monitoring and controlling. Institutional investors generally are profit maximizers, they 
will not engage in an activity whose costs exceed its benefits. And, they are likely to 
step in only where there are serious long-term problems. 
In China, one promising feature emerged recently from the A- and ß-share 
markets is the increasing trend in institutional ownership in the listed companies that is 
both a reflection and a consequence of the government's efforts to promote institutional 
investors to enter into the stock markets since 1997. On average, the percentage of' 
institutional shareholding increases to 6% by the end of 2006 from 2% in 1999. By 
comparing with the institutional shareholding in developed capital markets, however, it 
is still quit low. For instance, in the US, around 55% of US equities are owned and xO% 
of share trades are made by the institutional investors. In the UK, institutional 
ownership is around 65%-80%. And, the overseas level of ownership in UK reached 
approximately to 21% by the end of 2005 (Mallin, 2007). Other than smaller 
shareholding in the listed companies, Zhang (2007) and Chen and Zhang (2010a) argue 
that shareholder activism is very similar to market activism and they both suffer from 
the lack of effective market discipline. Chen and Zhang (2010a) state that shareholders, 
market and shareholder activism are one combined mechanism. On one hand, market 
discipline needs the helps of shareholder voting to oust incompetent management. On 
the other hand, active participation in corporate governance by shareholders is inf'6rnled 
by information from the market. However, if the fraudulent self-enrichment can not he 
detected, the importance of market will adversely affects the monitoring function ol'the 
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institutional shareholders, and the ability of shareholder activism to discipline 
managerial shrinking will also be lost. 
Despite these inclusive results, this study follows the arguments of TCF and AT 
and hypothesises that institutional shareholders in Chinese listed companies can 
mitigate opportunistic discretion in accounting through constant monitoring, thus reduce 
EM. Furthermore, given that the 2002 Code encourages the involvement of institutional 
investors in monitoring firms by stating that institutional investors shall play a role in 
the appointment of company directors, the compensation and supervision of 
management and major decision-making processes, the above impact is hypothesised to 
be more pronounced in the post-Code period. In alternative form: 
H6a: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative correlation between inslittrtional 
. shareholdings and 
EM in the Chinese listed companies. 
H6b: C'd eris paribus, the negative relationship between institulionul 
shareholdings and EM in the Chinese listed companies is more pronounced in the post- 
Code period. 
In order to examine these hypotheses, the dependent variable discretionary 
accruals as the proxy of EM, and the independent variable-institutional shareholdings 
are used. To differentiate the value of institutional shareholdings in the pre-Code period 
from those in the post-Code period, time measurement will be introduced. 
7.3.2.5. The Controlling Shareholders 
Both AT and TCE propose that most large corporations in the developed capital markets 
are to a significant extent controlled by their managers who enjoy nontrivial degree of' 
discretion, thus how to minimise the agency costs/transaction costs that originated from 
managers' opportunistically discretionary activities is the main concern of' these two 
theories. In other words, both attempt to address the conflict of' interests between 
management and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1994). Recent 
developments in corporate governance have highlighted another foram of' conflict of' 
interests-action being taken by controlling shareholders for their own benefits, at the 
expense of minority shareholders. As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997,11.75g), 
large investors may represent their own interests, which need not coincide with the 
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interests of other investors in the firm. " Comparing with the conflict of interests 
between management and shareholders, the essential effect of both scenarios is the same: 
insiders, through their control of the firm, pursue their private benefits at the costs of 
outsiders (Ding et al., 2007). 
Empirically, followed by the works of La Porta et a!., (1998; 1999) that focus on 
the ultimate controlling shareholders in the firms and the relevant legal systems around 
the world, Claessens et al., (2000; 2002), Leuz et al., (2003), Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 
(2006), Shen and Chih, (2007) study the impact of controlling shareholders on the I'M 
practices of firms. In consistent with La Porta el al-'s works (1998; 1999), they 
document that outsider economies with relatively dispersed ownership, strong investor 
protection, and large stock markets exhibit lower level of EM than insider countries 
with relatively concentrated ownership, weak investor protection, and less developed 
stock markets. 
In China, a unique feature in the listed companies is the concentrated ownership 
structure. By the end of 2006, the five largest shareholders on average account for 
58.5% of the total equity, compared with 25.4% in the US and 33.1 % in Japan (Mallira, 
2007). More strikingly, the largest shareholder holds more than 42% of total shares f 'or 
an average Chinese listed company. In addition, since the stock market is originally 
designed as a place to raise much-needed capital for the State-owned Enterprises (SoFs), 
and financing through the equity market shows a tremendous bias in favour of' Soils 
over non-SoEs (Ding et al., 2007). For this historical reason, majority of' current listed 
companies originated from restructured Sol, s are still under control of the State and/or 
other non-listed SoEs. These controlling shareholders are reported to he inellicient in 
improving firms' performance and sometimes involved in EM activities (e. g., Aharony 
et al., 2000; Chen and Yuan, 2006; Ding el a/., 2007; Jian and Wong, 2004, I. iu and 1 , 11, 
2007; Wang et al., 2004). 
The China's 2002 Code formulates higher corporate governance with regard to 
investor protection in order to promote fair and equal treatment towards all shareholders. 
In particular, it clearly states the duties and responsibilities, behaviour, and rights of' 
controlling shareholders of listed companies and illustrates the legal means that 
shareholders, especially the minority shareholders can use to protect their interests and 
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rights. The controlling shareholders owe a duty of good faith toward the listed 
companies and other shareholders. In addition, it states that a listed company shall 
establish a corporate governance structure sufficient for ensuring the full exercise of 
shareholders' rights. Consequently, the investor protection in China's stock market may 
be enhanced after passage of the Code. In line with the notion of constraining the 
controlling shareholders from engaging in the opportunistically discretionary 
behaviours through improved investor protection (e. g., Claessens el al., 2000; 2002; 
Leuz ei al., 2003; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), it is hypothesised that EM practices 
of the controlling shareholders in Chinese listed companies are declined after the Code. 
And, the EM activities in the State-controlled companies should also be mitigated in the 
post-Code period. In alternative form: 
H7: Ceteris paribus, the controlling shareholders in the Chinese listed companies 
engages less in EM in the post-Code period. 
H8: Ceteris paribus, the State-controlled Chinese listed companies engage less in 
EM in the post-C'ode period. 
The dependent variable-discretionary accruals as the proxy of IN, and the 
independent variables-the shareholdings and the ownership type of' the controlling 
shareholders will be used to test these hypotheses. Time measurement will he included 
to distinguish the value of the independent variables between the pre- and post-('ode 
periods. The structure of the hypotheses formulated is summarized in Figure 7.1. 
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7.4. Summary 
Based on both the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed, it is highlighted that 
there is still a paucity of empirical research to directly investigate the impacts of the 
China's 2002 Code coupled with several major mechanisms of corporate governance on 
EM practices in China's listed companies. 
Motivated by the gap of lacking a comprehensive empirical study, this chapter 
starts with stating the research question and objectives. The research question is: how 
does the passage of the Code with regard to the mechanisms of corporate governance 
(especially executive compensation) affect EM activities in China's listed companies? 
And, the corresponding research objectives in relation to the China's Code and several 
mechanisms of governance enforced by the Code are developed to address this research 
question. 
In the rest of the chapter, two major categories of hypotheses have been 
formulated regarding (I) the trend in EM activities over time, (2) the impacts of the 
main mechanisms of corporate governance enforced by the Code on such activities in 
China's listed companies. The mechanisms are composed of the independent directors, 
audit committee, external audit, institutional investors, and controlling shareholders 
(ownership concentration and type). And finally, Figure 7.1. provides a structural 
review of the hypotheses formulated. 
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Chapter 8: Research Design 
8.1. Introduction 
Having the research question, the corresponding research objectives and the relevant 
hypotheses been formulated in the previous chapter, this chapter aims to provide the 
research method of the thesis. It starts with an analysis of the basic elements of' the 
quantitative research. By definition, quantitative research is about quantifying 
relationships between variables. Using a deductive approach, it seeks to establish facts, 
make predictions and test hypotheses that have already been stated. Given that the 
research objectives of this thesis are to shed some lights on the trend in 1M activities 
over time and the impacts of the China's 2002 Code on such activities, the quantitative 
research approach is applied. 
Next, measurements of the key variables with reasons of using them are provided. 
The dependent variable (discretionary accruals) is calculated from the Modified Jones 
Model (Dechow et al., 1995) and the Larcker and Richardson (2004) Model (or I. &R 
Model) respectively. The independent variables arrange from the executive 
compensation to the characteristics of the controlling shareholder (shareholding and 
ownership type). The control variables are composed of firm size, leverage, sales, 
trading status, and additional share issuing. And then, the study period and the sample 
description and data collection procedure are demonstrated correspondingly. Finally, the 
hypotheses testing approaches and the regression models are illustrated. "Iwo 
appendices are provided, including the Chinese industry classifications (Appendix 8. A. ) 
and the review of some fundamentals of basic econometrics (Appendix 9.13. ). 
Ehe structure of this chapter is provided as the followings: 
8.1. Introduction 
8.2. Quantitative Research 
8.3. Research Design 
8.4. Summary 
Section 8.1. gives a brief introduction of' the chapter; 
section 8.2. reviews the basic elements ()J 'a quantitative 
research; section 8.3. provides the research design that 
includes the demonstration of the study period, variable measurements, sample 1111(l data 
description, hypotheses testing approaches; section 8.4. summaries. 
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8.2. Quantitative Research 
There are numerous definitions of quantitative research. For instance, Aliaga and 
Gunderson (2002) describe quantitative research as a means to explain phenomena by 
collecting numerical data that are analysed using mathematically based methods, in 
particular statistics. A more scientific approach to defining quantitative research conics 
from Huysamen (1998, p. 19), "descriptions of quantitative research typically discern a 
cycle of successive phases of hypothesis formulation, data collection, analysis and 
interpretation". And, Johns and Lee-Ross (1998, p. 29) propose that '`ýqýuantitative 
research is inclined to be deductive. In other words it tests theory. This is in contrast to 
most qualitative research which tends to be inductive. In other words it generates 
theory... [and], in perspective of data collection, quantitative research is the most useful 
method in gathering measurable information that can be tracked over time". In an 
overview form, quantitative research is about quantifying relationships between 
variables. Using a deductive approach, it seeks to establish facts, make predictions and 
test hypotheses that have already been stated. 
There are throng proponents of both qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
Fach has presented their arguments, usually focusing on the advantages of one over the 
other or the disadvantages of one of the basic forms of research. Although providing a 
detailed analysis of the debate is out of the scope of the current thesis, a brief analysis of 
the advantages and disadvantages of both the quantitative and qualitative research is 
demonstrated in the following paragraphs. 
More generally, qualitative research is said to have two primary advantages. Not 
only does it allow the moderator or interviewer for the interaction with the respondents, 
but it also facilitates the interactions among the respondents (group members). The 
primary disadvantage of qualitative research has been said to he its unreliability as a 
predictor of the population (Black, 1999). On the other hand, quantitative research has 
two distinct advantages. The first is that the results are statistically reliable. That is, 
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quantitative research can reliably determine whether one concept, idea, product, 
package, and so forth, is better than the alternatives. The second distinct advantage is 
that the results are projectable to the population. As the quantitative research aims to 
evaluate an existing phenomenon instead of generating new theories through deductive 
approach, the primary disadvantage of quantitative research is the issues that are going 
to be investigated must be measurable and known prior to the beginning of the research 
study (Balnaves and Caputi, 2001). Generally speaking, quantitative research is thought 
to be objective, whereas qualitative research often involves a subjective element. It is 
proposed that in gaining, analysing, and interpreting quantitative data, the researcher 
remains detached and objective. Often this is not possible with qualitative research 
where the researcher may actually be involved in the situation of the research. 
Given that the research objectives formulated in the previous chapter are to shed 
some lights on the trend in EM over time and the impacts of the China's 2002 Code on 
EM practices, the quantitative research approach is utilised by the current thesis. 
8.3. Research Design 
Having the fundamentals of the quantitative research been briefly reviewed, the research 
design of the current thesis will be presented in this section. It starts with demonstrating 
the measurements of the main variables, including the means to capture the dependent 
variable-discretionary accruals (or EM proxy), the independent variables including the 
measurements of executive compensation, board independence, internal and external 
audit, institutional and controlling shareholders, and control variables that are composed 
of firm's size, leverage, sales, trading status, and additional share issuing. Followed the 
variables design and measurements, the study period and the description of sample and 
data collection will be analysed respectively. And finally, the hypotheses testing 
approaches are formulated. 
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8.3.1. Variables Design and Measurements 
By definition, a variable is a "condition or quality that can differ from one case to 
another" (Argyrous, 2005, p. 4). And it can be identified by two distinguishing concepts 
namely, the conceptual definition (or nominal definition) and the operational definition. 
The conceptual definition of a variable "'uses literal terms to specify the qualities of a 
variable" (Argyrous, 2005, p. 5). It is much like a dictionary definition; it provides a 
working definition of the variable so that researchers can have a general sense of what it 
`means'. However, the conceptual definition of a variable is only the beginning; 
researchers still need a set of rules and procedures-operations-that will allow them to 
actually `observe' a variable for individual cases. This is the problem of 
operationalisation. Thus, the operational definition of a variable "specifies the 
procedures and criteria for taking a measurement of that variable for individual cases" 
(Argyrous, 2005, p. 5). The determination of an operational definition for a variable is a 
major, if not the major, source of disagreement in research. Any variable can usually be 
operationalised in many different ways, and no one of these definitions may be perfect. 
In relation to the hypotheses formulated, different groups of variables will be 
identified in the following subsections. They are composed of' the {proxy of FM (the 
dependent variable), the independent variables with regard to corporate governance, and 
the control variables. 
8.3.1.1. The Proxy of EM 
Following the prior research on EM which has been mentioned in the previous chapters, 
this thesis uses accruals measures as a proxy of EM. The accrual component of earnings 
contains accounting estimates based on forecasts and is therefore easier to manipulate 
than cash flows. Thus, the flexibility offered by accruals makes it a useful measure liar 
examining the quality of financial reports (Butler el al., 2004; Frankel el al., 2002; 
Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Myers el al., 2003). Rather than simply examining total 
accruals, this thesis is interested in identifying the unexpected component of total 
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accruals, namely the discretionary accruals. Recall from the early chapter, a large body 
of research attempts to identify the unexpected accrual component. Jones (1991) 
provides the standard techniques used for this decomposition. Total accruals are 
regressed on variables that are expected to vary with normal accruals. Her model can be 
estimated in either a time series approach for each firm or in the cross-sectional 
approach for each industry. While the cross-sectional approach has a cost on ignoring 
possible reveals of discretionary accruals from prior periods thereby reducing the power 
of detecting EM, it helps maximizing sample size and overcomes the survivorship bias 
problem inherent in the time-series version (Bartov el al., 2001; 2002; Becker el (l.. 
1998; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Larcker and Richardson, 2004; McNichols, 2000; 
2002). 
Attempts to decompose total accruals into expected and unexpected components 
can always be criticized for misclassifying expected accruals as unexpected because the 
model of expected accruals is incomplete (Bernard and Skinner, 1996). To address this 
issue, this thesis uses both the Modified Jones Model (Dechow ei al., 1995) and I. &R 
Model developed by Larcker and Richardson (2004). This method allows the current 
thesis to show if there is any consistency between the two models. To start with, the 
Modified Jones Model is estimated for each industry based on the Chinese Official 
Standard Industry Classification (CSRC, 2001) in order to control iör industry-wide 
changes in economic conditions that affect total accruals while allowing the coefficients 
to vary across time (e. g., Cohen el al., 2003; 2007; DeFond and Jiamhalvo, 1994). 
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7i1(, ',, I = the total accruals; 
ARE Vi, , =the change in revenues from the preceding year; 
PPE,,, the gross value of property, plant and equipment from year t, 
TA;,, -1 =total assets 
from the previous fiscal year (t-1). 
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The regression equation is deflated by lagged total assets in order to reduce 
heteroskedasticity (Cohen et al., 2008; Dechow et al., 1995). The coeflicient estimates 
from equation (8.1. ) are used to estimate firm-specific normal (nondiscretionary) 
accruals (NA;,, ) for the sample firms: 
NACj. t äo +ä, ý 
AREV.., -AREC,. t +äz 
PPE 
,, (8.2. ) 
TA j,, j TA,. 11 
TA; 
I-1 
In equation (8.2. ), where äo is the estimated intercept; ä1-ä2 are the slope 
coefficients for the sample firms. The reported revenues of sample firms (orAREV,, ) 
are adjusted for the change in accounts receivable (or AREC_,, ) to capture any potential 
accounting discretion arising from credit sales. The a1 coefficient is predicted to be 
positive, as changes in revenues are expected to be positively related to changes in 
working capital accounts. The expected sign on ä, is negative, as the level of fixed 
assets is expected to drive depreciation expenses and delerred taxes (Klein, 2002). 
Following the methodology used in the literature (Cohen eI at., 2008; Deland and 
Jiambalvo, 1994), the industry specific regressions are estimated using the change in 
reported revenues, implicitly assuming no discretionary choices with respect to revenue 
recognition. However, while computing the normal accruals, the reported revenues oI' 
sample firms are adjusted for the change in account receivable to capture any potential 
accounting discretion arising from credit sales. The measure of discretionary accruals is 
the difference between total accruals and fitted normal accruals, defined as: 
DAC I, t = TA j, I 
-NACJ, t (K. 3. ) 
The L&R Model has been introduced by Larcker and Richardson (2004) which is 
based on the cross-sectional Modified Jones Model. As they expressed, this model (1) 
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has far greater explanatory power than the cross-sectional Modified Jones Model; (2) 
identifies unexpected accruals that are less persistent than other components of earnings; 
and (3) identifies unexpected accruals that are associated with lower future earnings and 
lower future stock returns. It is assumed that the change in revenues less the change in 
accounts receivable is free from managerial discretion (e. g. credit sales are assumed to 
be abnormal) and that capital intensity drives normal accruals. In addition, this model 
includes two additional independent variables that are shown to be correlated with the 
measures of unexpected accruals. First, it includes the book-to-market ratio (BAIT). ßßt1 is 
measured as the ratio of the book value of common equity to the market value of 
common equity. BM is included as a control for extreme growth in firm's operations. It 
is expected to see large accruals for growing firms-a negative correlation between /3M 
and total accruals. Second, a measure of current operating performance is included 
(Larcker and Richardson, 2004). It is argued that measures of unexpected accruals are 
more likely to be misspecified for firms with extreme level of performance (l)echow C/ 
al., 1995). 't'hus, the current operating cash flows, ('F(O, is introduced as an additional 
independent variable. L&R Model in calculating total accruals is estimated as follows: 
TAC I AREV -AREC PPE ('I "O 
--a, ) +a fa 
ý-ýia, 
(RM) i a., ' f:, A'I'A, ATA 
) 
ATA;, 
) 
Al A, A I'A, 
Where, for firm i: 
A74,,, the average of total assets from the start and end of the fiscal year 1; 
BA., =the ratio of the book value of common equity to the market value of common 
equity in year t; 
('1-'0,,, =the current operating cash flows in year t; 
Taking the relevant coefficients estimated in equation 8.4., the non-discretionary 
accruals can be estimated from the following: 
NAC -äu I +ä, ARLV -AREC +ä2 51 c'I c' 
. i. i ýýf3Mýýý 
ä ýý ATA; ATA,, 
ý 
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Having the non-discretionary accruals been estimated from equation 8.5. above, 
the amount of discretionary accruals for sample firm j in year t is calculated as: 
DACj, t=(TACj, 1ATAj,. -NACH,,. In the tests that follow, both the directional values for 
abnormal accruals and their absolute values are used. In particular, if the FIM is 
directional, the appropriate metric is the raw value. In this case, the singed measures of 
unexpected accruals should be focused on. On the other hand, if the FM is 
nondirectional, the absolute value of unexpected accruals is appropriate. And, the 
deviations from a normal level of accruals should be concentrated on. 
The relevance and suitability of using discretionary accruals as an 1A measure in 
the Chinese context is often challenged in the literature (Ding ei a!., 2007; . lian and 
Wong, 2004; Srinidhi et al., 2004). One of the main arguments has been put forward by 
these authors is around the efficiency of recent policies on accounting harmonization. 
Before the 1970s, Chinese accounting had been tax-oriented, for instance the treatments 
used to be virtually the same for accounting and tax purposes. To ensure stable fiscal 
income, the Chinese authorities excluded almost all accounting choices from accounting 
conservatism, such as provisions and reversals, choice of depreciation method and the 
useful life of fixed assets. This system made it difficult for Chinese firms to adjust their 
earnings via non-cash accruals (Chen et al., 1999; Chen et u!., 2002; Davidson el a/., 
1996). However, the situation has totally changed over the past years (I lavcrty, 2006; 
Kuan and Noronha, 2007; Lin and Chen, 2005; Ping, 2008; Xiao el a!., 2004), and it is 
argued that for the period concerned by this thesis (2000-06), using discretionary 
accruals for EM is possible because of the recent full application of the conservatism 
principle in China35. Since 1999, the Chinese capital markets watchdog has required 
listed firms to make provisions for various potential losses. Baker and ßarhu (2007) 
argue that this has brought the Chinese accounting language closer to international 
standards, while also offering Chinese firms the opportunity to manage their earnings 
via more conventional discretionary accruals. By putting all together, using 
discretionary accruals as a proxy of EM should be an appropriate measurement t'61- this 
thesis. 
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8.3.1.2. The Independent Variables 
With regard to corporate governance, seven independent variables coupled with the 
specific measurements are defined. They arrange from the executive compensation 
which is measured by the natural logarithm value of cash compensation for the top three 
highest paid executives to the type of the controlling shareholders which is measured by 
a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the sample firm's ultimate owner is the State 
and 0 otherwise. 
(1) This thesis questions the effectiveness of executive compensation on FM 
practices and how it is affected by the passage of Code. An independent variable 
named `EXCOM' is included and measured by the natural logarithm value of 
cash compensation for the top three highest paid executives. This logarithm 
procedure mitigates heteroskedasticity resulting from extreme skewness and 
facilitates the comparison of results with previous studies (Murphy, 1999; Firth 
el aL, 2007). 
(2) This thesis also questions whether independent directors on the hoard enlilrced 
by the 2001 Guidelines for independent directors and 2002 Code can eftectivcly 
mitigate EM practices in China's listed companies. The variable 'INI)ROARZI)' 
is set as number of independent directors/non-executive board members divided 
by total number of board members. As proposed by Beasley (1996), Fama 
(1980), Fama and Jensen (1983a, b), that higher percentage of independent 
directors increases the board's effectiveness as a monitor ol' management_ In 
other words, the effectiveness of monitoring activity is proportional to the 
weight they have on the total number of members on the hoard. FolloWing tile 
literature, the proportion is used and not the absolute number of' independent 
directors. 
The current thesis uses two independent variables respectively to examine the 
effectiveness of audit committee and external audit enforced by the 2002 ('ode on 
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mitigating earnings manipulation. 
(3) The independent variable `AUDCOM' is defined as the establishment of an 
audit committee on the board. This variable takes the value of I if a firm 
establishes an audit committee on its board, and 0 otherwise. 
(4) An independent variable `AUDITOR' is to assess the quality of auditing. The 
notable change since the 2002 Code is the merger of local Chinese CPA with the 
Big 4 auditor, and, as a result, the Big 4 auditor are invited by more Chinese 
companies to audit their annual reports. The variable, 'AUDITOR', takes the 
value of 1 if a firm's auditor is one of the Big 4 auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
The current thesis also aims to investigate the impact of institutional investors enforced 
by the 2002 Code on mitigating EM practices in China's listed firms. One notable 
feature is the increasing involvement of domestic institutional investors although their 
shareholdings have not been very significant. 
(5) An independent variable `INSTITUTE' is defined as the proportion of 
shareholding held by institutional investors among the top ten shareholders. This 
is because that only the holdings of the top ten shareholders are disclosed in 
company's annual report. And, Chen and Cheng (2007, p. 288) argue that "... by 
further examining our data, it reveals that China's listed companies held by more 
than 10 institutional investors were rare, and therefore it is reasonable to assume 
that they had fewer opportunities to monitor the management opportunism". 
In order to examine the impact of ownership concentration in the hands of' the 
controlling shareholders on EM practices in Chinese listed companies with regard to the 
China's 2002 Code, and to be consistent with the prior literature (Bouhakri e/ at, 2005; 
Firth et al., 2007, Lo ei al., 2010), the shareholding percentage of the largest 
shareholder is used as the measure of ownership concentration. And, the measurement 
on the types of the largest shareholder is also included. As the ohjectivc here is to 
investigate the ultimately dominant power of the largest shareholder in the listed 
companies, the definition of a State-owned listed company has twofold: first, if a listed 
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company's largest shareholder is the State or a State's agency, then this company is a 
State-owned listed company; in addition, if a listed company's largest shareholder is a 
non-listed SOEs but ultimately controlled by the State, it is classified as a State-owned 
company. 
(6) An independent variable `TOPI' is set as the shareholding percentage of the 
largest shareholder among the top 10 shareholders. 
(7) An independent variable `STATE' is defined as a dummy variable takes the 
value of I if the sample firm's ultimate owner is the State and 0 otherwise. 
8.3.1.3. The Control Variables 
To control the effect of possible confounding factors (Bartov el al., 2000), this thesis 
includes five different variables that prior studies have found to be associated with FIM 
or governance variables (Chen and Zhang, 2010a; Davidson, el aL, 2005; Park and Shin, 
2004). In particular, the control variables are composed of firm's . size, /c i'erage, . sa/es, 
trading status, and additional share issuing. 
a. Size 
"Ehe relationship between firm's size and EM is somewhat controversial. Onc view is 
that the capital market pressures are greater for larger firms because they are subject to 
closer scrutiny by the investment banks and analyst community, leading them to adopt 
aggressive accounting policies. Therefore, larger firms have higher incentives to 
manage earnings upwards (Richardson, 2000). On the other hand, the political cost 
hypothesis argues that larger firms are more likely to prefer downward FN because the 
political cost of breaching the tighter government scrutiny is high for larger Iirnms (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1990; Yong, 1999). Recently, some empirical evidence also supports 
the negative relationship (Lee and Choi, 2002; Van Tcndeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005). It 
is argued that large firm is often required to disclose their financial information and 
hence have less probability to manage earnings. In the case of Chinas listed companies, 
due to the severe information asymmetry in its financial markets and the political 
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interference from the government, the size effect on EM is uncertain. Following the 
measurement of this variable in the literature, the natural logarithm of total assets 
(variable quoted as `Ln_Size') is used to proxy the size of a company. 
h. Leverage 
Two opposite evidence are found between leverage and EM. One stand of evidence is 
that highly leveraged firms are more likely to engage in upward EM to avoid debt 
covenant violations (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Press and Weintrop, 1990; 
Richardson, 2000; Sweeny, 1994; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Young, 1999). 
Specifically, firms that face financial constrains or distress have incentive to adjust 
earnings upwards in order to avoid a potential loss from disclosing a financial problem. 
Truthful revelation of financial statements by firms in short-term financial difficulty 
may lead to debt-covenant violation and an increase in financing costs, as well as the 
loss of key employees (Park and Shin, 2004). Thus, a debt-covenant violation argument 
would predict a positive relationship between EM and financial leverage. Opposite to 
the above view, highly leveraged firms may be less able to practice E, M because they are 
under close scrutiny of lenders (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). In particular, lenders may 
intensify the monitoring of EM for firms that are likely to miss earnings targets. ifthe 
lender monitoring effect prevails, then EM will decrease with financial leverage. Becker 
el al., (1998) argue that high leverage may induce income-decreasing FM in financially 
distressed firms in view of contractual renegotiations. ('hung and Kallapur (2003) do 
not find evidence of a statistically significant association between abnormal accruals 
and leverage. As a result, the relation between leverage and EM is uncertain. This thesis 
introduces a variable named `LEVERAGE' and is measured as the ratio of total debt 
and total assets to capture the impact of debt on FM. This ratio is regarded as the most 
suitable indicator to reflect the leverage status in China's listed firms (('hen, 2004). 
c Sales Trading status (ST PT) and Additional share issuir 
This thesis also examines whether firm's performance has an impact on F, M. 'I'wO 
notable reasons can be obtained: requirements on the new offerings and delisting policy. 
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Recall from the previous discussions, for a firm, the core requirement of additional 
offerings is to have an average ROE above 10% in the past three years but not lower 
than 6% in any of these years, and main standard of delisting is based on negative net 
profits for three consecutive years. All of these requirements are related to the financial 
performance of a firm. Empirically, numerous studies (e. g., Abarony e/ al., 2000: Chen 
and Yuan, 2006; Chen el al., 2004; Chen and Wang, 2007; flaw et al., 2005: Liu and l, u 
2007; Yu et al., 2006) provide evidence suggesting the executives in the Chinese listed 
firms and especially in those are poorly performed have high motivations to 
manipulated reported earnings. 
By following the study of Chen and Zhang (2010a) and Ding e>t ell., (2007), three 
additional control variables are used in the current thesis. In order to capture the effect 
of a firm's performance on EM, the variable quoted as 'Ln Sale' is used which 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the annual sales from main operations. Since a 
company's financial performance may have a reverse effect on its EM behaviour, this 
thesis expects a negative relationship between EM and Ln_Sales. In order to measure 
the incentives of engaging in EM in China, the variables 'S"I' P l" and 'ISSUING' are 
introduced. While the former is a dummy variable takes the value of' I it' he sample 
firms are labelled as either ST or PT in a given year and 0 otherwise, the latter equal to 
I if the sample firms issue new shares in a given year and 0 otherwise. It is expected 
that these two variables are positively correlated with EM practices 
8.3.2. The Study Period 
't'his thesis focuses in analysis on ENT practices across two main time periods the 
pre-Code period, and the post-Code period. The pre-Code period extends f'rorn 2000 
through 2001, and the post-Code period extends from 2002 through the end of' 2006. 
The starting year in the post-Code period is 2002, since China's Code was passed in 
2002. And, the ending year is 2006 to control for possible lagged eficct of' the policy 
reform. Figure 8.1. depicts different time periods analysed. 
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Figure 8.1.: Time periods analysed 
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8.3.3. Sample Description and Data Collection 
The population of the current thesis is composed of Chinese companies listed on both 
the SZSE and SHSE stock exchanges for the period of 2000-2006. Ilowever, the 
companies issue shares only on the foreign exchanges (e. g, H-share, N-share, and 
S-share companies) are excluded. There are two possible reasons: one is that the 2002 
Code is exclusively focused on the companies listed in the mainland China; the other 
reason is that those companies listed on the overseas markets are required to following 
the principles/guidelines of the local markets. More generally, the firms are then 
segregated into 13 industrial groups arranging from the Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 
(A) to Miscellaneous products & services (M) industry based on the Chinese Official 
Standard Industry Classification (CSRC, 2001). The manufacturing group (or group (') 
is further divided into 10 sub-groups as it includes over 60% of the sample firms. 
In order to calculate the discretionary accruals metrics employed in the analysis, 
and to be consistent with the previous researchers (e. g., Cohen el al.. 2009, Van 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005), the sample is restricted to all non-financial firms with 
available data. Financial institutions are excluded because of their specific accounting 
requirements, which may differ substantially from those of industrial and commercial 
companies. This way, Group I (the finance industry) has to be excluded. And, the 
sample is required to have at least eight observations in each year, each industrial group 
or sub-group (Cohen el cal., 2008; Larcker and Richardson, 2004). Group C'3 (the wood 
products and furniture manufacturing industry) is excluded as there are only 3 
observations on average in each year over the study period. Furthermore, this thesis 
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requires the sample firms to have both the financial and corporate governance data in 
each year over the period of 2000-2006. While this restriction facilitates the comparison 
of the results between the pre- and the post-Code periods, it likely introduces a 
survivorship bias, biasing the sample toward larger and more successful firms. 1-iowever, 
it is expected that this bias will reduce the variation in EM metric, resulting in a more 
conservative test of the research question. 
To facilitate data collection procedures, the current thesis uses secondary data as 
the main data source. By definition, secondary data is the information that has been 
gathered by someone other than the researcher and/or for some other purpose than the 
project at hand. And, the amount of secondary data available is overwhelming, and 
researchers have to locate and use the data relevant to their research (Black, 1999). 
Schmidt and Hollensen (2006) highlight some advantages of using secondary data in 
conducting research. While a detailed analysis of the secondary data is not a concern of' 
the current thesis, however, the main advantages secondary data offer are highlighted as: 
quick way to obtaining data, low cost, less effort expended, less time taken, and 
sometime more accurate than the primary data. 
In particular, the financial data are obtained from the Shenzhen Securities Into Co., 
Ltd., while the data of corporate governance are collected from the China Centre For 
Economic Research (CCER) database and China Stock Market & Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR). In order to ensure the reliability and accuracy of' the data that 
obtained from above database, the published annual reports arc used to constantly 
cross-check the data over the study period. The electronic annual reports are available 
on the website of China Finance Online (http: //www. jºj. com. cn), which is the major 
Chinese financial information provider and currently listed on the t . S. exchange 
(NASDAQ NM: JRJC). If some annual reports can not he found on this wehsitc, the 
official websites of the SHSE and the SZSE (http: //NýLw. see. com. ci1 and 
http: //www. cninfo. com. en) will he used. 
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Overall, the sample consists of 447 firms from 22 different industries representing 
3,129 firm-year observations over the period of 2000-2006. Among these firms, 219 
firms come from the SZSE stock exchange, and other 229 firms belong to the SIISE 
stock exchange. 
8.3.4. The Hypotheses Testing Approaches 
Generally speaking, the trend in EM activities across the study period (H1) and the 
impacts of the main mechanisms with regard to corporate governance enforced by the 
Code on mitigating such activities in China's listed companies (H2-H8) are examined. 
HI Testing (Univariate Analysis): 
Univariate Test of Earnings_Management 
H1 is tested through the univariate statistical test. It is to compare the 
accrual-based EM practices measured by both the Modified Jones Model and L&R 
Model in the post-Code period with those in the pre-Code period. Roth the absolute and 
directional values of discretionary accruals are investigated. It is expected that the level 
of EM is declined in the post-Code period. 
H2-H8 Testing (Multivariate Regression Analysis): 
More generally, there are two approaches in the panel data analysis, namely the 
fixed effects approach and the random effects approach. On one hand, the fixed ellcets 
approach is appropriate in situations where the individual -speciIic cllccts may he lixed 
and correlated with one or more regressors. By estimating the corresponding ordinary 
least squares (or OLS) regression model, the variations resulted from the 
individual-specific effects over individuals and/or time in the intercept as well as in the 
slope coefficients can be captured (Green, 2003). On the other hand, the random eflccts 
approach mainly differs from the fixed effects approach by treating the 
individual-specific effects as random and uncorrelated with the included explanatory 
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variables, and considering them as the components of the error term. The corresponding 
model of such an approach is the generalised least squares (or GLS) regression model 
(Green, 2003). 
Given that this thesis is interested in the impacts of the Code with regard to the 
governance mechanisms on EM practices, the OLS regression model may be more 
appropriate in measuring the time-specific effects due to the passage of the Code. It 
allows for the time-specific effects in the sense that EM and the impacts of governance 
mechanisms on EM may be different (or changed) between the pre- and post- Code 
periods. Similar model estimation methods are used by Peasnell el al.. (2000) and 
Cohen el al., (2008) to investigate the impact of Cadbury Report (UK) and 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US) on EM practices across time respectively. In order to examine 
the hypotheses 2-8, the OLS regression model is estimated below. The same regression 
is run two times using the Modified Jones Model and the I, &R Model respectively. Both 
the absolute and directional values of discretionary accruals are investigated. 
Earnings Management 
_ ý3+11'TIME+/32CODE+133EXCUM; + 13 EX('OM, *('ODI; + /i INDBl)ARD, 
-F/16INI)BOARD; *CODE+137AUD(Y)M, f/fýAUD('0M, *('OUE +/l, )A(11)ITl)R, 
+ ß3,0A UDITOR, *C'ODE+[3uINSTITUT'E; +131zINNTI'I'(1']'l: ', *( 'ODE + /ll, 7'01' l, 
+[114TOP], *CODE +/]1SS7A7E, +/3«STTF, *CODE F/ i7Lfl Size, 
+/3/HLEVERAGE, +/3j9Ln Sales; +ý321ýST P1, ýi2, ISS(IIN(], I i: 
As proposed by Gujarati (2003) that the specific-time ellects can he accounted for 
by introducing the relevant time measurements. In the above OLS regression model, 
two time measurements are introduced, namely the variable TIit1E which is measured as 
the calendar year minus 2000 and the variable C'ODE which takes the value o1.1 for the 
years 2002 onwards (or the post-Code period) and 0 otherwise. While the coefficient on 
the former (Iii) aims to present the trend in EM practices across time, the coefficient on 
the latter (132) demonstrates how the China's 2002 Code itself influences EM by 
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providing the differences (or changes) of the magnitude of EM between the pre- and 
post- Code periods. The coefficients (113,9s, ß /19, #l/. /1/3, /1/5) on the variables for 
corporate governance mechanisms reflect the overall impacts of such mechanisms on 
EM practices (Cohen et al., 2008). The interactive (or differential) variables by 
multiplying a corporate governance variable with the time variable (('ODE) can account 
for the differences (or changes) in slope coefficients (Gujarati, 2003). Thus, the 
coefficients (/i.,, 116, /I, /Jffi, 1112, #i. /, 1316) show the differences (or changes) of the impacts 
of governance mechanisms on EM between the pre- and post- Code periods. And finally, 
the coefficients (fJi7, ßM ß19, /320 1321) on the control variables present the impacts of 
firms' characteristics. The definitions and expected signs of the dependent, independent, 
and control variables are provided in the following Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1.: Definitions of variables 
Name(s) & Symbol(s) of the 
Variable(s) 
Expected 
Definition(s) of the variable(s) Sign(s) of 
the 
variable(s) 
The Dependent Variables 
IDA; I and DA; represent the absolute and directional 
Discretionary Accruals (IDA, I values of the discretionary accruals respectively. They 
and DA; ) are obtained by using both Modified Jones Model N/A 
and L&R Model. 
The Time Trend Variables 
Indicator for years of 
observations (TIME) 
The impact of the Code (CODE) 
Compensation received by the 
top 3 executives (EXCOM) 
CODE*EXCOM 
=(calendar year)-2000 
CODE is taking the value of 1 if the observation is - 
from the post-Code period (2002-2006), and 0 
otherwise. 
It is the natural logarithm value of cash - 
compensation for the top three highest paid 
executives 
To differentiate the value of compensation of two - 
periods. 
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Table 8.1.: Definitions of variables (continued) 
The Independent Variables- the Mechanisms of Corporate Governance 
Fraction of independent =INDEPENDENT/TOTAL, where INDEPENDENT is the 
directors (INDBOARD) number of independent directors on the board and - 
TOTAL is the total directors of the board (or the board 
size). 
INDBOARD*CODE To differentiate the value of INDBOARD of two periods. - 
Establishment of an audit It is taking the value of 1 if the firm establishes an - 
Committee (AUDCOM) audit committee on the board, and 0 otherwise. 
AUDCOM*CODE To differentiate the value of AUDCOM of two periods. 
Auditor type (AUDITOR) It is taking the value of 1 if the firm is audited by one 
of the Big 4 auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
AUDITOR*CODE To differentiate the value of AUDITOR of two periods. - 
Fraction of equity owned by =ISHARE/TSHARE, where (SHARE is the total shares 
the institutional shareholders held by the institutional shareholders (in the TOP ten - 
(INSTITUTE) list) of the firm and TSHARE is the total ordinary shares 
outstanding. 
INSTITUTE*CODE To differentiate the value of INSTITUTE of two periods. - 
Fraction of equity owned by =TOPSHARE/TSHARE, where TOPSHARE is the total 
the largest shareholder (TOP1) shares held by the largest shareholder of the firm and ? 
TSHARE is the total ordinary shares outstanding. 
TOP1*CODE To differentiate the value of TOP1 of two periods. ? 
Type of the largest shareholder It is taking the value of 1 if the firm's controlling ? 
(STATE) shareholder is the state, and 0 otherwise. 
STATE*CODE To differentiate the value of STATE of two periods. ? 
The Control Variables 
Firm's size (In-Asset) =Ln (ASSETS;,, ), it is the natural logarithm of total assets 
of the sample firms in year t. 
Firm's leverage (LEVERAGE) =(LTD;, t+STD;,, )/ASSETS;, t, where LTD is the long-term 
debt and STD is the short-term debt, ASSETS is the 
total assets of the sample firms in year t. 
Firm's performance (ln_Sales) 
Trading status 
(ST_PT) 
Additional Share issuing 
(ISSUING) 
=Ln (Sales, )It is the natural logarithm of the annual 
sales from main operations of the sample firms in year 
t. 
It is taking the value of 1 if the firm is labelled as either 
ST or PT in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
It is taking the value of 1 if the firm issues additional 
shares in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
........... . 7 
7 
+ 
+ 
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8.4. Summary 
Firstly, this chapter begins with the analysis of the basic elements of a quantitative 
research method. In comparison with the qualitative research method, the quantitative 
research aims to establish facts, make predictions and test hypotheses that have already 
been stated. And, it is thought to be objective in gaining, analysing, and interpreting 
quantitative data. Given that the current thesis is to shed some lights on the trend in EM 
over time and the impacts of the China's 2002 Code on EM practices, quantitative 
research approach is utilised. 
The measurements of variables have been provided in the second part of this 
chapter. The variables are composed of the dependent variable--EM (measured by 
discretionary accruals using Modified Jones and Larcker and Richardson (2004) Model 
(or L&R Model), the independent variables (e. g., executive compensation, hoard 
independence, internal and external audit, institutional investors, and controlling 
shareholders), and five control variables. 
The overall study period arranges from year 2000 to 2006. And it is further divided 
into two time periods: the period prior to the passage of the Code (the pre-Code period: 
2000,2001), and the period after the passage of the Code (the post-Code period: 2002 
through 2006). While the financial data are obtained from the Shenzhen Securities Info 
Co., Ltd., the data of corporate governance are collected from the China Centre l 'or 
Economic Research (CCER) database and China Stock Market & Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR). Overall, the sample consists of 447 firms from 22 different 
industries representing 3,129 firm-year observations over the period of'2000-2006. 
The rest of the chapter has provided the statistical approaches to test the hypotheses 
formulated. While hypothesis I is tested through a univariate statistical approach, the 
hypotheses of 2 to 8 are examined by the multivariate regression analysis. 
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Appendix 8. A. Chinese Industry Classification 
Figure 8.2.: China's standard industry classification (2001) 
China's SIC (2001) 
A. Agriculture. forestry. & fishing 
ý-- B. Mining f 
ý- 
(C. ManutaCturing 
(CO. Food and beverages 
C 1. Textiles suits and leathers 
(C2. Wood products and furniture 
C3. Paper making and printing 
'C4. Petroleum relining, chemical products 
ýýý 
'C'5. l. lectronic components and home appliances 
('6. Mineral products and metal products 
C'7. I(quipmcnts and machineries 
! C8. Drugs and biologic products 
! C9. Tobacco and other, 
I). Water, electricity, and gas 
IF. Construction 
'I'ransport and public untilities 
(G Inlormation technology 
(11. Wholesale and retail trade 
1. Financial and insurance 
(J. Real estate 
(K. Service 
(I Publishing, media, and allied services 
(M. Miscellaneous products and services 
Source: CSRC, 2001. 
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Appendix 8. B. Econometric Analysis 
Since the objective of this study is to empirically investigate the impact of corporate 
governance on EM of China's listed companies, it thus becomes indispensable to utilise 
econometric techniques. As expressed by Gujarati (2003, p. 1), -literally interpreted, 
econometrics means `economic measurement"'; and "econometrics ... consists of' the 
application of mathematical statistics to economic data to lend empirical support to the 
models constructed by mathematical economics and to obtain numerical results. " In the 
similar vein, Green (2003, p. 1) states that "... its main object shall be to promote studies 
that aim at a unification of the theoretical-quantitative and that are penetrated by 
constructive and rigorous thinking similar to that which has come to dominate the 
natural sciences. " 
Further, Gujarati (2003) points out that in econometrics the statistical technique of' 
regression analysis is the main tool used to obtain empirical support for the economic 
models. For example, he explicates that "regression analysis is concerned with the study 
of the dependence of one variable, the dependent variable, on one or more variables, the 
explanatory variables, with a view of estimating or predicting the population j mean or 
average value of the former in terms of the known or fixed Iin repeated sampling) 
values of the later" (Gujarati, 2003, p. 7). In the followings, the basic concepts of the 
econometric regression analysis will be reviewed. 
8.6.1. The Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) 
The linear regression model is the single most useful tool in the econometrician's kit. 
Though to an increasing degree in the contemporary literature, it is ollen only the 
departure point for the full analysis, it remains the device used to begin almost all 
empirical research. The CLRM can be expressed as: 
y=f(xj. x2,... XK + f: 
=x j/3 j -+-x2/32 - ... X/ 
/J/ + r: 
OR 
A 
Y, = LA XI') + C, (A. 1) 
Where y; is the i1h observation on the dependent variable y, /3, is the coefficient on 
the j'" explanatory variable x,, 1, and the t, is the i"' observation on the unobserved error 
term s. 
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Usually, equation (A. I. ) is re-expressed in a more convenient format in matrix notation 
as: 
Y=Xß+E (A. 2) 
Where y and t: are n* 1 column of vectors, ß is a k* 1 column vector and X is an 
n*k matrix where each column corresponds to a different explanatory variable. When 
the regression contains an intercept, by convention this is the first column of the matrix 
and consists of a vector of ones. 
More generally, there are six assumptions of the CLRM, including: (I) the model 
specifies a linear relationship between y and xi... xk, (2) there is no exact linear 
relationship among any of the independent variables in the model. This assumption will 
be necessary for estimation of the parameters of the model; (3) it is assumed that the 
expected value of the disturbance at observation i in the sample is not a function of the 
independent variables observed at any observation, including this one. This means that 
the independent variables will not carry useful information for prediction of e; (4) each 
disturbance has the same finite variance and is uncorrelated with every other 
disturbance; (5) it is assumed that the data in (x;, i, x; 2,... x,, ß; ) may be any mixture of 
constants and random variables. The ultimate source of the data in X is unrelated 
(statistically and economically) to the source of F; and (6) the disturbances are normally 
distributed. 
8.8.1.1.: The Ordinary Least Square Estimator (OLS) 
Since it is usually not feasible to obtain all possible extant observations in a population 
to estimate the population regression function (PRF) shown in equations (A. I) and (A. 2 
above, a sample regression function (SRF) is habitually estimated using the Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) method. This method has some very attractive statistical properties 
that have made it one of the most powerful and popular methods of regression analysis. 
In particular, let estimator denote the unknown parameter vector 13, then the sample 
regression function can be expressed as: 
Y=4 +e 
(A. 3) 
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Where e is a n* 1 vector of the residuals than are not explained by the regression. 
Moreover, here is the OLS estimator that minimise the sum of squared residuals, 
s=e' e= e 
nn Min s 
n 
(A. 4) 
Expanding the expression, 
nnnn 
S= y'y-y'(X )-ß'x'y+ß'x'xß (A. 5) 
Differentiating s with respect to gives the vector of first order conditions 
nn 
Spaß =2. 'y+2. i. ß 
rearranging, 
X' ß-X'Y (A. 7) 
Assuming that the matrix X is of rank k, the k*k symmetric matrix X'X will he of' 
full rank and its inverse (X'X)-' will thus exist. Pre-multiplying (A. 7) by this inverse 
gives the expression for the OLS estimator of 
ß (X'X)"'X'y 
(n. H) 
8. B. 1.2.: Unbiasedness of the OLS estimator 
Substituting the y from the equation (A. 2) into the OLS estimator (A. 8) yields 
ß =(X'X)-'X'y 
=(X, X)-' X, (X f +t. ) 
=(X, X)-' X'Xp+(X, X)-' X, I, 
=J +(X, X)-'X, u (A. 10) Taking the expectations of (A. 10) 
E(ß )=ß+E((X'X)-'X'l; ) 
=ß+(X'X)-'X'E(i) (A. 11) 
Where, in the second line, X is taken out of the equation because of' the 
assumption that matrix X is fixed in repeated sampling. Moreover, it is assumed that 
E(E)=0, the second item is zero so that: 
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E(ß)=ß 
n 
Therefore, it is argued that the estimator 
ß 
of OLS is unbiased. 
8.8.1.3.: The Variance of the OLS estimator 
From equations (A. 10) and (A. 12) 
=(3+(X'X)-'X'i 
= E(ß)+(X'X)-'X'E 
thus, 
(A. 12) 
ß E(ß )_ (X'X)-'X'E (A. 13) 
Since the variance is the expected value of the square of the deviation of' from 
its own mean, it gives: 
var( =E((X'X)"'X'EE' X(X'X)-') 
=(X'X)-'X'E(ES') X(X'X)-' (A. 14) 
Taken the assumptions that the matrix X is fixed in repeated sampling. and 
Var(E)=E E(£E')=a2In, equation (A. 14) can thus be re-expressed as: 
var( =(X'X)"'X'E(a2I) X(X'X)-' 
=a2(X'X)-'X' X(X'X)-' (A. 15) 
By cancelling X'X and its inverse (X'X)-', the expression for the variance of the 
OLS estimator (also referred to as the variance covariance matrix) can he obtained: 
var(y)=a2(X'X)-1 (A. 16) 
8. B. 1.4.: Some Remarks on OLS 
Up to this point, the typical derivation of the formulas to compute the O LS estimators 
necessary to estimate the sample regression function (SRI), and some of' the major 
assumptions of the OLS method have been shown. However, this review has only 
scratched the surface of the topic. For example, it has been shown that the derivation of 
the variance of the OLS estimator as a function of the error variance CT2 that appears in 
formula (A. 16), however, the 62 itself is unknown and needs to be estimated in practice. 
Since the topic is obviously too broad to be covered in details here, this subsection only 
gives a verbal account of some important issues. 
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Firstly, the significance of the OLS estimator is determined using t-test which 
utilises the estimated values of the standard deviations of the OLS estimator (not 
covered here). The null hypothesis of the t-test is that the OLS estimator is not different 
from zero while the alternative hypothesis is that the null is false. The hope in 
regression analysis is to reject the null and accept the alternative hypothesis with a two 
or one tail test. If E is assumed to be normally distributed G2 is also normally distributed 
since the X is assumed to be fixed. As a result, is also normally distributed. To test 
n 
the significance of an individual parameter in the vector , the t-distribution must 
he 
A 
used. It is because that while 
ß is normally distributed, var(13) is unknown due to a2 is 
nn 
t=-( [I 1-0)/S((i unknown. The specific procedure for an individual parameter is that: 
where is an individual parameter and 
5(l) 
is its standard deviation. This test 
statistic is assumed to follow the t-distribution with n-k degrees of freedom, where n is 
the number of the observations and k is the number of parameters estimated. The 
decision rule is that if the test statistic is greater than the `critical value' taken from a 
table of the t-distribution with n-k degrees of freedom then the null hypothesis is 
rejected. Secondly, the goodness of fit of an estimated regression is determined by the 
coefficient of determination or R2, which measures the proportion or percentage of total 
variation in y explained by the regression model. And finally, no discussion about the 
CLRM is complete without an examination of the consequences of the violations of the 
assumptions of the model. Common problems due to the violations of the assumptions 
which have been examined above include heteroscedasticity, multicollincarity, and 
model misspecification (e. g., exclusion of relevant variables and inclusion of irrelevant 
variables in the model)37. 
8. B. 2.: Panel Data Analysis 
According to Gujarati (2003), in panel data the same cross-sectional unit (say aI tinily 
or a firm or a state) is surveyed over time. In short, panel data have space as well as 
time dimensions. In literature, four different names are used for describing panel data, 
such as pooled data (pooling of time series and cross-sectional observations), 
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combination of time series and cross-section data, micropanel data, longitudinal data (a 
study over time of a variable or group of subjects), event history analysis (e. g., studying 
the moment over time of subjects through successive states or conditions), cohort 
analysis (e. g., following the career path of 1965 graduates of a business school). 
Although there are subtle variations, all these names essentially connote movement over 
time of cross-sectional units. The current study therefore uses the term panel data in a 
generic sense to include one or more of these terms. Panel data are now increasingly 
used in economic research. The topic of panel data regressions is vast, and some of the 
mathematics and statistics involved is quite complicated. At here, it is only expected to 
touch on some of the essentials of the panel data regression models. To start with, the 
general panel data model can be written as: 
Yit IXi, t+Ei, t (1.17 ) 
Where i=1... n and t=1... 'I' 
yit is the observation on the dependent variable y for the i`l' cross-sectional unit in 
the t`h period, x;, 1 is al *k vector of observations on k explanatory variables Im the i"' 
individual in the t°' period, and ß is a k* 1 vector of parameters. f:;,, is the disturbance 
term and it is assumed that 
Ei't=µß. c+vi. t 1 8) 
the error term contains an unobservable individual effect µ;,, and a disturbance u;,, 
The unobservable individual effect is supposed to capture the 'time invariant' 
characteristics of individual `i' which are not picked up by the variables in x;,, 
8. B. 2.1.: The Fixed Effects Approach 
The term "fixed effects" is due to the fact that, although the intercept may difier across 
individuals, each individual's intercept does not vary over time, that is, it is time 
invariant. Thus, the Fixed Effects (regression) Model can he expressed as: 
yi=Xiß+1ai+Ei (n. 19) 
This formulation of the model assumes that differences across units can he 
captured in differences in the constant term. Each u; is treated as an unknown parameter 
to be estimated. y; and X; are the T observations for the i'l' unit, i is a 'I* I column of 
ones, and cj is associated T* 1 vector of disturbances. 
Collecting these terms gives: 
2.13 
y=[X d, d, dn] aß 
+£ 
(A. 20) 
Where d; is a dummy variable indicating the i"' unit. Let the nT*n matrix D=jdi 
dz ... d1, J. Then assembling all nT rows gives: 
y=Xß+Da+E (A. 21) 
This model is usually referred to as the least square dummy variable (LSDV) 
model. It is a classical regression model, so no new results are needed to analyse it. I fn 
is small enough, then the model can be estimated by ordinary least squares with K 
regressors in X and n columns in D, as a multiple regression with K+n parameters. 
8. B. 2.2.: Random Effects Approach 
The basic idea of the Random Effects Model (REM) or Error Components Model (ECM 
is that instead of treating the individual's intercept (Pi; ) as fixed, it is assumed that the 
intercept term is a random variable with a mean 3, And the intercept value can be 
expressed as: 
ßii=ßi+vi i=1,2,..., N (A. 22) 
Where v; is a random error term with a mean value of zero and variance oC a2. 
It is essential to state that due to samples are drawing from a much larger universe 
and that they have a common mean value for the intercept ( (ii) and the individual 
differences in the intercept values of the individual are reflected in the error term v; 
Thus the general regression model of the random effects approach is written as: 
Yit -1'I+ß2X2it+ß3X3it+" "" 
PnXnit+Vi+fit 
=f I+ß2X2it+ß3X3it+"""ßnXnit+Wit (A. 23) 
Where (ojt=(v; +t 1), this composite error term, v;, which is the cross-section, or 
individual-specific, error component, and c; 1, which is the combined time series and 
cross-section error component. The term error components model derives its name 
because the composite error term w;, consists of two (or more) error components. 
More generally, the basic assumptions made by FCM are that: (I) both error terms 
(v; and cit) are normally distributed with the variance of a2; (2) the individual error 
components are not correlated with each other; and (3) they are not autocorrelatcd 
across both cross-section and time series units. Based on these assumptions: 
2.14 
E(wir)=0 
var(w; 1)= 6+6 (n"24) 
Further, it can be shown that coif is correlated with co;,; that is, the error terms of a 
given cross-sectional unit at two different points in time are correlated. The correlation 
coefficient, corr (wit, o)is), is as follows: 
6`Z 
corr (CUit, Wis)- a2 + 6F 
(A. 25) 
Notice two special features of the preceding correlation coefficient. First, for any 
given cross-sectional unit, the value of correlation between error terms at two dilicrent 
times remains the same no matter how far apart the two time periods are, as is clear 
from (A. 25). Second, the correlation structure given in (A. 25) remains the same for all 
cross-sectional units; that is, it is identical for all individuals. As argued by Gujarati 
(2003), Greene (2003), the most appropriate method here is the method of generalised 
least squares estimator (known as the GLS). 
8.8.2.3.: Fixed Effects (LSDV) versus Random Effects Model 
The challenge facing a researcher is: which model is better, FEM or REM? "the answer 
to this question hinges around the assumption one makes about the likely correlation 
between individual, or cross-section specific, error component v; and the X regressors: iI* 
it is assumed that v; and the X's are uncorrelated, REM may he appropriate, whereas i1' 
v; and the X's are correlated, FEM may be appropriate. According to Gujarati (2003, 
p. 650-651), four general criteria are listed in the followings: 
1. if T (the number of time series data) is large and N (the number of' cross-sectional 
units) is small, there is likely to be little difference in the values of' the parameters 
estimated by FEM and REM. Hence the choice here is based on computational 
convenience. On this score, FEM may be preferable. 
2. when N is large and T is small, the estimate obtained by the two methods can dif-fcr 
significantly. FEM will be appropriate if the researcher strongly believes that the 
individual, or cross-sectional, units in the sample are not random drawings from a larger 
sample. On the other hand, if the cross-sectional units in the sample are regarded as 
random drawings, then REM is appropriate. 
3. if the individual error component v; and one or more regressors are correlated, then 
the REM estimators are biased, whereas those obtained from FFM are unbiased. 
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if N is large and T is small, and if the assumptions underlying REM hold, RIM 
estimators are more efficient than FEM estimators. 
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Chapter 9: Empirical Analysis of the 
Results 
9.1. Introduction 
Drawing upon 3,129 firm-year observations obtained from 447 Chinese listed firms of' 
22 different industries over period of 2000-2006, this chapter presents the empirical 
results by running several statistical tests using the Eviews 5.0 software. It begins with 
the descriptive statistics of the explanatory and the control variables. By comparing the 
pre-Code results with those in the post-Code periods, the statistical changes of a specific 
variable over time are well represented. Next, the mean coefticient estimates of 
parameters calculated using the Modified Jones Model and L&R Model respectively are 
demonstrated. 
For the hypotheses testing, hypothesis 1 of the Chinese listed companies' level 0/ 
EM is lower in the post-Code period (HI) is examined by applying the univariate 
statistical tests. By using the multivariate regression tests, the second phase is to 
investigate the impacts of the main mechanisms of corporate governance eniorced by 
the Code on EM practices in China. The specific mechanisms included arrange from the 
executive compensation (coded as EXCOM) to the characteristics of the largest 
shareholder (ownership concentration-TOP] and type-STATE) (or 112-H8). Before 
running the main regression models, the tests for skewness, kurtosis, multicollinearity, 
and heteroscedasticity of the explanatory and control variables are provided. 
9.1. Introduction 
9.2. Descriptive Statistics 
9.3. Statistics of EM models 
9.4. Hypotheses Testing 
9.5. Summary 
chapter; section 9.2. provides the descriptive 
statistics of both the explanatory and control 
variables; section 9.3. analyses the mean 
coefficient estimates of' parameters calculated 
using the Modified Jones Model and I, &R Model 
respectively; section 9.4. tests the formulated hypotheses including tine-trend in F, M 
metrics and the impacts of the main corporate governance mechanisms on FM practices 
in China's listed companies; section 9.5. summaries the whole chapter. 
The structure of this chapter is provided as the followings: 
ntroduction 11 Section 9.1. gives a brief introduction of' the 
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9.2. Descriptive Statistics 
This section starts with providing the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
and the control variables. By comparing the pre-Code results with those in the post- 
Code periods, the statistical changes of a specific variable over time are well 
represented. 
9.2.1. Descriptive Statistics 
--Explanatory Variables 
Table 9.1. illustrates the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables introduced by 
the current thesis. The whole study period is categorised in pre- and post-Code periods, 
p-value for the differences between two contrasting regimes is provided through 
different statistical tests, such as I-test (mean differences), z-test (median differences), 
and chi-square test (categorical variables). Furthermore, the post-Code period is divided 
into sub-periods, namely the post-Code period (A) extends from 2002 to 2003, post- 
Code period (B) extends from 2002 to 2004, and post-Code period (C) extends from 
2002 through the end of 2005. The rational behind this is to show the time trend in the 
variables and to control any extreme cases in the sample for a given year which may 
bias the results obtained in the post-Code period (2002-2006). 
Table 9.1. Panel A. reports the summary statistics of the continuously explanatory 
variables arranged from compensation of top 3 executives to shareholding concentration 
of the largest shareholder in Chinese listed companies. The statistics summary is 
composed of the 25`x', 75th percentile, mean, median, and standard deviation (or S. D. ). 
First of all, the results of natural logarithm value of cash compensation for the top 
three highest paid executives (quoted as EXCOM) show an increasing trend over time. 
For instance, both mean and median of EXCOM are increased significantly in the post- 
Code period compared with those in the pre-Code period. In particular, by the end of' 
2006, on average, EXCOM is increased to 12.811 from 11.083 in the pre-Code period. 
And, the median grows to 12.867 from 11.092. The p-value For difference in either 
mean or median is statistically significant at I%. In the post-Code period (B) (or 2002- 
04), the mean and median are increased to 12.866 and 12.970 from 12.801 and 12.847 
in the post-Code period (A) (or 2002-03) respectively. And, the post-Code period ((') 
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(or 2002-05) shows a slight decrease both in mean (12.768) and median (12.815) 
comparing with the post-Code period (B). But comparing with the pre-Code period, all 
the sub-periods demonstrate significant increases in top 3 executive compensation 
(difference significant at 0.01 level). Overall, the compensation of top executives in 
Chinese listed companies increases significantly across the study period. In the similar 
vein, Chen et al., (2010) study the trend and determinants of executive compensation of 
502 Chinese listed companies over the period of 2000 to 2006. They report that the top 
3 executives earn approximately RMB0.20 million in cash compensation which is 
relatively stable before 2002. It, however, increases dramatically afterwards and reaches 
RMBO. 45 million on average by the end of 2006. In addition, from the perspective of 
the Western countries, similar results are documented. For instance, based on the US 
listed companies, both Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Cohen et al., (2008) 
report that while the performance-related executive compensation (cash bonuses and 
share options) remains relatively stable before 2001, over the period of 2001 to 2005, it 
increases significantly in each year. 
In order to comply with the requirements of the Code that a listed company shall 
introduce independent non-executive directors to its board and by 30 June 2003, at least 
one third of the board shall be independent non-executives, the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors (INDBOARD) on the board in Chinese listed 
companies increases significantly (difference significant at 0.01 level) in the post-Code 
period compared with that in the pre-Code period. In particular, as indicated in the 
second row of Table 9.1. Panel A., the average proportion ofindependent directors on 
the board arises from 3.4% in the pre-Code period to 33.7% in the post-Code period. In 
other words, it shows a more than 8-fold growth in IND13OARD. By further dividing the 
post-Code period into sub-periods, the results demonstrate that the proportion of' 
independent directors on the board increases gradually over time. By the end of 2003, 
on average, 32.6% of the board is composed of independent non-executives, and this 
proportion increases to 32.9% and 33.3% by the end of' 2004 and 2005 correspondingly. 
By comparing with the pre-Code period, the mean differences ofthese sub-periods are 
all significant at 0.01 level. For the median, it increases to 33.3% in tile post-Codc 
periods from 0% in the pre-Code period, and the differences are significant at 0.01 level. 
In literature, Chen and Zhang (2010a) study the trend in independent non-executive 
directors on the board by comparing the proportion of 103 B-share issuing companies in 
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the pre-2001 period (1999-2000) with that in the post-2001 period (2002-2006). Their 
results demonstrate a significant increase over time, since both the mean and median 
differences between two periods are around 30% and significant at 1%. Chen el al., 
(2010) analyse the median of the proportion of independent directors in order to study 
board independence of 502 Chinese listed companies over the period of 2000 to 2006. 
Statistically, they report that while the median increases to 22.2% by the end of 2002 
from 0.00% in either year 2000 or 2001, it is stabilised at 33.33% until the end of the 
study period. 
As stated in the previous chapter, in China, one promising feature emerged 
recently from the A- and B-share markets is the increasing trend in institutional 
ownership in the listed companies that is both a reflection and a consequence of' the 
government's efforts to promote institutional investors to enter into the stock markets 
since 1997. In addition, the Code encourages the involvement of' institutional investors 
in monitoring firms by stating that institutional investors shall play a role in the 
appointment of company directors, the compensation and supervision of management 
and major decision-making processes. Regarding the results of INSTITUTE the average 
shareholding owned by institutional shareholders in China increases to 6% with the 
median of 0.016 in the post-Code period from 2.6% with the median of' 0.005 in the pre- 
Code period. The p-value of either mean or median difference is statistically significant 
at 1% level. And, the results of sub-periods also demonstrate a significant increase in 
both mean and median. In particular, the mean shareholding increases to 4.4`%, in post- 
Code period (A) and (B) and 5.1% by the end of 2005. The corresponding p-value is 
significant at 1%. For the median, it increases to 0.007 by the end of 2004 and further 
raises to 0.009 in 2005 from 0.005 in the pre-Code period. And the p-value is significant 
at 5% and 1% level respectively. All in all, it shows the increasing interests of 
institutional investors in holding more companies' shares in ('hing. I lowever, 
comparing with the institutional ownership in developed market, such as around 551%, of, 
US equities are owned by institutional shareholders, and institutional ownership is 
around 41% in UK, the shares owned by institutional investors in Chinese listed 
companies are still quite small (around 6% on average by the end of 2006). This fhct 
may indicate Chinese stock market is inefficient, since the institutional environment is 
still incomplete. Accordingly, the institutional investors may find themselves in a 
disadvantageous position in the Chinese stock market and concern more about their 
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welfare being expropriated by other controlling shareholders. They are more likely to 
keep low shareholding and typically hold their shares for a short term. Regarding 
involvement in mitigating opportunistic discretion, Chen and Zhang (2010b) argue that 
only the large institutional investors have the incentive to undertake monitoring as the 
increased return from their monitoring may be sufficient to cover the associated 
transaction costs which are composed of the costs of gathering and analysing 
information, the costs of price effects and suboptimal tax timing, the problem of-free- 
rider" problem (Grossman and Hart, 1980), and so forth. Thus, high transaction costs 
associated with being active in monitoring further lower the incentive of smaller 
institutional investors in China to influence company's policy and monitor the 
management. In addition, Gillan and Starks (2000) propose that with low ownership, 
proposals sponsored by institutional investors may not perceived by other shareholders 
as being effective enough in pressuring corporate management to pursue them. 
The last row of Table 9.1. Panel A. presents the summary statistics of shares held 
by the largest shareholder (TOP! ) in China's listed companies between the pre- and 
post-Code periods. Overall, the findings document a decreasing trend in shareholding of 
TOP] in Chinese listed companies over time which is consistent with the results 
provided in the literature (e. g., Aharony et al., 2000; Chen and Yuan, 2006, Chen and 
Zhang, 2010a; Ding et al., 2007; Liu and Lu, 2007). For instance, Chen and /hang 
(2010a) find a significant reduction by 2.6% in the holdings of controlling shareholders 
over time in the B-share companies. According to the results of current thesis, the 
average shareholding of TOP] in a Chinese listed company is about 44.91%,, and the 
median is 44.4% in the pre-Code period. By the end of the 2006, on average, the biggest 
shareholder holds 40.5% of a listed firm's shares and the median shareholding drops to 
37.8%. The differences of the mean and median between these two periods are 
significant at 0.01 level. Ding et al., (2007) report the similar result as the mean interest 
held by the largest shareholder is about 41.9% in their sample firms, By dividing the 
post-Code period, it reveals that shareholding of the largest investor in Chinese listed 
companies is reduced year by year. For instance, the shareholding reduces to 42.81%, in 
the post-Code period (A), 42.4% in the post-Code period (11), and further, by the end of 
2005 it decreases to 41.9%. Repeatedly, the differences between the post-('ode sub- 
periods and pre-Code period are significant at 0.01 level. Despite the reduction in 
shareholding of the largest investors in listed companies, they still directly hold more 
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than 40% on average of shares in the post-Code period and, indirectly they may use 
pyramidal ownership structures to gain control of the firm. As argued by Rajagopalan 
and Zhang (2008), the dominant shareholders in China normally use pyramidal 
ownership structures whereby they can achieve control through interlocking ownership. 
Thus, this thesis argues that although the holding of largest shareholders in Chinese 
listed companies reduces gradually, they are still in the dominating position in most 
companies and have incentives to obtain benefits, at the expenses of minority 
shareholders' interests, through opportunistic behaviours, such as reported earnings 
manipulation. 
Panel B of Table 9.1. reports the statistics of three categorically explanatory 
variables, establishment of audit committee (AUDCOM), statutory audit (AUDI"/'OR), 
and the type of the controlling shareholders or government control (STATE). 
The 2002 Code recommends that various committees of the board be established 
in China's listed companies. And among these board sub-committees, audit committee 
has the responsibility to review the scope and outcome of audit, and to ensure the 
objectivity of auditors is maintained. Thus, it is argued that the passage of the Code 
should lead to an increase in the number of companies that establish audit committees 
on their boards. This argument is well supported by the findings reported in the first row 
of Panel B. In the post-Code period (A), the number of companies which establish audit 
committees (AUD(, 'OM) on their boards increases to 195 (43.6%) li'om 24 (5.4%) by the 
end of 2001. The difference is significant at 0.01 level. The number of companies 
established an audit committee is stable with a slight increase in both post-('ode period 
(B) with 203 (45.4%) and post-Code period (C) with 210 (47%). And finally, the 
number ends in 209 by the end of 2006. Again the differences are significant at 0.01 
level by comparing with the pre-Code period. Overall, the results show a significant 
increase in audit committee establishment in Chinese listed companies over time. it is 
consistent with the results reported by Chen and Zhang (2010a) that the number of' 13- 
share companies established audit committee during the period of 2002-2004 increases 
by approximately 30% compared to that during the period of' 1999-2000. 
The number of companies that employ one of the international reputable audit 
firms (or the Big 4) increases gradually over the study period (AUDITOR). It increases 
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from 28 (6.3%) in the pre-Code period to 38 (8.5%) by the end of 2006. But, none of 
the p-value reported in the post-Code periods is at significant level compared with the 
pre-Code period. Based on 103 B-share companies in China, Chen and Zhang (201 Oa) 
also document an increasing trend in number of companies that employ the Big 4 over 
period. However, comparing with the period of 1999-2000, the difference is 
insignificant as there are only 24 more companies employ the Big 4 to audit their annual 
reports over 2002-2004. Thus, it is argued that the impact of the statutory audit on N. M 
practices in the following statistical tests may be insignificant. 
As stated earlier, the original purpose of the stock market in China is to raise 
much-needed capital for State-owned Enterprises (SoEs), and financing through the 
equity market shows a tremendous bias in favour of SoEs over non-Sol; s. For this 
historical reason, majority of current listed companies originated from restructured Solý. s 
are still under control of the State and/or other non-listed SoEs (Chen and ! hang, 2010a; 
Chen et al., 2010). The findings of the largest shareholder type (STATE) are reported in 
the last row of Panel B. In particular, over 87% (393) of the sample companies are 
directly owned by either the government or other administrative agencies in the pre- 
Code period. In the post-Code period, the number of listed companies in China owned 
by the government is reduced to 348 (77.9%). And, the p-value for the difference 
between the pre- and post-Code period is significant at 0.01 level. By further dividing 
the post-Code period, there are 373 (83.4%), 366 (81.9%), and 352 (78.7%) companies 
are controlled by the government in relation to the different sub-periods. All differences 
are significant (arranged from 0.10 level to 0.01 level) comparing with the pre-Code 
period. Overall, although the number of State-owned listed companies in ('hina reduces 
significantly, about 78% of sample firms are still controlled by the State in the post- 
Code period. This reflects the dominant position held by the government in Chinese 
listed companies as stated by Ding ei al., (2007) that although the number and 
importance of privately-owned firms increase considerably in recent years, over 80% of 
the total number of listed companies in China stock market is still in hands of the State. 
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9.2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
--Control Variables 
Five variables that prior studies have found to be associated with EM or governance 
variables are included in the current thesis to control the possible confounding eff'ects 
(Chen and Zhang, 2010a; Davidson, et al., 2005; Park and Shin, 2004). They are 
composed of firm's size, leverage, sales, trading stains, and share issuing. 
Table 9.2. Panel A presents the statistics summary of each continuously control 
variables, namely the Ln Size, LEVERAGE, and Ln_Sales. Each statistic summary 
contains the 25th, 75`1 percentile, mean, median, and standard deviation (S. D. ) of the 
variable. By running the t-test and z-lest respectively, a comparison of values between 
the pre- and post-Code periods is provided. And the post-Code period is further divided 
into sub-periods to control extreme cases effects in the sample for the given year and to 
show the time trend in a particular variable. 
Ln_Size is the proxy used for controlling sample firm's size effect and calculated 
as the natural logarithm of total assets based on the literature (e. g., Lee and ('hoi, 2002, 
Richardson, 2000; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005,2008). Regarding the results, 
there is a significant increase in the size of Chinese listed companies over time. By 
comparing with the pre-Code period, the mean of Ln_ Size increases to 20.152 and the 
median grows to 20.513 in the post-Code period. And, the p-value of' either the mean or 
median difference between these two periods is significant at 0.01 level. 'I he results l()r 
the other sub-periods are stable with a slight increase over time, such as by the end of 
2005, the mean and median reach 20.939 and 20.443 respectively from 20.828 and 
20.286 by the end of 2004. Comparing with the pre-Code period, the p-value fi)r each 
sub-period is significant at 0.01 level. 
Secondly, LEVERAGE is the proxy introduced to capture the cl'lcct of debt 
financing on EM in the sample firms and is measured as the ratio of total debt and total 
assets (e. g., Chen and Wang, 2004; Park and Shin, 2004). I)ue to the Iierce Competition 
from the foreign banks, the Chinese government has promoted the domestic banks to 
engage in wider business areas since 2000, such as insurance, financing (IJU and 1.11, 
2007). This is supported by the findings reported in the second row of Panel A. 'fable 
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9.2., since there is a significant increase in the percentage of debt financing used by the 
listed companies in China. In the pre-Code period, on average, around 44.2% of a firm's 
total asset is financed using debt. It increases to 55.9% by the end of 2006, and the p- 
values for both mean and median differences between the pre- and post-Code period are 
significant at 0.01 level. Similar results are reported in the sub-periods. And repeatedly, 
the p-values between the sub-periods and pre-Code period are all significant at 0.01 
level. 
For the financial performance measured as the natural logarithm of annual sales 
from main operations (Ln_Sales) of the listed companies (Ding ei al.. 2007), it shows a 
significant increase over time. In the post-Code period, while the mean of' Ln Sales 
increases to 20.658 from 20.365 in the pre-Code period, the median arises to 20.620. 
Both mean and median are different significantly at 0.01 level from the pre-Code period. 
By analysing the findings of sub-periods, it is observed that performance of the listed 
companies increases steadily. By the end of 2003, the mean and median increases to 
20.479 and 20.462 respectively. And, in the post-Code period (13), the mean is 20.519 
with the median of 20.487. And finally, they reach 20.588 and 20.559 correspondingly 
by the end of 2005. The results of in these periods are significantly different from those 
in the pre-Code period at 0.01 level. 
As documented in literature that Chinese listed companies are likely to manipulate 
reported earnings in order to meet thresholds of offering more shares and avoid being 
delisted (e. g., Chen and Yuan, 2006; Chen el al., 2004; Chen and Wang. 2004; I law el 
al., 2005; Liu and Lu 2007). Thus, trading status (ST F? ) and additional share issuing 
(ISSUING) are examined and their results are demonstrated in Panel B of ''Fable 9.2. 
The p-value calculated from chi-square test is provided by comparing the results in the 
post-Code periods with those in the pre-Code period. 
For the trading status, it is observed that the number of companies that labelled as 
either ST or PT in the post-Code periods grows significantly over time (diflercnce level 
at 0.01). In the pre-Code period, 19 companies are labelled as either ST or 11'r, it 
increases to 44 (9.8%) and 46 (10.3%) in post-Code period (A) and (11) respectively. 
while the number decreases slightly to 39 (8.7%) in the post-Code period (C), by the 
end of 2006, there are 48 (10.7%) listed companies labelled as either STor PT. 
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For the ISSUING, it shows a significant reduction (difference level at 0.01) in 
number of listed companies that issue additional shares in the post-Code periods. 
Comparing with 318 listed companies issue more shares in the pre-Code period, 77 
(17.2%), 53 (11.9%), and 61 (13.6%) listed companies issue additional shares in the 
sub-periods, while the number increases to 130 companies by the end of 2006. 
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9.3. Statistics of EM Models 
This section starts with providing the regression fit statistics of parameters calculated 
using the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) and L&R Model (e. g., Butler el 
al., 2004; Larcker and Richardson, 2004) respectively. Table 9.3. presents the statistical 
results. The parameter estimates are averages from the respective 140 industry 
regressions for 2000 to 2006. The /-statistics are reported in parentheses below 
parameter estimates with the relevant significance level. 
According to Panel A of Table 9.3., the mean value of the coefficient on IREl', , 
in the Modified Jones Model is 0.031 (3.1%), which is significantly different from zero 
at 0.01 level (1=2.645). This result properly supports the argument proposed in prior 
research (e. g., Klein, 2002; Peasnell et at., 2000; 2005) that changes in revenues are 
usually positively related with changes in working accounts. For instance, account 
receivable, inventory and account payable are parts of total accruals and are positively 
related to changes in revenues. The findings also document a negative mean coefficient 
on PPE,. t with the value of -0.027 (-2.7%) which is significantly different from zero at 
0.05 level (t=-2.247). It is consistent with the notion that the level of fixed assets is 
expected to drive depreciation expenses and deferred taxes (Klein, 2002). Such as 
higher fixed assets are expected to lead to higher depreciation expenses, which reduce 
total accruals. And, the mean adjusted R2 is about 26% in the Modified Jones Model. 
Table 9.3.: Regression fit statistics of the parameters using the Modified Jones Model 
and L&R Model 
Panel Aa: Mean coefficient estimates using the Modified Jones Model 
Independent Variables 
Intercept AREV,, 
0.098** 
(-2.447) 
0.031*** 
(2.645) 
PPE,, r Adj. R1 
-0.027** 0.263 
(-2.247) 
Panel Bb: mean coefficient estimates using the L&R Model 
Independent Variables 
intercept dREV, dREC, t PPE,, BM,,, CFO0,, Adj. R2 
-0.117*** 0.067*** -0.020** 0.056*** -0.741*** 0.450 
(-3.101) (5.014) (-2.009) (4.546) (-27.955 
a: The accrual model is estimated using the Modified cross-sectional Jones technique: 
TAC;,, =ao+a1 AREV;, t+a2 PPE,, t+E;, t 
where TAC;,, is the difference between operating cash flow and income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations; AREV,, t is the change in revenues from the preceding year; and PPE,,, is the 
toi 
gross value of property, plant, and equipment. All variables are scaled by the lagged total asset to 
reduce heteroskedasticity. 
b: The accrual model is estimated using the L&R technique: 
TAC;,, =ao+a1 (AREV,,, - AREC,,, ) +a2 PPE;, t+ a3 BM;, t+ a4 CFO;, t+E,,, 
where TAC;, t is the difference between operating cash flow and income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations; AREV;, t is the change in revenues from the preceding year; AREC, is the 
difference in accounts receivable from the start to the end of the year; PPE;, t is the gross value of 
property, plant, and equipment; BM;,, is measured as the ratio of the book value of common equity to 
the market value of common equity; and CFO;, t is the current operating cash flows. All variables are 
scaled by the average of total assets using assets from the start and end of the fiscal year. 
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.100,0.050 and 0.010 level, respectively. 
Panel B of Table 9.3. reports the statistics summary of mean coefficient estimates 
calculated through the L&R Model (e. g., Butler et al., 2004; Larcker and Richardson. 
2004). Consistent with the findings of Larcker and Richardson (2004) in testing their 
model on coefficients for parameter estimates, the current thesis finds a positive 
coefficient on 4REU;., -ZIREC,, (0.067 or 6.7%) and a negative coefficient on PPF1, (- 
0.020 or -2%). The values of these two variables are significantly dificrent 1i-om zero at 
0.01 (t=5.014) and 0.05 (1=-2.009) level respectively. Given the notion that investment 
in inventory and other assets are likely to accompany growth phases of firm's life cycle. 
McNichols (2000,2002) argues large accruals are expected to be seen in growing firms. 
This argument is well supported by the findings in the third column of Panel 13 "fahle 
9.3. BM;,, is introduced as a proxy to control the growth in firm's operations. Its mean 
value of 0.056 (5.6%) is positively related with the total accruals, and is significantly 
different from zero at 0.01 level (1=4.546). The mean coefficient estimate of the current 
cash flows (CFO,,, ) is -0.741 and significantly different from zero at 0.01 level (I - 
27.955). Larcker and Richardson (2004) also report a negative correlation in their study 
and argue that accruals and cash flows are negatively correlated as they are two 
contradictory phenomena. While the mean adjusted R2 is documented as about 30% In 
Larcker and Richardson (2004)'s work, it is reported as about 45'%, in the current thesis. 
As reviewed in the previous chapters, the Modified Jones Model may lead to 
misspecified results, when it is applied to samples of firm-year experiencing extreme 
financial performance (Dechow et al., 1995; McNichols, 2000; 2002, Larckcr and 
Richardson, 2004). In order to control the extreme financial performance, BA1(control 
for extreme growth in the firms) and CFO (control for extreme performance) are 
introduced in the L&R Model. By comparing the mean adjusted R2 which may limit the 
issue of higher R2 resulted from the additional variables in Panel A and 11 of"fahle 9.3., 
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the one obtained from the L&R Model is higher on average than that found using the 
Modified Jones Model. This fact reflects the L&R Model may provide better goodness 
of fit of the regression equation, as around 45% of total variation in the total accruals 
(dependent variable) is explained by the explanatory variables included in the model. 
And, it seems that the L&R Model may mitigate the misclassification issues in the 
Modified Jones Model (Bernard and Skinner, 1996; Dechow et al., 2003) to certain 
extent. 
9.4. Hypotheses Testing 
9.4.1. The Hypothesis of EM Trend in China's Listed 
Companies-Univariate Analysis 
Recall from the previous chapters, both TCE and AT propose that any improvements of 
corporate governance system can be seen as the efforts to minimise opportunistically 
discretionary behaviour thus lower transaction costs or agency costs among dilicrcnt 
groups according to the asset-specialised transactions or different risk hearing 
respectively (e. g., Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b; Williamson, 1984a; 2005b). From the 
perspective of Chinese Code 2002, it is formulated to enhance the integrity of financial 
statements through improving corporate governance system and bring liOrward the 
healthy development of the stock markets. Thus, this section to test whether the Chinese 
listed companies' level of EM is lower after the Code (or H 1). 
The results of the univariate tests through comparing the discretionary accruals 
(hereinafter referred to as DAs) in the post-Code period with those in the pre-('ode 
period are illustrated in Table 9.4. It contains the absolute (ABS positive 
(Positive_DAs), and negative (Negative_DAs") values of 1)As. In order to tiicilitatc 
comparison, the post-Code period is further divided into sub-periods, namely the post- 
Code period (A), (B), and (C) respectively. 
The statistics summary of absolute DAs (ABS_ DA, s') calculated from the Moditicd 
Jones Model is documented in Panel A of Table 9.4. It contains the 25"', 7.0' percentile, 
mean, median, and standard deviation (S. D. ). Overall, the results show a statistically 
significant reduction (significance level arranges from 0.05 to 0.10) in AUS U;, l, ý its 
Chinese listed companies after promulgation of the China's 2002 Code. In particular, 
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with 0.046 (4.6%) in the 25"' and 0.110 (11%) in the 75`h percentile, the mean and 
median of ABS DAs in the pre-Code period is around 0.091 (9.1%) and 0.072 (7.2%) 
respectively. By the end of 2006, while the results in the 25`" percentile and median are 
relatively stable, the 75`x' percentile of ABS-DAs reduces to 0.101 (10.1 %) from l1% in 
the pre-Code period. The reduction of standard deviation from 0.110 in the pre-Code 
period to 0.101 suggests less variation in ABS DAs in the post-Code period. More 
importantly, the mean value ofABS_DAs reduces significantly at 0.05 significance level 
(p-value=0.021) to 0.082 (8.2%) from 9.1% in the pre-Code period. By taking all 
together, with less variation in the value, the findings of ABS DAs show a significant 
reduction in the post-Code period. By further dividing the post-Code period into sub- 
periods, similar results are reported. In the post-Code period (A) and (13), while the 
mean of ABS DAs reduces to 0.083 (8.3%) and 0.080 (8.0%), the median falls to 0.065 
(6.5%) and 0.062 (6.2%) respectively. With the p-value arranged from 0.081 to 0.033, 
differences of mean and median between these two sub-periods and the pre-Code period 
are statistically significant (significant level arranges from 0.05 to 0.10 level). In the 
post-Code period (C) (or 2002-05), while the difference in median remains insignificant, 
the mean of ABS 
_DAs 
decreases to 8.3% with the significance level of' 0.10 (J)- 
value=0.066) from the pre-Code period. 
The second row of Panel A of Table 9.4. provides the statistical results liar 
positive DAs (Positive_DAs) calculated from the Modified Jones Model of ('hinese 
listed companies. With the 25`x' percentile of 0.000 and 75`x' percentile ol'O. 039 (3.8'%, ), 
the findings show the mean and median of Postive DAs is 0.029 (2.9%) and O. ()()K 
(0.08%) respectively with a standard deviation of 0.052 in the pre-('ode period. In the 
post-Code period, while the value of the 25`x' percentile remains (0.000) and a 
statistically insignificant (p-value=0.721) increase in the median (0.012, or 1.2'%x). the 
mean, 75`x' percentile, and standard deviation of J'osiviº, c, UA, v all dcmonstratc 
reductions to certain extent. Among these, the reduction of the mean Irom 2.9'x, in the 
pre-Code period to 2.5% in the post-Code period is significant at 0.10 level (J)- 
value=0.104). Furthermore, in the post-Code period (A), the mean ot'Postive 1)A. ß Dills 
to 0.023 (2.3%) from 0.029 in the pre-Code period, and the difference is significant at 
0.10 level (p-value=0.064). But the difference of median is insignificant. For the post- 
Code period (B), the difference of either mean or median is insignificant. By the end of 
2005, while the median is stable, the mean reduces to 0.024 (2.4%) which is 
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significantly different from that in the pre-Code period at 0.10 level (gy)-value=0.06x). In 
summary, the results document that the level of positive DAs in Chinese listed 
companies reduces significantly in the post-Code periods by comparing with those in 
the pre-Code period. 
For negative DAs (coded as Negative_DAs) of Chinese listed companies, with the 
25`h percentile of -0.089 (-8.9%) and 75`x' percentile of -0.012 (-1.2%), the mean and 
median of Negative DAs is -0.062 (-6.2%) and -0.044 (-4.4%) respectively in the pre- 
Code period. And, the standard deviation is around 0.068 (6.8%). In the post-Code 
period, Negative _DAs 
is, on average, lower in magnitude (0.050, or 5%) than that in the 
pre-Code period. And, the mean difference between these two periods is significant at 
0.05 level (ip-value=0.040). This is not only true for the mean, but also fier the 25`x' 
percentile, median, and standard deviation. Thus, it is argued that Negative DAV reduce 
significantly in the post-Code period comparing with that in the pre-Code period. In the 
post-Code period (A), the magnitude of average Negative DAs declines to 0.053 (5.3%) 
and the median reduces to 0.038 (3.8%). However, only the difference in mean between 
this sub-period and the pre-Code period is significant at 0.05 level (p-value -0.054). By 
the end of 2004, the difference in mean remains significant at 0.05 level (J)- 
value=0.044), as the magnitude of the mean further reduces to 0.052 (5.2%). In the post- 
Code period (C), while the magnitude of median shows a slight increase, the magnitude 
of mean of Negative DAs reduces to 0.055 (5.5%) trorn 0.062 (6.2` o) in the pre-Code 
period. But, the differences in mean and median between these two periods are 
statistically insignificant. Overall, the results also document the level ofnegative I)As is 
decreased significantly after the Code. 
By comparing the magnitude of mean and median between Negu/ivc' I)4. s and 
Positive_DAs over the study period, it shows that Negative DAs have larger magnituclc 
in both mean and median than the latter. In particular, Panel ß of "Fahle 9.4. provides a 
comparison of mean magnitude between Positive DAs and Negative, I)Ac across the 
study period by running t-test analysis. In contrast to the results of Cohen el r1/., (2008) 
that larger earnings increasing DAs are followed by smaller reversals or negative DAs 
in the US listed firms over the period of 1987 to 2005, the findings of the current thesis 
illustrate an adverse direction of DAs in the case of China. The Chinese listed 
companies engage in larger earnings decreasing DAs are followed by smaller positive 
265 
reversals. And, it is also true by dividing the whole post-Code period into sub-periods. 
The rational behind this is that rampant use of income-increasing DAs to meet target 
earnings may easily attract attention from regulators or other exterior institutions which 
eventually lead to additional monitoring mechanisms being imposed on firms. As stated 
by Peasnell el al., (2000), it may be either infeasible or prohibitively costly to manage 
earnings upwards to meet target earnings. Thus, this suggests a preference of' listed 
companies to adopt a `big bath' strategy through income decreasing choices to store up 
positive earnings for future periods (Degeorge ei al., 1999; Healy, 1985) since these 
choices are relatively hidden from other stakeholders. 
Panel C of Table 9.4 reports the statistic summary of DAs in Chinese listed 
companies calculated using the L&R Model (e. g., Butler el al., 2004, I. arcker and 
Richardson, 2004). For the absolute values (ABS-DAs) in the post-Code period, while 
the mean reduces to 0.061 (6.1%) from 0.073 (7.3%) in the pre-Code period, the median 
decreases to 0.051 (5.1%) from 0.059 (5.9%). And, the differences in both values are 
statistically significant at 0.01 (p-value=0.001) and 0.10 (p-value==0.081) level 
respectively. Moreover, the findings show that the 25`x', 75`x' percentile, and standard 
deviation of ABS DAs in the post-Code period are also decreased. By further breaking 
down the post-Code period into sub-periods, the findings illustrate a reduction in hotte 
mean and median in post-Code period (A) and (B), but only the differences in median 
between these two sub-periods and pre-Code period are reported to be significant at 
0.10 level (p-value=0.080 and 0.067). In the post-Code period (C), although the median 
of ABS DAs is relatively stable, the magnitude of mean shows a significant reduction at 
0.10 level (p-value=0.074) comparing with that in the pre-Code period. ('onsistent with 
results calculated from the Modified Jones Model, ABS DAs of Chinese listed 
companies in the L&R Model also demonstrate a significant decrease in the post-('ode 
period. 
The last two rows of Panel C. Table 9.4. present the statistics 5Unln1ary oI. positive 
and negative DAs obtained by running the L&R Model correspondingly. In particular, 
on average, Postive_DAs in the post-Code period falls to 0.020 (2.0%) from 2.6'/, in the 
pre-Code period, and the difference is significant at 0.01 (gy)-value=-0.000) level. The 
results also demonstrate a reduction in both the 75`x' percentile and standard deviation of 
Postive_DAs. All in all, and consistent with the results obtained through the Modified 
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Jones Model, positive DAs of Chinese listed companies decrease significantly in the 
post-Code period. Furthermore, in all the sub-periods, both mean and median show 
reductions to certain extent comparing with those in the pre-Code period. And most 
importantly, all differences are statistically significant at 0.05 and 0.01 level 
correspondingly. 
For negative DAs (Negative_DAs), there is a significant reduction in their 
magnitude across the study period. For instance, in the post-Code period, the magnitude 
of mean and median decreases to 4.5% and 2.4% respectively. By comparing with that 
in the pre-Code period, the differences are significant at 0.01 level. And, it is also true 
for the 25"', 75`x' percentile, standard deviation of Negative-DAs in the post-Code period. 
For the post-Code period (A), the reduction in magnitude of mean and median is also 
significant at 0.10 (p-value=0.088) and 0.05 (-value=0.035) level respectively. In the 
post-Code period (B), while the mean remains, the magnitude of the median is further 
decreased to 0.023 (2.3%). Thus, comparing with those in the pre-Code period, the 
difference of mean is still significant at 0.10 level, but the difference of median reaches 
0.01 significant level. In the post-Code period (C), while the reduction in magnitude of' 
median appears insignificant, the magnitude of mean reduces significantly at 0.10 level 
(p-value=0.104) from that in the pre-Code period. 
And repeatedly, the findings illustrates Negative DAs have larger magnitude in 
both mean and median than Positive_DAs. A comparison analysis of mean magnitude 
between Negative DAs and Positive_DAs calculated using the 1, &R Model is given in 
Panel D of Table 9.4. More generally, the results are consistent with those generated in 
the Modified Jones Model. It reflects that the Chinese listed companies engage in larger 
earnings decreasing DAs are followed by smaller income increasing DAs. 
In summary, firstly the findings obtained by applying the univariatc statistical 
tests have provided consistent evidence to support hypothesis 1 (111) as I)As (in all 
types) are declined significantly after the passage of the Code. Secondly, the results also 
reveal that Chinese listed companies engage in larger earnings decreasing I)As are 
followed by smaller income-increasing DAs. And finally, the findings o1 DAs reported 
by running the Modified Jones Model and the L&R Model are consistent. 't'his suggests 
the findings obtained are robust. 
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Figure 9.1. Panel A and B provide graphical illustration of DAs using the 
Modified Jones and L&R Model respectively. In Panel A, the trends in ABS DA. s, 
Positive DAs, and Negative DAs indicate reduction in the level of fM to certain extent 
across the study period. More importantly, the trends demonstrate that the post-Code 
period (2002-2006) is, indeed, associated with a higher level of decrease in FM 
comparing with that in the pre-Code period (2000-2001). Consistent with the results 
represented in Panel A, Panel B also shows a higher level of decrease in DAs in the 
post-Code period. 
Figure 9.1.: The trends in discretionary accruals across the study period 
Panel A: Discretionary accruals calculated from the Modified Jones Model 
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9.4.2. The Hypotheses of Corporate Governance and EM in 
China's Listed Companies-Multivariate Regression 
Analysis 
9.4.2.1. Model Fitness Tests 
By using the univariate analysis to investigate the time-trend in EM metrics in Chinese 
listed companies (HI), the results provided in the previous section have approved I'M 
activities are declined significantly after passage of the China's 2002 Code. Through the 
multivariate regression analysis, the second phase is to investigate the impacts of the 
mechanisms of corporate governance enforced by the Code on EM practices in China. 
The mechanisms included arrange from the executive compensation (coded as L 00,11) 
to the characteristics of the largest shareholder (ownership concentration and type) in 
the listed companies (or H2-H8). Before moving to this phase, current section provides 
the model fitness tests, including the tests for skewness, kurtosis, multicollinearity, and 
heteroscedasticity of explanatory and control variables. 
Table 9.5. Panel A., B., and C. illustrate the results respectively. In particular. the 
skewness and kurtosis statistics of independent and control variables are provided in 
Panel A. The skewness statistics fall in the range of 0.07 and 0.452 (ignoring minus 
sings) with the relevant standard error of 0.238. The kurtosis statistics are hctwecn 
0.098 and 0.844 (ignoring the minus sings) and the standard error of the kurtosis is 
0.472. All the skewness and kurtosis are no greater than twice their standard error, thus 
the distributions of those variables are not significantly different from normal. 
Table 9.5.: Tests for skewness, kurtosis, multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity 
Panel A.: Tests of skewness and kurtosis 
Skewness Kurti 
Independent Variables: Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
EXCOM 0.452 0.238 0.773 
INDBOARD -0.242 0.238 -0.574 
AUDCOM 0.423 0.238 -0.693 
AUDITOR 0.252 0.238 0.581 
INSTITUTE 0.438 0.238 0.712 
TOP1 0.169 0.238 0.441 
STATE -0.383 0.238 -0.644 
Control Variables: 
Ln SIZE 0.408 0.238 0.492 
LEVERAGE 0.383 0.238 0.844 
Ln_SALE -0.260 0.238 0.098 
ST PT 0.051 0.238 __ 0.276 
ISSUING 0.070 0.238 0.769 
ISIS 
Std. Error 
0.472 
0.472 
0.472 
0.472 
0,472 
0.472 
0.472 
0.472 
0.472 
0.472 
0.472 
0.472 
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Panel B. of Table 9.5. reports the correlation matrix between independent and 
control variables, which demonstrates the Pearson's correlations and Variance Inflation 
Factors (or VIF). Overall, the results show that the risk of bias due to strong correlations 
among covariates is minimal as all VIFs are less than two, thus giving little cause for 
concern about the problem of multicollinearity. 
In particular, it is revealed that executives of the privately controlled firms tend to 
earn more than their colleagues in the State-controlled firms. As executives of the State- 
controlled firms may simultaneously hold certain positions in the government agencies, 
they thus concern more about their political career rather than salaries or bonuses could 
be received from the companies (Liu and Lu, 2007). And, the more the executives being 
paid the higher the chance that companies being punished by the market (labelled as 
either ST or PT). This reflects that some executives focus more on how well they will 
be paid instead of the real performance of firms. And, larger private firms with less 
dominant from the biggest shareholder, high institutional ownership, and active debt- 
financing strategy tend to have large number of independent directors served and an 
audit committee established on their board. Further, the large and profitable State- 
controlled firms with less active debt-financing strategy are more likely to employ one 
of the Big 4 auditor and attract investments from institutional shareholders. In addition, 
institutions are also more like to invest in the firms with less chance to he labelled as 
either ST or PT and issue additional shares (or seasoned equity oilers). Furthermore, the 
State-owned firms are normally large and profitable. And, they use less debt-finacing 
and issue few additional shares. 
Heteroscedasticity is tested by performing the White's test. White's test is 
asymptotically distributed as a x2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of'slope 
coefficients, excluding the constant, in the test regression (21 coefficients in the 
following regressions). Regarding Panel C., since the Ohs*R-. cyuarL(/ obtained from the 
Eviews 5.0 of six corresponding regressions based on two models in calculating I, M are 
all less than 5% critical x2 value of 32.6705, we cannot statistically reject the null 
hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity. Thus, heteroscedasticity should not be an issue in 
this thesis. 
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9.4.2.2. Multivariate Regression Results 
This section examines the trend in EM activities by firms and the impacts of' the 
mechanisms with regard to corporate governance enforced by the 2002 Code on I. M 
practices. Table 9.6. represents the results by running OLS regression models (the 
justification of the choice of model estimation method is provided in Chapter 8). In 
particular, Panel A. of Table 9.6. reports the results when absolute value of DAs are 
calculated using the Modified Jones Model, ABS_ DAs, and when DAs are split into 
positive and negative DAs. Panel B reports the results when DAs are obtained through 
the L&R Model. The estimated coefficients, /-statistics, R`, adjusted R2 and PP'-value 
from the regressions of DAs calculated through these two models on corporate 
governance variables and variables to control firms' characteristics are provided. 
For regressions of both models in measuring DAs, more generally, they are highly 
significant. The adjusted Res illustrated in Panel A are between 10.4`%O and 12.0% and 
the F-value arranges from 10.663 to 12.75 are highly significant. For regressions of' 
DAs obtained using the L&R Model, the adjusted R2s are between 1O. 5'%, and 12. % 
and the F-value falls in the range of 12.960 to 38.380 and are highly significant. 'these 
adjusted R2s obtained in the current thesis are fairly comparable with those in the 
similar studies, for example Warfield et al., 's (1995) adjusted R2: 8.34", x, -12.48°',,, bill 
and Lu's (2007) adjusted R2: 2.83%, Ding el al-'s (2007) adjusted R2: 3.8%- l2.3",.. or 
Lo el al., (2010)'s adjusted R2: 5.8%-6.6%. 
The Trend in EM Activities' (Hl 
In consistence with the findings obtained previously, the results here also document a 
decreasing trend in level of EM in Chinese listed companies, especially in the post- 
Code period. For instance, in Panel A of Table 9.6., while the positive correlation 
(0.001) between variable TIME and negative DAs calculated using the Modified JOncs 
Model is insignificant, the coefficients under ABS DAS (-0.003) and 1'0. Vrii1,,, /)". 1. s (- 
0.004) are negative and significant at 0.10 level. For the dummy variable it is 
negatively related to the absolute value of DAs (-0.041), and significant at 0. OI level. 
Similar results are obtained by splitting DAs into positive and negative values. While 
the correlation between CODE and Positive_DAs is -0.067 and significant at 0. u level. 
CODE is positively correlated (0.038) with Negative DAs at 0.05 significant level. As 
the decreasing trend in EM proved by the results of durnmy variable TiA/1: '. the results 
27(, 
suggest that, controlling for corporate governance and firm's characteristics variables. 
the period after promulgation of the Code is characterised by lower accrual-based l: M 
and this decrease primarily resulted from a decrease in income-increasing IIIM as the 
magnitude of CODE coefficient under Positve_DAs is the highest. 0.067. 
The Executive Compensation (H2a ýi H2b) 
The theoretical view on the effectives of executive compensation proposed by AT is 
contradictory to the argument originated from TCE. While AT argues that manages are 
more likely to make operating and investing decisions that can maximise shareholder 
wealth by tying their compensation strategy to performance, 'l'('l: states that 
remuneration strategy as an ex ante alignment may not be an effective mechanism to 
prevent opportunistic discretion given the written contracts are never complete and 
mangers are given to be opportunism. 
However, to my best knowledge, there is no published study to empirically 
investigate the impact of executive compensation on FM practices in C'hina's listed 
companies. In line with AT, it is conjectured that due to the lack of stock options 
utilised in China, tying executive compensation to performance advanced from the one 
that was totally separated from the performance in the 1980s may become a mechanism 
to align the interests of managers with those of the shareholders, thus may encourage 
them to act on behalf of shareholders and limit their opportunistically discretionary 
behaviour. 
The results of testing the relationship between executive compensation and I .M 
practices in Chinese listed companies over time are represented in row 3 and 
4 (EXCOM*CODE) of Panel A. Table 9.6. however, none of the relationship under 
different categories of DAs is either statistically or economically significant, as the 
coefficients are near to zero (0.000). This doesn't support the conjecture that tying 
executive compensation to firm performance in China may be regarded as an alignment 
mechanism as argued by AT. One possible explanation is that executives of ('hinese 
listed companies, especially those transferred from the State-owned F. nterpriscs, usually 
hold certain positions in the government agencies other than directorships in the listed 
companies. They thus concern more about their political career rather than the salaries 
or bonuses could be received from the companies (Liu and Lu, 2007). All in all, the 
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results obtained from the multivariate regressions don't support hypotheses 2a and 2h. 
And implicitly, the results also indicate that the performance-based executive 
compensation in China may not be considered as the incentive to engage in DAs as 
proposed by TCE and empirical studies based on the Western experiences (e. g.. Raker 
et al., 2003; Cohen et al., 2008; Gao and Shrieves, 2002). 
The Independence of the Board (H3a & Hab) 
Both TCE and AT have mentioned the role of the board in monitoring managerial 
discretion. And, for the board composition, both theories argue corporate hoards should 
include outside members, that is, members who are not internal managers, and hold a 
majority of seats. The outside board members act as arbiters in disagreements among 
internal managers and carry out tasks that involve severe problems between internal 
managers and residual claimants, for instance, setting executive compensation or 
searching for replacements for top managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983h; Jensen, 2004. 
2005; Williamson, 1984a). 
With regard to the results, the proportion of independent non-executive directors 
on the board (INDBOARD) is found to be negatively related to . '9R. ß' D. 1. ß (0.055) sind 
Positive DAs (-0.053) respectively, and is positively related to Negwirr 
And all correlations are significant at 0.10 level. It reflects that the independent non- 
executive directors do mitigate the opportunistically discretionary behaviours through 
effective monitoring in Chinese listed companies across the study period. 'I he results 
extend the Chen et al., (2006)'s study by stating that in addition to effectively detecting 
overstatement errors and accounting frauds, the independent directors constrain firms 
from engaging accrual-based EM practices. Consistent with the results of I'easncll ('t u/ 
(2000) on examining effectiveness of independent non-executives alter promulgation of 
the UJK Cadbury Report in 1992, the findings of the current thesis illustrate that, in the 
post-Code period, the effect between independent directors and I)As increases 
significantly. In particular, INDBOARD*CODE is negatively correlated with ; I/3, ti' 
(-0.098), Positive_DAs (-0.077), and positively related with Negative /). 1s ((). 117) at 
0.05 significant level. 
By taking all together, consistent with the prior literature (e. g., Beasley, 1096; 
Dechow ei al., 1996; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2000,2005; Xie eI al., 2003), the 
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results of the current thesis suggest that independent non-executive directors decrease 
the incentives to manipulate reported earnings through effective monitoring the listed 
companies. And, this effect is primarily resulted from the promulgation and 
enforcement of the 2002 Code, as it further strengthens the independence of the non- 
executives on the board in Chinese listed companies. Therefore, hypotheses )a and 3h 
are supported by the results. 
The Infernal and External Audi! (H4a & H4b; HSa & H5b) 
Theoretically, the importance of internal and external audit on monitoring activities is 
highlighted by both TCE and AT. In particular, TCE argues that while some managers 
play "end games" (undisclosed strategic decisions to cut and run before corrective 
measures can be taken), others may disclose information selectively or distort data. 
Additional checks against such concealment and distortion provided by independent 
audit committees and accredited accounting firms are thus required to he created 
(Williamson, 1984). In the similar vein, AT proposes that an independent audit 
committee should be an outstanding function in monitoring activities. In principle. 
external auditors could act as a checking point to make sure the financial information 
published is comprehensive, punctual, and accurate (Jensen, 2000). 
Regarding the creation of audit committee (A(JI)('UA1) on the hoard, the results 
demonstrate a negative and statistically significant correlation between : 1(ß'J)('11, %1 and 
positive DAs (Posilive_DAs) across the study period with coct'licient of' -0.040 and 
significant level at 0.05. And, this effect increases significantly in the post-('ode period 
as the coefficient on AUDC'OM*C'ODE reaches -0.045 with significant level of I°(). 
This suggests that audit committees could provide diligent oversight to ensure 
management is not compromising shareholder interests (e. g.. Archa, nhcault and 
DeZoort, 2001; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1991; Kunitakc. 1983). and this cl'füct is 
significantly increased in the post-Code period suggesting audit committee as 
monitoring mechanism is strengthened by enforcing the 2002 ('ode. ('lien and %hanp 
(2010a) argue that audit committees effectively promote convcrpencc of, ('Itinnese 
accounting practices with IFRS practices by mitigating opportunistically nmaiiageri. al 
discretion in applying different accounting standards. The results tour Posifiv(' /).. t,, of 
the current thesis further extend their argument by stating that audit committees can also 
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constrain opportunistic discretion in using income-increasing DAs to manipulate 
reported earnings in China. 
The coefficient on AUDCOM is negative for ABS__DAs (-0.01 1) and positive for 
Negative DAs (0.008) but statistically insignificant. While the coefficients for both 
ABS DAs (0.014) and Negative DAs (-0.011) turn into adverse direction in the post- 
Code period, however, none is statistically significant. One possible explanation is that, 
since income-decreasing choices to store up positive earnings for future periods 
(Degeorge et al., 1999; Healy, 1985) are relatively hidden comparing with aggressive 
income-increasing DAs, lack of qualified accounting professionals on the audit 
committees coupled with ineffective financial infrastructures (e. g., monitoring system. 
ethic education or training, legal infrastructure and enforcement) in China (Ball cl al., 
2000; Chen, 2005; Chen et al., 2002; Chen and Zhang, 2010a, La Porta Cl al.. 20(X)h; 
Leuz et al., 2003) mainly contribute to their failures in detecting and mitigating income- 
decreasing accruals used by listed companies. 
All in all, although audit committees mitigate positive DAs of ('bimse listed 
companies, especially in the post-Code period, it does not provide sufficient monitoring 
on the income-decreasing DAs due to lack of quality accounting professionals. 
Eventually, the findings could partially support the hypotheses 4a and 4h. 
In contrast to the prior literature on supporting the notion that Jill-ge , audit firms 
have more resources, expertises and incentives to mitigate FM (e. g.. Recker ei c11.. 1')yK; 
Francis et al., 1999; Gore et al., 2001; Krishnan, 2003; Van ]'endeloo and Vanstraelen, 
2005,2008), the results reported in row 9 (AUDITOR) don't show any significant 
correlation with EM for the entire period, and this association does not change 
significantly in the post-Code period either (A(JDITOR*Co/)E). This reflects that 
replacing a Chinese local CPA firm with an international reputable audit firm (the Rig 4) 
to audit financial statements does not contribute to the reduction in FM in 'I htus, 
taking the notion of ineffective financial infrastructures in China, it is argued that the 
quality of audit performed by the same auditor, even if the international reputable one, 
such as the Big 4, may be different from it appears in a well-developed institutional 
system. Accordingly, the results don't support hypotheses 5a and Sb. 
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The Institutional Investors (H6a & H6b) 
It is generally believed that due to the greater accessibility to firm information coupled 
with concentrated voting power, institutional investor could make managers to töcus 
more on corporate performance and less on opportunistic and/or sell-serving behaviour 
through constant monitor, discipline and influence of managers (e. g., Bainbridge, 2005; 
Brav et al., 2008; Jensen, 2000; Williamson, 2007). And, 'I'CE and AT mention that 
being active is the core in constraining opportunistically managerial discretion. This is 
to be backed up by direct engagement in the firms where appropriate (. Jensen. 2000. 
Williamson, 2007). 
The role of institutional investors (INSTITUTE) on mitigating IN practices over 
time in China is examined in row 1I and 12 respectively (116, & 116,, ). For the positive 
DAs, there is negative (-0.109) and statistically significant (significant level of' 0.01 ) 
correlation with shares held by institutional investors in listed companies across time. 
This effect between Positive DAs and INSTITUTE is strengthened significantly in the 
post-Code suggesting the monitoring power of institutional investors is enhanced by the 
Code. The coefficient between Positive DAY and INS7'ITU7'1: *('QI)1: is -0.137 and 
significant at 1% level. The results between positive DAs and institutional ownership 
support the argument proposed earlier that due to the greater accessibility to firm 
information coupled with concentrated voting power, institutional investor could make 
managers to focus more on corporate performance and less on opportunistic and/or sell'- 
serving behaviour through constantly monitor, discipline and influence of' managers. 
However, it is also stated that in order to secure the value of ultimate beneficiaries 
(stakeholders) through constant monitoring the performance ofcompanies, institutional 
investors are required to be active. One of the conditions which may lead them to be 
active in monitoring activities is large blocks of shares held in the firms (c. g.. 
Bainbeidge, 2005; Chen and Zhang, 2010b; Gillan and Starks, 2000). Comparing with 
the developed market, such as around 55% of US equities are owned by institutional 
shareholders, and institutional ownership is around 41% in 11K, the average 
shareholding of institutional investors in China is just around 6% by the end of 2006. 
Due to such smaller shareholding, institutional investors may not he effective in 
monitoring managerial discretion as they are in the Western countries ((iillan and Starks, 
2000). The results of ABS_DAs and Negative DAs provide evidence for the above 
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argument, as their correlations with shareholding of institutional investors are 
statistically insignificant either in the entire period or the post-Code period. One 
possible explanation is that as a large amount of resources are required to detect and 
effectively reduce the income-decreasing DAs of firms which are more hidden. 
institutional investors who only hold a fraction of shares in Chinese listed companies 
are not willingly to invest in such monitoring resources. The results also suggest the 
inefficiency of Chinese stock market and the incompleteness of Chinese institutional 
environment. The institutional investors may find themselves in a disadvantageous 
position in the Chinese stock markets and concern about their welfare being 
expropriated by other controlling shareholders. They keep low shareholding and 
typically hold their shares for a short term which consequently constrain their 
motivations in monitoring activities. Thus, the findings provide evidence to partially 
support hypotheses 6a and 6b. 
The Characteristics of the Largest Shareholder (H7; H8) 
Other than the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders pinpointed by 
Jensen and Meckling's work in 1976 and Williamson's work in 1994 respectively. 
recent developments in corporate governance have highlighted another form of conflict 
of interests-action being taken by the controlling shareholders for their own benefit, at 
the expense of minority shareholders (La Porta el a!., 1997; 1999; 2000a: h; Velure and 
Jenkins, 2006). As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 758), "large investors may 
represent their own interests, which need not coincide with the interests of other 
investors in the firm. " Comparing with the conflict of interests between management 
and shareholders, the essential effect of both scenarios is the same: insiders, through 
their control of the firm, pursue their private benefits at the costs of outsiders (Ding ei 
al., 2007). In order to mitigate the expropriation of minority shareholders' interests bv 
controlling shareholders, prior literature focuses on the role played by a strong and 
efficient investor protection system (Claessens et u!., 2000,2002; La Porta o ul.. 1()()8; 
1999; Leuz et al., 2003; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Shen and Chili, 2007). 
The influences of largest shareholders on FM in Chinese listed companies over 
time are investigated in row 13 to 16 Panel A. Table 9.6., including their ownership 
concentration (TOP]) and type (STATE). In particular, coefficient on TON of the entire 
period is positive for ABS DAs (0.015) and Posi/ivc DAS (0.046), and negative ti)r 
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Negative DAs (-0.006), while the correlation with Positive DAs is significant at 5°/,. 
And, by categorising controlling shareholders based on different types of ownership (or 
State vs. private), the results in row 15 (STATE) demonstrate that State-dominated listed 
companies exhibit positive correlation with ABS-DAs (0.014) at 0.05 significant level 
for the entire period. Consistent with the findings reported by Ding el al.. (2007), the 
controlling shareholders in general manipulate reported earnings through DAs over time. 
And, by comparing DAs of the State-controlled firms with those used by the privately- 
owned companies, the State-controlled firms significantly engages in more DAs over 
the study period. 
In regard to the impact of the controlling shareholders on FM in the post-Code 
period compared with that in the pre-Code period, coefficient on TOPI *('01)1 , 'is 0.030 
for ABS DAs, 0.050 and -0.033 for Positive DAs and Negative DAs respectively. And, 
all correlations are significant at the level arranged from 0.01 to 0.10. The results of the 
biggest shareholders' type (STATE*('ODE) provide the similar evidence. In particular. 
while STATE*CODE is positively correlated with Posi/ive i)As (0.023) at 10N%%ß 
significant level, it is negatively related to Negative DAY (-0.023) at 5% significant 
level. And, there is a significantly positive correlation between ABS /)A. c and 
STATE*CODE (0.021) at 5% level. As the effect of engaging in EM activities by listed 
companies with controlling shareholders, and especially who are ultimately controlled 
by the government is significantly increased in the post-Code period, it is argued that, in 
practice, the promulgation of 2002 Code on controlling shareholders and State 
domination doesn't constrain their opportunistic behaviour through expropriating 
minority shareholders' interests. Therefore, such inefficiency of' 2002 Code illustrates 
the investor protection in Chinese stock market is not enhanced alter the ('ode, and it is 
relatively limited on mitigating EM practices. Overall, the results of characteristics of 
the largest shareholders extend the argument of Ding ei a!.. (2007) by not only stating 
the controlling shareholders and State-owned firms use 1)As to manipulate earnings 
more, but also proving the weak legal protection system in China is the primary reason. 
Correspondingly, the findings don't support either hypothesis 7 or hypothesis K. 
The results of control variables are also interesting. First of all, highly leveraged 
firms (LEVERAGE) are positively correlated with ABS DAs (0,012) at PV % significant 
level, indicating that they manipulate reported earnings to avoid potential loss Isom 
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disclosing financial problem (e. g., Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Richardson, 2000, 
Sweeny, 1994). Truthful revelation of financial statements by firms in short-term 
financial difficulty may lead to an increase in financing costs as well as the loss of key 
employees. Further, the findings reveal that highly-leveraged firms are more likely to 
engage in both income-increasing and income-decreasing choices to manipulate 
reported earnings. Secondly, the coefficient on firms' profitability (Lii Sales) is 
negative for ABS DAs and Positive DAs, and positive for Negative DAs. All 
correlations are significant arranged from 0.01 to 0.10 level. These indicate that poorly 
performing firms tend to have higher levels of EM not only through applying dill rent 
accounting standards as argued by Chen and Zhang (2010a), but also DAs. And finally, 
firms in financial difficulty (ST PT) also manage their earnings, but downward through 
Negative DAs (-0.043 with 1% significant level). Before their rights issue (ISSUING), 
firms tend to maximize their earnings through operating accruals, as coetlicients for 
ABS DAs (0.006) and Positive_DAs (0.009) are positive and significant at 0.10 level. 
These results are consistent with findings in the extant literature (e. g., Chen and Yuan. 
2006; Ding et al., 2007, Srinidhi et al., 2004), confirming that Chinese firms do manage 
earnings to meet the market and regulatory requirements. 
Panel B of Table 9.6. reports OLS regression results of I)As using the I, &R 
Model on corporate governance and control variables. Overall, the results are nearly 
symmetric to those illustrated in Panel A in which DAs are measured by the Modified 
Jones Model. This indicates that these two models should he viewed as conlplenient. u-y 
rather than contradictory or one form can supersede the other. It also proves that the 
results obtained are robustness. In particular, the coefficient on J'/A1/; ' is negative I'm, 
ABS DAs and Positive DAs, while positive for Negative DAs. And, the former two are 
significant at 0.10 level. For the coefficient on ('ODE, it is negative (fit- ABS D. -l. c and 
Positive DAs) and positive (for Negative DAs), and statistically significant at the level 
arranged from 5% to 10%. INDBOARD is found to he negatively correlated with 
ABS_DAs and Positive DAs, and positively related with Neg(tive 1); 1s for the entire 
period. And the correlations are significant at 0.05 and 0.10 level correspondingly. This 
effect is significantly increased in the post-Code period as the coeflicients on 
INDBOARD*CODE reach -0.158, -0.070, and 0.063 accordingly. And, all are 
statistically significant. The negative correlation between A UD('OA1 and /'nsinre- 
increased significantly in the post-Code, as coefficient on AUD('QAJ*('OI)}: reaches 
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-0.016 at 0.05 significant level. Institutional shareholding is negatively and significantly 
correlated with usage of positive DAs over time. In post-Code period, the correlation 
remains significant at 1% but the coefficient reaches -0.100. Controlling shareholders 
(TOP]) and State-dominated firms (STATE) are found to manipulate earnings over time. 
Their significant correlations in the Post-Code period indicate the inefficiency of 
investor protection in China's stock market. 
Control variables of Ln Size, LEVERAGE, Ln Sales, ST PT and ISSUING are 
significantly correlated with DAs. Among them, firm size (Ln Size) is negatively and 
significantly correlated with ABS DAs and Positive DAs, which indicates that as Nigger 
firms are often required to disclose their financial information, thus have Icss 
probability to manage earnings (e. g., Lee and Choi, 2002, Van 'l endeloo and 
Vanstraelen, 2005). 
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Table 9.6.: Discretionary accruals and corporate governance mechanisms: multivariate 
regression analysis 
Panel A: Discretionary accrual calculated from the Modified Jones Model 
EM Modified Jones Model- 
ßo+ß1*TIME+ß2*CODE+ß3*EXCOM+ß4*EXCOM*CODE+p5*INDBOARD 
+06*INDBOARD *CODE+Iß7*AUDCOM+%38*AUDCOM *CODE 
+)99*AUDCOM*CODE+310*AUDITOR+311 *AUDITOR*CODE+1312*INSTITUTE 
+1313*INSTITUTE*CODE+ßI4*TOP1+(3,5*TOP1 *CODE+016*STATE 
+ß1 7*STATE *CODE+(318 *Ln_Size+ß19 *LEVERAGE+(310 *Ln_Sales 
+ßf321 *ST PT +iß22*ISSUING+e 
ABS DAs Positiv e DAs Negativ e DAs 
Variables Coefficien t (t-stat) Coefficien t (t-stat) Coefficien t (t-stat) 
TIME -0.003* (-1.739) -0.004* (-1.649) 0.001 (0.602) 
CODE -0.041*** (-2.737) -0.067** (-2.472) 0.038** (1.990) 
EXCOM 0.000 (0.646) 0.000 (0.453) 0.000 (1.248) 
EXCOM*CODE 0.000 (-0.796) 0.000 (-0.094) 0.000 (-1.316) 
INDBOARD -0.055* (-1.836) -0.053* (-1.761) 0.052* (1.848) 
INDBOARD*CODE -0.098** (-2.006) -0.077** (-1.996) 0.117** (1.960) 
AUDCOM -0.011 (-0.760) -0.040** (-2.201) 0.008 (0.448) 
AUDCOM*CODE 0.014 (0.939) -0.045*** (-2.724) -0.011 (-0.554) 
AUDITOR 0.004 (0.308) 0.007 (0.357) -0.004 (-0.227) 
AUDITOR*CODE -0.001 (-0.040) -0.002 
---- (-0.817) -0.003 (-0.190) 
INSTITUTE 0.026 (0.901) -0.109*** (-2.637) 0.021 (0.348) 
INSTITUTE*CODE -0.044 (-0.650) -0.137*** (-2.725) -0.037 (-0.546) 
TOP1 0.015 (1.508) 0.046** (2.082) -0.006 (-0.296) 
TOP1*CODE 0.030*** (2.802) 0.050*** (2.578) -0.033* ( 1.742) 
STATE 0.014** (1.972) 0.013 (0.936) 0.010 (0.889) 
STATE*CODE 0.021** (2.324) 0.023* (1.675) -0.023** (-1.989) 
Ln_Size -0.001 (-0.197) 0.000 (-0.042) 0.002 (0.280) 
LEVERAGE 0.022*** (6.492) 0.017** (2.192) -0.021*** (-5.736) 
Ln Sales -0.047*** (-8.991) -0.035* (-1.904) 0.049*** (8.175) 
ST PT 0.029*** (4.151) -0.003 (-0.255) -0.043*** (5.031) 
ISSUING 0.006* (1.661) 0.009* (1.691) -0.001 (-0.294) 
Intercept 0.154*** (3.422) 0.104 (1.439) -0.154*** (-3.036) 
R2 0.1 27 0.1 41 0.1 15 
Adjusted R2 0.1 09 0.1 20 0. 104 
F-value (Pr>F) 12.755 ( <0.0001) 11.915 ( <0.0001) 10.663 ( <0.0001) 
* ** *** Denote sign ificance (2-tail ed) at 0.100,0 . 050 and 0.010 level, respec tively. 
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Table 9.6.: Discretionary accruals and corporate governance mechanisms: multivariate 
regression analysis (continued) 
Panel B: Discretionary accrual calculated from the L&R Model 
EM L&R Modes = )go+, 81 *TI ME+ß2 *CODE+ß3 *EXCOM+ß4 *EXCOM *CODE+ßs *1 NDBOARD 
+ß6 *INDBOARD*CODE+9 *AUDCOM+ß8*AUDCOM*CODE+ß9*AUDCOM*CODE 
+310*AUDITOR+x811 *AUDITOR *CODE+ß12*INSTITUTE+ß13*INSTITUTE *CODE 
+1314 *TOP1+/315 *TOP1 *CODE+916 *STATE+(317 *STATE *CODE+ß, 8 *L n_Size 
+319*LEVERAGE+020*Ln_Sales+021*ST PT +ß2Z*ISSUING+E 
ABS DAs Positive DAs Negative DAs 
Variables Coefficien t (t-stat) Coefficien t (t-stat) Coefficient (t-stat) 
TIME -0.002* (-1.683) -0.001* (-1.702) 0.001 (0.678) 
CODE -0.035** (-2.078) -0.040* (-1.808) 0.033* (1.757) 
EXCOM 0.000 (0.173) 0.000 (0.073) 0.000 (0.292) 
EXCOM*CODE 0.000 (-0.174) 0.000 (-0.321) 0.000 (-1.291) { 
INDBOARD -0.049** (-2.249) -0.046* (-1.765) 0.039* (1.682) 
INDBOARD*CODE -0.158*** (-3.209) -0.070** (-1.985) 0.063* (1.753) 
AUDCOM 0.005 (0.281) -0.012* (-1.844) 0.006 (0.296) 
AUDCOM*CODE -0.003 (-0.162) -0.016** (-1.992) 0.007 (0.225) 
AUDITOR 0.004 (0.334) 0.005 (0.718) 0.004 (0.204) 
AUDITOR*CODE 0.007 (0.511) -0.015 (-1.498) 0.004 (0.216) 
INSTITUTE 0.061 (1.244) -0.083*** (-3.669) 0.007 (0 
INSTITUTE*CODE 0.037 (0.716) -0.100*** (-2.501) 0.000 (0.02.023 3) 
TOP1 0.008 (0.482) 0.016 (1.380) -0.009 (-0.360) 
TOPI CODE * 0.026* (1.799) 0.023* (1.837) 0.015 (0.059) 
STATE 0.009 (0.928) 0.012** (2.085) -0.022* (-1.742) 
STATE*CODE 0.022** (2.000) 0.012* (1.681) -0.045*** ( 2.834) 
Ln_Size -0.020*** (-4.288) -0.012*** (-3.465) -0.000 (-0.015) 
LEVERAGE 0.023*** (6.590) 0.018** (2.258) -0.021*** (-5.296) 
Ln_Sales -0.113*** (-11.700) -0.073** (-2.329) 0.071*** (12.138) 
ST PT -0.001 (-0.160) - 0.003 -- --- (0.578) -0.012* (-1.646) 
ISSUING 0.017*** (4.575) 0.002 (0.911) -0.011** (-2.023) 
Intercept 0.067 (1.599) 0.151*** (4.920) -0.146*** (-2.492) 
R2 0.1 24 0.1 05 0.119 
Adjusted 0.1 18 ---- -- 0.1 ---- 03 0.106 
F-value (Pr>F) 38.380 ( <0.0001) 12.960 ( <0.0001) 15.0170 (<0.0001) 
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.100,0.050 and 0.010 level, respectively 
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9.4.3. Robustness Tests 
SUSPECT firm Analysis 
One concern in the above analysis is whether the proxies used are capturing F NI 
activities of Chinese listed firms, or whether these trends illustrated represent some 
other phenomenon. To provide construct validity for the proxies. additional tests are 
provided using "suspect firms" (SUSPECT) that are likely to have managed earnings 
based on the benchmarks that firms are likely to have incentives to meet (liurgstahler 
and Dichev, 1997; Cohen et al., 2008; Peasnell el al., 2000; Roychovvdhury. 2006). In 
the prior research, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Peasnell ei al., (2000) examine two 
earnings targets. Specifically, they are the targets of avoiding reporting losses and 
earnings declines. Another possible target is meeting analysts earnings forecasts. 
Degeorge et al., (1999) find that while managers appear to manipulate reported earnings 
upwards to meet analysts' forecasts, EM practices to avoid losses and earnings declines 
proves predominant. Therefore, based on the analysis of Burgstahlcr and I)ichev (1907 ). 
the following tests use avoidance of losses and earnings declines as the benchmarks. 
Using this subsample, the main objective is to empirically examine \ohether 1, N1 
strategies (i. e., the values of DAs measured by either the Modified Jones Model or I .&k 
Model, DAs) used by Chinese listed firms to meet the benchmarks have changed in the 
post-Code period as compared to the pre-Code period. 
First, as in Cohen ei al., (2008), Roychowdhury (2006), this thesis indlentities 
firm-year observations with net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets 
that lies in the interval [0,0.005) (these are labelled as SUSPECT fir-nm-years), since it is 
likely that these firms during these years manage their earnings to report income 
marginally above zero (Peasnell ei al., 2000). Next, a second measure o St ýSPI1(' I 
firm-years is calculated as the change in net income he(ore extraordinary items from the 
previous year scaled by total assets lies in the interval 10,0.005). This latter definition is 
consistent with evidence in prior research that firms are more likely to manage earnings 
in order to meet prior years' earnings numbers (e. g., Degeorge ei al., 199): (irah: un ei 
al., 2005; Peasnell el al., 2000). The results for these two measures are reported in 
Table 9.7. Panel A and B respectively. While Panel A provides the results by crýnlharing 
mean DAs of `SUSPECT' firms that manage earnings to 'just" avoid reporting losses in 
the pre-Code period with that in the Post-Code period, Panel 11 demonstrates the I.. M 
28K 
activities of the firms which are suspected to have the objective of meeting or beating 
last year's net income. 
Overall, the findings propose several arguments that are consistent with those 
obtained from the main models. Firstly, income-decreasing DAs are used by both 
`SUSPECT' subgroups which arrange from -0.034 to -0.013 in both before and after the 
Code. This supports the argument proposed earlier that rampant use of income- 
increasing DAs to meet target earnings may easily attract attention from regulators or 
other exterior institutions which eventually lead to additional monitoring mcchanisnms 
being imposed on firms. As stated by Peasnell e/ a!., (2000), it may he either inlcasihlc 
or prohibitively costly to manage earnings upwards to meet target earnings. Thus, this 
suggests a preference of Chinese listed companies to adopt a 'big bath' strategy through 
income decreasing choices to store up positive earnings for future periods (l)egeorge ei 
al., 1999; Healy, 1985) as these choices are relatively hidden frone other stakeholders. 
Secondly, a decreasing trend in EM practices in both 'SUSPI": C'I" suh-groups is 
reported. Based on the Modified Jones Model, the magnitude of' negativ c DAs of f irnms 
that `just' avoid reporting losses decreases to 0.016 by the end oi' 2006 comparing ýý ith 
0.034 in the pre-Code period. The difference is statistically significant at O. ()5 level. 
And similar results are documented for other sub-periods. The magnitude of' negative 
DAs of firms which have the objective of meeting or beating last year's net income 
reduces significantly (at 0.05 level) to 0.013 by the end of 20U(ß from 0.03O in the pre- 
Code period. While the magnitude is 0.020 and 0.021 in post-Code period (A) and (B) 
respectively, only the magnitude of 0.014 in the post-Code period (C) is significantly 
different from that in the pre-Code period at 0.10 level. 'T'hese results indicate that I : IN1 
activities decrease significantly across time. And, the period after promulgation of the 
Code is characterised by lower accrual-based EM practices in listed firms. 'I hir(liv. tile 
results reported using the L&R Model are consistent with those obtained froill tile 
Modified Jones Model suggesting two models should be viewed as Complementary 
rather than contradictory or one form can supersede the other. 
By putting all together, this analysis provides greater confidence in early results 
and strengthens the argument generated for F: M practices in Chinese listed companies. 
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Alit Shure Refbrm E fett 
Another concern in the empirical results provided is the possible effect of a program of 
converting non-tradable shares into A shares in China (know as the split share reI rm) 
that was carried out by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission at the beginning of 2005. Shang Fulin, the chief administrator of'the ('SR(' 
said on December 27,2005, the reform on non-tradable shares introduced aims at 
eliminating trading right difference between non-tradable and tradable shares. not 
floating all non-tradable shares at the stock market. As the post-Code period includes 
2005 and 2006, a sensitivity test by excluding these two years is provided to control the 
possible effect of such programme. 
The OLS regression results are provided in Table 9.8. The adjusted Rs are 
comparative with those reported in the main models. They arrange from 0.077 to 0.1 6. 
and 0.076 to 0.111 in Panel A and B respectively. All F-values are highly significant. 
Overall, the results are consistent with those of main models suggesting the robustness 
of findings obtained. In particular, the coefficient on 7'11111; is negativ c tier . 113.5 D. Is and 
Positive 
_DAS, 
while positive for Negative DA. s. And, the former t\\o are significant at 
0.01 and 0.10 level respectively. For the coefficient on dummy variable ('l )l )1:, it i, 
positive (for ABS_DAs and Positive DAs) and negative (liar . A'c-iýa! ive and 
statistically significant at the level arranged from 1% to 5°/,. LN1)1? O. -1K1) IS ti01111i1 to be 
negatively correlated with ABS _DAs 
and Positive DAs, and positively' related \ýith 
Negative DAs for the entire period in both the Modified Jones and I. & R Models. and 
the significant level arranges from 0.10 to 0.01. And such effect increases signiticantlvv, 
in the post-Code period. The negative correlation between A(! I)(Y). 1I and /'u. Nitv(- D. -fs 
increased significantly in the post-Code. Institutional shareholding is negati\cl\ and 
significantly correlated with usage of positive DAs. Controlling shareholders I'1 ý11'll 
and State-dominated firms (STATE) are found to manipulate earnings over time. 'I heir 
significant correlations in the Post-Code period indicate the inelficicncv of investor 
protection in China's stock market. 
And finally, this thesis also repeats all analyses by defining the post-('ode period 
as the years 2003 through 2006. The results (not tabulated here) are nearly sy nmtnnctric 
with those obtained from the main models. 
1 
Table 9.8.: Robustness test-using 2002 to 2004 as post-Code period 
Panel A: Discretionary accrual calculated from the Modified Jones Model 
EM Modified Jones Model- ßo+131 *TI ME+)3z *CODE+)33 *EXCOM+(34 *EXCOM *CODE+ß5 *INDBOARD 
+f36 *1 NDBOARD *CODE+ß7*AUDCOM+iß8 *AUDCOM *CODE 
+ß9*AUDCOM*CODE+J310*AUDITOR+ß11 *AUDITOR *CODE+012 *INSTITUTE 
+)3l3*INSTITUTE*CODE+)314*TOP1+315*TOP1 *CODE+(316*STATE 
+)317 *STATE*CODE+iß18 *Ln_Size+ß1q *LEVERAGE+J820 *L n_Sales 
+13321 *ST PT +/322*ISSUING+E 
ABS DAs Positive DAs Negative DAs 
Variables Coefficient (t-stat) Coefficient (t-stat) Coefficient (t-stat) 
TIME -0.088* (-1.795) -0.015*** (-2.455) 0.004 (0.881) 
CODE -0.043** (-2.324) -0.048*** (-2.820) 0.041** (1.981) 
EXCOM 0.000 (0.566) 0.000 (0.376) 0.000 (1.257) 
EXCOM*CODE 0.000 (0.533) 0.000 (-0.165) 0.000 (-1.200) 
INDBOARD -0.067* (-1.753) 0.058** (-1.941) 0.067* (1.681) 
INDBOARD*CODE -0.069** (-1.874) -0.101** (-2.156) 0.080** (1.926) 
AUDCOM -0.013 (-0.835) -0.046** 
--------- (-2.115) 0.004 (0.234) 
AUDCOM*CODE 0.014 (0.821) -0.047** (-1.958) -0.001 (-0.059) 
AUDITOR 0.006 (0.484) 0.008 (0.499) -0.012 (-0.876) 
AUDITOR*CODE -0.016 (-0.943) -0.004 (-0.191) 0.007 (0.392) 
INSTITUTE 0.036 (0.717) -0.108*** (-3.137) 0.022 (0.399) 
INSTITUTE*CODE -0.033 (-0.560) -0.119*** (-2.926) -0.020 (-0.288) 
TOP1 0.011 (0.625) 0.049** (2.138) -0.012 (0.642) 
TOPI *CODE 0.054** (2.145) 0.062* (1.716) -0.024* ( 1.884) 
STATE 0.012* (1.688) - -0.011 
--- (-0.9 
. 945) 0.010 (0.996) 
STATE*CODE 0.025** (1.958) 0.022* (1.718) 
-0.023* (-1.884) 
Ln Size -0.004 (-0.447) -0.002 (0.176) 0.017** (2.626) 
LEVERAGE 0.046*** (9.632) 0.051*** (2.930) -0.049*** (-5.633) 
Ln_Sales -0.012** (-2.140) -0.021* (-1.613) 0.037*** (5.146) 
ST PT 0.036*** (3.858) -0.011 (-0.678) -0.017*' (-1.803) 
ISSUING 0.003 (0.588) 0.012* (1.770) 0.000 (0.086) 
Intercept 0.153*** (2.789) 0.084 (1.015) -0.174*** (-4.746) 
0.0 88 0.1 68 0.1 2S 
Adjusted 0.0 77 0.1 36 0.1 08 
F-value (Pr>F) 8.095 (< 0.0001) 10.311 ( <0.0061) 11.767 ( <0.0001) 
* ** *** Denote sign ificance (2-tail ed) at 0.100,0 . 050 and 0.01 0 level, respec tively. 
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Table 9.8.: Robustness test-using 2002 to 2004 as post-Code period (continued) 
Panel B: Discretionary accrual calculated from the L&R Model 
EML&R 
Model - /3o+ß1 *TIME+132*CODE+ß3 *EXCOM+134 *EXCOM *CODE+, 35 *INDBOARD 
+ß6 *I NDBOARD *CODE+ß, *AUDCOM+/38 *AUDCOM *CODE+139 *AUDCOM *CODE 
+310*AUDITOR+/3 *AUDITOR *CODE+/312*INSTITUTE+i61 j*/NSTITUTE *CODE 
+/314*TOP1+)315*TOP1 *CODE+ß16*STATE+ß*STATE*CODE+ß1B*Ln_Size 
+ß, y*LEVERAGE+1320*Ln_Sales+1321*ST PT+1322*ISSUING+e 
ABS DAs Positive DAs Neg 
Variables Coefficient (t-stat) Coefficient (t-stat) Coeffii 
TIME -0.004* (-1.758) -0.007* (-1.831) 0.001 
CODE -0.044*** (-3.431) -0.041*** (-4.710) 0.044*' 
EXCOM 0.000 (-0.596) 0.000 (0.468) 0.000 
EXCOM*CODE 0.000 (1.558) 0.000 (-0.133) 0.000 
INDBOARD -0.042** (-2.004) -0.036** (-1.989) 0.020* 
INDBOARD*CODE -0.066*** (-3.998) -0.064*** (-3.436) 0.026* 
AUDCOM -0.008 (-0.806) -0.011* (-1.863) 0.006 
AUDCOM*CODE 0.009 (0.920) -0.017* (-1.757) 0.006 
AUDITOR 0.001 (0.096) 0.013 (1.492) -0.004 
AUDITOR*CODE -0.003 (-0.698) -0.018 (-1.395) 0.003 
INSTITUTE 0.018 (0.604) -0.105** (2.095) 0.022 
INSTITUTE*CODE -0.035 (-1.002) -0.129*** (-2.623) 0.006 
TOP1 0.000 (0.004) 0.005 (0.386) -0.01C 
TOP1*CODE 0.026** (1.997) 0.021* (1.751) -0.018 
STATE 0.001 (0.124) 0.011* (1.6998) 0.009 
STATE*CODE 0.030* (1.839) 0.016* -1- (1.671) -0.012" 
Ln_Size -0.005 (-1.408) -0.009* (-1.811) 0.000 
LEVERAGE 0.014*** (4.956) -0.005 (-0.765) -0.019' 
Ln Sales -0.039*** (-8.078) -0.009 (-0.630) 0.044*' 
ST PT -0.001 (-0.155) 0.009 (1.070) -0.016' 
ISSUING 0.006** (2.091) 0.001 (0.338) -0.006 
Intercept 0.137*** (4.218) 0.144*** (3.120) -0.101' 
R2 0.087 0.122 
Adjusted 0.076 0.097 
F-value (Pr>F) 10.030 (<0.0001) 12.869 (<0.0001) 10.0' 
* ** *** Denote signiticance (2-tailed) at 0.100,0.050 and 0.010 level, respectively. 
.............. 7tive DAs 
: ient (t-stat) 
(0.166) 
(2.119) 
(0.375) 
(-0.737) 
(1.751) 
(1.903) 
(1.003) 
(1.094) 
(-0.354) 
(0.151) 
} (0.511) 
(0.111) 
(-0.619) 
} 
(-1.908) 
(0.974) 
*f (1.955) 
(-0.005) 
( 2.056) 
(7.319) 
( 1.856) 
( 1.732) 
( 1.941) 
0.134 
0.111 
)3 (<0.0001) 
2, ) i 
9.5. Summary 
To start with, this Chapter has provided the descriptive statistics of the explawitorY and 
the control variables. By comparing the statistics in the pre-Code period with that in the 
post-Code period, the changes of a specific variable over time are well represented. The 
mean coefficient estimates of parameters calculated using the Modified Jones Model 
and L&R Model has also been demonstrated. 
For hypotheses testing, current thesis runs univariate statistical tests to examine 
the time-trend in EM metrics across the study period. In addition, a graphic analysis of 
EM trend across time is also provided. Based on both statistical and graphic results, it is 
argued that the magnitude of DAs of Chinese listed companies decreases across the 
study period. And, the reduction is more pronounced in the period aller the 
promulgation of the Code in 2002. Therefore, hypothesis l is supported. In addition. b\ 
further analysing the magnitude of mean and median between earnings-increasing 
(Positive DAs) and earnings-decreasing (Negative DAs) discretionary accruals. it is 
demonstrated that Chinese listed companies engage in larger earnings-decreasinv 
discretionary accruals are followed by smaller positive reversals. 
The impacts of the major mechanisms regarding corporate governance cntforccd 
by the Code on EM practices in Chinese listed companies are investigated hy runnin! 
the multivariate OLS regression tests. The governance mechanisms arrange trmnº the 
executive compensation to the characteristics of the controlling shareholders. In 
particular, the correlation between the natural logarithm value of cash compensation for 
the top three highest paid executives and DAs is neither statistically nor econonºieallý 
significant. This doesn't support the conjecture that tying executive eontpens, ati()n to 
firm performance in China may be regarded as an alignment mechanism as argued by 
AT. Thus, the results obtained from the multivariate regressions don't support 
hypotheses 2a and 2b. And implicitly, the results also indicate that the perti+rm, 1nce- 
based executive compensation in China may not he considered as the incentive tcº 
engage in DAs as proposed by TCE and empirical studies based on the Western 
experiences. 
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The proportion of independent non-executive directors on the hoard is reported toi 
be adversely and significantly related to the use of DAs, and such effect is increased 
significantly in the post-Code period. This suggests that these independent non- 
executives decrease the Chinese listed firms' incentives to manipulate reported earnings 
through effective monitoring. And, this effect is primarily resulted froill tile 
promulgation and enforcement of the 2002 Code. The results provide supporting 
evidence of hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
Although the establishment of audit committees and shareholding of institutional 
investors are negatively and significantly related with positive l)As. and such elicct is 
increased significantly in the post-Code period, they don't provide sufficient monitoring 
on income-decreasing choices. This reflects that lack of quality accounting 
professionals on audit committees coupled with ineffective financial infrastructures and 
smaller shareholding of institutional investors are the primary reasons fier constraining 
the effectiveness of these two governance mechanisms in China. The results could 
partially support hypotheses 4a and 4b; 5a and 5b. 
The results do not show any significant relationship bctw%ecn use ()I' III 
international reputable auditor and DAs in Chinese listed companies. I his reflects that 
replacing a Chinese local CPA firm with an international reputable audit firnt toi audit 
financial statements does not contribute to the reduction in I: M in ('hing. I he results 
don't support hypotheses 6a and 6b. 
The findings of characteristics (ownership concentration and type) o1' the largest 
shareholders in listed companies reveal that the biggest shareholders in ('himi engage in 
DAs over time, and as this effect is significantly increased in the post-('ode period, it is 
argued that, in practice, the promulgation of 2002 Code on controlling shareholders 
doesn't constrain their expropriation of minority shareholders' interests. In addition. as 
the State dominant firms engage in EM practices significantly over time, this reflects 
the inefficiency of 2002 Code on constraining opportunism behaviour of the firnns 
which are ultimately controlled by the government, thus Further illustrates in\estor legal 
protection in Chinese stock market is relatively limited. 'the hypotheses 7 and t{ are not 
supported by the findings. 
i, ), N 
The results obtained using the L&R model are consistent to those measured hv 
the Modified Jones Model. This indicates that these two models should he vvicvvcd as 
complementary rather than contradictory or one form can supersede the other. It also 
proves that the results obtained are robustness. 
At the end of the Chapter, `SUSPECT' firms are identified by sub-groupin, 11 the 
sample based on the benchmarks of avoiding losses and earnings declines. And. another 
sensitivity test is conducted by excluding 2005 and 2006 from the post-('ode period in 
order to control the effect of split share reform. Overall, the results of both additional 
tests are consistent with those of main models suggesting the robustness of findings 
obtained. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
10.1. Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis. It starts with summarising the main findings reported 
in the last chapter. Based on these findings, it illustrates the main contributions of this 
thesis. Followed by the major contributions, it highlights both the theoretical and 
managerial implications. And finally, this chapter mentions the limitations and 
suggestions for future research. 
10.2. Main Findings of the Current Thesis 
This thesis examines the trend in accrual-based earnings management (or F AI) practices 
and the impacts of the major mechanisms of corporate governance (C'(i) arranged tlon1 
the executive compensation to the characteristics of controlling shareholders on such 
practices in two contrasting governance regimes (pre- and post-C'ode periods). O' erall. 
the findings show that several major CG mechanisms enforced by C'hina's 2OO2 ('ode 
significantly contribute to the reduction of EM practices in China's listed conmpanies. it 
is indicated that good CG system constrains firms from engaging in opportunistic 
discretion. 
Firstly, by comparing discretionary accruals measured by the Modified "lunýs 
Model (Dechow et al., 1995) and the L&R Model (Larcker and Richardson. 2uu4t 
respectively after the passage of the Code with those prior to the ('ode through the 
univariate statistical tests, this thesis provides robust evidence showing that ývhile the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals is decreased over time, the reduction is more 
pronounced after the 2002 Code. In addition, by Further analysing the magnitude ý)I 
mean and median between earnings-increasing (Po. s-itive 1)As) and earnings-decreasing 
(Negative DAs) discretionary accruals, it is demonstrated that Chinese listed companies 
engage in larger earnings-decreasing discretionary accruals are followed by snl, tller 
positive reversals. One possible explanation provided is that ranipant use of, 
income-increasing discretionary accruals to meet target earnings ina\' easily attract 
attention from regulators or other exterior institutions which eventually led tu 
"17 
additional monitoring mechanisms being imposed on firms. Thus. this suggests a 
preference of listed companies to adopt a `big bath' strategy through income decreasing 
choices to store up positive earnings for future periods (Degeorge ei ul., 1999; 1lealy. 
1985) as these choices are relatively hidden from other stakeholders. 
Secondly, the impacts of the main mechanisms regarding CG which are enforced 
by the 2002 Code on EM practices are investigated by running the multivariate ()I .S 
regression tests. 
Among these CG dimensions, executive compensation is considered as an 
alignment mechanism by conjecturing that due to the lack of stock options utilikeci in 
China which have been largely blamed as the root cause of I: M practices basal on the 
Western experiences, building a more systematic and operational perlormancc-based 
compensation system advanced from the one that was totally separated lronm the 
performance in the 1980s may encourage executives to act on behalt' of shareholders 
and limit their opportunistically discretionary behaviour-EM. I Iowever, the correlation 
between the natural logarithm value of cash compensation for the top three highest paid 
executives and discretionary accruals is neither statistically nor economically siginilic, atit. 
One possible explanation is that executives of Chinese listed conmpainies, esheciallN 
those transferred from the State-owned Enterprises, usually hold certain Positions in the 
government agencies other than directorships in the listed companies. 'IIhey. thus 
concern more about their political career rather than the salaries or bonuses could he 
received from the companies (Liu and Lu, 2007). 
The proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board is reported to 
be negatively and significantly related to the use of discretionary accruals over tiiric, 
and such effect is significantly increased in the post-Code period. 1 his suggests t,,, It the 
independent non-executives decrease the incentives to manipulate reported earning s 
through effectively monitoring the listed companies. And, they are discharging their 
financial reporting responsibilities more effectively after the passage of the ('ode. 
2, ) x 
Although the establishment of audit committee on the board and shareholdings 
held by the institutional investors are negatively and significantly related with positive 
or income-increasing discretionary accruals, and such effect is increased significantly in 
the post-Code period, there is no significant correlation between these two C( I 
mechanisms with the income-decreasing discretionary accruals. From the perspective of 
audit committees, it is argued that, since income-decreasing choices to store up positive 
earnings for future periods (Degeorge et al., 1999; Healy, 1985) are relatively hidden 
comparing with aggressive income-increasing discretionary accruals. lack Of' qualified 
accounting professionals on the audit committees coupled with ineffective financial 
infrastructures (e. g., monitoring system, ethic education or training. legal in frastructiure 
and enforcement) in China (Ball ei al., 2000; Chen, 2005; Chen ei al., 2002. ('hen and 
Zhang, 2010a; La Porta et al., 2000b; Leuz et al., 2003) mainly contribute to their 
failures in detecting and mitigating income-decreasing choices in the listed companic'. 
Regarding the institutional investors, as a large amount of resources are required 
to detect and effectively reduce the income-decreasing discretionary accruals of lirný, 
which are more hidden, they only hold a fraction of shares in the listed conipanie' in, a% 
not he willingly to invest in such monitoring resources. The results also suggest the 
inefficiency of China's stock markets and the incompleteness of Chinese instit lit i(Mal 
environment. The institutional investors may find themselves in a disadvantageuuý 
position in the Chinese stock markets and concern about their \velliºre hörig 
expropriated by other controlling shareholders. They keep low shareholding and 
typically hold their shares for a short term which consequently constrain their 
motivations in monitoring activities. 
The results do not show any significant relationship hctww-Ccn use o, ), an 
international reputable auditor and discretionary accruals. It is art; ucd that 
effective institutional supporting systems such as the monitoring system, ethic e(ItIcatiun 
or training, legal infrastructure and enforcement (e. g., Ball el al., 200O: ('hen, 2005: I 
,a 
Porta et al., 2000b; Leuz et al., 2003), the quality of audit perlormed by the same 
2, ), 1 
auditor, even if the international reputable ones such as the Big 4. may he dili: rent from 
it appears in a well-developed institutional system. 
And finally, the results of the characteristics (ownership concentration and t\pe) 
of the largest shareholders in China's listed companies are reported. In particular. 
controlling shareholders in general manipulate reported earnings through discretionarA 
accruals over time. And, by comparing discretionary accruals of the State-controlledI 
firms with those of the privately-owned companies, the State-controlled firms 
significantly engages in discretionary accruals over the study period. And. such ellect is 
increased significantly in the post-Code period. Overall, the results indicate that the 
promulgation of 2002 Code on controlling shareholders and State domination doesn't 
constrain their opportunistic behaviours through expropriating minority shareholders' 
interests. Such inefficiency of 2002 Code illustrates the investor protection in Chinese 
stock markets is not enhanced after the Code, and it is relatively limited on mitigating 
EM practices. 
10.3. Contributions of the Current Thesis 
Theoretically, while Eisenhardt (1989) and Lambert (2001) argue that Agency I heor' 
(AT) has been one of the most important theoretical paradigms applied in ('(i during the 
last 20 years, Marcher and Richman (2006) in a review of"transaction ('ost I.: cunwnfics 
(TCE) and its applications find fewer literature has actually investigated the applications 
of TCE particularly to empirical issues between CG and F. M. This thesis contributes to 
the literature by applying both AT and TCE to the theoretical f'ramcwork tiºr ('(i and IAJ 
research in the Chinese setting. Consistent with both Al' and 'l ('I':. the findings indicate 
that improvements of CG system can be seen as the efforts to minimise I": M practices in 
China. Among the monitoring mechanisms highlighted by both tlheor-ICS, board 
independence, audit committee, and institutional investors do play important notes in 
detecting and mitigating EM practices to certain extent in China's listed coompanies, 
especially in the period after the Code. In contrast to the theories, executive 
; oo 
compensation and statutory auditor seem to be less effective in mitigating F. M practices 
in China's listed companies. For executive compensation, it may not be regarded as an 
effective alignment mechanism as proposed by AT, neither be treated as an incentive of 
engaging in EM practices proposed by TCE. 
Empirically, the current thesis adds to the literature by studying the consequences 
of the resulting changes with regard to CG and EM after the Code. In brict'. the findings 
indicate EM practices decrease significantly after the Code and several C(i mechanisms 
(e. g., independent non-executives, audit committee, institutional investors) cnt'orccd bv 
the Code contribute to such effect. 
Methodologically, as mentioned earlier, the current thesis uses two models to 
obtain discretionary accruals: Modified Jones Model and L&R Model. While the former 
is widely used in the literature (e. g., Cohen et al., 2008; Ding ei al., 2007: I. eur. e-1 aal 
2003; Peasnell el al., 2005; Xie ei al., 2003), the latter is introduced to control the 
misclassification issues in the Modified Jones Model, such as the extreme performance 
and growth of firms (Dechow et al., 1995; Gordon ef al., 2004; McNichols. 2000). This 
thesis contributes to the accounting research by arguing that these two models should he 
viewed as complementary rather than contradictory or one lorm can supersede the oils r, 
as the results obtained from both models are nearly symmetric. 
10.4. Implications of the Findings 
10.4.1. Theoretical Implications 
Theoretically, AT examines contract predominately from an ex wUe incenti,, lignment 
point of view while TCE is more concerned with crafting ex post go\ern, ance structure', 
within which the integrity of contract is decided. Despite such a (li11crciice, hcºth ißt tIicni 
provide similar arguments with regard to EM practices and the numnituring 
mechanisms. 
lol 
In brief, AT argues that due to the problems of moral hazards and ad%er, e 
selection that are originated from the separation of decision management and control. 
managers who do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions nma1% 
engage in EM to maximise their own profits and to minimise the bonding and 
monitoring costs imposed on them by misleading shareholders about the underk inz 
firms' performance. TCE argues that managers and shareholders are hilatcralk 
dependent according to high level of human specific asset and monetary -hand specific 
asset (to pay the agent for services provided) respectively. In such an asset-specific 
transaction, due to the issues of uncertainty coupled with opportunism. managen lis 
engage in EM in order to gain private benefits and to minimise the costs related to the 
premature transaction termination by artificially dressing up their firms' apparent 
performance. In order to mitigate such opportunistically discretionary hcha\ ion s. both 
theories highlight the role played by monitoring governance. For instance, the hoard) 
that is composed of a majority of independent non-executives could he regarded as a 
major control instrument. Both the audit committee composed of outside dire tors and 
the accredited auditing firm can mitigate opportunistically discretiunarý helms tours in 
information disclosure. And, corporate monitoring conducted by institutional in\e", tur, 
can force managers to focus more on corporate performance and less on opportunistic or 
self-serving behaviours. 
The findings of the current thesis indicate that while cxccuti\e compen. ", itio n a, ;In 
incentive alignment mechanism may not he effective as mangers concern more , ºI'otit 
their political career in China, the major monitoring ntechanisnºs indepý ndent 
non-executives, audit committee, and institutional investors) proposed h\ both theories 
do constrain EM practices to certain extent. 'T'hus, one important theoretical implication 
of'the findings is that, as AT and TCf are complementary theories although the l6r11ner 
is specialised on structuring the contractual relation between the principal and agent to 
provide appropriate incentives ex ante and the latter has advantage of fiºcttsing on the 
monitoring and control for agency problem during the contract execution. a theoretical 
framework by incorporating TCE with AT should he robust in iiivestipill ittp, tlhe 
m? 
relationships between CG and EM in China's stock markets. 
10.4.2. Managerial implications 
The findings also provide some insightful implications to investors. stock 111,11-Let 
regulators and policy makers respectively. 
The findings indicate that China's listed companies engage in IN practices. and 
more importantly, listed companies seem to adopt a 'big bath' strategy through 
income-decreasing choices which are relatively hidden. Thus. before making the 
investment decisions, investors need to check firms' financial statements with great 
caution. The findings of this thesis put forward some indications which may he hclpl, ul 
to detect EM activities: (1) the fewer the independent non-executives served on the 
boards coupled with non-existence of audit committee the higher the possihilitý of the 
companies to manipulate earnings; (2) the lower the level of institutional shareholding 
in the companies the higher the possibility of the companies to manipulate earnings: (3) 
the higher the level of shareholding concentration especially in hands of the State the 
higher the possibility of the companies to manipulate earnings: (4) poorly-performed 
and highly-leveraged companies tend to manipulate earnings: and (5) listed coýmpanie, 
have the incentive to manipulate earnings in order to avoid being dc-listed and issue 
additional shares. 
The findings also indicate that the independent non-executives decrease the 
incentives to manipulate reported earnings through effectively monitoring the listed 
companies, especially after the promulgation of the 2002 ('ode. In order to ensure their 
constant monitoring, the security market regulators need to further entree more 
transparent compliance with the Code. And also, they need to consider extending t'c ; 
Code to enforce the role of independent non-executive directors by clearly stating their 
tenture, number of positions could be held either inside (as indepefJent no, n-executives 
of firms) or outside (as executives of other firms), their payment structure, and so tiýrth. 
il li 
In addition, the findings indicate that lack of qualified accounting professionals on 
the audit committee coupled with ineffective financial infrastructures (e. g.. monitoring 
system, legal infrastructure and enforcement) in China constrain it from detecting and 
mitigating EM practices to certain extent. The Chinese accounting prolessionals, 
especially those who serve on the audit committee, need some in-depth training in 
accounting expertise in order to improve their abilities of providing high glualit\ 
auditing so that greater oversight can be provided. Such training may need to he specific 
on EM and especially how to accurately detect and eftectively mitigate the 
income-decreasing choices. Through such training, the auditing function of audit 
committee can be improved. The regulators also need to strengthen the requirements 
with regard to audit committee in the CG Code. Such as. it should require the audit 
committee to be entirely composed of independent non-executives (instead of' nmajority 
as currently stated). It should require the majority of the non-executives served on the 
committee to have professional accounting and financial knowledge (instead of at least 
one as currently stated). And, an establishment of a code ot'practice particularly to audit 
committee also promote and enforce its role in CG. 
The findings further indicate that international reputable auditors do not 
outperform their Chinese local CPAs with regard to mitigating I.: M hraetieeý. IIhe 
security market regulators need to he cautious about their strategy of promoting the 
participation of the international audit firms (such as the Rig 4). This is partieul, urIN true 
when high-profile international firms charge a much higher ice than their Chinese local 
counterpart, but not necessarily help China improve its monitoring s\ steam. 
And finally, the findings indicate that investor protection cºgrinNt rritrulliiit' 
shareholders' expropriations through EM at the expense of the minority sharehuldcrs in 
China's stock markets is still relatively weak. Institutional investors themseI e' arc 
minority shareholders as their average shareholding is around ( by the end rrl 2006, 
they may find themselves in a disadvantageous position in the ('hinese stuck markets 
and concern about their welfare being expropriated by other controllint: sh. ºrch, )I(Icrs. 
They keep low shareholding and typically hold their shares for a short term and are less 
likely to invest in large amount of resources required for positive monitoring as other 
small and passive shareholders may free ride the resulted benefits. ('onsequcntl\. the 
weak investor protection reduces their motivations in mitigating [M practices to certain 
extent. The policy makers need to consider improving the legal environment so as tu+ 
make expropriation of minority shareholders more difticult. Indeed. they need to 
consider legal reforms more radical in nature, and give shareholders explicit rights to 
either prevent expropriation or seek remedy when it occurs, Such as the opportunit\ to 
sue the controlling shareholders for oppressive conduct. 
10.5. Limitations and Future Research 
With regard to the results, the establishment of the audit committee and the 
shareholdings held by the institutional investors are signilicantly correlated vv ith 
income-increasing discretionary accruals. However, the correlations are insipnific"ant 
when taking the earning-decreasing discretionary accruals into consideration.: 11thoL h 
the relevant explanations have been provided, it will still be v'erv interesting ii'the future 
research can break-down the earning-decreasing discretionary accruals into ddiIlerent 
items and examine the impacts of these two mechanisms on each specific itel . And . as 
indicated by the results, although the level of executive cumpcnsation is reported tO he 
neither statistically nor economically related to F: M practices in ('hin;,. it \ý ill he er\ 
interesting in the future research to identify the determinants of executive cO I,,, )e"i», itiOI 
and investigate the impacts of those determinant factors on IN practices. 
While the findings provide evidence suggesting that the independent diirect()r, in 
the board do significantly mitigate the level of IN in ('hina. their tinancial'accountilip 
accounting background may have some impacts. It will he x'ery interesting it the future 
research can partition firms according to the number of independent directors v hýý 11; 1\ 
the financial/accounting background on the hoard (e. g. more \s. fc\% incnrhe rý ý\ ith 
ills 
financial/accounting background), and compare the corresponding impacts on I. Al 
practices. 
Following the similar studies on investigating specific-tine effects (('ehen Ci at.. 
2008; Peasnell ef al., 2000), OLS regression model (the justification oi' model 
estimation is provided in Chapter 8) is used by this thesis. I lowever. as the C'hina's 2002 
Code may have some lagged impacts on both EM practices and (. '(i it will he 'Cr\ 
interesting if the future research can use the dynamic or lagged regression models toi 
investigate the impacts of the Code. 
Im, 
NOTES: 
r By following most of Williamson's works, this study also sets the frequency of' 
transactions as recurrent to simplify the description. However, an interesting analysis 
between occasional and recurrent frequency can also be found in Williamson. 1970. 
pp. 246-247. 
2 "China's top legislature adopts new laws, approves ministers nomination, expels 
corrupt deputies", 
http: //fec2. motcom. gov. cn/aarticle/news/200708/20070805048180. htmI. 
3A trade secret is a formula, practice, process, design, instrument, pattern, or 
compilation of information which is not generally known or reasonably ascertainable. 
by which a business can obtain an economic advantage over competitors or customers. 
In some jurisdictions, such secrets are referred to as "confidential information" or- 
"classified information" (http: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Trade secret). 
4 This argument is related to the issues of asymmetric information and disclosure. 
however it is beyond the scope of the current study. More information can he t'oundi in 
Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973), Stiglitz and Rothschild (1976). Boyer and 
Ortiz-Molina (2008), and etc. 
5 By following the argument of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (199 3.1994. 
2004b), the term monitoring that is used in this paper includes more than just 
measuring or observing the behaviour of the agent. It includes eitorts on the part (it' 
the principal to `control' the behaviour of the agent through budget restrictions, 
compensation policies, operating rules, etc. 
6 In their paper of The nature of man, Jensen and Meckling (1994) make a cor»p, rrisrr 
of the REMM model with the other four different models (i. e. the I": conomic Model. 
the sociological Model, the Psychological Model, and the Political Model) in 
demonstrating human behaviours. And, they conclude that the explanatory po\\cr of' 
REMM dominates that of all the other models summarised. IRI: MM incorpoI. zlle, the 
best of each of these models. 
According to Padilla (2002), risk-averse is necessarily related to the fäct that 
individuals are not evolving in a world of perfect and complete information. And. rhw" 
literature usually assumes that the principal is risk-neutral while the agent is 
risk-averse. 
8 More examples of physician and patient, insurer and insured, and borrower and 
lender can be found in Padilla's work (2004), p. 7. 
9 Several researchers do provide the comprehensive comparison of these two niodcls 
of board structure, such as Haassen, G. F. (2002), Mallira (2007), Monks and Ntirto 
(2008), Stiles and Taylor (2001). 
10 Although the average number of shares held by institutional investors increases 
approximately to 6% in 2006 from 2.5% in 1995 (CSR('. 2000), it is still rclati\cI\ 
low compared to the shares held by the largest shareholders in listed con1hariies. 
r "State share reform doesn't mean `selling out"', 
http: //www. chinadaily. com. cn/bizchina/2005-06/27/contcnt 54.1172. htrn. 
12 Online at: http: //www. cs. com. cn/ztbd/02/14/t20040804 116023. htr». 
ill? 
13 Online at: http: //www. cs. com. ca/ztbd/01/15/t200604l3_902I02. htm. 
14 The perspectives of EM can be considered from different points of view. For 
examples, rather than the opportunistic and informative perspectives. Scott (2OO5 º 
views EM from the contracting and financial reporting perspectives. 
15 According to Fama and Jensen (1983b), the decision process has four steps: 
initiation, ratification, implementation, and monitoring. Initiation and implementation 
of decisions are allocated to the agents (decision management). The term decision 
control includes the ratification and monitoring of decisions (normally done by 
principals). 
16 Agency costs are defined as the sum of (1) the monitoring expenditures of the 
principal, (2) the bonding costs by the agent, and (3) the residual loss. Residual loss 
is the reduction in the value of the firm that obtains when the entrepreneur dilutes his 
ownership. The shift out of profits and into managerial discretion induced by the 
dilution of ownership is responsible for this loss. (Fama and Jensen, 1983b.. Icnsen. 
2000). 
17 As argued by Brav et al., (2005), it has been well-known that managers are 
reluctant to cut dividends. It is mainly consistent with the large negative stock price 
reactions observed around the announcement of dividend cuts. 
18 For an analysis of these components, see Mallin (2007), pp. 143-147. Murphy 
(1999), pp. 9-25. 
19 Using the model of Black and Scholes (1973), option intensity is measured as the 
change in the value of the executive's option portfolio from a $1000 change in the 
value of the firm's equity. Refer to Denis et al., (2006) pp. 476-478 for an analesis Mn 
measuring option intensity. 
20 In the late 1970s, Watts and Zimmerman laid the foundations for Positive 
Accounting "Theory which aims to explain and predict accounting practice. Within the 
Positive Accounting literature, four major hypotheses have been included: the bonus 
plan hypothesis, the debt equity hypothesis, the income smoothing hypothesis. and the 
political costs hypothesis. See Kothari (2001) for more details about the 1'ositi\ c 
Accounting Theory. 
21 Usually, a specific regulation has the impacts on the whole society. For instance. the 
anti-dumping law imposes countervailing duties on foreign importers can bring 
important benefits to domestic producers such as the ability to raise prices, production 
and sales; to improve their financial condition; and to maintain employment. on the 
other hand, the domestic customers may suffer from such regulations by pay more on 
the same products than before. 
22 Firms in electronic industry of Taiwan face strong product competition and require 
professional management teams to be competitive. Typically, the institution, rl 
ownership dominates the ownership of board of electronic firms leading to less se\ crrc 
agency problem in electronic firms in Taiwan; thus lower NM (Kao and ('hen. 2004, 
pp. 104-105). 
23 The study is based on reported results as of the companies' annual reports for 2002. 
Needless to say, a sequence in time does not establish causation. I Inl'ortunateiv. tile 
authors do not have a control group of companies the have not introduced 
WX 
independent directors, thus leaving open possibility that the performance of ma ny 
companies may have suffered simply due to economic conditions. 
24 For convenience I use the term Big 4 auditor to identify the large international audit 
firm networks. Some of the studies I refer to were conducted before the mergers 
resulted into a reduction to four international audit networks. 
25 The six countries include Belgium, Finland, France, Netherlands, Spain. and l'nited 
Kingdom. 
26 An index aggregating shareholder rights which they label as "antidirector rights. '" 
The index is formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail 
their proxy vote to the firm; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares 
prior to General Shareholders Meetings; (3) cumulative voting or proportional 
representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed 
minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that 
entitles a shareholder to call an Extraordinary Shareholders Meeting is less than or 
equal to 10 percent; or (6) shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can oil I% he 
waived by a shareholders vote. The index ranges from 0 to 6. Source: La Porta ei ul., 
(1998,1999). 
27 Eight countries (cities) are composed of Hong Kong (China), Indonesia. Japan, 
Korea, Rep. of, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and 'T'hailand. 
28 Incentive effect is related to the concept of large shareholders have strong 
incentives to maximize their firms' value and are able to collect inli rmation and 
oversee managers, and so can help overcome the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers. On the other hand, entrenchment effect is more 
considering with the notion of large investors may represent their o\\n interests. 
which need not coincide with the interests of other investors in the firm. or \%ith the 
interests of employees and managers (Claessens ei al., 2002). 
29 Nine countries (cities) are composed of Hong Kong (China), India. Indonesia. 
Korea, Rep. of, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore. Taiwan, and Thailand. 
30 Source: Chinese stock market database of Wind. net Co. Ltd 
31 Source: Chinese stock market database of Wind. net Co. Ltd (ww% 
32 For instance, current Chinese securities laws do not allow proportionate legal 
enforcement. Regulators can only take extreme actions (prison sentences or \\, rr, ºips): 
they cannot impose moderate penalties (Liu and Lu, 2007, p. 995). 
33 Four different types of shareholder proposals examined: (1) external corporate 
control market issues; (2) internal corporate governance issues', (3) 
compensation-related issues; (4) other miscellaneous, (5) mixed issues. 
34 In the study of Ho and Wang (2001), only I H-share Chinese companny responded to 
their questionnaires; the rest are either Hong Kong firms or the forcign firms. And. 
Chen and Zhang (2010a) only study 103 B-share Chinese companies, given the total 
number of listed firms in China is 1,488 by the end of 2007. 
35 According to Chen ei al., (1999), as a result of economic reform aimed at rehuildint 
a market economy, China undertook far-reaching changes to its accounting System ill 
the late 1980s and 1990s. In 1992, there was a nationwide campaign aimed at aligning 
China's accounting practices with internationally accepted practices, The slogan of the 
; o') 
campaign was set as "connecting the track with international practices". For more 
details of accounting changes, refer to Chen et al., (1999, p. 93). More recently. a 
special government policy implemented by the CSRC in 2001 that prohibited a firm's 
management from providing different accounting estimates based on its Chinese 
GAAP-based reports and its IFRS-based reports for the same business transactions 
and events. For more details of this policy, refer to Chen and Cheng (2007). ('hen and 
Zhang (2010a). 
37 The detailed analyses can be found at the Gujarati (2003) Ch. 10---Multicollinearjty 
(pp. 341-375), Ch. 11-I leteroscedasticity (pp. 387-439), Ch. I2-Autocorrelation (pp. 
441-504), Ch. 13-Misspecification (pp. 506-559), and Greene (2003) Ch. ) K 
10-Multicollinearity, Ch. II -Heteroscedasticity, Ch. I2--Autocorrelation. 
Ch. 21-Misspccification. 
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